Situated minimalism versus free enrichment

In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing.     

The production and understanding of utterances in dyadic communication

Verbal communication in four dyads was analyzed with respect to syntactic form and cognitive and affective functions. Quantitative and qualitative methods were proposed to study these aspects of language behaviour. Utterances which conveyed a negative affective evaluation tended to be syntactically and cognitively complex. The cognitive and affective functions of a speaker's utterance tended to influence the syntactic quality of the listener's following utterance more than what the listener said in his own previous utterance. An investigation of the relationships between the personality characteristics flexibility, intelligence and verbal competence, and language variables suggested that flexible subjects often used utterances which expressed a positive evaluation. Furthermore, flexible subjects tended to influence the listener more by what they said than intelligent and verbally competent subjects did. It was concluded that this kind of functional analysis of language should be more adequate for psychological inquiry than in particular that of the transformational generative theory of language.     

Relevance theory,pragmatic inference and cognitive architecture

Relevance Theory (RT) argues that human language comprehension processes tend to maximize “relevance,” and postulates that there is a relevance-based procedure that a hearer follows when trying to understand an utterance. Despite being highly influential, RT has been criticized for its failure to explain how speaker-related information, either the speaker’s abilities or her/his preferences, is incorporated into the hearer’s inferential, pragmatic process. An alternative proposal is that speaker-related information gains prominence due to representation of the speaker within higher level goal-directed schemata. Yet the goal-based account is still unable to explain clearly how cross-domain information, for example linguistic meaning and speaker-related knowledge, is integrated within a modular system. On the basis of RT’s cognitive requirements, together with contemporary cognitive theory, we argue that this integration is realized by utilizing working memory and that there exist conversational constraints with which the constructed utterance interpretation should be consistent. We illustrate our arguments with a computational implementation of the proposed processes within a general cognitive architecture.

Abbreviations: ACT-R Adaptive Control of Thought - RationalCOGENT Cognitive Objects within a Graphical ENvironmenTCS/SS Contention Scheduling/Supervisory SystemRBCP Relevance-Based Comprehension ProcedureRT Relevance Theory     

Constructions as categories of language

What causes children to categorize distinct utterances they hear into a constructional generalization? That is, what makes subjects create a constructional category instead of treating each utterance as a distinct unrelated idiom? One simple factor that encourages the learning of abstract categories is shared concrete similarity. When instances share concrete attributes, learners are more likely to categorize them together, and moreover are more likely to attend to their abstract commonalities [Gentner, D., & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development rules. Cognition, 66, 236-297; Markman, A.B., & Gentner D. (1993). Splitting the difference: A structural alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 517-535]. This paper reports results that confirm the prediction that presentation of items with concrete shared similarity early in training enhances language learning in adults.     

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from ‘some X-ed’ to ‘not all X-ed’ are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying ‘some X-ed’ when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach.     

Source attributions and false memories: a test of the demand characteristics account

When lists of related words are presented to subjects, they sometimes recall or recognize nonpresented words related to those lists (critical lures). In fact, subjects sometimes claim to remember which of two speakers said the critical lures. We examined whether this finding could be accounted for by demand characteristics. If subjects’ willingness to make source attributions to critical lures reflects experimental demand, one would predict that subjects should be willing to change and should have little confidence in these attributions. Subjects made more attributions, were less likely to change their attributions, and were more confident in their attributions for critical lures than for unrelated distractors. Subjects had even more confidence in the attributions that they made for words that had actually been presented, and they were even less likely to change these attributions. These findings suggest that false memories are quite compelling but that they are also subtly different from true memories.     

Effects of changes in narrative time on eye movements and recognition responses

Abstract

Gibbs and O'Brien (1990) recently claimed that the images that people associate with everyday idioms reflect the deep conceptual metaphors that underlie the meanings of those idioms. However, because idiomatic strings can convey both a literal and an idiomatic meaning, people must be able to inhibit or ignore literal meanings if they are to produce mental images that uniquely reflect idiomatic meanings. We investigated the potential interference between literal and idiomatic meanings in three experiments. Experiment 1 used a mental-image production task similar to that used by Gibbs and O'Brien. Counter to Gibbs and O'Brien's claim, the images that we obtained referred overwhelmingly to the literal meanings of idiomatic strings rather than to their idiomatic meanings. Experiments 2 and 3 employed a paraphrase verification task to examine the effects of mental imagery on idiom comprehension. If the images associated with an idiom reflect that idiom's meaning, then imagery should facilitate comprehension. No evidence for facilitation was found in either experiment. Instead, imagery interfered with comprehension, as assessed by paraphrase verification time, both for idiomatic meanings and for literal, concrete meanings. We conclude that the images associated with idioms do not reflect idiom meanings.     

On Alienation from the Built Environment

If “environment” means “that which environs us,” it isn’t clear why environmentalist thinkers so often identify it with nature and not with the built environment that a quick glance around would reveal is what we’re actually environed by. It’s a familiar claim that we’re “alienated from nature,” but I argue that what we’re really alienated from is the built environment itself. Typically talk of alienation from nature involves the claim that we fail to acknowledge nature’s otherness, but the built environment is just as other from us as the natural one. And just as we are said to fail to recognize the role of nature as the origin of everything with which we have to do in the world, so too we fail to recognize the role of socially organized human labor in the objects that surround us. Overcoming alienation would require acknowledging the builtness and the sociality of the world we inhabit.     

Influence of perspective and goals on reference production in conversation

We examined the extent to which speakers take into consideration the addressee's perspective in language production. Previous research on this process had revealed clear deficits (Horton & Keysar, Cognition 59:91-117, 1996; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 34:1466-1481, 2008). Here, we evaluated a new hypothesis--that the relevance of the addressee's perspective depends on the speaker's goals. In two experiments, Korean speakers described a target object in situations in which the perspective status of a competitor object (e.g., a large plate when describing a smaller plate) was manipulated. In Experiment 1, we examined whether speakers would use scalar-modified expressions even when the competitor was hidden from the addressee. The results demonstrated that information from both the speaker's and the addressee's perspectives influenced production. In Experiment 2, we examined whether utterance goals modulate this process. The results indicated that when a speaker makes a request, the addressee's perspective has a stronger influence than it does when the speaker informs the addressee. These results suggest that privileged knowledge does shape language use, but crucially, that the degree to which the addressee's perspective is considered is shaped by the relevance of the addressee's perspective to the utterance goals.     

Determining truth conditions in signaling games

Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of cognitive complexity. Cognition exploits the reliable clustering of events in this space. Using this framework to analyze our ordinary concepts of truth and justification, it appears that while justification can be a simple matter of conforming to historically entrenched strategies, truth cannot be fully specified on the basis of the system’s causal history, but requires a robust clustering in the larger world state space.     

Discriminating between memories: evidence for children's spontaneous elaborations

Children are more confused than adults about memories for what they said and what they imagined saying. The present studies examine the extent to which this confusion is related to the person subjects imagine. In Experiment 1, subjects (7, 10, and adult) said words and imagined someone (themselves, a parent, or a friend) saying other words. They were then asked to distinguish words they said from words they imagined. Performance varied with age as well as with the person subjects imagined. Further, performance was better for words subjects imagined than for words they said. Metamemory responses indicated subjects of all ages remembered elaborative processing activated spontaneously during imagination when discriminating between memories. When the nature of subjects encodings was constrained (i.e., subjects said and imagined someone saying words as part of a sentence completion task. Experiment 2), performance declined for all age groups. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that elaborations reported in response to our metamemory questions occurred during imagination and were not solely prompted by our metamemory questions.     

Avowals and First-Person Privilege

When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.     

Beyond perception: Testing for implicit conceptual traces in high-load tasks

The present commentary addresses the main results obtained in the Butler and Klein [Butler, B. C., & Klein, R. (2009). Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 811–819.] study and discusses them in relation to the Perceptual Load Theory of Lavie [Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 451–68.]. The authors claim that the use of implicit indexes of conceptual distractor processing in high-load situations would be an important addition to the load literature, which would benefit the research field regardless of their positive or negative findings.     

Consciousness and information integration

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.

     

Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein.     

The identification of metaphor

A number of philosophers, linguists and psychologists have made the dual claim that metaphor is cognitively significant and that metaphorical utterances have a meaning not reducible to literal paraphrase. Such a position requires support from an account of metaphorical meaning that can render metaphors cognitively meaningful without the reduction to literal statement. It therefore requires a theory of meaning that can integrate metaphor within its sematics, yet specify why it is not reducible to literal paraphrase. I introduce the idea of a “second-order meaning”, of which metaphor is but one instance, that is a function on literal-conventional, i.e., first-order meaning, and outline a linguistic framework designed to provide a representation of linguistic meaning for both. This framework is designed to represent linguistic units ranging from a single word to an entire text since I argue that the by-now familiar position that the sentence is the appropriate unit for metaphor has mislead us into asking the wrong questions about metaphorical meaning. With this apparatus, we can specify the conditions under which an utterance may transcend the constraints on first-order meaning (transgressions not always apparent on the sentential level), without thereby being “meaningless”. Conversely, we can specify the conditions that may render apparently odd utterances first-order meaningful rather than metaphorical. In this way we see how metaphorical language differs both from deviant language and from specialized language such as technical language, fanciful and fantastical language (in fairy tales, science fiction, etc.).     

Inadequacy of voice recognition as a demonstration of self-deception

Gur and Sackeim (1979) argued that subjects deceived themselves when they failed to recognize their own voices on playback from a tape recorder. This claim is based primarily on the observation that subjects showed a heightened galvanic skin response when their own voices were present regardless of whether recognition took place. The authors suggest that even though subjects may not consciously recognize their own voices, a heightened physiological response implies that true recognition did in fact occur at some other level of cognitive processing. This article describes an experiment demonstrating that results similar to those arrived at by Gur and Sackeim can also be produced when subjects attempt to recognize the voice of a familiar "other." These results suggest that self-deception is not the main factor operating to produce the heightened physiological response.     

Conditions on rate normalization in speech perception

Recent work by Summerfield (1975) and others indicates that a listener’s phonemic judgments may vary with the utterance rate of prior context. In particular, if a phonemic distinction is signaled by a temporal cue such as voice onset time (VOT), faster utterance rates tend to shift the phoneme boundary toward smaller values of that cue. The listener thus appears to “normalize” temporal cues according to utterance rate. In the present experiment, subjects identified syllables varying in VOT ([ga]-[k^ha]) following either a slow or a fast version of the phrase “Teddy hears_ _ _ _ .” Typical normalization effects were observed when the precursor phrase and target syllable had formant frequencies corresponding to an adult male vocal tract. However, a reversal of the typical pattern (i.e., a shift in the perceived voicing boundary towardlarger values of VOT with an increased utterance rate) occurred when the precursor and target had formant frequencies corresponding to an adult female vocal tract. Both normalization and “reverse” normalization effects were reduced or eliminated under several conditions of source change between precursor and target. These conditions included a change in fundamental frequency, a change in implied vocal-tract size (as reflected in an upward or downward scaling of formant frequencies), or both.     

Infants' understanding of object-directed action

When and in what ways do infants recognize humans as intentional actors? An important aspect of this larger question concerns when infants recognize specific human actions (e.g. a reach) as object-directed (i.e. as acting toward goal-objects). In two studies using a visual habituation technique, 12-month-old infants were tested to assess their recognition that an adult's reach is directed toward its target object. Infants in the experimental condition were habituated to a display in which an actor reached over a wall-like barrier with an arcing arm movement, to pick up a ball. After habituation infants saw two test displays, for which the barrier was removed. In the direct test event the actor reached directly for the ball, the arm tracing a visually new path, but the action consistent with attempting to reach for the object as directly as possible. In the indirect test event the actor traced the old path, reaching over in an arc, even though the wall was no longer present. This arm movement was identical to that in habituation but no longer displayed a reach going directly to its object. In a control condition infants saw the same movements but in a situation with no goal-object. In the experimental conditions, with a goal object present, infants looked longer at the indirect test event in comparison to the direct test event. In the control conditions infants looked equally at both indirect and direct test events. We conclude that sensitivity to human object-directed action is established by 12-month-olds and compare these results to recent findings by [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193] and [Woodward, A. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 69, 1-34].