Undecidable Decisions: Rationality Limits and Decision-making Heuristics

In this article the theoretic evolution and the empirical-experimental efforts that have led to the affirmation of the bounded/procedural rationality paradigm are discussed. Moreover, the debate on supporters of the “optimization” approach and supporters of the “bounded/procedural rationality” approach is traced, highlighting the irreconcilability of these two approaches and, in retort, a solid defense against a merely “reductionist” attempt of the innovative context of the Simonian theory. Critically going over the debate on decision dynamics, it becomes clear how, due to the uncertain nature of rational processes, it is impossible to establish the decision-making best way. The imperfect character of individual choice is explained by how the decider identifies a solution that appears satisfying in that moment due to cognitive and temporal limits.     

How to Make Decisions in An Uncertain World: Heuristics,Biases, and Risk Perception

From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. There are factors that, day by day, represent significant obstacles to decision making.     

The distribution matters: two types of sample-size tasks

Different studies on how well people take sample size into account have found a wide range of solution rates. In a recent review, Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1997) suggested that a substantial part of the variation in results can be explained by the fact that experimenters have used two different types of sample-size tasks, one involving frequency distributions and the other sampling distributions. This suggestion rested on an analysis of studies that, with one exception, did not systematically manipulate type of distribution. In the research reported in this paper, well-known sample-size tasks were used to examine the hypothesis that frequency distribution versions of sample-size tasks yield higher solution rates than corresponding sampling distribution versions. In Study 1, a substantial difference between solution rates for the two types of task was found. Study 2 replicated this finding and ruled out an alternative explanation for it, namely, that the solution rate for sampling distribution tasks was lower because the information they contained was harder to extract than that in frequency distribution tasks. Finally, in Study 3 an attempt was made to reduce the gap between the solution rates for the two types of tasks by giving participants as many hints as possible for solving a sampling distribution task. Even with hints, the gap in performance remained. A new computational model of statistical reasoning specifies cognitive processes that might explain why people are better at solving frequency than sampling distribution tasks. Copyright© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between anomalistic belief,misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy

Abstract

A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.     

Illusory Control and Motives for Control: The Role of Connection and Intentionality

An experiment was done to examine the control heuristic perspective on illusory control and the effects of motives on control judgments, using a computer task similar to the light onset task used in previous research. Desire for the outcome and reinforcement were manipulated. As predicted from a control heuristic perspective, the effect of level of reinforcement on judgments of personal control was mediated by the measure of perceived connection: the perception of the number of positive confirming cases. Motives increased illusions of control, but only in the high reinforcement condition. A mediational analysis that examined how motives affect control judgments found that when the motive to get the outcomes was high, participants had higher estimates of having acted intentionally and these estimates partially mediated the relationship between the motivation manipulation and judgments of control. It appears that perceptions of connection mediate the relationship between reinforcement and illusory control, while judgments of intentionality partially mediate the effect of motives for control and illusory control.     

Age and probabilistic reasoning: Biases in conjunctive,disjunctive and Bayesian judgements in early and late adulthood

Probabilistic reasoning plays an essential part in many aspects of our daily routine and it has been argued that as we grow older, the need to make judgements under uncertainty becomes increasingly important. Two studies were conducted to establish whether the propensity to commit probabilistic reasoning errors increased with age. Young (aged 16–24), middle aged (25–54), and older persons (55 years and above) were included. Study 1 revealed systematic biases and errors across a range of judgement tasks. However, no evidence of any age effect in Bayesian inference, the incidence of the conjunction fallacy, or in the number of disjunction errors was found. The results obtained in Study 1 were replicated in Study 2, where the potential mediating role of working memory processes and intellectual capacity were explicitly assessed. While some aspects of probabilistic reasoning performance were correlated with measures of intelligence and working memory functioning among young adults, this was much less evident in older persons. The present findings are discussed in relation to the evolution of the dualistic heuristic–analytical system over the adult lifespan. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chances and frequencies in probabilistic reasoning: rejoinder to Hoffrage,Gigerenzer, Krauss,and Martignon

Do individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type of data in order to draw correct inferences about uncertain events? Girotto and Gonzalez (Cognition 78 (2001) 247) showed that naive individuals solve frequency as well as probability problems, when they reason extensionally, in particular when probabilities are represented by numbers of chances. Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon (Cognition 84 (2002) 343) argued that numbers of chances are natural frequencies disguised as probabilities, though lacking the properties of true probabilities. They concluded that we failed to demonstrate that naive individuals can deal with true probabilities as opposed to natural frequencies. In this paper, we demonstrate that numbers of chances do represent probabilities, and that naive individuals do not confuse numbers of chances with frequencies. We conclude that there is no evidence for the claim that natural frequencies have a special cognitive status, and the evolutionary argument that the human mind is unable to deal with probabilities.     

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.     

Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity,instructions, thinking styles,and relevant knowledge

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.     

Probabilistic reasoning in prediction and diagnosis: Effects of problem type,response mode,and individual differences

In prediction, subset relations require that the probability of conjoined events is never higher than that of constituent events. However, people's judgments regularly violate this principle, producing conjunction errors. In diagnosis, the probability of a hypothesis normatively is often higher for conjoined cues. An online survey used a within‐subjects design to explore the degree to which participants (n = 347) differentiated diagnosis and prediction using matched scenarios and both choice and estimation responses. Conjunctions were judged more probable than a constituent in diagnosis (76%) more often than prediction (64%) and in choice (84%) more often than direct estimation (57%), with no interaction of type of task and response mode. Correlation, regression, and path analyses were used to determine the relationships among individual difference variables and the diagnosis and prediction tasks. Among the correlation findings was that time spent on the task predicted higher conjunction probabilities in diagnosis but not prediction and that class inclusion errors predicted increased conjunction errors in choice but not estimation. Need for cognition and numeracy were only minimally related to reasoning about conjunctions. Results are consistent with the idea that people may misapply diagnostic reasoning to the prediction task and consequently commit the conjunction error. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The interactive effects of age,education, and BMI on cognitive functioning

We examined the moderating effects of age and cognitive reserve on the relationship between body mass index (BMI) and processing speed, executive function, and working memory based on the literature suggesting that obese individuals perform more poorly on measures of these abilities. Fifty-six healthy, dementia-free community-dwelling older (mean age 65.72 ± 7.40) and younger (mean age 21.10 ± 2.33) adults completed a neuropsychological battery and reported height and weight. Mixed effects models were used to evaluate the interactive effects of age, education (a proxy for cognitive reserve), and BMI on cognitive scores. Higher education was protective for executive deficits in younger, but not older adults. Age differences in executive functions were reduced at higher education levels but increased in individuals with higher BMI. Results suggest the inter-relationships between cognitive reserve – as measured by education – and BMI differ across age, and that obesity may accelerate the cognitive aging process.     

How to change it: modes of engagement,rationality, and stance voluntarism

We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within the framework of other constraints, e.g., beliefs, one has) also maximizes one’s rationality.     

Paranormal belief and errors of probabilistic reasoning: The role of constituent conditional relatedness in believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research are discussed.     

Violent video games exposure and aggression: The role of moral disengagement,anger, hostility,and disinhibition

Based on the General Aggression Model (GAM), the current study investigated the interactive effect of personal factors (e.g., sensation-seeking) and situational factors (e.g., violent video games exposure [VVGE]) on the trait aggressive behavior, and the mediating role of individual difference trait (e.g., moral disengagement, anger, and hostility). We recruited 547 undergraduates (48.45% male) from five Chinese universities. The results showed that VVGE was positively associated with moral disengagement, disinhibition, and the four aggressive traits (physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger, and hostility), which were positively associated with each other. Moral disengagement was positively associated with both the disinhibition and the four aggressive traits. Disinhibition was positively associated with the four aggressive traits as well. When controlled for gender, moral disengagement, anger, and hostility wholly mediated the relationship between VVGE and aggression, but the moderation effect of disinhibition was not significant. These findings support the framework of GAM and indicate that moral disengagement, anger, and hostility may be the factors that increase the risk of a higher level of aggression following repeated exposure to violent video games.     

Gross情绪调节模型及对心理健康的影响

Gross的情绪调节理论指出,在情绪发生过程中的情绪调节主要有情景选择、情景修正、注意分配、认知改变和反应调整五个方面。其中情景选择、情景修正、注意分配、认知改变是在情绪反应趋势形成之前发生,属于先行关注情绪调节;反应调整是在情景反应形成之后发生,属于反应关注情绪调节。同时Gross还提出了两种最常用的情绪调节策略——认知重评和表达抑制,并分析了它们对心理健康的影响。     

From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past,present, and future of hot hand research

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning.     

The structure of working memory and how it relates to intelligence in children

This study explored the structure of working memory, and its relationship with intelligence in 176 typically-developing children in the 4th and 5th grades at school. Different measures of working memory (WM), and intelligence (g) were administered. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that WM involves an attentional control system and storage aspects that rely on domain-specific verbal (STM-V) and visuospatial (STM-VS) resources. The structural equation models showed that WM predicts a large portion (66%) of the variance in g, confirming that the two constructs are separable but closely related in young children. Findings also showed that only WM and STM-VS are significantly related to g, while the contribution of STM-V is moderate. Theoretical implications for the relationship between WM and g are discussed.