Extension and critique: A response to Robert Young

In response to Robert Young's critical comments concerning Hermeneutics and Education I clarify two issues. First, I suggest that a more detailed account of interpretation and learning could be developed in a hermeneutically informed cognitive psychology. This would be an account that escapes the textual model of silent reading construed as private mental experience, and that acknowledges the social and communicative dimensions of understanding. Second, in contrast to Young's view, I contend that phronesis is not reducible to a set of inner thought processes and that it has a role to play even in a critical social theory of education.     

Statistical analysis of timing errors.

Human rhythmic activities are variable. Cycle-to-cycle fluctuations form the behavioral observable. Traditional analysis focuses on statistical measures such as mean and variance. In this article we show that, by treating the fluctuations as a time series, one can apply techniques such as power spectra and rescaled range analysis to gain insight into the mechanisms underlying the remarkable abilities of humans to perform a variety of rhythmic movements, from maintaining memorized temporal patterns to anticipating and timing their movements to predictable sensory stimuli.     

A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and Laudan's conceptions applied

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice ‘pathologies’ – inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions – are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules.     

Differentiation of a precise timing response

Humans, monkeys, and rats were trained by a process of successive differentiations to press a bar for at least 1.00 sec but for no longer than 1.27 sec. Initially, animals were reinforced for all responses, then a minimum duration of response was gradually differentiated, below which no responses were reinforced. Finally, a maximum duration of response was differentiated above which no responses were reinforced. The duration of response in all three species approximated the minimum duration of response necessary for reinforcement. As the duration of response necessary for reinforcement increased, so did the mean duration of response in the three species. As the maximum allowable duration decreased, further compression of the mean occurred. The fact that the acquisition of the differentiation was approximately the same in all three species is a further indication of the control reinforcement exerts on operant responding.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.     

Mary and femininity: A psychological critique

This essay uses Freud to interpret the symbolism and theology of Mary in modern Catholicism. In her role as the mother of believers, Mary functions to place the Christian in the position of a child who receives illusory gratification from the mother. In her role as model for Christians to emulate, Mary functions to place the Christian in the position of receptivity and dependence which Freud associated with femininity. Reinterpreting Freud from a feminist perspective, I suggest that the kind of femininity Mary represents serves to perpetuate patriachal social structures and to inhibit full psychological maturity.     

Therapist response modes in the exploration stage: timing and effectiveness

In an investigation of the exploration stage of single counselling sessions with 26 anxious female volunteer clients and 13 female doctoral student therapists, no overall association was found between client narrative processing modes and subsequent therapist verbal response modes. There was evidence in a third of the sample for an association between therapist response modes and subsequent client narrative modes, such that clients used more internal than external or reflexive narrative processing modes when therapists used open questions about feelings and reflections of feelings. Client and therapist helpfulness ratings did not differ for different therapist response modes or client narrative process modes. Hence, overall results suggested that all four therapist response modes (open questions about thoughts, open questions about feelings, restatements, reflections of feelings) are effective during the exploration stage.     

PET Flasher: A machine language subroutine for timing visual displays and response latencies

PET Flasher presents a one-line stimulus display at any location on a PET/CBM (Commodore Business Machines) screen and measures reaction time from display onset. Display duration is accurately controlled in 16.7-msec steps, and reaction time measurement is accurate within ±1 msec. PET Flasher is easily incorporated within any PET/CBM BASIC program, since as a subroutine, it is called only when precise timing operations are required.