魏晋玄学与道教关系研究

魏晋时期作为中国历史上重要的思想转型期之一,在军事、政治、经济、文化甚至整个意识形态上都经历了重大的转折,哲学由此获得全新解放。在此基础上,魏晋玄学大兴,神仙道教也从神学的角度回应了哲学思潮。二者之间既相互联系,又有所不同,了解魏晋玄学与神仙道教之间的内在关联,对于理解魏晋的思想有着极其重要的意义。     

玄学:人生价值准则的重新确立

从形式上说,魏晋玄学是汉末清议的延续,这一点已得到学界大部分人的肯定。我以为,汉末清议与魏晋玄学之间不仅存在形式上的联系,而且有实质上的关联。汉代的清议和魏晋玄学实质都是士大夫阶层在感到人生价值失落情况下对人生价值的重新确立,二者的区别在于清议是以一种新的尚未提到哲学高度的人生价值准则去评议具体人物,而魏晋的百谈则力图从抽象的哲学层面确立一种新的人生价值准则。一、魏晋之前中国士大夫阶层的价值准则基本上是由儒家确立的。儒家认为,人生的理想境界就是心与道为一。孔子所谓“七十而从心所欲不逾矩”,指的就…     

技术、主体与形而上学的玄学遐想

本文主要从科学、技术与社会(STS)的视角出发,通过对当今法国哲学家让·鲍德后期晦涩的哲学思想,特别是其命定策略的考察,阐发了鲍德里亚后期哲学的重要意义:(1)鲍德里亚后期思想是一种典型的悲观的技术决定论;是现代技术决定论的翻版。(2)鲍德里亚的后期思想是对近代理性哲学的颠覆和“反动”,它试图通过对技术与人的关系的思辨考察,消解近代理性哲学中的大写的主体的“人”,并给出了未来技术社会中一幅悲观可怕的“人”的命运的图画。(3)后形而上学的玄学则是鲍德里亚思想的最终归宿。鲍德里亚后期思想既有其悲观主义的极端倾向,也包含了深刻的哲理,需要处于信息社会的我们加以关注。     

苏轼佛教音乐美学思想初探

佛教思想对中国传统思想文化影响深刻而广泛,涉及到哲学,文学,音乐,美术,雕塑等领域,其理论被儒,道所吸收,如般若理论对于魏晋玄学,心性理论对于宋明理学。     

重视哲学史方法论的研究——读《郭象与魏晋玄学》

魏晋玄学是中国哲学发展中一个重要的阶段。经历两汉经学神学几百年的迷信、荒诞、烦琐、干枯、死气沉沉的统治之后,进入魏晋,人们的思想骤然为之得一解放。清新、潇洒、自由,驰骋于玄远、超脱、辩名析理的玄思之境,迅速把中国哲学推进到以本体论为特征的新阶段,留下了丰富的哲学遗产,深刻的思维经验教训,众多的研究课题,吸引人们发掘、思考、剖析、总结。解放以前汤用彤先生著《魏晋玄学论稿》,前驱先路,提纲挈领,对玄学的     

魏晋玄学中必然与偶然思想述评

魏晋玄学是中国哲学思想发展史上的一个重要里程碑,它的产生在中国哲学史上引起了一场划时代的变革,表现在它不仅最终结束了统治两汉时期达数百年之久的经学传统,同时也开创了贯穿整个魏晋南北朝时期的一代玄风。经过这一时期的洗礼,不仅大大提高了人们的哲学抽象思维水平,而且玄学本身无论在理论形态、概念范畴、思维方法以及向其它文化领域扩展渗透所形成的时代精神风貌,也颇为新颖独特。本文仅对魏晋玄学中包含的必然和偶然及其关系的思想作一发微并加以评述。     

从经学到书法:汉晋间琅琊王氏家族文化的传承与流变

西汉时期,琅琊王吉以通经而入仕,家族开始振兴。王吉与其子王骏、孙王崇三世为官,家族政治和文化地位开始上升。但是,自王崇开始,家族子弟不再固守通经入仕之路,家族在东汉并不显赫。魏晋时期,琅琊王祥以孝行入仕,并对当时盛行的玄学和道家思想有所涉猎,家族文化出现多元化发展倾向。西晋时期,王戎、王衍等人全面谈玄,由此而激发出艺术精神,家族出现研习书法的热潮,书法文化开始成为家族文化的主要内容,这为琅琊王氏在东晋成为书法文化世家奠定了基础。     

从经学到玄学:以王符、仲长统为例

王符、仲长统等人开创的东汉儒学批判思潮,是经学向玄学过渡中的一个重要的思想环节。虽然说王符等人所尝试的哲学探索还尚在量的积累阶段,但是如果没有这种量的积累,那么也就没有思想史上经学转变为玄学的飞跃。它为魏晋玄学在理论上做着准备,尽管这种探索还处于初级阶段,还存在着很多缺陷,可它毕竟开启了一个新的理论时代,值得认真注意。     

汤用彤魏晋玄学研究中的杨朱思想

杨朱思想在《列子》中有重要位置。汤用彤本人并不直接讨论杨朱,但他在魏晋玄学研究中,将体现杨朱思想的《列子》和对杨朱思想(包括《列子》)有特别诠释的张湛,放在魏晋玄学发展史上来看待,并给予特殊的位置。如果说汤用彤奠定了中国学术史从哲学角度解释魏晋玄学的方法,那么观察和分析汤用彤对张湛、《列子》、杨朱思想的解释,可以看到汤用彤如何用一种哲学的方式重新解释杨朱思想。在本文讨论中,将首先梳理汤用彤魏晋玄学学术史,来看汤用彤如何将杨朱(《列子》、张湛的注解)思想重置;其次,更着重分析汤用彤在玄学史上重置杨朱思想的哲学做法:摆脱儒道释的绝对分隔,进入各家对人性、生活态度等的哲学思考,力图说明杨朱(《列子》、张湛注)有超越三家、并同时对三家思想资源有吸收及发挥的哲学意味;再次,汤用彤对杨朱(《列子》、张湛注)问题分析的哲学做法,重新回到学术史是他不仅在魏晋玄学史上给予杨朱(《列子》、张湛注)特殊位置,更认为杨朱(《列子》、张湛注)对后来的宗教及哲学发展有影响。     

从儒学到玄学——以王弼玄学的生态智慧为例

魏晋玄学是对汉代儒学的正本清源,而并非是对儒学的简单否定。通过会通儒道的方式,玄学完成了对儒学的继承与革新。作为魏晋玄学最重要的开创性人物,王弼在对生态智慧的阐释中,一方面吸收了儒家思想,强调发挥人的主观能动性,认为人在整个生态系统中处于主导地位;另一方面,又从道家思想中汲取营养,强调人类应该因顺自然,充分地体现了儒学对玄学的继承与革新。     

Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something?

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (?ūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism.     

《老子》首章新释

《老子》首章在《老子》思想研究中有着举足轻重的地位,历代讨论的论作不胜枚举。但对《老子》首章的本义究竟如何解读,仍然是一个有待探讨的问题。下面,本文试对《老子》首章的各句逐一讨论,并对其主旨作一辨析。不妥之处,敬请批评。     

Guo Xiang on Self-so Knowledge

The perspective on zhi 知 (‘knowledge’) is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi (e.g. da zhi 大知 ‘greater knowledge’ or zhen zhi 真知 ‘genuine knowledge’.) In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which, like his intellectual contemporaries, is to unify Daoist and Confucian ideas. In addition, I will argue that if we look at the larger context of Guo Xiang’s own philosophical approach, and interpret his notion of zhi within this framework, then we find a strong argument for an alternative to the epistemological perspectives in the Zhuangzi – one that includes mysticism and relativism, but goes beyond them.     

孔子“晚而喜易”与其晚年思想的变化

<正>孔子与《易经》的关系是一个古老的话题,从司马迁提出孔子"晚而喜易"后,孔子作《易传》之说流行了近千年,"先儒更无异论"(孔颖达《周易正义序》)。然而,欧阳修《易童子问》的     

Psychosomatic medicine and the philosophy of life

Basing ourselves on the writings of Hans Jonas, we offer to psychosomatic medicine a philosophy of life that surmounts the mind-body dualism which has plagued Western thought since the origins of modern science in seventeenth century Europe. Any present-day account of reality must draw upon everything we know about the living and the non-living. Since we are living beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from our own first-hand experience. Therefore, our philosophy of life, in addition to starting with what empirical science tells us about inorganic and organic reality, must also begin from our own direct experience of life in ourselves and in others; it can then show how the two meet in the living being. Since life is ultimately one reality, our theory must reintegrate psyche with soma such that no component of the whole is short-changed, neither the objective nor the subjective. In this essay, we lay out the foundational components of such a theory by clarifying the defining features of living beings as polarities. We describe three such polarities:

The Nothing and the Ontological Difference in Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?

This essay gives an interpretation of Heidegger's “What is Metaphysics?” lecture in light of passages from his other writings and lecture courses of the period. This exegetical task is important, for interpreters of “What is Metaphysics?” have been confused by puzzling phrases in the lecture without noticing that Heidegger makes the same points in clearer terms elsewhere. In particular, these interpreters ignore Heidegger's crucial distinction between entities and the being of entities. Since Heidegger's “nothing” is an aspect of being, this difference is at the core of Heidegger's lecture. The present interpretation establishes a conditional conclusion: If the ontological difference makes sense, then we have a sound basis for understanding “What is Metaphysics?” and do not need to read Heidegger as an irrationalist who debunks science or rejects the principle of contradiction. This paper does not give independent justification for the ontological difference.     

葛洪与玄学

玄学是魏晋时期兴起的一种影响深远的社会思潮,两晋之际玄学在理论上发展到极至,其影响开始渗入社会生活的各个方面。葛洪早年深受儒家学说熏陶,又是官方道教理论的创立者,无论是为了维护传统的儒家思想,还是出于为官方道教建立理论的需要,葛洪在主观上都反对玄学所促发的行为方式。但客观上,葛洪却不自觉地受了玄学的影响。本文力图通过分析葛洪思想中玄学的成分,来揭示玄学对当时士人的巨大影响力。     

The categorical interpretation of Guo Xiang’s “independent genesis”

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms.     

试论慎子的学术思想

慎子是战国中期稷下学宫的代表人物之一。其思想主要体现在《慎子》①一书中。由于资料缺乏,慎子的思想学术派别历来说法不一。②本文以为:慎子将道家"道法自然"的思想加以演化并与其"尊君"、"尚法"、"贵势"、重"术"的学术理论很好地融合在了一起,但法家思想是其学术思想的重点与核心,他是战国中期由学说林立走向学术融合的重要代表性人物。