论《周易》的道德谱系

《周易》是一部人学著作,也是一部道德著作。《周易》构建了一种特殊的道德谱系,这种道德谱系由本能无意识、文化无意识、社会意识、自我意识道德化四个层面构成。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联系起来,从而有了“人道”,也把“道”与“德”联系起来,从而有了“道德”。《周易》在性命之理的基础上探讨了人的形成、演化及人性的内容;又在“人”与“道”的基础上构建了“成人”与“做人”的道德谱系。《周易》的道德谱系把“人”与“道”联接起来是人学,把“道”与“德”联接起来是伦理学。天道、人道等统一于性命之理的命题之中,成为了道德谱系的奇特内容,从而人也就成为了道德谱系的本体。     

什么是道德

主持人的话:今年是德国著名思想家、法兰克福学派主要代表阿多诺(T.W.Adorno,1903—1969)诞辰100周年。阿多诺一生勤于探索、善于思辨,他在批判地继承前人思想的基础上,呕心沥血地构造了以否定的辩证法、社会批判理论和音乐批评为核心的思想体系。在西方学术界,他的哲学思想深刻而独树一帜,他的社会理论丰富而特色鲜明,对20世纪西方国家的知识界产生了极大影响,他也因此成为上个世纪最有影响的哲学家和社会学家之一。为了纪念这位思想家,我们在此特别刊登国内从未发表过的三篇论文,它们分别选自阿多诺的《克尔凯郭尔——审美的结构》、《最低限度的道德》和《道德哲学的问题》三部著作。如果说《克尔凯郭尔——审美的结构》是阿多诺刚刚进入哲学界时所写、反映他的青年思想的处女作,那么《最低限度的道德》则是他反对法西斯统治、抒发经历二战体验的作品,文风多有警句格言,颇有哲学散文的韵味,而《道德哲学的问题》则是他生前的讲课文稿,文风完全不似他的其它哲学著作那样深奥晦涩,而是朴实直白、深入浅出,对人们正确理解和认识道德哲学确有振聋发聩的作用。我们希望,这几篇论文的发表能够展现阿多诺思想的几个不同侧面,对国内学术界全面认识阿多诺思想有所裨益。     

从现象学到谱系学——尼采哲学的两重面向

尼采哲学同胡塞尔、海德格尔和梅勒-庞蒂等为代表的现象学有着很多共识。首先,尼采哲学同现象学一样抛弃了现象与本体或"物自身"的形而上学的二元对立,肯定了现象是唯一的实在,并认为现象就是权力意志;其次,尼采认为权力意志是具有赋予和创造意义的"意向性"特征;最后,尼采还承认权力意志的意义赋予或创造具有时间性的视角特征。从这些共识来说,尼采哲学可以被看成是一种现象学。但是,尼采哲学不只有现象学的一面,还包含了谱系学的一面。作为一个谱系学家,他否定了现象学的"明见性"原则以及对于"起源"的追求,而是认为任何"起源"都是历史性的,都是权力意志的偶然产物。从这一点来说,尼采哲学同时包含了超出现象学的新视野。     

"道德能力"概念的知识谱系考察——从亚里士多德、黑格尔到罗尔斯

本文通过一种知识谱系学(希腊思想传统意义)的考察,在理解道德的基础上,试图在实践理性意义上证成道德能力.道德能力是自由意志实践过程中将主观精神与客观实践相统一、实现自身的能力.     

对社会主义道德建设的有益探索——读钱广荣教授的《中国道德建设通论》

钱广荣教授的《中国道德建设通论》一书(安徽大学出版社2004年12月出版,以下简称《通论》),是作为国家社科基金项目“中国道德国情研究”的最终研究成果《中国道德国情论调》的姐妹篇而撰写的。广荣教授一直着力于对中国的道德国情和道德建设问题的研究,先后发表了近30篇专题论     

“学”作为道德生活何以可能 ——《论语》“学”论：《中庸》

《中庸》作为《论语》"学"论,是对《论语》之"学"作为一种可能的道德生活的合法性做哲学证明。本文通过对孔子一以贯之"为学之道"是"仁且智"的中庸之道的讨论,对《中庸》"学"—"德"—"道"、"道"—"德"—"学"的天人双向回环路径的构建,对中庸之道"不可能"与"不可离"的悖论的分析,开启了"学"作为道德生活何以可能的论题。在《中庸》中,构建了"天"-"性"-"道"-"教(学)"的整体"为学"境域,为"学"作为一种道德生活何以可能奠定了本体论的基础,并对《中庸》中的不同类人对中庸之道的不可能的可能性分析,论证了"学"作为道德生活的现实可能性。     

伦理学与道德学——苏联伦理学界关于伦理学对象的讨论

当前,苏联伦理学界正就伦理学的对象、特点、结构等问题展开讨论。今年《哲学问题》杂志在二月号上发表的六篇文章,反映了这一讨论的概貌。这场讨论的基础是B.T.叶非莫夫的文章《伦理学和道德学》。在这篇文章发表之前,编辑部曾把文章的手稿交给苏联一些著名伦理学家争求意见,要他们对文章提出的问题发表自己的观点和意见。《哲学问题》杂志编辑部在公布这一讨论时表示,这一题目的讨论还将在苏联的杂志上,在教研室、科研机关的研究室和其他集体里继续下去。叶非莫夫在《伦理学和道德学》一文中,首先提     

《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的经济道德解读

《手稿》是一部经济道德内涵丰富的马克思早期著作。对这部著作作经济道德解读,有助于我们更深刻地理解和把握马克思主义。本文从四个方面对《手稿》进行了经济道德解读:一是经济事实与经济主体及其关系的价值分析;二是异化劳动导致劳动关系的非理性化;三是资产阶级国民经济学的道德缺损;四是资本主义制度下经济发展与道德进步的悖论。     

宣传无神论的必要性

《任继愈宗教论集》于近日出版,我们选取其中一段文字发表,以飨读者。该文最初发表于1988年,载于宁夏人民出版社《宗教·道德·文化》一书。全文标题为《关于宗教与无神论问题》。本文是其中第三段的一部分。     

尼采的道德视角主义

尼采对道德的价值重估不仅批判了柏拉图—基督教道德基于神目观的形而上学道德实在论("自在的善"),而且驳斥了康德和功利主义立足于抽象的道德规则的伦理学,他认为它们都是以外在的权威和标准压制生命的本能条件,本质上都是虚无主义。他的道德视角主义否定了道德的绝对价值和客观标准,认为没有道德事实,只有对现象的道德解释。一方面,解释总是多元的、多视角的,因而道德是多元化的;另一方面,一切道德要求都必然关联着内在根据即生命的本能条件,没有无条件的道德要求。尼采的道德视角主义在我们今天的道德话语(比如"内在理由"的伦理学)中仍有活力。     

Genealogy of Morality and Law

In order to clarify the relationship between morality and law, it is necessary to define both concepts precisely. Cultural realities refer to concepts which are more specifically defined if we focus towards the genealogy of those realities, that is to say, their motivation, function and aim. Should we start from legal anthropology, comparative law and history of law, law arises as a social technique which coactively imposes ways of solving conflicts, protecting fundamental values for a society's co-existence. Values subject to being protected are proposed by morality, the latter making subordination of law to morality inevitable. This explains that a great number of modern constitutions include a reference to fundamental moral values, that is to say, they have explicitly positivised moral contents. Legal reasoning, at all levels and expressions, needs to appeal to the aforementioned values. Constitutional reasoning, international law, legislative activity and judicial practice are studied to verify the latter. This subordination of law to morality sets out a serious problem: moralities are cultural realities which are only valid for a specific society. In order for law not to fall in a not very rational legal relativism, law should not be subordinated to morality, but to ethics, the latter understood as cross-cultural morality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a step forward in this sense.     

科技时代的替代经验与道德的个人亲证问题

人对自己生活于其中的科技时代的批判,是与人的自我意识一同发生的。当今世界,科技已越来越被当作自主的、异在于人的并沿着非人性化的惯性而展开的过程。如何对这一过程重新进行人化?如何使现代人具有科技进步时代的人的内容的清醒意识?这是每一个人文学者必须给予严肃关注的问题。从道德本性的角度视之,科技社会所制造的大量的替代经验对道德实践基础的蚕食和颠覆,具有根本的决定性的作用。因此,在科技社会中如何确立实践智慧、个人亲证在道德领域里的独立性,对于避免当代人的“道德孤儿”的命运,便具有头等重要的意义。     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved</Emphasis>

This essay shall discuss the moral feeling of “being morally moved” (daode gandong 道德感动) and explore its philosophical significances in understanding the nature of virtue ethics, especially that of Confucian ethics as exemplary ethics. I would like to argue that the feeling of being morally moved, similar to other feelings such as resentment or indignation, should be seen as one of the most important testimonies or manifestations of our morality or moral consciousness. It has played a very important role of moral judgment and moral cultivation in the history of Chinese moral philosophy and in its everyday moral practices. Instead of being a testimony of morality as cold laws or norms, “being morally moved” is a testimony to our moral virtues, and it should be a living motive of our moral actions as well.     

自律性组织在乡村公民道德建设中的地位和作用调研——以湖南益阳为例

乡村自律性组织是农村社会转型过程中推进农民道德建设的一种与时俱进的组织依托,具有自主性、功能的单一性、务实性等特征,其类型和形式多种多样。它反映了农民道德建设的一种自觉,充分发挥了道德的自律作用,强化了农村道德的评价机制和赏罚机制,提高了道德教育效果。     

Curiosity as an Agent of Conscience

Public outcry against social outrages in our nation in the past few years have called for solutions that suggest that we as a nation believe that by strengthening the observational and punishing components of the superego of the American Psyche we can successfully overthrow our moral failings. By using data in regard to Adolph Eichman and other Nazis as clinical examples, it is suggested that the problem of our moral failings resides not in a deficient superego (a refluent moral agent) but in the insufficient development of conscience (a reflective consciousness). The roles that curiosity and impeded curiosity take in the development of morality are shown to be central to an understanding of how conscience differs from superego.     

Evolutionary Skepticism about Morality and Prudential Normativity

Debunking arguments aim at defeating the justification of a belief by revealing the belief to have a dubious genealogy. One prominent example of such a debunking argument is Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking explanation of morality. Joyce’s argument targets only our belief in moral facts, while our belief in prudential facts is exempt from his evolutionary critique. In this paper, I suggest that our belief in prudential facts falls victim to evolutionary debunking, too. Just as our moral sense can be explained in evolutionary terms, so presumably can our tendency to judge our actions in prudential terms. And if the evolutionary explanation of our moral sense has an undermining effect, then so does the evolutionary explanation of our belief in prudential facts. This also undermines moral fictionalism, the view that we have prudential reasons to maintain moral discourse as a fiction. I consider and refute four possible objections to the suggested debunking of our belief in prudential normativity.     

The Progression and regression of slave morality in Nietzsche''s Genealogy: The moralization of bad conscience and indebtedness

With the advent of slave morality and the belief system it entails, human beings alone begin to advance to a level beyond that of simple, brute, animal nature. While Christianity and its belief system generate a progression, however, allowing human beings to become interesting for the first time, Nietzsche also maintains in the Genealogy that slave morality is a regression, somehow lowering or bringing them down from a possible higher level. In this paper I will argue that this is not a mere inconsistency in Nietzsche's writing, but is instead an important clue to a correct interpretation of the Genealogy.     

医疗事故纠纷的本质及法律责任

医疗事故纠纷及处理的道德本质和司法原则在于对病人权利的维护。强化医务人员对病人生命与健康的医德责任感和病人权利意识,并使之成为自律、自觉的行为是预防和减少医疗事故纠纷发生的第一要素;而提高医务人员的法律意识,完善法律的制约机制,对医疗事故的防范是同样重要的。     

Does Han Fei have a conception of justice?

Han Fei’s political theory is widely characterized as eschewing any connection with morality; so, can he have any conception of justice? In this paper, I accept the interpretation of Han Fei jettisoning any moral commitment, but I argue that he gives heed to an understanding of justice. This conception of justice arises naturally from the ordinary human sentiment of resentment for wrongs done and becomes a moral staple in the consciousness of ordinary people. Such a conception of justice has these features: all and only the guilty receive punishment, and the punishments are in some sense proportionate to the crime. Since disregarding this popular conception of justice results in resentment and political instability, Han Fei, without any moral commitment to it, accepts the popular conception of justice on prudential and consequentialist grounds.