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Joaquín Barutta Pía Aravena Agustín Ibáñez 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(2):176-183
In a recent paper called To think human out of the machine paradigm, it is stated that psychological science operates within a machine paradigm that is committed to mechanical causality. In
addition, it is emphasizes the epistemological and methodological limitations of explanations based in deterministic mechanics
and instead argues for the need of an ‘organic paradigm’ that takes into consideration psychological processes such as subjectivity,
inter-subjectivity, and agency. Although there is no doubt that much psychological science has operated under a machine paradigm,
we argue that recent psychological research is pursued using a wide variety of approaches and with an absence of a partially
integrated meta-theoretical corpus. The present situation looks more like a Tower of Babel of epistemological approaches and
empirical programs. The reconsideration of the organic paradigm and an explicitly addressed epistemological framework could
constitute a step forward and lead to an explanatory pluralism built on greater dialogue within the psychological sciences. 相似文献
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Mary Tiles 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):525-543
Bruno Latour, as part of his advocacy of science studies urges us to move beyond what he calls ‘the Modernist Settlement’
that, among other things, separated science from politics and subject from object. As part of this project he has frequently
called for the abolition of epistemology, including quite specifically the historical epistemology/epistemological history
of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. Pierre Bourdieu, on the other hand, deploys the resources of historical epistemology,
to dismiss Latour’s science studies. After examining the charges against historical epistemology and their rebuttal, I rule
in favor of the defense. However, I also suggest that Latour raises genuine concerns about how to equip ourselves to tackle
problems such as those associated with climate change; these are problems that require engagement with the politics of nature,
with the politics of the sciences of nature and with the epistemological challenges associated with the need to deploy multiple
disciplines in the service of complex, practical, policy-relevant problem solving. 相似文献
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Alan W. Richardson 《Topoi》2003,22(1):55-67
It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists
argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such
accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising
the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned
not simply the place of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is
the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience,
one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second
episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each
case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call
for logical methods in epistemology.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Barbara Forrest 《Synthese》2011,178(2):331-379
Intelligent design creationism (ID) is a religious belief requiring a supernatural creator’s interventions in the natural
order. ID thus brings with it, as does supernatural theism by its nature, intractable epistemological difficulties. Despite
these difficulties and despite ID’s defeat in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005), ID creationists’ continuing efforts to promote the teaching of ID in public school science classrooms threaten both
science education and the separation of church and state guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. I examine the ID movement’s
failure to provide either a methodology or a functional epistemology to support their supernaturalism, a deficiency that consequently
leaves them without epistemic support for their creationist claims. My examination focuses primarily on ID supporter Francis
Beckwith, whose published defenses of teaching ID, as well as his other relevant publications concerning education, law, and
public policy, have been largely exempt from critical scrutiny. Beckwith’s work exhibits the epistemological deficiencies
of the supernaturally grounded views of his ID associates and of supernaturalists in general. I preface my examination of
Beckwith’s arguments with (1) philosopher of science Susan Haack’s clarification of the established naturalistic methodology
and epistemology of science and (2) discussions of the views of Beckwith’s ID associates Phillip Johnson and William Dembski.
Finally, I critique the religious exclusionism that Beckwith shares with his ID associates and the implications of his exclusionism
for public policy. 相似文献
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Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and
some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist
theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology,
which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really
does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with
both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist
aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods.
This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve
epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational
concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. 相似文献
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Jacqueline Feldman 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1-2):133-143
Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, the epistemology of social sciences has oscillated from aiming at the classical model of scientificity to emphasizing its own specificities. We argue here that the existence of unambiguous, well defined objects has allowed discoveries and cumulativity in the natural sciences. Whereas, in the social sciences, the term is most often used in a metaphorical meaning, as it represents a basically fluid and changing reality. Its apprehension partly depends on the emotional/intellectual identity of the researcher, which makes it difficult to achieve a full consensus. Yet, beside real, natural or created objects, we do find structures, regularities and objectivations in society. 相似文献
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Herkert JR 《Science and engineering ethics》2001,7(3):403-414
Three frames of reference for engineering ethics are discussed—individual, professional and social—which can be further broken
down into “microethics” concerned with individuals and the internal relations of the engineering profession and “macroethics”
referring to the collective social responsibility of the engineering profession and to societal decisions about technology.
Few attempts have been made at integrating microethical and macroethical approaches to engineering ethics. The approach suggested
here is to focus on the role of professional engineering societies in linking individual and professional ethics and in linking
professional and social ethics. A research program is outlined using ethics support as an example of the former, and the issuance
of position statements on product liability as an example of the latter.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on Technology and Society 2000 (ISTAS 2000),
Rome, Italy, 7 September 2000.
Joseph R. Herkert directs a dual-degree program in engineering and humanities/social sciences and is editor of Social, Ethical, and Policy Implications of Engineering (Wiley/IEEE Press). 相似文献
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William Grassie 《Zygon》1996,31(2):285-304
Abstract. This article is a close reading of two essays by Donna Haraway on feminist philosophy, the biophysical sciences, and critical social theory. Haraway's strong social constructionist approach to science is criticized by colleague Sandra Harding, resulting in an epistemological reconceptualization of objectivity by Haraway. Haraway's notion of “situated knowledges” provides a workable epistemology for all social and biophysical sciences, while inviting the reintegration of religions as critical conversation partners in an emancipatory hermeneutics of nature, culture, and technology. 相似文献
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Sacha Loeve 《Nanoethics》2011,5(2):203-222
This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical approach rather than with an epistemological
critique. For this aim, I propose a ‘techno-aesthetical’ approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform
the logic of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist philosophy,
the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut distinction between image-as-representation and
other modes of existence of images, such as the one of ‘imaginaction’ that I draw from a comparison between far-field and near-field microscopies. Once this regime of imaginaction is distinguished
from representation, I focus on nanotechnological percepts and argue that they follow a transmodal logic. I then draw the implications of this enquiry in terms of a new sensible condition that changes the way we think of non-living objects. Finally, I conclude that if techno-aesthetics dares to posit and articulate
sensibility beyond the privileged sphere of subject/object relationships, it simultaneously engages us to consider the political
character of our responsibilities towards the design of nano-engineered sensorial spaces. 相似文献
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Middle Eastern (Omani) and Western (U.S.) students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in the sciences were compared on four
dimensions of personal epistemology proposed by Hofer and Pintrich (Review of Educational Research (1997), 67, 88–140). As predicted, given their experiences with comparatively traditional political and religious institutions, Omani
more so than U.S. college students were more likely to accept scientific authorities as the basis of scientific truth. Furthermore,
Omani men were more accepting of authorities than were Omani women, but there was no gender difference among U.S. students.
Omani more than U.S. students also believed that knowledge in the sciences was simpler and more certain, which is consistent
with comparisons between U.S. and Asian students (e.g., Qian & Pan, 2002, A comparision of epistemological beliefs and learning
from science text between American and Chinese high school students. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistomology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 365–385), Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum). Students in the two countries did not differ, however, in whether their beliefs were
based on personal opinions versus systematic evidence. Suggestions for further research included directly assessing experiences
with, and attitudes toward, authorities in academic and other areas of students’ lives. 相似文献
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Ron Amundson 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(3):333-344
Philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined philosophers often hold that the substantive discoveries of psychology can provide an empirical foundation for epistemology. In this paper it is argued that the ambition to found epistemology empirically faces certain unnoticed difficulties. Empirical theories concerned with knowledge‐gaining abilities have been historically associated with specific epistemological views such that the epistemology gives preferential support to the substantive theory, while the theory empirically supports the epistemology. Theories attribute to the subject just those epistemic abilities which associated epistemologies attribute to the scientist. The concept of epistemological significance is introduced as the significance a psychological theory can have for modifying the epistemological suppositions with which the theory was originally associated. Substantive psychological theories are strongly constrained by the epistemologies used in their development; the endorsement an epistemology receives from its associated theory should carry no weight. The alliance between psychology and epistemology is not progressive to the development of either field. Alternative sources of progress in epistemology and psychology are suggested. 相似文献
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Henning Peucker 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):135-146
This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from
the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory
of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary
categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s
search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be
reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To
reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories
can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this
article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts
are given to us in a categorical abstraction. 相似文献
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Fernando Birman 《Philosophia》2010,38(4):715-731
I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice
to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of
it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view,
can be best understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which
we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events. 相似文献
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Markus Schmitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(2):271-305
The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between
Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for
construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of
the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially
for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate
‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate
between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension
of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil
the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension
of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary,
is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit
presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological
reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number
of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition
of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has
existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl,
Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself
empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's
main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological
reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent
basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of
affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Christian Coseru 《亚洲哲学》2009,19(3):239-264
In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of svasa[mdot]vitti (‘self-awareness’, ‘self-cognition’) following similar attempts in the domains of phenomenology and analytic epistemology. First, I examine the extent to which work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and intentionality, could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. Second, I argue against a foundationalist reading of the causal account of perception offered by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, I argue that it is possible to read Dignāga's (and following him Dharmakīrti's) treatment of svasamvitti as offering something like a phenomenological account of embodied self-awareness. 相似文献
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John A. Schuster 《Synthese》2012,185(3):467-499
One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled
a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy,
non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related
to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined
with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous
epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the
mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases
one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he
believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical
program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later
work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an
achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal
knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular
motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system. 相似文献
19.
Eine Kritik der poiëtischen Vernunft. Anmerkungen zur Wissenschaftstheorie vom technischen Gestalten
Klaus Erlach 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(1):1-25
A Criticism of Poiëtical Reason. Remarks on Epistemological Philosophy of Technological Shaping. According to Aristoteles human reason can be divided into three independent properties: ?εωρια,πραξισ, and πoιησισ. The latter is required for the technological construction of actuality. Scrutinizing to the conception of μιμησισ it can be figured out that technological acting intends a representation of truth, not an imitation of nature. The concept of nature developed by sciences of modern times is discussed in its lawful disposition. To give some features of an epistemological philosophy of technological shaping first the difference between technological rules and laws of nature is examined. Second, three attributes of technological sciences in distinction to natural sciences are described. Finally, some shaping rules used by engineering sciences are presented. These rules need an epistemological investigation put through other wise than the philosophy of science. 相似文献
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Hans Jürgen Wendel 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1992,23(2):323-352
Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. 相似文献