How to avoid inconsistent idealizations

Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation.     

Paradoxes of praise: Identity‐inconsistent praise results in praise‐inconsistent responses

In four experimental studies, we explored the effect of consistency between central group values and the content of group‐directed praise on group‐based esteem, group identification, and willingness to express attitudes and intentions (in)consistent with the content of praise. Study 1 used pre‐existing groups with clearly defined central values, Study 2 relied on individual differences in perceptions of central group values within the same social group, and Studies 3 and 4 manipulated the centrality of group values experimentally. The results demonstrated that identity‐inconsistent praise resulted in lower group‐based esteem (Studies 1–4), and reduced group identification (Study 4), as compared to identity‐consistent praise. In addition, in all studies, identity‐inconsistent praise led to stronger willingness to reaffirm (the ignored) central group characteristics than identity‐consistent praise. The results are consistent with extensions of the self‐verification approach to the collective self.     

Nothingness,Meinongianism and inconsistent mereology

Synthese - Within the framework of Meinongianism, nothingness turns out to have contradictory features—it seems to be an object and not. In this paper, we explore two different kinds of...     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

Aristotle's thesis in consistent and inconsistent logics

A typical theorem of conaexive logics is Aristotle's Thesis(A), (AA).A cannot be added to classical logic without producing a trivial (Post-inconsistent) logic, so connexive logics typically give up one or more of the classical properties of conjunction, e.g.(A & B)A, and are thereby able to achieve not only nontriviality, but also (negation) consistency. To date, semantical modellings forA have been unintuitive. One task of this paper is to give a more intuitive modelling forA in consistent logics. In addition, while inconsistent but nontrivial theories, and inconsistent nontrivial logics employing prepositional constants (for which the rule of uniform substitution US fails), have both been studied extensively within the paraconsistent programme, inconsistent nontrivial logics (closed under US) do not seem to have been. This paper gives sufficient conditions for a logic containingA to be inconsistent, and then shows that there is a class of inconsistent nontrivial logics all containingA. A second semantical modelling forA in such logics is given. Finally, some informal remarks about the kind of modellingA seems to require are made.     

Identification of inconsistent variates in factor analysis

When some of observed variates do not conform to the model under consideration, they will have a serious effect on the results of statistical analysis. In factor analysis the model with inconsistent variates may result in improper solutions. In this article a useful method for identifying a variate as inconsistent is proposed in factor analysis. The procedure is based on the likelihood principle. Several statistical properties such as the effect of misspecified hypotheses, the problem of multiple comparisons, and robustness to violation of distributional assumptions are investigated. The procedure is illustrated by some examples.     

Parents' inconsistent emotion socialization and children's socioemotional adjustment

Parents socialize children's emotion through active, purposeful strategies and through their own expressivity; yet little research has examined whether parents are inconsistent within or between these socialization domains. The author presents a heuristic model of inconsistency in parents' emotion socialization. Parents (M age = 34.8 years, 85% mothers) of preschool-aged children (M age = 4.5 years, 53% female) reported on their responses to children's emotions, their own expressivity, child emotion regulation and expressivity, child social competence, and child internalizing and externalizing. Parents were largely consistent in their emotion socialization, with one exception being that some highly negatively expressive parents punished children's negative expressivity. This pairing of inconsistent socialization behaviors interacted to explain variance in child emotion regulation and internalizing. The author discusses the implications and limitations of the findings and directions for future research.     

On inconsistent entities. A reply to Colyvan

In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment to inconsistent entities. Colyvan’s argument could be interpreted, and in part is presented, as a reductio of Quinean scientific realism; yet, Colyvan in the end manifests some willingness to bite the bullet, and provides some reasons why we shouldn’t feel too uncomfortable with those entities. In this paper we wish to indicate a way out to the scientific realist, by arguing that no indispensability argument of the kind suggested by Colyvan is actually available. To begin with, in order to run such an indispensability argument we should be justified in believing that an inconsistent theory is true; yet, in so far as the logic we accept is a consistent one it is arguable that our epistemic predicament could not be possibly one in which we are justified in so believing. Moreover, also if our logic admitted true contradictions, as Dialetheism does, it is arguable that Colyvan’s indispensability argument could not rest on a true premise. As we will try to show, dialetheists do not admit true contradictions for cheap: they do so just as a way out of paradox, namely whenever we are second-level ignorant as to the metaphysical possibility of evidence breaking the parity among two or more inconsistent claims; Colyvan’s examples, however, are not of this nature. So, even under the generous assumption that Dialetheism is true, we will conclude that Colyvan’s argument doesn’t achieve its surprising conclusion.     

Emotional agency appraisals influence responses to preference inconsistent information

Bringing together the literature on emotional appraisals and the literature on biased processing in judgment, two studies investigate how incidental emotions varying in valence and agency influence decision making after exposure to preference consistent vs. inconsistent information. We show that emotions differ in their response to preference inconsistent information due to their differences in self vs. other agency appraisals, whereas no emotional differences were found in response to preference consistent information. Negative emotions associated with other agency appraisals increase resistance to preference inconsistent information whereas negative emotions associated with self agency appraisals encourage acceptance of preference inconsistent information relative to neutral conditions. We show this pattern reverses for positive emotions. These effects were driven by changes in confidence after exposure to inconsistent information and reflected in evaluative judgments. We discuss the significance of these findings for the emotions, preference consistency, and decision-making literatures.     

Attitude bolstering when behavior is inconsistent with central attitudes

An experiment was conducted to study the effects of behaving inconsistently with a central attitude. In a theoretical account, it is suggested that subjects who score high on a feminism scale and who fail to solve a sex-role problem and thus demonstrate sexist thinking will be motivated to adopt feminist (nonsexist) behavior more than subjects who are either lower in feminism or who don't fail such a problem. Since the attitude is central, attitude bolstering rather than change in the direction of the behavior should be the preferred mode of inconsistency reduction for such subjects. Bolstering, in the form of positive affirmative action decisions, was generally demonstrated by subjects who failed the sex-role problem. This effect was more pronounced for those highest in feminism. No such effects on affirmative action decisions were observed for subjects who didn't fail the sex-role problem. Results support the view that threats to one's self-image caused by one's own counter-attitudinal actions lead to attempts to reestablish those threatened values. A conceptual analysis of the conditions under which bolstering rather than attitude change in the direction of the behavior should be expected is presented.     

Vection in depth during consistent and inconsistent multisensory stimulation

We examined vection induced during physical or simulated head oscillation along either the horizontal or depth axis. In the first two experiments, during active conditions, subjects viewed radial-flow displays which simulated viewpoint oscillation that was either in-phase or out-of-phase with their own tracked head movements. In passive conditions, stationary subjects viewed playbacks of displays generated in earlier active conditions. A third control, experiment was also conducted where physical and simulated fore-aft oscillation was added to a lamellar flow display. Consistent with ecology, when active in-phase horizontal oscillation was added to a radial-flow display it modestly improved vection compared to active out-of-phase and passive conditions. However, when active fore-aft head movements were added to either a radial-flow or a lamellar-flow display, both in-phase and out-of-phase conditions produced very similar vection. Our research shows that consistent multisensory input can enhance the visual perception of self-motion in some situations. However, it is clear that multisensory stimulation does not have to be consistent (i.e., ecological) to generate compelling vection in depth.     

Minimally Creative Thought

Creativity has received, and continues to receive, comparatively little analysis in philosophy and the brain and behavioural sciences. This is in spite of the importance of creative thought and action, and the many and varied resources of theories of mind. Here an alternative approach to analyzing creativity is suggested: start from the bottom up with minimally creative thought. Minimally creative thought depends non‐accidentally upon agency, is novel relative to the acting agent, and could not have been tokened before the time it is in fact tokened, relative to the agent in question. Thoughts that meet these three conditions—agency, psychological novelty, and modal—are what may be called cognitive breakthroughs. Even if such breakthroughs are not necessary to or definitive of richer creativity, they are indeed central to much of creativity. The minimal analysis provides a more workable explanandum for theories of creativity of varied motivation and method.     

Minimally Sufficient Research

ABSTRACT— Psychology would be improved if researchers stopped using complicated designs, procedures, and statistical analyses for the sole reason that they are able to do so. The present article reviews some of the classic studies in psychology, all of which are breathtakingly simple. The notion of minimally sufficient research is suggested as an ideal worth following. More generally, questions should dictate research methods and statistical analyses, not vice versa.