Piaget and Levy-Bruhl

Levy-Bruhl exerted a powerful influence, seldom considered, on Piaget. The Levy-Bruhlian thesis of a "pre-logical mentality" characterized by "mystical participation" is outlined, together with its initial reception. The first evidence of Piaget's interest in it dates from 1920, and when he began his studies of children's thinking he compared it with that of 'primitives," also adopting Levy-Bruhl's concept of "participation." By 1928 Piaget had elaborated a theory of the social foundations of different types of thought, which he regarded as also explaining the alleged similarity between the thinking of primitives and children. Both are subject to constraint, primitives by elders and children by parents and teachers. Logical as opposed to pre-logical thought was said to depend on cooperation in free social interaction. Piaget continued to maintain essentially the same views long after Levy-Bruhl himself had renounced the notion of pre-logicality.     

Freud and Piaget: The phoney war

This paper explores the relation between the Freudian and Piagetian systems, arguing that the view that they are irreconcilable “schools of thought” stems from arbitrary professional divisions rather than theoretical necessity. The laws of infantile thought according to Piaget, and of the unconscious according to Freud, overlap save in one crucial respect: Piaget's rejection of the fundamental psychoanalytic notion of “thought in the service of desire”.Though a synthesis of these two systems is practicable, and has occasionally been attempted, the paper argues that they are both trapped within a paradigm which ignores the essentially social construction of mind. The way out is suggested by recent developments in both child psychology and psychoanalysis.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.