“真知”是对“认识活动之本质”的认识——认识论视角下的庄子“知”论解读

庄子的“知”论历来被视作境界论,而非认识论。如果我们以认识论的视角去解读庄子的“知”论,会发现庄子所谓的“真知”并非是对“道”的体认,而是对“认识活动之本质”的认识。庄子认为“真”的本义是“倒下的人”,引申为“主体性的消解”。所以“真知”的内容为：“认识”从本质上来说是一种前主体性的活动,而非通常所理解的主客二分下的活动(“俗知”)。这一方面揭示了认识活动的本真面目,另一方面也消解了“认识何以可能”的问题,避免了陷入由“俗知”所带来的“认识论困境”。     

《庄子》知言观中的道

为了解决道的知与不知和言与不言的矛盾,庄子提出"不知之知"的"真知"观和"不言之言"的"大言"论.他以道知和道言关系为中心,从认识论和语言哲学的角度回答了道的有无、隐显、道物关系等本体论问题,阐释了认识的起源、本质、界限、作用、真妄及语言表达等认识论问题,指出了知、言、道关系的人生实践意义,并最终把知与言解释为道的存在.     

论庄子的技术哲学及其现代意义

庄子对技术的见解，可发见于其关于知识的议论。在区分假知与真知时，庄子曾以技术为典型来说明后者。故讨论庄子①的技术观，须检讨庄子的知识论及认识论。     

意之所在,不言而会 --老庄意会认识论初探

中国意会认识论发韧于《老子》 ,集大成于《庄子》 ,本文论析了老庄意会认识论的来源、内涵、特点、方法以及广义认识论的层次结构     

成玄英《庄子疏》“知与不知,通而为一”的思想

成玄英《庄子疏》“知与不知,通而为一”的思想蔡方鹿本文对唐代道教学者成玄英“知”的思想和认识论作了探讨。指出成玄英融合道、佛,以明道为认识目的,主张“境知两忘,能所双绝”,提出“知与不知,通而为一”的思想,并区分真知与俗知。其理论的思辨性,反映了唐代...     

中国传统知论的特点

把握中国传统知论的特点,对理解中国传统哲学以及传统文化,具有重要意义。然而"中国传统哲学认识论意识不发达"一类的论断,却在一定程度上妨碍了人们对中国传统知论具体特点的探究。中国传统知论的特点与传统哲学的倾向密切相关。中国传统哲学重"道",相应地,传统知论也以求知"道"为重要目标,而这一目标使得中国传统知论在主体认识能力承诺、认识路径选择以及真知确证原则的认定方面,呈现出与西方认识论不同的特点:一、对人的认识能力有更为乐观的承诺;二、开辟了由"德"而"道"的认识路径;三、形成了"广一贯"的确证原则。     

《庄子》对“理”的揭示及其所反映的哲学思维嬗变

本文通过析理《庄子》诸篇中“理”字的不同内涵,旨在论证老庄和庄子后学在道论、认识论和修养实践论三个层次上对“智”的不同态度,从而揭示出战国中晚期道家哲学的思维特点和思维嬗变.在道论上,庄子和老子都是可知论者;在认识论上老子“容智”,庄子“弃智”;修养实践论上老庄都主张“弃智”.庄子部分后学在三个层次上都主张绝对“弃智”,认为道是不可知的,比老庄更绝对化;部分后学在三个层次上都“容智”,其中吸收儒家和黄老之学的一部分后学转变为“主智”派,庄学特征已淡化.庄子后学对“理”的关注,表现出战国中晚期理性高扬的时代风貌和道家哲学由神秘主义向理性主义演化的思维运动规律.     

身观与心证——《庄子》“忠恕之道”发微

忠恕是孔子的一贯之道,在儒家的经典诠释史上,通常是强调其道德层面的意涵。章太炎别出新解,一是称忠恕之道是求知的方法论,内含归纳与演绎的逻辑学原理;二是说庄子继承孔子的忠恕之道,其中包含德性之知与闻见之知的双重义谛。就德性的层面言,相对于儒家的尽己、推己说,庄子主张“才全而德不形”,反对将道德形显发用出来;就知识的层面说,忠指身观,恕指心证,前者是验事以成理,后者是据理以事量,犹如逻辑学中归纳与演绎的方法。透过对庄子忠恕之道的阐发,不仅丰富了忠恕的意涵——忠恕因而成了解读庄子的人生哲学及其认识论的重要概念,还可由此观照孔子与庄子、儒家与道家之间的思想关联。     

中国哲学“知”范畴理论的历史发展及其特点

本文对中国哲学认识论的核心范畴──“知”的理论在各个历史时期的发展演变作 了论述，并指出“知”范畴的理论在中国哲学史上的发展，具有感性认识与理性认识相结合，主体与 客体既对立又结合，认识论与道德论相结合，认识论与本体论相结合，知行统一、认识与实践（实 行、践履）相结合等特点。这既体现了中国哲学及其认识论的特征，同时也包含了一些反映人类认 识发展规律的共同的思想内容。     

庄子哲学实则气学——兼论其理论盲点与理论困境

《庄子》哲学,其实质是一种气论哲学。"气"在《庄子》中具有五种内涵,气论思想贯穿《庄子》始终并有其内在逻辑。《庄子》气论哲学为自然美奠定了哲学基础,但也有其理论盲点和理论困境。《庄子》气论哲学的理论盲点集中体现在未对"心""气"二者关系进行自觉、恰当的阐发,这也就造成了其理论困境,即"听之以气"缺乏切实可行的学理通路。     

Dreaming as a primordial state of the mind: The clinical relevance of structural faults in the body ego as revealed in dreaming1

Thetherapeuticactionofpsychoanalysis, attributedformanyyearstotheinterpretation of the repressed libido, has shifted its focus to object relationships. Some modern analysts maintain that the primary factor of psychic change is the new model of object relationship provided by analysis, and do not consider signifi cant the knowledge of episodes comprising implicit memories, whose irrecoverable nature is demonstrated by neuroscience. Nevertheless, the author proposes that the knowledge of specifi c archaic events, useless as their interpretation may be, offers a glimpse of the make‐up of the mind, contributing to the improvement of the empathy indispensable for inducing changes in the patient. Episodes linked to absolute narcissism, in the beginnings of the body ego, which do not appear either in associations or in transference, emerge in dreams. Neuroscience has made possible the understanding of aspects of dreaming capable of providing a glimpse of the genesis of the ego, whose development from the bodily phase of absolute narcissism to the psychic object phase can thus be traced. The unearthing of the genesis of primary structural faults in dreaming furnishes the analyst with an estimate of the possibilities for development of the ego, and this knowledge provides fi ne tuning capable of guiding the analyst's conduct. A clinical case illustrates how these phenomena occur, showing the intersubjective relationship as the silent primary generator of psychic changes, consolidated and developed secondarily by means of the analytical dialogue.     

Conceptual change in physics: children’s naive representations of sound

The organization of physics knowledge (degree of coherence and nature of conceptual change) was studied in 89 6–10-year-old children using the concept of sound. We attempted to determine whether children apply properties of objects to sound or if they consider sounds as a vibratory process. Three properties of physical objects were studied: substantiality, weight, and permanence. The younger children considered sound more like an object than the older children did. Substantiality was attributed to sound more often than were weight and permanence. Based on the substantiality data, four mental models were identified (sound cannot pass through other objects unless there are holes, sound can pass through solids if it is harder than they are, sound is immaterial, sound is a vibratory process). We concluded that conceptual change in knowledge about sound does not happen through the sudden transfer of the concept from the ontological category of matter to the ontological category of processes, but rather through a slow and gradual process of belief revision, in the course of which the various properties of matter are abandoned in a hierarchical order.     

Frontotemporal neural systems supporting semantic processing in Alzheimer’s disease

We hypothesized that semantic memory for object concepts involves both representations of visual feature knowledge in modality-specific association cortex and heteromodal regions that are important for integrating and organizing this semantic knowledge so that it can be used in a flexible, contextually appropriate manner. We examined this hypothesis in an fMRI study of mild Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Participants were presented with pairs of printed words and asked whether the words matched on a given visual–perceptual feature (e.g., guitar, violin: SHAPE). The stimuli probed natural kinds and manufactured objects, and the judgments involved shape or color. We found activation of bilateral ventral temporal cortex and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during semantic judgments, with AD patients showing less activation of these regions than healthy seniors. Moreover, AD patients showed less ventral temporal activation than did healthy seniors for manufactured objects, but not for natural kinds. We also used diffusion-weighted MRI of white matter to examine fractional anisotropy (FA). Patients with AD showed significantly reduced FA in the superior longitudinal fasciculus and inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus, which carry projections linking temporal and frontal regions of this semantic network. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that semantic memory is supported in part by a large-scale neural network involving modality-specific association cortex, heteromodal association cortex, and projections between these regions. The semantic deficit in AD thus arises from gray matter disease that affects the representation of feature knowledge and processing its content, as well as white matter disease that interrupts the integrated functioning of this large-scale network.     

Three-month-old infants' object recognition across changes in viewpoint using an operant learning procedure

Object knowledge refers to the understanding that all objects share certain properties. Various components of object knowledge (e.g., object occlusion, object causality) have been examined in human infants to determine its developmental origins. Viewpoint invariance--the understanding that an object viewed from different viewpoints is still the same object--is one area of object knowledge, however, that has received less attention. To this end, infants' capacity for viewpoint-invariant perception of multi-part objects was investigated. Three-month-old infants were tested for generalization to an object displayed on a mobile that differed only in orientation (i.e., viewpoint) from a training object. Infants were given experience with a wide range of object views (Experiment 1) or a more restricted range during training (Experiment 2). The results showed that infants generalized between a horizontal and vertical viewpoint (Experiment 1) that they could clearly discriminate between in other contexts (i.e., with restricted view experience, Experiment 2). Overall, the outcome shows that training experience with multiple viewpoints plays an important role in infants' ability to develop a general percept of an object's 3D structure and promotes viewpoint-invariant perception of multi-part objects; in contrast, restricting training experience impedes viewpoint-invariant recognition of multi-part objects.     

Motor simulation in verbal knowledge acquisition

Recent research highlights the importance of motor processes for a wide range of cognitive functions such as object perception and language comprehension. It is unclear, however, whether the involvement of the motor system goes beyond the processing of information that is gathered through active action experiences and affects also the representation of knowledge acquired through verbal learning. We tested this prediction by varying the presence of motor interference (i.e., squeezing a ball vs. oddball detection task) while participants verbally acquired functional object knowledge and examined the effects on a subsequent object detection task. Results revealed that learning of functional object knowledge was only impaired when participants performed an effector-specific motor task while training. The present finding of an effector-specific motor interference effect on object learning demonstrates the crucial role of the motor system in the acquisition of novel object knowledge and provides support for an embodied account to perception and cognition.     

行动语义、客体背景和判断任务对客体动作承载性的影响

客体动作承载性指人们知觉客体时同时激活的针对客体的行动。当Gibson最初提出动作承载性概念时, 他认为客体的这种属性是可以自动激活的。然而近年来越来越多的证据显示, 在知觉和行动的关系中, 行动语义知识和客体所处背景对客体动作承载性具有调节作用, 表现在人们可以根据这些自上而下的信息选择针对客体的适当的行动。此外, 不同的判断任务在引发客体动作承载性效应上具有特异性, 表现在若判断任务仅需知觉客体表层属性时, 不能激活对客体的动作, 进而不能产生客体动作承载性; 若判断任务需要对客体进行深层加工时, 才会激活对客体的动作。未来研究还需要进一步探究行动语义知识和客体所处背景影响客体动作承载性发生的原因和机制, 以及不同判断任务中出现结果特异性的原因。     

Ideational action impairments in Alzheimer's disease

We report data from a group of patients with mild Alzheimer's disease on a range of tasks requiring either stored semantic knowledge about objects (e.g., naming object use) or the execution of action to objects (e.g., miming and using objects). We found that the patients were impaired at miming in response to objects, even when they could describe the object's function. On the other hand, copying gestures was not impaired relative to naming gestures, indicating that an ideomotor deficit in action execution, per se, was unlikely to explain the impairments in object use. We suggest instead that the patients had an impairment in stored motor programmes for action, over and above their deficits in semantic knowledge. Despite this, the patients were better at using than at miming to objects, consistent with the view that proprioceptive input (when using objects) can directly constrain selection of the appropriate motor programme for action.     

Kant's Aesthetics and the 'Empty Cognitive Stock'

It is sometimes assumed that Kant's claim that a judgement of taste is grounded in a pleasure 'without concepts' leaves little room for any credible account of critical judgements of art. I argue that even Kant's conception of free (as opposed to dependent) beauty can provide the framework for an analysis of aesthetic judgements about art works. It is a matter of understanding what roles for concepts Kant prohibits in his analysis of pure judgements of taste: conceptual cognition must be neither what gives rise to the subject's pleasure nor part of the evidential basis for the subject's judgement. But this does not entail that the subject encounters the object in a wholly 'concept–free' manner. Kant's account of free beauty is quite different from Schopenhauer's superficially similar theory, and is compatible with the thought that increased conceptual knowledge can enhance critical judgements of art.     

Something-We-Know-Not-What,Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley,Meaning and Minds

It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea of it, then one cannot speak meaningfully of it. But if this is Berkeley’s position, then there is a puzzle, because Berkeley also explicitly claims that it is impossible to perceive/have ideas of minds. So if he is relying on a criterion on which terms get their meaning by referring to ideas, then, just as Berkeley rejects talk of material substance, so, too, must he reject talk of mental substance. Famously, however, Berkeley insists that there is no parity between the cases of material and mental substance. It is typically suggested that the disparity between matter and minds rests on the fact that although one cannot strictly speaking perceive minds, nonetheless Berkeley thinks that one can have experiential access to minds via reflection, and that this access allows for meaningful talk of minds. Of course, one can only have reflective experience of one’s own mind. But what of other minds, which one cannot reflectively experience? Here the usual tactic is to suppose that, although one cannot have direct reflective experience of other minds, nonetheless one can indirectly experience such minds via analogy to our own minds, and that this indirect experience grounds the meaningfulness of talk of other minds. In this paper, I argue that the reasoning behind Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle,’ that an idea can only be like another idea, can be generalized to argue against this experience-based account of our access to other minds. I claim instead that Berkeley allows for the meaningfulness of talk of other minds by expanding the criterion of meaning in a different way. I argue that Berkeley holds a criterion of meaning on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies either an object of experience or an object that one has reason to posit on the basis of experience, i.e., an object that is necessary to explain our experiences. When an object is neither experienced nor explains our experiences, then and only then is Berkeley willing to reject it as meaningless. Thus he writes of “the word matter,” that “it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about we know not what, and we know not why” (Principles, §77.) The word is not meaningless merely because we do not know what matter might be; it is meaningless because we also do not know why it should be. Correspondingly, I argue that the term ‘mind’ is meaningful because although we have no experience of minds, nonetheless they play an important role in explaining our experiences.     

Spatial updating during locomotion does not eliminate viewpoint-dependent visual object processing

Two experiments were conducted to investigate whether locomotion to a novel test view would eliminate viewpoint costs in visual object processing. Participants performed a sequential matching task for object identity or object handedness, using novel 3-D objects displayed in a head-mounted display. To change the test view of the object, the orientation of the object in 3-D space and the test position of the observer were manipulated independently. Participants were more accurate when the test view was the same as the learned view than when the views were different no matter whether the view change of the object was 50° or 90°. With 50° rotations, participants were more accurate at novel test views caused by participants’ locomotion (object stationary) than caused by object rotation (observer stationary) but this difference disappeared when the view change was 90°. These results indicate that facilitation of spatial updating during locomotion occurs within a limited range of viewpoints, but that such facilitation does not eliminate viewpoint costs in visual object processing.