(Math, Science, ?)

In science as in mathematics, it is popular to know little and resent much about category theory. Less well known is how common it is to know little and like much about set theory. The set theory of almost all scientists, and even the average mathematician, is fundamentally different from the formal set theory that is contrasted against category theory. The latter two are often opposed by saying one emphasizes Substance, the other Form. However, in all known systems of mathematics throughout history, mathematicians have moved fluidly between ideas conceived of as thing-like, property-like, and process-like. On the other hand one way to advance science is to better distinguish between thing, property, and process. All this constitutes a distracting background for those interested in, or distressed by, the possible application of category theory to science, and to mathematics as well.     

Self-knowledge,belief, ability (and agency?)

Matthew Boyle [(2011). “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, and that these simply disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge, along the lines of that defended by John Hyman [(1999). “How knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433–451; John Hyman (2015). Action, Knowledge, and the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, there is no explanatory role for (B) left to play.     

Blinding me with (queer) science: religion, sexuality, and (post?) modernity

This essay brings to bear insights from continental philosophers Michel Foucault and Judith Butler on the science of (homo)sexuality and, more importantly, the desire to use such science to resolve contemporary conflicts over homosexuality’s acceptability. So-called “queer science” remains deeply beholden to modern notions of sex, gender, and sexuality, the author argues, a schematic that its premodern (Christian) roots further denaturalize. The philosophical insights drawn from this analysis are then applied to the controversy over homosexuality within global Christianity that often pits the “backward” former colonies against the “modern” west.     

Legacies,archives, afterlife: re-envisioning the Li-La-Lo theatre (Tel Aviv, 1944–1948)

This article suggests re-reading documents that remain from Li-La-Lo theatrical events, which include playbills, programmes, photos, archive files, and television shows. Through this historiographic way of working, that is, the re-reading of what remains from past performances but differently, this article will demonstrate what Tel Aviv offered to the artists, what the theatre as a cultural institution offered to the residents of the city and, in the broader circle, how Li-La-Lo was an intersection of performance traditions. Historical circumstances brought the Li-La-Lo artists to Tel Aviv, and the leaders and residents of the city, who cultivated normalcy, enabled them to continue to do what they knew best: perform. Thus, performance artists strengthened Tel Aviv’s status as a cultural centre, a symbol, and embodiment of cultural heterogeneity.     

In the beginning was the rhyme? A reflection on Hulme,Hatcher, Nation,Brown, Adams,and Stuart (2002)

Phonological sensitivity at different grain sizes is a good predictor of reading acquisition in all languages. However, prior to any explicit tuition in alphabetic knowledge, phonological sensitivity develops at the larger grain sizes-syllables, onsets, and rimes-in all languages so far studied. There are also developmental differences in the grain size of lexical representations and reading strategies across orthographies. Phoneme-level skills develop fastest in children acquiring orthographically consistent languages with a simple syllabic (CV) structure, such as Finnish and Italian. For English, however, both "large" and "small" units are important for the successful acquisition of literacy.     

Does familiarity breed contempt or liking? Comment on Reis, Maniaci, Caprariello, Eastwick, and Finkel (2011)

Reis, Maniaci, Caprariello, Eastwick, and Finkel (see record 2011-04644-001) conducted 2 studies that demonstrate that in certain cases, familiarity can lead to liking--in seeming contrast to the results of our earlier article (see record 2006-23056-008). We believe that Reis et al. (a) utilized paradigms far removed from spontaneous, everyday social interactions that were particularly likely to demonstrate a positive link between familiarity and liking and (b) failed to include and incorporate other sources of data-both academic and real-world-showing that familiarity breeds contempt. We call for further research exploring when and why familiarity is likely to lead to contempt or liking, and we suggest several factors that are likely to inform this debate.