理由、情感与道德的规范性——西方伦理学与元伦理学的论争进路

道德的规范性问题是道德哲学的核心问题之一,对该问题的回答决定了我们在多大程度上能够为道德责任奠定合理性的基础.从古希腊至启蒙时期,道德哲学体系围绕理由还是情感作为道德规范性渊源进行了探索.在当今的元伦理学争论中,虽然实践理由成为道德规范性问题的标准话语体系,但该体系下的争论仍然围绕理由与情感而展开.     

论辩证法、逻辑与认识论的统一(特约稿)

“虽说马克思没有遗留下‘逻辑’(大写字母的),但他遗留下‘资本论’的逻辑,应当充分地利用这种逻辑来解决当前的问题。在‘资本论’中,逻辑、辩证法和唯物主义的认识论〔不必要三个词:它们是同一个东西〕都应用于同一门科学,而唯物主义则从黑格尔那里吸取了全部有价值的东西,并且向前推进了这些有价值的东西。”——列宁     

康德自主道德的理性主义基调及其困难 ——兼论对话伦理学和康德道德哲学之关联

韦尔默在其《伦理学与对话——康德和对话伦理学中的道德判断要素》一书中基于康德道德哲学之困难,考察对话伦理学为克服其困难所做的尝试并分析其成败得失,他把康德的绝对命令理解为一种以推己及人的方式检验准则确立法则的程序,并认为这只有在预设人类可能的"共同意志"的前提下才能成立,这种对绝对命令的颇具经验主义色彩的解读因忽视康德道德哲学的理性主义基调和道德普遍主义立场而难免误读之嫌。作为道德性的最高原则,绝对命令并非程序性原则,而是表达"理性地行动"这一自主道德的要求。由此引出的论证和应用的问题是康德道德哲学的两个重要问题,也是其困难所在。就对话伦理学与康德道德哲学的关联性而言,相比于韦尔默重点分析的哈贝马斯版本的对话伦理学,阿佩尔先验语用学路向的对话伦理学更好地继承了康德的理性主义精神,紧扣康德道德哲学的问题并尝试对之进行"改造"。     

问题、事件与先验的经验主义——试论德勒兹划分伦理学与道德哲学的根据

德勒兹在《斯宾诺莎的实践哲学》一书中认为,伦理学,亦即作为存在之内的诸样式之类型学区分于道德哲学,因为后者总是将存在归因于超验的诸价值.这为我们提出了一个根本性的问题:德勒兹区分伦理学与道德哲学的最终依据是什么?而针对该问题,德勒兹一直晦暗不明.但要讨论该问题,我们首先还得从德勒兹激进的"问题"本体论出发.在德勒兹看来,真正的伦理"问题"关联到的是未被表达与展开的潜在的领域,它深深嵌入某种异质性的、生存论的境遇当中,而且这种据于个体生存实情的境遇往往先于抽象的道德规训或价值约束.在此基础上,德勒兹通过事件理论具体阐释了事件是作为蕴藏于事实中的那种潜在,即它并非事物状态的时空实现,而先天的价值秩序或者伦理规范仅仅只是作为时空实现中的一个现实化了的事态而已.最后,德勒兹基于先验的经验主义立场,深度刻画了其伦理学是区别于基于人类理性形象而建构的道德哲学这一基本事实.据此,从问题、事件到先验经验主义相关哲学理论的致思来看,这都与德勒兹区分伦理学与道德哲学的思想努力有着直接的关联.     

伦理学:形式的?抑或实质的?——论马克斯·舍勒对康德道德哲学的批判

马克斯·舍勒建构的质料伦理学从多方面批判了康德的形式主义伦理学.舍勒的价值序列理论、现象学方法、人类学理论带有非常鲜明的现代特色,是富有现代性内涵的道德哲学.由于舍勒的批判更多地将人的神性的存在作为自己的出发点,所以在人性的某些层面又不可能颠覆康德道德哲学的基础,因而也就不可能消除康德道德哲学的影响.     

对“分析进路的伦理学范式”的思考

当前,在关于“分析进路的伦理学范式”的讨论中,有一种观点引人关注:“科学性的描述,使得道德既不通达‘天理’(因为形而上学被否定了),也不脚踏实地(因为‘道德’变成了对概念的词义分析,变成了单纯的‘知识’,而不指导生活和行动)。”对此,笔者认为有必要作出回应,并澄清一些问题。按照笔者的理解,邓安庆在《分析进路的伦理学范式批判》一文中所作的并非是对分析哲学本身的批判,也不是对整个分析进路的伦理学的批判,而只是对那种不适当地把分析哲学方法应用于伦理学研究的某些“范式”进行批判。     

道德与人的尊严、幸福、卓越 ——与托马斯·希尔教授谈康德道德哲学研究

康德道德哲学一直以来是伦理学研究的热点。伴随着近年来美德伦理复兴引起的对于规范伦理的反思热潮,康德道德哲学研究的方向也发生了显著变化,围绕"尊严"、"爱"、"德性"等核心概念对康德道德哲学目的论维度、德性论维度的考察展现了康德道德哲学研究的新重心。托马斯·希尔教授是美国著名的康德研究者,近年来发表了大量关于康德道德哲学的专著和论文,在寻求康德道德哲学的新解释路径方面具有一定的典型性。对他的访谈有助于读者了解其本人甚至本领域当前研究的新思路和方法。     

什么是道德

主持人的话:今年是德国著名思想家、法兰克福学派主要代表阿多诺(T.W.Adorno,1903—1969)诞辰100周年。阿多诺一生勤于探索、善于思辨,他在批判地继承前人思想的基础上,呕心沥血地构造了以否定的辩证法、社会批判理论和音乐批评为核心的思想体系。在西方学术界,他的哲学思想深刻而独树一帜,他的社会理论丰富而特色鲜明,对20世纪西方国家的知识界产生了极大影响,他也因此成为上个世纪最有影响的哲学家和社会学家之一。为了纪念这位思想家,我们在此特别刊登国内从未发表过的三篇论文,它们分别选自阿多诺的《克尔凯郭尔——审美的结构》、《最低限度的道德》和《道德哲学的问题》三部著作。如果说《克尔凯郭尔——审美的结构》是阿多诺刚刚进入哲学界时所写、反映他的青年思想的处女作,那么《最低限度的道德》则是他反对法西斯统治、抒发经历二战体验的作品,文风多有警句格言,颇有哲学散文的韵味,而《道德哲学的问题》则是他生前的讲课文稿,文风完全不似他的其它哲学著作那样深奥晦涩,而是朴实直白、深入浅出,对人们正确理解和认识道德哲学确有振聋发聩的作用。我们希望,这几篇论文的发表能够展现阿多诺思想的几个不同侧面,对国内学术界全面认识阿多诺思想有所裨益。     

阐释的生命伦理学：感知理解之路

阐释的生命伦理学：感知理解之路［美］ＲｏｎａｌｄＡ．Ｃａｒｒｓｏｎ聂菁葆编译医学伦理学从本质上讲是一项解释的事业。也就是说,生命伦理学处理医疗实践中的道德问题不是通过“发现”（发现隐蔽的或世俗的真理照耀我们）,也不是通过“发明”（发明预设的神圣或自然...     

如何规定艺术

一、艺术定义在20世纪西方美学中的两个类型 20世纪后半期西方有一些实证主义传统的美学家、艺术理论家极端地认为,艺术是开放的,因而不可定义。莫里斯·韦茨就‘声称’‘艺术’是一个‘开放的’概念,任何封闭的艺术定义都将使艺术创造成为不再可能” (转引自拉马克,第43页)。他的意思是说:“并没有一种认识的标准可以构成(艺术定义)必要和充分条件。因为在我们断言某种东西是艺术作品之时,可以拒绝承认这些条件中的任何一个条件,甚至认为艺术作品必须是件人     

Review Article of Michael Staudigl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Phänomenologie der Gewalt</Emphasis>

This book is a rounded well-informed study of violence, especially from a hermeneutical and social-studies perspective. It is relevant to peace studies. It raises key issues about the phenomenology of the person, of violence, of the foundations of ethics. Although it tends to skirt normative phenomenological, eidetic as well as moral issues they are always insistently on the edge of the rich discussions philosophical-hermeneutical issues and contemporary writings on these matters.     

Catholic Feminist Ethics Reconsidered

Taking Catholic sexual ethics and liberal feminist ethics as points of departure, this essay argues that both frameworks are ill‐prepared to deal with the moral problems raised by sex trafficking: while Catholic sexual ethics is grounded in a normative understanding of sexuality, liberal feminist ethics argues for women's sexual autonomy, resting upon freedom of action and consent. From a perspective that attends both to the phenomenological interpretation of embodied selves and the Kantian normative interpretation of dignity, it becomes possible to critique both the Catholic and the liberal feminist frameworks of ethics. I argue that Catholic sexual ethics requires a reconceptualization as social ethics in order to meet the challenges of our present time, but that the shift is possible without giving up the moral imperatives of both Catholic and feminist ethics to protect human dignity and women's rights.     

The Dharma of Ethics, the Ethics of Dharma: Quizzing the Ideals of Hinduism

This paper is divided into six parts. The first presents a rudimentary definition of ethics based on Western philosophical theories, particularly their concern for articulating universal moral principles. The second examines the assumptions anchoring Western moral philosophies, and raises the question: are the philosophical presuppositions of modern Western philosophy consistent with the presuppositions of Hinduism? It concludes that the two are not entirely in agreement, particularly on the issue of personal and social identity. The third section locates areas in Hinduism that discursively concur with the concerns of Western ethicists, and explores the limits of the semblance. The fourth identifies problematic areas, and raises the question: should the idea of universal ethics be abandoned for Hinduism? The fifth section concludes that such abandonment would be hasty, and initiates a searching look into the Hindu epics for concepts that, while not identical with may still be parallel to some Western notions of ethics. The sixth looks at the content of normative Hindu morality, and generalizes on the basis of this content about the nature of “Hindu ethics”.     

Ethics and Intuitions

For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics.     

Eudaimonism,Virtue, and Self‐Sacrifice

This essay introduces some of the key topics at stake in the ongoing controversies about the place of eudaimonism in Christian ethics and theology. Whether and in what way a person should seek her or his own happiness and flourishing has been a central question in ethics for centuries. Here I summarize the contributions the essays in this focus issue make to that conversation, and conclude by briefly sketching a Neoplatonist approach to eudaimonism that may offer a way to build on the insights and concerns articulated in the focus essays.     

Are My Temporal Parts Agents?

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub-personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me-in-my-twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action.     

The Practicality of Ancient Virtue Ethics: Greece and China

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics “practical science.” How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion.     

规范伦理学之本体论质疑——海德格尔存在主义的视角

上世纪 6 0年代规范伦理学的复归是伦理学理论的一个发展 ,从存在主义的角度看 ,规范伦理学必然会碰到这样一些理论困境 :道德规范的根源如何确认 ?道德规范的确证是否可能 ?道德规范的约束力如何保证 ?道德规范如何适用于人之外的世界 ?     

Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics

Here is a prima facie plausible view: since the metaethical error theory says that all positive moral claims are false, it makes no sense for error theorists to engage in normative ethics. After all, normative ethics tries to identify what is right or wrong (and why), but the error theory implies that nothing is ever right or wrong. One way for error theorists to push back is to argue for “concept preservationism,” that is, the view that even though our ordinary moral discourse is deeply flawed, we should nevertheless continue to engage in moral thought and talk. However, in this article, I pursue a different strategy. I argue that even if we completely abandon moral discourse, thus endorsing “concept abolitionism,” the discipline of normative ethics survives. While traditional normative ethics uses as its “starting points” moral claims and beliefs, instead, concept abolitionists can make use of alternative utterances and attitudes that share salient characteristics with moral claims and beliefs, allowing for a kind of theorizing that is practically oriented, impartial, involves the traditional subject matters and methods of normative ethics, and allows engagement with the arguments of traditional moral philosophers.