The generalization of shared reality: When communication about one target shapes evaluations of other targets

Communicators often tune their message about a target to the audience's attitude toward that target. This tuning can shape a communicator's own evaluation of the target, which reflects the creation of a shared reality with the audience. So far, evidence for shared‐reality creation has been confined to one specific target. In two experiments, we examined whether and when a shared reality would generalize to other targets. In Experiment 1, shared‐reality creation about an ambiguous sexist target generalized to the evaluation of a new ambiguous sexist target for which no audience attitude was provided. However, this happened only when there was high (vs. low) commonality with the audience regarding previous judgments. In Experiment 2, we investigated conditions for the temporal persistence of generalization. One week after message tuning to a high‐commonality audience, a shared reality generalized to a new ambiguous sexist target when participants recalled the shared‐reality creation about the initial target, but it did not generalize in conditions without such recall. Also, no generalization occurred for non‐ambiguous or non‐sexist targets. Results suggest that shared reality generalization depends on perceived commonality with the audience, recollection of shared reality at time of judgment, and similarity between new and initial targets.     

Creating shared reality about ambiguous sexual harassment: The role of stimulus ambiguity in audience-tuning effects on memory

By tuning messages about ambiguous information to their audience's attitude, communicators can reduce uncertainty and form audience-congruent memories. This effect has been conceptualized as the creation of shared reality with the audience. We applied this approach to representations of ambiguous antecedents of sexual harassment and examined whether the effect depends on the event's perceived ambiguity. Participants read a testimony about a supervisor's ambiguous behaviors toward a female employee and described the behaviors to an audience who had previously evaluated him positively or negatively. We manipulated perceived ambiguity of the testimony by including or omitting information about eventual, clear-cut harassment (known vs. unknown outcome). As predicted, participants aligned their messages and memory with their audience's evaluation only in the unknown-outcome condition, where epistemic uncertainty was higher. The findings highlight the role of epistemic needs in the communicative creation of a shared reality about a ubiquitous social situation with potentially harmful outcomes.     

How communication goals determine when audience tuning biases memory

After tuning their message to suit their audience's attitude, communicators' own memories for the original information (e.g., a target person's behaviors) often reflect the biased view expressed in their message--producing an audience-congruent memory bias. Exploring the motivational circumstances of message production, the authors investigated whether this bias depends on the goals driving audience tuning. In 4 experiments, the memory bias was found to a greater extent when audience tuning served the creation of a shared reality than when it served alternative, nonshared reality goals (being polite toward a stigmatized-group audience; obtaining incentives; being entertaining; complying with a blatant demand). In addition, the authors found that these effects were mediated by the epistemic trust in the audience-congruent view but not by the rehearsal or accurate retrieval of the original input information, the ability to discriminate between the original and the message information, or a contrast away from extremely tuned messages. The central role of epistemic trust, a measure of the communicators' experience of shared reality, was supported in meta-analyses across the experiments.     

Audience-tuning effects on memory: the role of shared reality

After tuning to an audience, communicators' own memories for the topic often reflect the biased view expressed in their messages. Three studies examined explanations for this bias. Memories for a target person were biased when feedback signaled the audience's successful identification of the target but not after failed identification (Experiment 1). Whereas communicators tuning to an in-group audience exhibited the bias, communicators tuning to an out-group audience did not (Experiment 2). These differences did not depend on communicators' mood but were mediated by communicators' trust in their audience's judgment about other people (Experiments 2 and 3). Message and memory were more closely associated for high than for low trusters. Apparently, audience-tuning effects depend on the communicators' experience of a shared reality.     

Creating shared reality in interpersonal and intergroup communication: the role of epistemic processes and their interplay

We describe research on the creation of shared reality in communication, emphasizing the epistemic processes that allow communicators to achieve confident judgements and evaluations about a communication topic. We distinguish three epistemic inputs: (1) the communicator’s own judgement about the topic (judgement of communicator); (2) the communicator’s perception of the audience’s judgement about the topic (judgement of audience); and (3) the communicator’s message to the audience about the topic (message of communicator). We argue that the influence of each input increases with the communicator’s confidence in the validity of that input. We review a variety of empirical studies in terms of this framework. We also address barriers to shared-reality creation in intergroup communication and describe interventions that work by increasing the validity strength of judgement of an outgroup audience. We discuss the relation between the present research and other approaches to social influence and social sharing.     

Eye Remember What Happened: Eye‐Closure Improves Recall of Events but not Face Recognition

Eye‐closure improves event recall. We investigated whether eye‐closure can also facilitate subsequent performance on lineup identification (Experiment 1) and face recognition tasks (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants viewed a theft, recalled the event with eyes open or closed, mentally rehearsed the perpetrator's face with eyes open or closed, and viewed a target‐present or target‐absent lineup. Eye‐closure improved event recall, but did not significantly affect lineup identification accuracy. Experiment 2 employed a face recognition paradigm with high statistical power to permit detection of potentially small effects. Participants viewed 20 faces and were later asked to recognize the faces. Thirty seconds before the recognition task, participants either completed an unrelated distracter task (control condition), or were instructed to think about the face with their eyes open (rehearsal condition) or closed (eye‐closure condition). We found no differences between conditions in discrimination accuracy or response criterion. Potential explanations and practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Combating Co‐witness contamination: Attempting to decrease the negative effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Witnesses who discuss an event with others often incorporate misinformation encountered during the discussion into their memory of the event. Two experiments were conducted to establish whether this memory conformity also occurs in the context of an interview and whether it is possible to reduce the effect. Participants viewed a crime‐video which they then discussed with a co‐witness. Some participants were warned they may have been exposed to misinformation during the discussion before all were interviewed individually. In Experiment 1, participants made remember/know judgments about each component of their free recall, and in Experiment 2 they were asked to indicate the source of their memories. Co‐witness information was incorporated into participants' testimony, and this effect could not be significantly reduced using warnings and source‐monitoring instructions. Remember/know judgments may be useful in distinguishing ‘real’ memories from false memories. We make some recommendations regarding the interviewing of witnesses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of experienced versus non‐experienced suggestions on children's recall of repeated events

Three experiments were conducted to test the proposition that children's suggestibility about an occurrence of a repeated event is heightened when an interviewer suggests false details that were experienced in non‐target occurrences of the event as opposed to new details that never occurred. In each experiment, children participated in a repeated event during which specific items varied each time (e.g. the children always got a sticker but the theme of the sticker was different in each occurrence). Separate biasing and memory interviews were then conducted. In Experiment 1, the interviewer merely suggested that the false details might have occurred in the event. In the remaining experiments, the suggested details were clearly linked to the target occurrence with either a contextual or temporal cue. The potential moderating effect of the child's age (Experiment 1) and the retention interval (Experiments 1 and 2) were also examined. Consistent with the initial hypothesis, suggestions about experienced (non‐target) details were more likely to be repeated by the children compared to suggestions about non‐experienced details. In Experiments 2 and 3, experienced suggestions were also more likely to inhibit children's recall of the target occurrence. The relevance and generalizability of these findings to the legal setting are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective retrieval and induced forgetting in eyewitness memory

This study analyses retrieval‐induced forgetting (RIF) in eyewitness memory. Selective retrieval of specific information about an event could cause eyewitnesses to forget related contents. Based on a video of a man being robbed while withdrawing money from a cash machine, we examined the effects of partial retrieval on the most relevant aspects of the event: actions (Experiment 1) and offender characteristics (Experiment 2), in both immediate and long‐term recall (24 hours). In both experiments long‐term recall was a replica of immediate recall for correct information as well as errors. The effects of partial retrieval practice were also repeated in long‐term recall. Conventional RIF was found for offender characteristics but selective retrieval of the actions of the event produced no comparable effect. It is assumed that the organisation and integration of the actions of the event protected them from RIF. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Influence of recorder affect on the content of behavioural diaries and the recall of behaviours

Two experiments are described. In Experiment 1, supervisors (N = 4) kept daily performance diaries for each of four subordinates over an eight‐week period. In Experiment 2, students (N = 48) kept behavioural diaries for their instructor over a three‐week period. Daily measures of positive and negative affect were used to predict the favourability, person‐typicality and behavioural specificity of diary entries. Diary‐keepers tended to record behaviours that were consistent with their affect levels. Analyses of the variability of the favourability and person‐typicality ratings further suggested that high negative affect induced diary‐keepers to make fine discriminations among events, while high positive affect induced diary‐keepers to perceive events as similar. Diary‐keeper affect and the three diary content variables were used to predict memory for the diary entries. Diary‐keepers in Experiment 1 reported higher recall for negative behaviours than for positive behaviours, particularly if the behaviours were typical of others. This same negativity effect in recall emerged in Experiment 2, but only when there was low consistency in the positive affect experienced by diary‐keepers at encoding and recall. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing at Second Hand

Participants on both sides of the contemporary debate between reductionism and anti‐reductionism about testimony commonly describe testimonial knowledge as knowledge acquired at second hand. I argue that fully appreciating the distinctive sense in which testimonial knowledge is secondhand supports anti‐reductionism over reductionism but also that it supports a particular kind of anti‐reductionism very different from that typically offered in the literature. Testimonial knowledge is secondhand in the demanding sense of being justified by the authority of a speaker where this requires that epistemic responsibility for meeting challenges to the audience's testimonial knowledge is shared between speaker and audience. The epistemic credentials of testimonial knowledge are in this sense importantly interpersonal.     

The role of the physical context in supporting young children's use of spatiotemporal organization in recall

Four experiments were conducted to investigate the role of the physical context in supporting 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' use of spatiotemporal organization in recall. Children were familiarized with several target items and their corresponding landmarks arranged along a path in a model park. After familiarization, an experimenter removed the target items from the park. In Experiment 1, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds recalled the missing items with the park either in view or out of view. When the park model was in view, 4‐ year‐olds used the order of the items along the path to structure their recall. In Experiment 2, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds recalled the missing items with the landmarks arranged either in the same order as in familiarization or in a new order. Children used the order of landmarks along the path at test to structure their recall, even though the order of landmarks changed from familiarization to test. Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except that the path was removed from the park. Five‐year‐olds used the order of landmarks along the path at test to structure their recall when the order of landmarks remained the same from familiarization to test, but had much more difficulty doing so when the order of landmarks changed from familiarization to test. Using a more difficult task, Experiment 4 revealed that spatiotemporal organization was positively related to amount recalled. Together, these findings suggest that the structure of the physical environment plays an important role in supporting young children's use of spatiotemporal organization in recall.     

Drawings as memory aids: Optimising the drawing method to facilitate young children's recall

There has been supportive evidence of drawing facilitating young children's event recall. The present study investigated whether additional event details are recalled if the interviewer uses interactive questions in response to information children have spontaneously drawn or verbally reported. Eighty 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds were shown a video clip of a novel event and were interviewed the following day. The children were randomly allocated to one of four recall conditions: tell‐only, draw‐and‐tell, interactive draw‐and‐tell and interactive tell‐only. The children's verbal reports were transcribed and scored on four different categories of recall: items (objects and people), actions, colours and sayings. The interactive draw‐and‐tell group recalled more correct information for items compared to the other three recall groups, without any accompanying increase in errors. We propose that drawing increases the opportunity for the interviewer to ask interactive questions, which in turn facilitates children's accurate recall of item information. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uncertainty matters: impact of stimulus ambiguity on infant social referencing

Most infant social referencing studies have assumed that infants would be more likely to engage in social looking and be influenced by adults' message when a context is ambiguous. The present study empirically tested the effect of stimulus ambiguity on infants' referencing behaviours, with three different stimuli (positive, ambiguous, and negative), two different messages (happy and fearful), two different message providers (mother and stranger), and in two age groups (12 and 16 month olds). A typical social referencing paradigm was used and infants' social looking and regulation were measured. Infants looked at adults more frequently and faster during ambiguous situations than during unambiguous situations. They also tended to regulate their affect and behaviour based on adults' message only towards ambiguous toys. Older infants tended to look at adults faster, and showed stronger reactions towards ambiguous stimuli than younger infants, suggesting that infants' social development may moderate the effect of stimulus ambiguity on social referencing. Overall, results indicated that the ambiguity postulate is a legitimate assumption for infant social referencing. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“说出即相信”效应的影响因素和理论解释

在人际沟通中, 沟通者向听众态度方向调整关于目标人物的信息, 并且随后沟通者对目标人物的记忆和评价也会出现相应的偏差, 这就是“说出即相信”效应。“说出即相信”效应的影响因素包括沟通目的、反馈、沟通者与听众的关系、求知需求、沟通者的人格特征等。研究者用基本信息过程、认知失调理论、分享现实理论等来解释这一效应。未来的研究可以将这一效应推广到群体领域, 完善理论机制并开展更多的应用研究。     

He is smarter when he looks smart in front of many versus a few others: Impact of audience size on target appraisals in a cross-cultural context

Will a person be seen as more superior if he or she receives an award in front of a large audience in comparison with a small audience? We predicted that this would hold true for East Asians, whose cultural logic of face asserts that a person's worth can only be conferred by collective others, but would not hold true for European Americans, whose cultural logic of dignity promotes the judgement of a person's worth based on their own perspective. This study found an audience-size effect for East Asians, in which participants gave higher appraisals to a target when they imagined the target's high performance to have been seen by 10 other people (vs. one other person) even when the target's performance level remained constant. In contrast, Westerners were not affected by the size of the audience witnessing the target's performance. In addition, perceived social reputation was found to mediate the audience-size effect; the participants imagining the target performing well in front of 10 others (vs. one other) perceived others as thinking more highly of the target; this in turn led participants to give higher appraisals to the target. As expected, this mediation effect was only found for East Asians.     

Selective exposure among advisors: the impact of impression motivation

Audience confirmation bias (ACB) refers to the extent to which people prefer information supporting (vs. conflicting with) their audience's views. In two studies, we showed that advisors shifted their ACB toward the needs of their advisees (i.e., audience): When advisors were led to believe that their advisees wanted to defend their views, the ACB was higher compared with when advisees were open minded for critique. Study 2 indicated that this pattern occurred because advisors wanted to have a pleasant interaction with their advisees (impression motivation): Whereas impression‐motivated advisors exhibited a stronger ACB when they were asked to give advice to a defensive (vs. open‐minded) advisee, accuracy‐motivated advisors showed a balanced ACB, regardless of their advisee's needs.     

Is the Medium the Message? A Study of the Effects of Media,Communicator, and Message Characteristics on Attitude Change1

The present study examined the interactive effects of type of media, communicator, and position of message on persuasiveness of the communication. Subjects received a communication over television, radio (audio tape), or written medium, which either agreed with a position they held or strongly disagreed with it. The communicator was either a newscaster or a candidate for political office. The results indicated that subjects felt the newscaster to be more trustworthy than the candidate. In line with previous research, there was no main effect of media on persuasiveness. However, media interacted with the other variables so that when the communication disagreed with the audience, television was the most persuasive medium with the newscaster but the least persuasive with the untrusted candidate. There was no effect for media when the message agreed with the audience. Further, the candidate taking a position congruent with the audience's was rated as more attractive but less trustworthy than a candidate taking the opposite position. It was suggested that television may be the most involving medium and that either a counterargument theory or reactance theory could explain why it was not effective with the candidate.