共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
1.
2.
3.
《法音》2008,(4):1-1
问曰:人能以力胜人、并国、杀怨,或畋猎皮肉,所济处大;令不杀生,得何等利?答曰:得无所畏,安乐无怖。我以无害于彼,故彼亦无害于我,以是故无怖无畏。好杀之人,虽复位极人王,亦不自安;如持戒之人,单行独游,无所畏难。复次,好杀之人,有命之属皆不喜见;若不好杀,一切众生皆乐依附。复次,持戒之人命欲终时,其心安乐,无疑无悔,若生天上,若在人中,常得长寿,是为得道因缘,乃至得佛,住寿无量。复次,杀生之人,今世后世受种种身心苦痛;不杀之人,无此众难,是为大利。复次,行者思惟:我自惜命爱身,彼亦如是,与我何异?以是之故,不应杀生。复次,若人杀生者,为善人所诃、怨家所嫉,负他命故,常有怖畏,为彼所憎,死时心悔,当堕地狱,若畜生中,若出为人,常当短命。复次,假令后世无罪,不为善人所诃、怨家所嫉,尚不应故夺他命。何以故?善相之人所不应行,何况两世有罪、弊恶果报!复次,杀为罪 相似文献
4.
5.
6.
7.
哀伤,是生命里的必经窄巷,具摧毁生命之能。然而,史记《屈原贾生列传》有云:"人穷则反本,故劳苦倦极,未尝不呼天也。"何解呼天?因为"天者,人之始也。"西方学者也指出,哀伤经验能够促使人从灵性与宗教的深处发问"何故"的问题。考夫曼(Jeffrey Kauffman)认为,"何故"是罪咎的展现;"何故"是怀疑的符号; 相似文献
8.
《哲学动态》1993,(11)
郭安沁:也谈“科学技术是第一生产力”与“人的因素第一”之关系在“科学技术是第一生产力”与“人的因素第一”之关系的讨论中,有人认为科学技术与人共处于生产力之中,只能有一个第一。更有二种“发展论”者,力图人人生产力发展的历史过程或从科学技术与生产力诸要素在现代生产力中的地位和作用方面.论证用前者取代后者的科学性、合理性,从而否定“人的因素第一”的现实意义。这实质上是把科学技术与人完全对立起来去研究这两个命题的关系。笔者认为,必须从历史唯物主义立场出发,从马克思本人对“人”与“科学技术”关系的理解入手力口以研究。马克思在《政治经济学批判》一书中,把科学技术看作人在生产力的客体化和对象化,科学技术构成了人的社会现实体,成为社会化和历史化了的人,它以人的本质力量的面貌出现在自然界面前。而现实中活动着的人,只不过是历史化了的人的过程,社会化了的人的局部,系统化了的人的元素。因此,在自然界面前,人的社会现实体──科学技术与具体的人是一致的。“科学技术是第一生产力”,是指在一般生产劳动过程中,科学技术是全部人类改造自然界能力的主要部分,它在现实财富的创造和增长过程中居于支配地位,科学技术活动在人们直接面向自然的斗争中越来越 相似文献
9.
10.
11.
Lara Denis 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1997,78(4):321-348
Abstract: This paper investigates the nature and foundation of duties to oneself in Kant's moral theory. Duties to oneself embody the requirement of the formula of humanity that agents respect rational nature in them-selves as well as in others. So understood, duties to oneself are not subject to the sorts of conceptual objections often raised against duties to oneself; nor do these duties support objections that Kant's moral theory is overly demanding or produces agents who are preoccupied with their own virtue. Duties to oneself emerge as an essential and compelling part of Kant's moral theory. 相似文献
12.
Hogan R 《Journal of personality assessment》2006,86(2):119-130
Every significant piece of public policy, every important generalization in history, economics, political science, and sociology depends on (largely unevaluated) assumptions about human nature. Personality psychology concerns the nature of human nature; it is, therefore, concerned with one of the most powerful and dangerous forces on earth. Developing adequate methods for conceptualizing human nature and forecasting significant components of social behavior-for example, integrity, creativity, leadership-would seem to be a matter of real urgency. Nonetheless, personality psychology has a minor and marginal status in academic psychology. I have spent my career trying to understand the origins of human behavior, trying to develop measurement models for capturing key elements of social performance, and trying to defend the study of personality against the complaints of a seemingly endless supply of academic critics. 相似文献
13.
Kurt Anders Richardson 《Zygon》1995,30(2):281-291
Abstract. This paper advances ways in which the understandings of “nature” and “creation” can be seen to overlap through specialized relations between humans and their environment. The hope of redemption of nature, united with evidences of grace in the advancements of science, can become helpful guides toward a theological interpretation of technology and the emerging character of human relations with nature. 相似文献
14.
Patrick D. Hopkins 《Zygon》2002,37(2):317-344
Many religious critics argue that biotechnology (such as cloning and genetic engineering) intrudes on God's domain, or plays God, or revolts against God. While some of these criticisms are standard complaints about human hubris, I argue that some of the recent criticism represents a "Promethean" concern, in which believers unreflectively seem to fear that science and technology are actually replicating or stealing God's special deity–defining powers. These criticisms backfire theologically, because they diminish God, portraying God as an anthropomorphic superbeing whose relevance and special nature are increasingly rivaled by human power. 相似文献
15.
Andrew Kelley 《Sophia》2013,52(1):159-184
In this article, I examine the issue of forgiveness of oneself by looking at the writings of two postwar French philosophers: Georges Gusdorf and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Gusdorf believes that forgiving oneself is necessary for being able to forgive others. On the other hand, Jankélévitch sees no possibility of forgiveness for oneself and for similar reasons is very suspicious of traditional views of the role accorded to repenting and penitence. In short, the main view that separates the thinkers is, quite literally, whether work on oneself—such as repentance and penitence—comes first before forgiveness, or whether repentance and penitence are the result of some prior gracious act, such as forgiveness. Somewhat ironically, their views, when all is said and done, may not really be all that far apart from each other, especially in light of how each views the nature of the self. In the end, the main factor dividing the two thinkers is metaphysical allegiances. Reflecting a tendency that is shown in most—if not all—of his early works, Gusdorf views the self more from the perspective of anthropology. Jankélévitch, like his mentor Henri Bergson, has faith in science and does not have a supernatural view of the human soul. 相似文献
16.
Nin Kirkham 《Zygon》2013,48(4):875-889
“Arguments from nature” are used, and have historically been used, in popular responses to advances in technology and to environmental issues—there is a widely shared body of ethical intuitions that nature, or perhaps human nature, sets some limits on the kinds of ends that we should seek, the kinds of things that we should do, or the kinds of lives that we should lead. Virtue ethics can provide the context for a defensible form of the argument from nature, and one that makes proper sense of its enduring role in debates concerning our relationship to technology and the environment. However, the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is controversial. On the one hand, contemporary biological science no longer defines species by their essential characteristics, so from a biological point of view there just are no essential characteristics of human beings. On the other hand, it might be argued that humans have, in some sense, “transcended our biology,” so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this article, I examine and defend the argument from nature, as a way to ground an ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I argue that, properly interpreted as an appeal to an evaluative account of human nature, the argument from nature is defensible with the context of virtue ethics and, in this light, I show how arguments from nature made in popular responses to technological and environmental issues are best understood. 相似文献
17.
When one moves, the spatial relationship between oneself and the entire world changes. Spatial updating refers to the cognitive
process that computes these relationships as one moves. In two experiments, we tested whether spatial updating occurs automatically
for multiple environments simultaneously. Participants turned relative to either a room or the surrounding campus buildings
and then pointed to targets in both the environment in which they turned (updated environment) and the other environment (nonupdated
environment). The participants automatically updated the room targets when they moved relative to the campus, but they did
not update the campus targets when they moved relative to the room. Thus, automatic spatial updating depends on the nature
of the environment. Implications for theories of spatial learning and the structure of human spatial representations are discussed. 相似文献
18.