DUNS SCOTUS: HIS HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

This essay offers an attempt to explore the relation of Duns Scotus’ philosophy to modernity and post‐modernity. The latter seems but an advanced version of the former, in which the inseparability of univocity, representation and flattened causal interaction along a single plane becomes more fully realised. One might also contend that according to a post‐Scotist perspective, there is no “modern” phase at all, and so also no “pre‐modern” to which one might nostalgically appeal. Instead, there is a certain middle ages which has never ceased to be dominant. Where, in the midst of all these epochs, which turn out not to be epochs at all, is one to look?     

THE RATIO DEI AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF HISTORY

The Radical Orthodoxy movement has revived postmodern theology's interest in John Duns Scotus. This article reviews Catherine Pickstock's substantial contribution to this discussion and the several articles that engage Pickstock in this same issue. The article notes two lines of engagement: the first, more analytical line considers the logic of "God-talk," the ratio Dei , to consider whether Scotus's doctrine of univocity is adequate to speak of divine transcendence. The second is more historical and asks whether Radical Orthodoxy's historical genealogy offers a sufficiently generous account of the plurality and ambiguity of the history of the church.     

Duns Scotus’ univocity: applied to the debate on phenomenological theology

Scotus’ theory of univocity is described: his exact definition of univocity and his view of transcendental concepts that are ‘simply simple’. These concepts are said to be univocally applied to God and creatures. Next, we describe Scotus’ views on univocity in ‘being’ and the precise meaning of the infinite and finite ‘mode’ of being. Finally, we apply these results to work of Heidegger and Marion. It appears that they had an insufficient grasp of the intricacies of Scotus’ theory of univocity and that Marion’s religious phenomenology could have benefitted from these scotistic tools.     

THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVOCITY IS TRUE AND SALUTARY

After clearing up some misunderstandings of Scotus's doctrine of univocity, I argue that the doctrine of univocity is true. All predications about God must be reducible to univocity if they are to be intelligible at all. So even if the doctrine has unwelcome consequences, we ought to affirm it anyway; it is not the job of the theologian or philosopher to shrink from uncomfortable truths. I then argue that the doctrine of univocity in fact has no unwelcome consequences. Moreover, it has at least two salutary logical consequences of the highest importance. I conclude that the polemic against univocity, and against Scotus as its defender, is misplaced.     

Duns Scotus on material substances and cognition: a discussion of two recent books

In a recent book, Thomas Ward advances an original interpretation of Duns Scotus’s hylomorphism, which stresses the ability of the parts of certain kinds of composites to exist independently from each other and from the composite to which they belong. Ward argues that the notion of essential order plays a key role in accounting for the unity of those parts in a composite. In another book, Richard Cross gives a comprehensive treatment of Duns Scotus’s theory of cognition, which proposes an interesting but controversial interpretation of Duns Scotus as introducing a distinction between object and content and defending the view that the contents of intellectual cognitive acts are determined only by their internal structure.     

Does Univocity Entail Idolatry?

Idolatry is vehemently rejected by the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), and closely connected with idolatry are certain varieties of anthropomorphism, which involve the attribution of a human form or personality to God. The question investigated in this paper is whether a highly anthropomorphic conception of God, one that commits the sin of idolatry, is entailed by a particular theory of religious language. This theory is the 'univocity thesis', the view that, for some substitutions for 'F', the sense of '___ is F' as applied to God and its sense as applied to human creatures is exactly or substantially the same. My claim is that the univocity thesis entails a strong form of anthropomorphism that in effect reduces God to creaturely status and thus succumbs to idolatry (albeit a conceptual form of idolatry). In the course of my argument, a comparison is made between, on the one hand, the methods of Duns Scotus and modern proponents of perfect-being theology in arriving at a concept of God as maximally perfect, and on the other hand the work of Thomistic philosophers (especially Barry Miller) in showing how a more adequate conception of divinity can be reached by dispensing with some of the methods and assumptions of perfect-being theology, particularly the assumption of univocity.     

FREE WILL ACCORDING TO JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND NEUROSCIENCE

Abstract. This paper examines two views of free will. It looks first at the fourteenth‐century religious insights of John Duns Scotus, one of history's seminal thinkers about free will. It then examines what current neuroscience tells us about free will. Finally, it summarizes the past and present views and concludes by answering two questions: Does free will refer to an absence of external constraint, or does it refer to a human ability to decide in an acausal manner?     

The Immaculate World: Predestination and Passibility in Contemporary Scotism

The Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus (ca.1266–1308) taught the puzzling doctrine that had Adam not sinned, the totus Christus would have been immediately glorified. While the Scotist commentarial tradition developed this idea in several surprising ways, most twentieth‐century Scotists rejected it. This article uses a modern philosophy of counterfactual statements to evaluate the interpretive claims of F. X. Pancheri and Juniper Carol, two prominent twentieth‐century Scotists, and presents a new understanding of the traditional Scotist notion that had Adam not sinned, the Word would have become incarnate in impassible flesh.     

Duns Scotus on the metaphysics of virtue and conformity to right reason

For Duns Scotus, facts about moral psychology are ultimately reducible to facts about ontology. The created agent has a soul which includes as formal “parts” the intellect and will; the intellect and will, of course, are the seat of qualities (e.g. thoughts and volitions, respectively) and habits (e.g. virtues) that are related to one another in various ways. One of these ways is the conformity relation. From a metaphysical base of categorical being – whether Substance, Quality/Habit, or Relation – Scotus constructs an ethical theory which complements, though in some interesting ways departs from, the Aristotelian tradition of which he is a part. In this essay, our aim is twofold: first, to reconstruct the ontological status of virtue within Scotus's overall metaphysical framework. Second, we attend to the ways in which this metaphysic of virtue places constraints on how one is to understand the conformity relation that, according to Scotus, must exist between an agent's will and right reason whenever a morally good action results.     

Worlds and times

In the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus suggested that the proper analysis of modality required not just moments of time but also ??moments of nature??. In making this suggestion, he broke with an influential view first presented by Diodorus in the early Hellenistic period, and might even be said to have been the inventor of ??possible worlds??. In this essay we take Scotus?? suggestion seriously devising first a double-index logic and then introducing the temporal order. Finally, using the temporal order, we define a modal order. This allows us to present modal logic without the usual interpretive questions arising concerning the relation called variously ??accessibility??, ??alternativeness??, and, ??relative possibility.?? The system in which this analysis is done is one of those which have come to be called a hybrid logic.     

RE-SITUATING SCOTIST THOUGHT

In "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance", Catherine Pickstock presents several levels of a critique against Scotist thought. My response focuses upon the assumptions that ground her critique. In sum, I think that Pickstock's argument errs on two counts. While her contemporary critique may be better lodged upon the interpreters and not the Franciscan himself, her much more elaborated critique of Scotus is not well founded. I conclude my essay with a few comments about the danger of historical categories such as "voluntarism" or "intellectualism" for any authentic retrieval of a medieval thinker.     

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ash?arite divine command and Mu?tazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.     

READING DUNS SCOTUS: FROM HISTORY TO PHILOSOPHY

One cannot insert Duns Scotus directly into contemporary debates of theology without first of all recalling and recounting his place in the history of metaphysics understood as a transcendental science. It is only then, and starting from philosophical arguments, that one will be able to engage thoughts about God—i.e., do "theology"—in such as way as not to betray God's transcendence.     

Meeting Scotus: On Scholasticism and Its Ghosts

Recalling the story of the ghost of Duns Scotus that haunts Merton Library, we investigate in this article whether Christian theology contains room for belief in ghosts. We conclude that there is no good reason why ghosts should not exist within a proper dogmatic account of death and resurrection, but that there is no theological need to affirm that ghosts do exist either. Thus we suggest that this matter is dogmatically indifferent. That same dogmatic account, however, demands that we take seriously the continuing lively voices of those, like Scotus, who have gone before as we pursue our own theological vocations.     

The evolution of the primates: Anglicanism,primacy and conciliarity

Contemporary debate about the relationship between civil and religious law, highlighted by the Archbishop of Canterbury's 2008 lecture on ‘Civil and Religious Law in England’, prompts a reassessment of the place of ius divinum in the understanding of the nature of law. This article questions the assumption of modernity that there is no place for divine law, and briefly surveys the different role played by divine law in Judaism, Islam and Christianity. It examines the contrasting Christian perspectives of Aquinas and Duns Scotus, which leads to a critique of the relationship between personal welfare and the common good. Since, in the context of post-modernism, questions related to divine law are once again being addressed, the article criticises aspects of a fundamentalist approach to it in both Islam and Christianity. It argues that, from a Christian perspective, the personal truth of Jesus Christ embodies the place where the divine freedom comes into relation with human freedom. It concludes that in reflecting on a common praxis for humanity, it is this embodied relationship which provides the basic perspective for practitioners of canon law to contribute in a significant way to the debate now gathering momentum.     

Transcendental being: Scotus and Scotists

Of singular importance to the medieval theory of transcendentals was the position of John Duns Scotus that there could be a concept of being univocally common, not only to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. Scotus's doctrine of univocal transcendental concepts violated the accepted view that, owing to its generality, no transcendental notion could be univocal. The major difficulty facing Scotus's doctrine of univocity was to explain how a real, as opposed to a purely logical, concept could be abstracted from what agreed in nothing real, in this case, God and creatures. The present article examines Scotus's solution to this difficulty and its interpretation in four of his noted fourteenth-century followers. It is shown that the balance Scotus's solution achieved between the competing demands of the real diversity between God and creatures, on the one side, and the conceptual unity of transcendental being, on the other, is taken in opposed directions by his interpreters. Either the real diversity of God and creatures is given priority, so that the concept of being becomes a purely logical notion, or the real unity of the concept of being is stressed, so that some sort of real community is posited between God and creatures.In the following notes,Lect. andOrd. are abbreviations forLectura andOrdinatio, the titles of Scotus's earlier and later versions of his Oxford commentary on theSentences, respectively.     

Voluntarism,Atonement, and Duns Scotus

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6‐1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology—his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis—before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti‐Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject.     

DISABILITY,IMPAIRMENT, AND SOME MEDIEVAL ACCOUNTS OF THE INCARNATION: SUGGESTIONS FOR A THEOLOGY OF PERSONHOOD

Drawing on insights from the medieval theologians Duns Scotus and Hervaeus Natalis, I argue that medieval views of the incarnation require that there is a sense in which the divine person depends on his human nature for his human personhood, and thus that the paradigmatic pattern of human personhood is in some way dependent existence. I relate this to a modern distinction between impairment and disability to show that impairment—understood as dependence—is normative for human personhood. I try to show how medieval theories of the resurrection of the body can provide, within this context, plausible accounts of what it might be for human persons to be redeemed.     

Radical Orthodoxy, Luther, and the Challenge of Western Secularization

This "Theology Update" analyzes the Radical Orthodoxy of John Milbank in light of Martin Luther's dialectic between Law and Gospel. Milbank and his colleagues attack contemporary secularized culture in a manner parallel to Luther's attack on the 16^th century Holy Roman Empire for being soulless, aggressive, litigious, materialistic, and finally nihilistic. By re–engaging the battle between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, the radical orthodox party seeks to become post–modern by making a half turn back to the pre–modern Thomas, for whom philosophy and theology were integrated, subject was united to object, and being could be understood as relational because the Trinity is relational. Luther is mistakenly dismissed when reducing him to Scotus' nominalism, however. Lutheranism complements radical orthodoxy's analysis of secularized culture; yet Lutheranism maintains an integrity to faith–as the presence of Christ–that this new school fails to grant.