Arousal, working memory, and conscious awareness in contingency learning

There are wide individual differences in the ability to detect a stimulus contingency embedded in a complex paradigm. The present study used a cognitive masking paradigm to better understand individual differences related to contingency learning. Participants were assessed on measures of electrodermal arousal and on working memory capacity before engaging in the contingency learning task. Contingency awareness was assessed both by trial-by-trial verbal reports obtained during the task and by a short post-task recognition questionnaire. Participants who became aware had fewer non-specific skin conductance responses and tended to score higher on a digit span assessment. Skin conductance level was not significantly lower in the aware group than in the unaware group. These findings are consistent with studies showing that lower arousal and greater cognitive processing capacity facilitate conscious perception of a greater breadth of information within a scene or a task.     

Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.     

Past experience influences object representation in working memory

The nature of object representation in working memory is vital to establishing the capacity of working memory, which in turn shapes the limits of visual cognition and awareness. Although current theories discuss whether representations in working memory are feature-based or object-based, no theory has considered the role of past experience. However, work with humans and non-human primates suggests that once participants learn which features are important for category membership, these diagnostic features become more salient than non-diagnostic features in long-term memory and object recognition. Critically, the brain areas involved in this diagnosticity effect are also recruited during working memory tasks. We report two experiments testing whether a diagnosticity effect exists in working memory; and whether it is present when visual information is encoded into working memory, or if it is the result of maintenance within working memory. Results showed a diagnosticity effect which was present at encoding. Maintenance did not influence the nature of object representation in working memory. These findings show that the meaning we glean from our past experience has a profound influence on the nature of object representation in working memory.     

How rats perform spatial working memory tasks: limitations in the use of egocentric and idiothetic working memory

Rats of the Dark Agouti strain were trained on delayed alternation under conditions that should encourage egocentric working memory. In two experiments a T-maze was set within a cross-maze so that different arms could be used for the sample and test runs. The maze had high opaque side-walls, and testing was conducted in low light levels so that distal visual cues might be eliminated. By rotating the maze 90° between the sample and choice run and by using two identical mazes set side by side it was possible to nullify other spatial strategies. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that rats preferentially used place information, intramaze cues, and direction cues, even though only egocentric or idiothetic (nonmatch-to-turn) working memory could successfully solve every trial. Rats were able to maintain an accurate sense of location within the maze even though distal cues were not visible and the animal was moved between the sample and choice runs. Experiment 2 confirmed that another rat strain (Long-Evans) shows the same learning profiles. Both experiments indicate that rats are very poor at using either egocentric or idiothetic information to alternate, and that retention delays as short as 10 s can eliminate the use of these forms of memory.     

How rats perform spatial working memory tasks: Limitations in the use of egocentric and idiothetic working memory

Rats of the Dark Agouti strain were trained on delayed alternation under conditions that should encourage egocentric working memory. In two experiments a T-maze was set within a cross-maze so that different arms could be used for the sample and test runs. The maze had high opaque side-walls, and testing was conducted in low light levels so that distal visual cues might be eliminated. By rotating the maze 90° between the sample and choice run and by using two identical mazes set side by side it was possible to nullify other spatial strategies. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that rats preferentially used place information, intramaze cues, and direction cues, even though only egocentric or idiothetic (nonmatch-to-turn) working memory could successfully solve every trial. Rats were able to maintain an accurate sense of location within the maze even though distal cues were not visible and the animal was moved between the sample and choice runs. Experiment 2 confirmed that another rat strain (Long-Evans) shows the same learning profiles. Both experiments indicate that rats are very poor at using either egocentric or idiothetic information to alternate, and that retention delays as short as 10 s can eliminate the use of these forms of memory.     

How a high working memory capacity can increase proactive interference

Previous findings suggested that a high working memory capacity (WMC) is potentially associated with a higher susceptibility to proactive interference (PI) if the latter is measured under high cognitive load. To explain such a finding, we propose to consider susceptibility to PI as a net effect of individual executive processes and the intrinsic potential for PI. With the latter, we refer to the amount of information that is activated at a given time and that has the potential to exert PI subsequently. In two studies deploying generalized linear mixed models, susceptibility to PI was modeled as the decline of performance over trials of a complex span task. The results revealed that a higher WMC was associated with a higher susceptibility to PI. Moreover, the number of stimuli recalled in one trial as a proxy variable for the intrinsic potential for PI negatively affected memory performance in the subsequent trial.     

How checking as a cognitive style influences working memory performance

Compulsive checking is known to influence memory, yet there is little consideration of checking as a cognitive style within the typical population. We employed a working memory task where letters had to be remembered in their locations. The key experimental manipulation was to induce repeated checking after encoding by asking about a stimulus that had not been presented. We recorded the effect that such misleading probes had on a subsequent memory test. Participants drawn from the typical population but who scored highly on a checking‐scale had poorer memory and less confidence than low scoring individuals. While thoroughness is regarded as a quality, our results indicate that a cognitive style that favours repeated checking does not always lead to the best performance as it can undermine the authenticity of memory traces. This may affect various aspects of everyday life including the work environment and we discuss its implications and possible counter‐measures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How basic need satisfaction and dispositional motives interact in predicting flow experience in sport

We have integrated the basic psychological needs approach from self‐determination theory with motive disposition theory in order to enhance the prediction of flow experience in sports. We hypothesize that an environment that enables people to fulfill their basic psychological needs for competence and social relatedness results in flow. Additionally, we assume that the effect of competence need satisfaction is moderated by the achievement motive and that the effect of need‐for‐relatedness satisfaction is moderated by the affiliation motive. Four studies show the expected positive effects of need satisfaction on flow and further confirm that high achievement and affiliation‐motivated individuals benefit more from competence and relatedness sports environments, respectively, than individuals low in these motives.     

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception,spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.     

From conscious experience to a conscious self

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011 Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.     

Brain stimulation and conscious experience

Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for the subject to respond to the cessation of the visual experience after the end of electrical stimulation could be as brief as 225-242 ms. We also carried out extensive studies in cats under a variety of anesthetic conditions using the same electrodes and parameters of stimulation employed in the human studies to study the patterns of neuronal activity beneath the stimulating surface electrode. Whereas sufficiently strong currents can activate neurons within milliseconds, stimulating currents close to threshold activate sustained neural activity only after at least 350-500 ms. When currents are close to threshold, some neurons are inhibited for several hundreds of millisecond before the balance between inhibition and excitation shifts towards excitation. These results suggest that the prolonged latencies, i.e., latencies beyond 200-250 ms, for the emergence of conscious experience following direct cortical stimulation result from a delay in the sustained activation of underlying cortical neurons at threshold currents rather than being due to any unusually long duration in central processing time. Intracellular records from cortical neurological cells during repetitive electrical stimulation of the surface of the feline striate cortex demonstrate that such stimulation induces a profound depolarizing shift in membrane potential that may persist after each stimulus train. Such a depolarization is evidence that extracellular K+ concentrations have increased during electrical stimulation. Such an increase in extracellular K+ progressively increases cortical excitability until the threshold for sustained activation of cortical neurons is reached and then exceeded. Consequently, the long latency for threshold activation of cortical neurons depends upon a dynamically increasing cortical facilatory process that begins hundreds of milliseconds before there is sustained activation of such neurons. In some cases, this facilatory process must overcome an initial stimulus-induced inhibition before neuronal firing commences.     

How to measure working memory capacity in the change detection paradigm

Although the measurement of working memory capacity is crucial to understanding working memory and its interaction with other cognitive faculties, there are inconsistencies in the literature on how to measure capacity. We address the measurement in the change detection paradigm, popularized by Luck and Vogel (Nature, 390, 279-281, 1997). Two measures for this task-from Pashler (Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 369-378, 1988) and Cowan (The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-114, 2001), respectively-have been used interchangeably, even though they may yield qualitatively different conclusions. We show that the choice between these two measures is not arbitrary. Although they are motivated by the same underlying discrete-slots working memory model, each is applicable only to a specific task; the two are never interchangeable. In the course of deriving these measures, we discuss subtle but consequential flaws in the underlying discrete-slots model. These flaws motivate revision in the modal model and capacity measures.     

Task experience and children's working memory performance: a perspective from recall timing

Working memory is an important theoretical construct among children, and measures of its capacity predict a range of cognitive skills and abilities. Data from 9- and 11-year-old children illustrate how a chronometric analysis of recall can complement and elaborate recall accuracy in advancing our understanding of working memory. A reading span task was completed by 130 children, 75 of whom were tested on 2 occasions, with sequence length either increasing or decreasing during test administration. Substantial pauses occur during participants' recall sequences, and they represent consistent performance traits over time, while also varying with recall circumstances and task history. Recall pauses help to predict reading and number skills, alongside as well as separate from levels of recall accuracy. The task demands of working memory change as a function of task experience, with a combination of accuracy and response timing in novel task situations being the strongest predictor of cognitive attainment.     

Dementia and working memory

This study explored the hypothesis that patients suffering from dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) are particularly impaired in the functioning of the Central Executive component of working memory, and that this will be reflected in the capacity of patients to perform simultaneously two concurrent tasks. DAT patients, age-matched controls and young controls were required to combine performance on a tracking task with each of three concurrent tasks, articulatory suppression, simple reaction time to a tone and auditory digit span. The difficulty of the tracking task and length of digit sequence were both adjusted so as to equate performance across the three groups when the tasks were performed alone. When digit span or concurrent RT were combined with tracking, the deterioration in performance shown by the DAT patients was particularly marked.     

How talking therapists experience working with adult clients who have autism

This research aims to gain new insight by exploring the thoughts, feelings and experiences of therapists working with clients who have autism. Three professional talking therapists participated in the study. Unstructured interviews were conducted and analysed using interpretive phenomenological analysis. Six main themes and 13 sub-themes were found which include therapists’ validation of autism, how therapists integrated autism when addressing mental health problems, how their personal experiences of autism impacted on their work and how they experienced the situation in which autism emerges during the therapy. Helpful suggestions are made for clinicians, namely, to zoom-in and zoom-out of autism, hold the knowledge that people with autism process information differently, incorporate working with trauma, consider disclosing a personal connection to autism and consider carefully whether, or not, to tell a client that they may have autism.     

Implicit working memory

Working Memory (WM) plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, decision making, goal pursuit and cognitive control). The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM.     

How the bimodal format of presentation affects working memory: an overview

The best format in which information that has to be recalled is presented has been investigated in several studies, which focused on the impact of bimodal stimulation on working memory performance. An enhancement of participant’s performance in terms of correct recall has been repeatedly found, when bimodal formats of presentation (i.e., audiovisual) were compared to unimodal formats (i.e, either visual or auditory), in providing implications for multimedial learning. Several theoretical frameworks have been suggested in order to account for the bimodal advantage, ranging from those emphasizing early stages of processing (such as automatic alerting effects or multisensory integration processes) to those centred on late stages of processing (as postulated by the dual coding theory). The aim of this paper is to review previous contributions to this topic, providing a comprehensive theoretical framework, which is updated by the latest empirical studies.     

Distinguishing short-term memory from working memory

The aim of the present research was to determine whether short-term memory and working memory could be distinguished. In two studies, 7- to 13-year-olds (N = 155, N = 132) were administered tasks thought to assess short-term memory as well as tasks thought to assess working memory. Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses distinguished short-term memory tasks from working memory tasks. In addition, performance on working memory tasks was related to word decoding skill but performance on short-term memory tasks was not. Finally, performance on both short-term memory and working memory tasks were associated with age-related increases in processing speed. Results are discussed in relation to models of short-term and working memory.     

Shooting behaviour: How working memory and negative emotionality influence police officer shoot decisions

Previous research on police officer shoot decisions has focussed on the influence of situational factors that lead to the shooting error. Focussing instead on the ‘shooter’, the present study examined whether working memory capacity and threat‐related increases in negative emotionality influenced participant shoot decisions in a simulated shooting task. Following a working memory test, 24 police officers viewed a police‐relevant threatening video while physiological indices of arousal and negative affect were obtained and then completed a computerized shoot‐don't shoot task. Results indicated that lower working memory capacity was associated with a greater likelihood of shooting unarmed targets and a failure to shoot armed targets. Moreover, an interaction effect indicated that these associations were only significant for officers who experienced heightened negative emotionality in response to the video. Results suggest that when negatively aroused via threat, limited working memory capacity increases the risk of shooting error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.