Your Data are (Not) My Data: The Role of Social Value Orientation in Sharing Data About Others

The personal data consumers share with companies on a daily basis often also involves other people. However, prior research has focused almost exclusively on how consumers make decisions about their own data. In this research, we explore how consumers’ social value orientation impacts their decisions regarding data about others. In contrast to the notion of proselfs as “selfish” decision-makers, across four studies we find that proselfs are less likely than prosocials to share data about others with third parties. We show that this effect arises because proselfs feel less ownership over data they hold about others than prosocials, which in turn reduces their willingness to share it. Overall, this work contributes to literature on social value orientation as well as privacy decision-making and helps marketers and policy makers in designing interdependent privacy choice contexts.     

Bad for me or bad for us? Interpersonal orientations and the impact of losses on unethical behavior

The present research examines the role of allocations of losses versus gains on the emergence of unethical behavior as a function of people's social value orientation. The authors demonstrate that (a) proselfs regard unethical behavior to prevent losses as more justified than prosocials (Study 1) and (b) proselfs engage in more unethical behavior to prevent losses than prosocials (Study 2). These differences are explained by prosocials' greater concern for harm to interdependent others in the domain of losses. A third study further substantiates these findings by revealing that unethical behavior to prevent losses increases among prosocials as harm to others is reduced. In sum, these results reveal that depending on whether people attend only to their self-interest or also consider the outcomes of others, losses either may increase or curtail unethical conduct. Considering social value orientations thus may reconcile conflicting theoretical perspectives on the impact of losses on social decisions.     

大学生在社会困境中的公平决策:社会价值取向的影响

通过两项研究考查大学生在社会困境中的行为决策及公平感体验,检验社会价值取向的影响作用,有效被试分别为85名和84名。结果表明:(1)亲社会者比亲自我者更倾向做公平决策;信息对称比不对称条件更促进被试做公平决策;女生比男生更倾向做公平决策。(2)性别在社会价值取向与信息对称性对公平决策的影响中起调节作用,社会价值取向显著影响男生的公平决策,信息对称性显著影响女生的公平决策。(3)社会价值取向显著影响个体对不公平的容忍度,亲社会者更不容忍不公平行为。(4)对于利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向接受,亲社会者并不比亲自我者体验到更强的内疚情绪;对于不利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向拒绝,且产生较强的不公平感及气愤情绪。     

True versus strategic fairness in a common resource dilemma: Evidence from the dual‐process perspective

Common resource dilemmas involve collectively coordinating individual choices to promote group efficiency. Equal division represents one of the most important coordination rules. Previous research suggests that individuals follow the equality rule for different reasons. Some individuals behave cooperatively out of their concern for other's welfare, whereas some individuals cooperate strategically to enhance personal gains. Building on the dual‐process perspective, the authors aim to differentiate strategic fairness from true fairness in solving a resource dilemma. In four experiments, the effect of cognitive processing manipulations on individual harvesting behavior in a one‐shot resource dilemma was tested against participants with different social values. Results consistently showed that prosocials, who value joint outcome and equality, requested significantly less money than did proselfs, who value personal gain. More importantly, prosocials in the intuition and deliberation conditions request similar amounts, whereas proselfs in the intuition condition request more money than those in the deliberation condition. The results were further validated by a follow‐up meta‐analysis based on the four experiments. The implications of the dual‐process perspective for social coordination research are discussed.     

Mother Teresa versus Ebenezer Scrooge: mortality salience leads proselfs to endorse self-transcendent values (unless proselfs are reassured)

Recently, Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski demonstrated that mortality salience (MS) increased contributions to (an ingroup) charity (i.e., the Scrooge effect). The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientations would moderate the Scrooge effect. In line with an Ebenezer shift hypothesis, proselfs were less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values in a dental pain control condition but were indistinguishable from prosocials in an MS condition as proselfs increased endorsement of self-transcendent values under MS (Experiments 1 and 2a). However, when participants gave their impressions of an unfavorable prosocial or a favorable proself prior to the MS manipulation, proselfs were again less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values (Experiments 2a and 2b), suggesting that proselfs are unlikely to transform into prosocials under conditions of MS when given reasons to disidentify with prosocial values or identify with proself values.     

The egocentric nature of procedural justice: Social value orientation as moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures

In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we measured participants’ social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

Effects of social value orientations on fairness judgments

The authors assessed the impact that social value orientations--prosocial (i.e., concerned about outcomes for both oneself and others) versus proself (i.e., concerned about one's own outcome only)--had on fairness judgments in a non-negotiation setting. The results indicated that prosocials generally formed fairness judgments in a manner suggested by equity theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw an equal outcome as fairer than a favorable or unfavorable outcome. The fairness determinations of proselfs, however, tended to follow the tenets of self-interest theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw a favorable outcome as fairer than an unfavorable outcome. Contrary to self-interest theory, proselfs did not find a favorable outcome fairer than an equal outcome. These findings indicate that social value orientations differentially affect the evaluation of outcome information in the formation of fairness judgments.     

社会价值取向对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制

以往关于为自己和代他人决策的冒险行为研究结果不一致, 这可能是因为以往的研究没有考虑决策情境和决策者人际特质等因素对于决策行为的影响。社会价值取向(social value orientation, SVO)是一种典型的人际特质, 是个体在对自我和他人资源分配时所表现出的社会偏好, 通常分为亲社会者和亲自我者。为探究SVO对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制, 采用为自己和陌生人分别完成多轮混合赌博游戏的任务。结果发现亲自我比亲社会者代他人决策更冒险。用模型量化的损失厌恶和对潜在损失的敏感度部分中介了自我-他人风险决策差异, 但只有对他人潜在损失的敏感度部分中介自我-他人决策的SVO效应。说明SVO会影响自我-他人风险决策, 且该效应可以通过对他人利益的关心程度起作用, 所以在自我-他人风险决策的研究中应将SVO这一决策者的人际特质因素考虑在内。     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Injustice for All or Just for Me? Social Value Orientation Predicts Responses to Own Versus Other's Procedures

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.     

Justifying decisions in social dilemmas: justification pressures and tacit coordination under environmental uncertainty

This article investigates how justification pressures influence harvesting decisions in common resource dilemmas. The authors argue that when a division rule prescribes a specific harvest level, such as under environmental certainty, people adhere more strongly to this division rule when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. When a division rule does not prescribe a specific harvest level, such as under environmental uncertainty, people restrict their harvests when they have to justify their decisions to fellow group members. The results of two experimental studies corroborate this line of reasoning. The findings are discussed in terms of tacit coordination. The authors specify conditions under which justification pressures may or may not facilitate efficient coordination.     

What other's disappointment may do to selfish people: emotion and social value orientation in a negotiation context

The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientation moderate responses to other's expressions of disappointment in negotiation. The literature suggested competing hypotheses: First, prosocials are more responsive to other's disappointment because they have a greater concern for other; second, proselfs are more responsive because they see other's disappointment as a threat to their own outcomes. Results of a computer-mediated negotiation in which a simulated opponent expressed disappointment, no emotion, or anger supported the second prediction: Proselfs conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to a neutral or angry one, whereas prosocials were unaffected by the other's emotion. This effect was mediated by participants' motivation to satisfy the other's needs, which disappointment triggered more strongly in proselfs than in prosocials. Implications for theorizing on emotion, social value orientation, and negotiation are discussed.     

All is well that ends well,at least for proselfs: emotional reactions to equality violation as a function of social value orientation

In step‐level public good dilemmas the equality rule serves as an important distribution rule to tacitly coordinate group members' decisions. In two studies, we examined the motives that may underlie the use of the equality rule. More specifically, we examined whether people use the equality rule out of fairness concerns or out of efficiency concerns. For this purpose, we assessed people's emotional reactions toward a violator of the equality rule when the group succeeded vs. failed, as a function of social value orientation. The results of both experiments showed that proselfs' emotional reactions towards a violator were a function of the success or the failure of the group, whereas prosocials' emotional reactions did not vary as a function of the outcome feedback. These results suggest that prosocials prefer the equality rule out of fairness concerns whereas for proselfs efficiency concerns dominate. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Social Dilemma Analysis of Commuting Preferences: The Roles of Social Value Orientation and Trust1

The current research advances a social dilemma analysis of commuting, examining the roles of preexisting personality differences in social value orientation (i.e., prosocial vs. proself orientation) and trust (i.e., a general belief in the honesty and cooperative intentions of others) in determining preferences for collectively desirable commuting options: preferences for commuting by public transportation (Study 1) and carpooling (Study 2). Consistent with predictions, both studies revealed that, relative to p of prosocials, preferences of proselfs were more strongly associated with beliefs about the relative efficiency of cars (i.e., an outcome affecting personal well-being). Also, greater preferences for collectively desirable actions were observed among prosocials with high trust—relative to prosocials with low trust and proselfs with high or low trust—providing support for the claim that 2 conditions (i.e., prosocial goals and trust in others) must be met to obtain collectively desirable commuting preferences.     

The consequences of mimicry for prosocials and proselfs: Effects of social value orientation on the mimicry–liking link

People often mimic each other's behaviors. As a consequence, they share each other's emotional and cognitive states, which facilitates liking. Mimicry, however, does not always affect liking. In two studies, we investigate whether the mimicry–liking link is influenced by people's social value orientations. More specifically, we examine whether prosocials and proselfs are differently affected when being mimicked or not. Prosocials and proselfs indicated their liking for the interaction partner after being or not being mimicked in a face‐to‐face interaction. The results of two studies showed that prosocials rated the interaction partner as less likeable when they were not mimicked than when they were mimicked. Proselfs, however, were not affected by mimicry. These results show that people's social motives play a role in whether or not the effects of mimicry on liking occur: Proselfs are less sensitive to the mimicry acts of others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

One of the main issues in research on ultimatum bargaining is whether bargainers are motivated by self-interest or by a concern for fairness. It is difficult to distinguish between both motivations, because it may be in the own interest to make fair offers. In the current paper on ultimatum bargaining, it is investigated whether bargainers are truly motivated to be fair, or whether they merely strategically use fairness as a means to increase their own outcomes. The results of two experimental studies indicate that social value orientations play an important role: strategic use of fairness is mainly displayed by proselfs.     

Cooperating If One's Goals Are Collective‐Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal Transformation1

Prior studies of the effect of group identification on cooperation in social dilemmas have advanced 2 competing accounts: the goal‐transformation hypothesis, which holds that identification makes personal and collective goals interchangeable; and the goal‐amplification hypothesis, which states that identification induces positive expectations about others’ cooperative behavior. However, prior studies have neglected to assess the process measures necessary to pit the one account against the other. The present study showed that the effect of identification was moderated by participants’ social value orientation. Identification influenced proselfs’ cooperation more than prosocials’ cooperation. Mediational analyses further showed that the effect of our identification manipulation was mediated by participants’ sense of collective self, and not by their expectations.     

The double meaning of a single act: influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour

The present research examines how a single behaviour that is informative of both the morality and intelligence of a person influences impressions, degree of cooperative behaviour expected from that person, and degree of cooperative behaviour displayed toward that person in a mixed‐motive interdependence situation (i.e., a social dilemma). Furthermore, it is investigated how individual differences in social value orientation influence these processes. Participants were provided with behavioural information that could be construed in terms of both morality (high/low) and intelligence (high/low). Consistent with the morality‐importance hypothesis, participants assigned greater weight to morality than to intelligence aspects of the information. Congruent with the social value orientation hypothesis (i) only proselfs and not prosocials expected more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, and (ii) prosocials attended more strongly to morality aspects than proselfs in deciding on own cooperation. Finally, consistent with the relative benefit hypothesis, people overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display, and this tendency was especially pronounced with others described by moral/unintelligent behaviour, and for people with a proself value orientation. The authors discuss a model describing influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are social value orientations expressed automatically? Decision making in the dictator game

Drawing on the social intuitionist model, the authors studied the hypothesis that social value orientations are expressed automatically in behavior. They compared spontaneous and more deliberated decisions in the dictator game and confirmed that social values determine behavior when responses are based on the automatic system. By means of both mediation and experimental analyses, the authors further demonstrate that the automatic expression of social value orientations is mediated by perceptions of interpersonal closeness. A reasoning process can subsequently override these automatic responses and disconnect decisions from perceptions of interpersonal closeness. This results in lower levels of other-regarding behavior, at least for prosocials.