Grammatical structure and recall: A function of the space in immediate memory or of recall delay?

Savin and Perchonock suggest that when a sentence and additional unrelated words are presented for immediate recall, the number of words recalled in addition to that sentence represents the space left over in a limited memory store after the sentence and its transformational tag have been stored. They report error data and word-recall data in support of a transformational model of sentence processing. In two replications of that study, error data failed to support the transformational model. Furthermore, the word-recall data could be attributed to differential word-recall delays-the more complex the sentence, the longer the delay between word presentation and word recall. These findings, as well as others in the literature. fail to support a transformational interpretation of sentence processing.     

Does memory affect judgment? Self-generated versus recall memory measures.

Most evidence regarding the independence of memory and judgment comes from studies that used memory measures consisting of Ss' recall of raw input data (recall measures). Such evidence provides the primary support for on-line judgment formation. The results of 2 experiments suggest that self-generated memory measures capture the contents of memory at the time of judgement more effectively than recall measures and, accordingly, are more likely to provide evidence that memory and judgment are related. When directly compared, a self-generated measure provided evidence of a memory-judgment relationship and a recall measure did not. Thus, memory-based judgment formation may be more prevalent than the on-line processing literature suggests.     

Does recognition memory improve with age?

In order to test the hypothesis that recognition is a developmentally stable component of the memory system, age differences in recognition of faces were examined while controlling for nonmemory factors that might contribute to differences between the groups. Three groups of children (mean ages: 3 years, 4 months; 4 years, 9 months; and 6 years, 11 months) and a group of college students were tested on a recognition task and a similar matching task. The results indicated no change in recognition across the preschool years but an improvement from the later preschool period to the first grade. Further analyses indicated that this improvement was not due to changes in decision criteria or perceptual skills. These findings call into question the view that recognition is a developmentally invariant component of the memory system.     

Does spatial information impact immediate verbatim recall of verbal navigation instructions?

The present study addresses the issue of whether spatial information impacts immediate verbatim recall of verbal navigation instructions. Subjects heard messages instructing them to move within a two-dimensional depiction of a three-dimensional space consisting of four stacked grids displayed on a computer screen. They repeated the instructions orally and then followed them manually by clicking with a mouse on the grids. Two groups with identical instructions were compared; they differed only in whether the starting position was indicated before or after the instructions were given and repeated, with no differences in the manual movements to be made. Accuracy on both the oral repetition and manual movement responses was significantly higher when the starting position was indicated before the instructions. The results are consistent with the proposal that there is only a single amodal mental representation, rather than distinct verbal and nonverbal representations, of navigation instructions. The advantage for the before condition was found even for the oral repetition responses, implying that the creation of the amodal representation occurred immediately, while the instructions were being held in working memory. In practical terms, the findings imply that being able to form a mental representation of the movement path while being given verbal navigation instructions should substantially facilitate memory for the instructions and execution of them.     

Does reward depletion influence spatial memory performance?

If spatial memory tasks are considered as foraging problems, it can be predicted that rats' difficulty in learning a win-stay task—revisiting part of a maze where food has recently been found—should be partly overcome if the food is not fully consumed at the first visit (nondepleted reward) rather than being all eaten (depleted reward). Three experiments confirmed and further analysed this result. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that it does not depend on the amount of food initially found; nor is win-stay performance affected by the amount of food actually eaten. Experiment 3 suggested that the effects of nondepleted reward are mainly due to the animals' being interrupted while eating, and very little to the fact that uneaten food is left behind. The results are discussed with regard to their implications for learning theory, and for the application of foraging theory to learning and memory experiments.     

Does visual expertise improve visual recognition memory?

In general, humans have impressive recognition memory for previously viewed pictures. Many people spend years becoming experts in highly specialized image sets. For example, cytologists are experts at searching micrographs filled with potentially cancerous cells and radiologists are expert at searching mammograms for indications of cancer. Do these experts develop robust visual long-term memory for their domain of expertise? If so, is this expertise specific to the trained image class, or do such experts possess generally superior visual memory? We tested recognition memory of cytologists, radiologists, and controls with no medical experience for three visual stimulus classes: isolated objects, scenes, and mammograms or micrographs. Experts were better than control observers at recognizing images from their domain, but their memory for those images was not particularly good (D’ ~ 1.0) and was much worse than memory for objects or scenes (D’ > 2.0). Furthermore, experts were not better at recognizing scenes or isolated objects than control observers.     

Schema anticipation in recall: memory process or report strategy?

Summary This article reports an experimental investigation testing the hypothesis that recall reports are systematically biased by the recaller's knowledge about who is to receive the recall report, while that bias is absent from a recognition test. Subjects listened to one of two versions of a story recounting John's visit to the doctor. After the story was read, subjects were asked to recall the story either with standard-recall instructions or with instructions to recall for peers, for Martians, or for a contest. In a fifth condition, subjects performed a filler activity, viz., the recall of a personal experience. After the recall test subjects were administered a recognition test. Between the groups no systematic differences in memory performance were observed in the recognition test. Recall for peers appeared to be poorer than recall in the other conditions. Subjects in the recall for a contest condition scored higher than the subjects in the other groups. Not only did groups differ with respect to bias, but there were also systematic differences in the memory or discrimination scores. The findings are discussed within the framework of schema theory.     

Recognition and recall in slow movements: separate memory states?

If slow positioning movements are governed only by a recognition process (e.g., Schmidt, 1975) then subject's performance should be independent of the mode or response (active versus passive). Two groups learned a criterion movement under either active or passive conditions following which KR was withdrawn. Although no differences were apparent on acquisition trials, active-group performance deteriorated dramatically during KR withdrawal while passive-group performance remained stable. These results suggest that recall and recognition are potentially separable in slow movements on the basis of the information available to the performer.     

Does strategic memory training improve the working memory performance of younger and older adults?

The paper examines the effect of strategic training on the performance of younger and older adults in an immediate list-recall and a working memory task. The experimental groups of younger and older adults received three sessions of memory training, teaching the use of mental images to improve the memorization of word lists. In contrast, the control groups were not instructed to use any particular strategy, but they were requested to carry out the memory exercises. The results showed that strategic training improved performance of both the younger and older experimental groups in the immediate list recall and in the working memory task. Of particular interest, the improvement in working memory performance of the older experimental group was comparable to that of the younger experimental group.     

Separate memory laws for recall of performed acts?

The present study was inspired by an experimental report by Cohen (1981). where recall of subject performed minitasks was demonstrated to give serial position curves without primacy effect. The question raised was whether this deviation implied the formulation of new memory laws. Eight new experiments were conducted. Two of them replicated Cohen's observations; one with concretely performed acts, and one with symbolically performed acts. A third experiment examined recall of proposed, nonperformed acts, with results similar to those found in the other minitask experiments. Four experiments studied the effect of visually imagining act performance, again with results which demonstrated the existence of interesting similarities between the different types of act recall. Several of the experiments explored the role of self-involvement and task familiarity, and the last experiment was specially designed to test a task-difficulty hypothesis. The results were discussed in terms of a representation-system theory, a nonstrategic lack-of-rehearsal interpretation, and in terms of a general problem-solving account. None of these theories were found, all observations taken together, to have been clearly supported or clearly disproved, and more evidence was therefore deemed necessary before new memory laws need to be postulated.     

Does the radial arm maze necessarily test spatial memory?

Since its design 25 years ago (Olton & Samuelson, 1976), the eight-arm radial maze has become very popular and is now widely used to assess spatial memory in rodents. Two versions of the full-baited maze protocol are present in the literature: with or without confinement between the visit of each arm. The confinement was introduced by Olton himself as early as 1977 (Olton, Collison, & Werz, 1977) to eliminate stereotypic behaviors that he had previously observed. It is widely regarded that the confinement prevents rodents from developing these response patterns, and as such it is considered an improved procedure to test spatial memory. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been especially designed to demonstrate the efficacy of the confinement in blocking the stereotypic behaviors of the animals. The present study compares the strategies of rats trained with or without a confinement procedure. The results show that, after nine days of training, rats submitted to a 5- or a 10-s confinement reach the same level of performance as rats without confinement. The confinement totally prevents stereotypic behaviors like clockwise serial searching strategies which are often observed without confinement. Even a 0-s confinement is sufficient to prevent clockwise strategies, but rats seem to develop other stratagems which do not imply spatial memory. Furthermore, rats previously trained without confinement are unable to perform the task when confinement is introduced on a test day. In contrast, rats previously trained with confinement perform the task correctly when the confinement is no longer present. Thus, without confinement, good levels of performance can be achieved without precise spatial representations.     

Detection of changes in spatial position: Short-term visual memory or motion perception?

The limiting conditions for short-term visual memory were explored for materials which are not readily codable. Two fields of random dots were presented successively in time. On half of the observations, the second display was identical to the first, and on the other half, a fraction of the dots was displaced relative to the first display. The task of the S was to indicate if any of the dots had moved (displacement detection), and in separate tests, if any of the dots had not moved (stationarity detection). Stationarity and displacement detection are largely related to the same variables, although performance is somewhat better with displacement detection. Discrimination of small displacements is critically dependent upon the interval between displays, with maximum accuracy in the region of 64 msec for briefly presented displays. Maximum accuracy is obtained under conditions which yield good apparent motion. By contrast, displacement discrimination is, within limits, relatively independent of the number of dots displayed, of the fraction of displaced dots.     

Short report: Is spatial information encoded automatically in memory?

A dual-task paradigm was used to test Hasher and Zacks' (1979) hypothesis that spatial memory is automatic. Subjects saw two sets of 16 words each, the words being presented singly in random corners of a monitor screen. They were asked to remember the words and the corner in which each word was shown. In addition, subjects were given a concurrent task to perform. This task was either “easy” (counting aloud by ones) or “difficult” (counting aloud by sevens). Attention was focused either on the memory task or on the counting task. Word recognition was better when subjects carried out the easier competing counting task and when subjects concentrated mainly upon remembering the words and their positions. Contingent spatial memory was unaffected by either manipulation, supporting the hypothesis that spatial memory is automatic.     

Grounding and anchoring: on the structure of Epstein’s social ontology

Brian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?     

Slowhand: Does time perception change in peri-hand space?

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - A variety of attentional and perceptual changes occur in peri-hand space, including increases in visual temporal acuity. These changes in cognition have been...     

Modulation of working memory updating: Does long-term memory lexical association matter?

The aim of the present study was to investigate how working memory updating for verbal material is modulated by enduring properties of long-term memory. Two coexisting perspectives that account for the relation between long-term representation and short-term performance were addressed. First, evidence suggests that performance is more closely linked to lexical properties, that is, co-occurrences within the language. Conversely, other evidence suggests that performance is linked more to long-term representations which do not entail lexical/linguistic representations. Our aim was to investigate how these two kinds of long-term memory associations (i.e., lexical or nonlexical) modulate ongoing working memory activity. Therefore, we manipulated (between participants) the strength of the association in letters based on either frequency of co-occurrences (lexical) or contiguity along the sequence of the alphabet (nonlexical). Results showed a cost in working memory updating for strongly lexically associated stimuli only. Our findings advance knowledge of how lexical long-term memory associations between consonants affect working memory updating and, in turn, contribute to the study of factors which impact the updating process across memory systems.     

Does a person selectively recall the good or the bad from their personal past? It depends on the recall target and the person’s favourability of self-views

In three studies, participants remembered real-life behaviours at Time 1 and attempted to recall them at Time 2. When the recall target was the self, a positivity bias emerged: self-positivity. In Study 3, self-positivity extended to an individual (target) who was liked by the participant, but did it not extend to a disliked target. For this latter target, a negativity bias emerged. For recall targets that were participants’ acquaintances, self-positivity in recall was also eliminated in Studies 1 and 3, and a negativity bias in recall emerged in Study 2. Finally, in Study 2 (but not Study 3), the favourability of participants’ self-view predicted the magnitude of the self-positivity in self-recall, but it did not predict valence effects in other-recall. Taken together, the results indicate that the link between behaviour valence and recall is moderated by the recall target and the favourability of one’s self-view.     

Verbal and spatial short-term memory: common sources of developmental change?

Verbal and spatial span, articulation and tapping rate, and verbal and spatial speed-of-search tasks were administered to sixty 6- to 12-year-olds. A variance-partitioning procedure was then used to identify age-related and age-invariant components of variance in span. Outcomes were very similar for verbal and spatial span, in particular, (i) most of the age-related variance was shared by the speed-of-search and rate predictors, (ii) articulation rate provided an age-independent contribution, (iii) changing-state versions of predictor tasks did not account for variance over steady-state versions, and (iv) predictors of the same modality as the span task did not outperform predictors of the other modality. We conclude that verbal and spatial short-term memory appear to rely on similar processes when serial recall is required and that developments in span are closely tied to increases in processing speed.     

Are space and time automatically integrated in episodic memory?

The aim of the present study was to determine to what extent spatial and temporal features are automatically integrated during encoding in episodic memory. Both nameable and non-nameable stimuli were presented sequentially at different locations on a computer screen. Mixed and pure blocks of trials were used. In the mixed blocks participants were instructed to focus either on the spatial or the temporal order of the objects, as on the majority of the trials recall of this feature was tested (expected trials). However, on a few trials participants had to reproduce the other feature (unexpected trials). In the pure blocks either the spatial or the temporal order of the objects was tested on all trials. More errors were made on unexpected than on expected trials of the mixed blocks. Moreover, no primacy or recency effects were found when performance on the spatial task was plotted as a function of the temporal position. These results suggest that spatial information and temporal order information rely on separate encoding processes.