Francis Bacon's behavioral psychology

Francis Bacon offers two accounts of the nature and function of the human mind: one is a medical-physical account of the composition and operation of spirits specific to human beings, the other is a behavioral account of the character and activities of individual persons. The medical-physical account is a run-of-the-mill version of the late Renaissance model of elemental constituents and humoral temperaments. The other, less well-known, behavioral account represents an unusual position in early modern philosophy. This theory espouses a form of behavioral psychology according to which (a) supposed mental properties are "hidden forms" best described in dispositional terms, (b) the true character of an individual can be discovered in his observable behavior, and (c) an "informed" understanding of these properties permits the prediction and control of human behavior. Both of Bacon's theories of human nature fall under his general notion of systematic science: his medical-physical theory of vital spirits is theoretical natural philosophy and his behavioral theory of disposition and expression is operative natural philosophy. Because natural philosophy as a whole is "the inquiry of causes and the production of effects," knowledge of human nature falls under the same two-part definition. It is an inquisition of forms that pertains to the patterns of minute motions in the vital spirits and the production of effects that pertains both to the way these hidden motions produce behavioral effects and to the way in which a skillful agent is able to produce desired effects in other persons' behavior.     

Why be a good Human Being? Natural Goodness,Reason, and the Authority of Human Nature

The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority-of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism.     

New insight into Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature

In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness.     

董仲舒易学哲学思想探析

董仲舒的易学哲学思想是他的整个哲学体系的核心内容.其内涵丰富而深刻,主要表现在董仲舒赋予<易传>中的"元"以逻辑在先和价值根源之意义,表明"元"是一个价值本体范畴;他把<易传>的"继善成性"论改造为"天止人继"说,反映了人类在宇宙万物中之地位与意义的一种自觉精神;又把<易传>"人文化成"的思想观念发展为一种"人文宇宙观",从宇宙观高度审视人类文化,又从人类文化角度看待宇宙,观与文化观合二为一,表明了宇宙是人类文化创造的本源和基础,而人类文化是宇宙的发展和完善.这就从宇宙观的高度肯定、突出了人文价值的崇高意义.     

东西方文化的人性观差异及其对道德认知的影响

人性观,即认为人性究竟是本善的还是本恶的,不仅是哲学思辨的焦点,也是日常生活中形成的一种常人理论(lay theory)。对于东西方文化传统的检视表明,西方文化占主导地位的是性恶论人性观,东方文化占主导地位的则是性善论人性观。研究通过实证数据支持了这一结论,发现中国被试相对于美国被试,对于人性的主观评定更倾向于性善的一端(研究1)。这种人性观差异导致中国被试在道德方面,尤其是规范性道德(行善)方面,对人提出了更高的要求(研究1),并且这种因果关系得到了启动实验的支持(研究2)。这些研究结果有助于人们更好地理解文化如何塑造了人们对于人性和道德的看法。     

PHILOSOPHY AS ART IN ARISTOTLE’S PROTREPTICUS

Observing certain affinities with Plato’s Alcibiades, this paper argues that a distinction between care (epimeleia) of the soul and philosophy as its art (technê) is reflected in Aristotle’s Protrepticus. On the basis of this distinction, it claims that two notions of philosophy can be distinguished in the Protrepticus: philosophy as epistêmê and philosophy as technê. The former has the function of contemplating the truth of nature, and Aristotle praises it as the natural telos of human beings; whereas philosophy as technê helps nature to accomplish the end it designed for human beings. It emerges that according to Aristotle in the Protrepticus philosophy is the art of making oneself coincide with one’s nature as a human being.     

孟子性善论新探

In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness. Translated by Wang Bei from Qilu Xuekan 齐鲁学刊(Journal of Qilu), 2006, (4): 16–20     

On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to Presence in a Distracted World

In the biblical creation story human beings are depicted as beings ejected from the true home given to them in creation and entrapped in the dynamics of their flight from God. Franz Rosenzweig suggested that modern life is best understood as a type of chronic living death characterized by an animate but nevertheless sterile experience of loss. Following Eric Santner's presentation of this theme in Rosenzweig, this article will explore what it might mean to recover a sense of the goodness of place and particularity. I will examine Santner's suggestion that to become present to ‘place’ is to have undergone the ‘undeadening’ intervention of another person, who offers us an exit route in the midst of the tangle of our lived lives. I will then show how the main lines of his analysis both parallel and offer ways to sharpen important aspects of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account in Creation and Fall of the dynamics of the Fall and the healing of creatures. Human beings are depicted by Bonhoeffer as in need of being transformed into creatures, a theological insight resting on a complex account of creation, and which I will suggest, in conclusion, is a particularly important theme of a Christian gospel that can speak to a world saturated by the desire to be elsewhere.     

Philosophy,Early Modern Intellectual History,and the History of Philosophy

Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic and Aristotelian contemporaries, the article attempts to problematize this notion of pay‐off from an historian's perspective.     

Gaita's Moral Philosophy and the Rational Soul

Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy has a Platonic emphasis on “goodness beyond virtue.” But it also displays an anti‐rationalist tendency, subordinating reason to the immediate responsiveness of human beings to each other. However, Gaita's account of the lucidity on which moral life depends fits ill with this subordination. Some Wittgensteinian remarks that have influenced Gaita are deployed to show that a Platonic rationalist psychology better serves his purposes than does his own, implicitly empiricist, psychology. The conclusion notes that Gaita's more recent work evidences less hostility to rationality.     

Philosophical Sensitivity

Although much has been written about the nature of philosophy and how the discipline can be defined, little attention has been paid to the ways we develop the facility to reflect philosophically or why cultivating this ability is valuable. This article develops a conception of “philosophical sensitivity,” a perceptual capacity that facilitates our awareness of the philosophical dimension of experience. Based in part on Aristotle's notion of a moral perceptual capacity, philosophical sensitivity starts with most people's natural inclinations as children to reflect about life's fundamental mysteries; when this capacity is cultivated with training over time, our attentiveness to the philosophical features of ordinary life becomes almost second nature. In much the same way an aesthetically sensitive person notices certain qualities of experience not readily perceptible by others, philosophical sensitivity involves the development of a particular way of seeing the world.     

Redefining Ecological Ethics: Science,Policy, and Philosophy at Cape Horn

In the twentieth century, philosophy (especially within the United States) embraced the notion of disciplinary expertise: philosophical research consists of working with and writing for other philosophers. Projects that involve non-philosophers earn the deprecating title of "applied" philosophy. The University of North Texas (UNT) doctoral program in philosophy exemplifies the possibility of a new model for philosophy, where graduate students are trained in academic philosophy and in how to work with scientists, engineers, and policy makers. This "field" (rather than "applied") approach emphasizes the inter- and transdisciplinary nature of the philosophical enterprise where theory and practice dialectically inform one another. UNT's field station in philosophy at Cape Horn, Patagonia, Chile is one site for developing this ongoing experiment in the theory and practice of interdisciplinary philosophic research and education.     

幽明之故与天人之际--从船山易学的视域看

易学具有一个言幽明而不言有无的视域,明清之际的思想家王夫之的研究表明,从这个视域可以更为深入地理解中国哲学的基本问题:天人之际.天人之际的根本回答不在于流俗所理解的"天人合一",而在于天人相继.通过天人相继,确立的是人的自由以及人道的基本依据.而且,在幽明之故的视野中,还可以生发出中国古典思想对原善问题的基本理解,善不是别的,正是在人道的畛域内发生的对天人之间的存在连续性的努力.     

Stanislas Breton's Use of Neoplatonism to Interpret the Cross in a Postmodern Setting

In the aftermath of the debate between Derrida and Levinas on Hebraism and Hellenism, Christian thought that retains a place for philosophy is often regarded as "Graeco-Christian", a monolithic system with an unfortunate history. The work of the French philosopher Stansilas Breton suggests that the reality is more complex. In Le Verbe et la croix (Paris, Desclee, 1981), he examines the function of the term logos staurou in Paul, arguing that this untranslatable term stands as a question mark in a world of language that could only speak "Jew" or "Greek". Far from being a sign of Christian superiority, the cross signals an imperative for dispossession intrinsic to Christian language. In its "nothingness" the cross functions as a principle of critique that makes innovation and engagement possible. Thus while the cross involves negation it moves beyond negative theology. Drawing upon neoplatonist philosophy, Breton delineates the way in which the cross makes possible "the writing of the self in the world". This paper draws upon Breton's understanding of the function of the cross to argue that the heritage of Athens endures and must be re-thought, always recognizing the limits of all human language. After examining Breton's understanding of the logos staurou , it relates this notion to his broader understanding of revelation as "writing". Finally it shows how Breton appeals to neoplatonist meonotology to speak in more universal terms of the need for a principle of dispossession at the heart of all religious language. For Christians the cross is this principle, enabling human beings to be causes of themselves who engender new being.     

The Evolution of Consciousness and the Theology of Nature

Theology and philosophy have traditionally assumed a radical split between human beings and the rest of creation. Philosophically, the split is usually justified in terms of a locus humanus , some one cognitive trait that human beings possess and nonhuman animals do not. Theologically, this trait is usually identified as that which makes us in the image of God. Research in animal cognition, however, suggests that we are not unique in as many respects as we think we are. This suggests that we rethink the idea of the image of God. In light of this, I propose that we think of nature itself as being in the image of God, with humankind as part of the broader natural and theological process.     

EVOLUTION, HUMAN VALUES AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

This essay sketches an interpretation of human experience utilizing the perspective of’ process philosophy. Beauty is a key notion, and emergent evolution is a central theme. The following topics are addressed: the emergence of modern evolutionary thinking and alternative responses to it; the nature of human nature in a process perspective; the place of humans in nature; the immanence of laws; emergent evolution on this planet; some implications of the hierarchy of nature for the interpretation of human life, human morality, and human values; and human religious experience.     

INTEGRATING EVOLUTION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF CREATION

Abstract. Science has demonstrated that the universe creates itself through its own history. This history is the result of a probabilistic process, not a deterministic execution of a plan. Science has also documented that human beings are a result of this universal, probabilistic process of general evolution. At first sight, these results seem to contradict Christian teaching. According to the Bible, history is essentially the history of salvation. Human beings therefore are not an "accident of nature" but special creations to be saved. With deeper theological probing, it becomes clearer, however, that creation must create itself. The Christian God is the loving God who enters into a loving relationship with human beings if they desire to reciprocate. If creation could not create itself, human beings could not be free. Without freedom to ignore or reject God's love, the central act of the Christian God, the drama of salvation, would become a parody played by marionettes in the hands of a supernatural manipulator. Christians should welcome the fundamental insight brought forth by science that the universe, including human beings, created itself through its own history. This article will try to show that this scientific insistence is required and confirmed by the intrinsic character of the orthodox, Judeo-Christian concept of God. That nature has to create itself, including human beings, secures human freedom and with it, the responsibility for human actions. From this perspective one might better understand the Bible in the light of God's revelation through the book of nature.     

论人的脆弱性和依赖性

人类所有的脆弱性是人性的一个基本事实。人类的脆弱性与人类的德性需要是内在相关的。但是,在漫长的西方哲学史上,对于人的脆弱性以及人的依赖性这一基本的人性事实却很少有人注意。然而,人类需要承认依赖性的德性。     

Growth,Experience and Nature in Dewey's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

Growth is an important concept in Dewey's philosophy,and,indeed,its ultimate focus.It is not,however,an easy task to posit growth as an ethical ideal,for here Dewey immediately faces a metaphysical dilemma:whether to offer us an objective standard of growth,which becomes a type of absolutism,or to inevitably fall into relativism.This paper explores how Dewey avoids this dilemma with his concept of experience,which is interrogated through the relationship between human beings and nature.Still,human growth in nature involves the cultivation of virtuosities (de德) in accordance with the rhythm of nature,and requires a completely different way of life other than our technological one.For this reason,I use Chinese philosophy,specifically ideas from the Yijing,to show how growth can be illustrated through the interaction between humans and the natural world.     

MARGOLIS ON HISTORY AND NATURE

Abstract: In his philosophy of culture, Joseph Margolis maintains that, although human beings and human societies have a history, there is no human nature in the sense of a fixed essence. I consider objections to Margolis's thesis, beginning with the possibility that nonhuman intelligent species might be in a position to study human behavior from its origins to its demise with the proper distance from our own situation in order to arrive at an understanding of what is essential to human nature, perhaps as a Kantian regulative rather than constitutive principle, and involving abstractions from particular cases and idealizations, as in other branches of science. Finally, I examine the historical-past orientation of Margolis's concept of humanity's self-understanding and its dependence on the intentionality of human thought, and I conclude that it provides an inadequate reason for denying that there can be such a thing as human nature.