“This story is right on”: The impact of regulatory fit on narrative engagement and persuasion

When people read a story, feelings of rightness from regulatory fit (consistency between regulatory state and strategic means) could suggest that the story is “right on” relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. Under these conditions, individuals who are experiencing feelings of rightness should engage more with the narrative and be more persuaded by its implicit messages. Results from two experiments supported these hypotheses. Participants in Experiment 1 were more mentally engaged (transported) by the story when they experienced regulatory fit. We replicated this effect in Experiment 2 and extended it to endorsement of story‐consistent beliefs, an indicator of persuasion via narratives. Additionally, we found that drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of feelings of rightness eliminated the regulatory fit effects on transportation and persuasion, suggesting attribution of feelings of regulatory fit/nonfit to the plausibility of the narrative world. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory fit as input for stop rules

Three experiments show that the motivational effects of regulatory fit (consistency between regulatory state and strategic means) are context dependent. With no explicit decision rule about when to stop (Experiment 1) or an explicit enjoyment stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted more effort on tasks when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. With an explicit sufficiency stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted less effort when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. The interactive effect of regulatory fit and stop rules can be explained by misattribution of rightness feelings from regulatory fit; the effect was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings (Experiments 1 and 3).     

The effect of incidental experiences of regulatory fit on trust

Two experiments provide support for the hypothesis that when people assess how much they trust another person, feelings of rightness from an initial, brief experience of regulatory fit (consistency between prevention or promotion regulatory focus of goals and strategic means) can suggest the other person is trustworthy, relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. This regulatory-fit effect on trust was stronger for acquaintances than for individuals participants knew well (Experiment 1) and was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to how right the earlier, trust judgment-irrelevant event made them feel (Experiment 2). Implications are discussed for regulatory-fit theory, possible applications to applied settings and to other populations, and possible effects of other types of regulatory fit.     

The asymmetric effect of regulatory fit on moral judgments of other-oriented lies

We examined whether regulatory fit effects are asymmetric—namely, whether they occur only among individuals with a promotion focus or a prevention focus. We adopted a task where individuals make moral judgments of other-oriented lies and conducted three studies. The results indicated that prevention-focused individuals judged other-oriented lies based on a vigilant strategy as more moral than lies based on an eager strategy (Studies 1 and 2). Meanwhile for promotion-focused individuals, there were no differences between eager and vigilant strategies on moral judgments of other-oriented lies. Additionally, the results suggested that the feeling of rightness is an underlying mechanism of the regulatory fit effects of prevention focus (Study 3).     

Engaging the consumer: The opposing forces of regulatory nonfit versus fit

Higgins and Scholer (Higgins, E. T., and Scholer, A. A. (2009). Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19(2), 100-114) propose that while opposing forces do not create value, value is created when people engage in the act of countering these forces. To the extent that feeling wrong from regulatory nonfit may be perceived as an opposing force, their hypothesis can be extended to understanding regulatory nonfit effects. More specifically, while regulatory nonfit does not create value, the experience of regulatory nonfit may signal that something “feels wrong”. Consumers may be prompted to counter this feeling wrong experience when they are involved in the decision making process, and this intervention in turn leads to value creation.     

When Group Influence Is More or Less Likely: The Case of Moral Judgments

We investigated whether group influence can change judgments even for high-consensus (i.e., unambiguous) moral norms. We found that participants often matched the judgment of the other current group members even when this moral judgment was normatively incorrect (nonstandard), and this occurred more for more ambiguous issues. Moreover, this social influence on public judgments was generally followed by private agreement and re-interpreting general values to be consistent with those judgements. We also found that participants who experienced a fit between their regulatory focus and their feelings of power (i.e., promotion/high power; prevention/low power) were less influenced by the group.     

False recognition across meaning,language, and stimulus format: Conceptual relatedness and the feeling of familiarity

Four experiments examined contributions of conceptual relatedness and feelings of familiarity to false recognition. Participants first studied lists of unrelated items (e.g., table, lock) followed by a recognition test with three types of items: (1) studied items (e.g., table), (2) semantically related lures (e.g., key), and (3) unrelated lures (e.g., cup). Participants falsely recognized more related than unrelated lures when the stimuli were words (Experiment 1A) and pictures (Experiment 1B), when the studied items and related lures differed in language (Experiment 2), and when they differed in perceptual format (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation, designed to make feelings of familiarity nondiagnostic for memory judgments, eliminated the false-recognition effect obtained in Experiment 3. Overall, the study suggests that conceptual relatedness produces false recognition even in the absence of shared perceptual surface features between study and test items, and it does so by generating feelings of familiarity.     

Processing fluency affects behavior more strongly among people higher in trait mindfulness

Processing fluency is the ease of processing information about a stimulus, which people can attribute to the experience of enjoyment. Despite consistent findings that processing fluency can affect self-reported judgments, little research has examined whether processing fluency or its interactions with personality traits can affect behavior. The current studies demonstrate that processing fluency is more likely to affect behavior among people higher in trait mindfulness. We manipulated processing fluency with rhyming versus nonrhyming maxims in Study 1 and with regulatory fit versus nonfit in Study 2. Participants higher in mindfulness showed a stronger positive effect for processing fluency on the dependent variable: the number of ideas they listed in a task they continued for as long as they enjoyed it.     

Making message recipients "feel right": how nonverbal cues can increase persuasion

Nonverbal cues are an inherent component of most persuasive appeals. We use regulatory-fit theory as a framework for understanding the effect of nonverbal cues on a message's effectiveness, and as a foundation for developing a new persuasion technique. We propose that when the nonverbal cues of a message source sustain the motivational orientation of the recipient, the recipient experiences regulatory fit and feels right, and that this experience influences the message's effectiveness. Experimental results support these predictions. Participants experiencing regulatory fit (promotion-focus participants viewing messages delivered in an eager nonverbal style, prevention-focus participants viewing messages delivered in a vigilant nonverbal style) had more positive attitudes toward a message's topic and greater intentions to behave in accordance with its recommendation than did participants experiencing nonfit. Feeling right was also greater for participants experiencing fit than for those experiencing nonfit and was associated with greater message effectiveness. Regulatory-fit theory provides a framework for making precise predictions about when and for whom a nonverbal cue will affect persuasion.     

Haptic pictures: fit judgments predict identification,recognition memory,and confidence

DAngiulli et al (1998 Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 39 187-190) found blind and sighted (blindfolded) children identified common objects in raised-outline drawings explored haptically, and corrected themselves without feedback. The self-correction suggests that participants can assess the extent to which the referents they suggest as possible identifications fit the haptic pictures. Indeed, when we asked subjects to identify haptic pictures, and to judge how well the referents they mentioned fitted the pictures, their fit judgments predicted the accuracy of their suggestions. Also, when one group of subjects offered the suggestions and another group assessed the fit of the suggestions to the pictures, the fit judgments predicted the accuracy of the suggestions. Further, good fit predicted successful recognition memory. In addition, both high and low fit judgments were made confidently, so the range of confidence judgments was smaller than the range of fit judgments. Finally, visual judgments of fit by one group predicted the level of success of the suggestions from another (haptic) group. In sum, subjects assess their suggested identifications appropriately, most likely on the basis of object shape criteria, outlined surface edges, and use of a vantage point.     

Making a good decision: value from fit

The classic answer to what makes a decision good concerns outcomes. A good decision has high outcome benefits (it is worthwhile) and low outcome costs (it is worth it). I propose that, independent of outcomes or value from worth, people experience a regulatory fit when they use goal pursuit means that fit their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit increases the value of what they are doing. The following postulates of this value from fit proposal are examined: (a) People will be more inclined toward goal means that have higher regulatory fit, (b) people's motivation during goal pursuit will be stronger when regulatory fit is higher, (c) people's (prospective) feelings about a choice they might make will be more positive for a desirable choice and more negative for an undesirable choice when regulatory fit is higher, (d) people's (retrospective) evaluations of past decisions or goal pursuits will be more positive when regulatory fit was higher, and (e) people will assign higher value to an object that was chosen with higher regulatory fit. Studies testing each of these postulates support the value-from-fit proposal. How value from fit can enhance or diminish the value of goal pursuits and the quality of life itself is discussed.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Exploring the complexities of value creation: The role of engagement strength

Regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological Review, 113, 439–460; Higgins, E.T. &; Scholer, A.A. (2009). Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process. Journal of Consumer Psychology) proposes that engagement strength plays a critical role in the creation of value intensity. We discuss the ways in which engagement, in this model, can be distinguished from arousal, motivation to act, and experienced difficulty. We distinguish between the mechanisms and predictions made by regulatory engagement theory versus cognitive dissonance theory and a goal systems approach. We also describe the complexities and conditions under which some sources of engagement strength (e.g., regulatory fit) may relate to value creation. For instance, while regulatory fit has more typically been associated with increased engagement strength, regulatory nonfit may also sometimes increase engagement by serving as an obstacle to be overcome. We review existing evidence and highlight open questions related to the role of engagement strength in creating value.     

Truth from language and truth from fit: the impact of linguistic concreteness and level of construal on subjective truth

In four experiments, the impact of concreteness of language on judgments of truth was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that statements of the very same content were judged as more probably true when they were written in concrete language than when they were written in abstract language. Findings of Experiment 2 also showed that this linguistic concreteness effect on judgments of truth could most likely be attributed to greater perceived vividness of concrete compared to abstract statements. Two further experiments demonstrated an additional fit effect: The truth advantage of concrete statements occurred especially when participants were primed with a concrete (vs. abstract) mind-set (Experiment 3) or when the statements were presented in a spatially proximal (vs. distant) location (Experiment 4). Implications for communication strategies are discussed.     

A rose in any other font would not smell as sweet: effects of perceptual fluency on categorization

Fluency--the ease with which people process information--is a central piece of information we take into account when we make judgments about the world. Prior research has shown that fluency affects judgments in a wide variety of domains, including frequency, familiarity, and confidence. In this paper, we present evidence that fluency also plays a role in categorization judgments. In Experiment 1, participants judged a variety of different exemplars to be worse category members if they were less fluent (because they were presented in a smaller typeface). In Experiment 2, we found that fluency also affected judgments of feature typicality. In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that the effects of fluency can be reversed when a salient attribution for reduced fluency is available (i.e., the stimuli are hard to read because they were printed by a printer with low toner). In Experiment 4 we replicated these effects using a within-subject design, which ruled out the possibility that the effects were a statistical artifact caused by aggregation of data. We propose a possible mechanism for these effects: if an exemplar and its category are closely related, activation of one will cause priming of the other, leading to increased fluency. Over time, feelings of fluency come to be used as a valid cue that can become confused with more traditional sources of information about category membership.     

Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from “how” to “what”

Regulatory fit is experienced when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation. Previous research on promotion and prevention orientations has found that regulatory fit increases people’s perception that a decision they made was “right,” which in turn transfers value to the decision outcome, including being willing to pay more for a product than those who chose the same product without regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000; Higgins et al., in press). We predicted that the effect of regulatory fit on monetary value could be generalized to locomotion and assessment orientations. Participants were willing to pay over 40% more for the same book-light when it was chosen with a strategy that fit their regulatory orientation (assessment/“full evaluation”; locomotion/“progressive elimination”) than when it was chosen with a non-fit strategy.     

Regulatory fit and persuasion: transfer from "Feeling Right."

The authors propose that when a message recipient "feels right" from regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000), this subjective experience transfers to the persuasion context and serves as information for relevant evaluations, including perceived message persuasiveness and opinions of the topic. Fit was induced either by strategic framing of message arguments in a way that fit/did not fit with the recipient's regulatory state or by a source unrelated to the message itself. Across 4 studies, regulatory fit enhanced perceived persuasiveness and opinion ratings. These effects were eliminated when the correct source of feeling right was made salient before message exposure, supporting the misattribution account. These effects reversed when message-related thoughts were negative, supporting the claim that fit provides information about the "rightness" of one's (positive or negative) evaluations.     

Children's Moral Evaluations of Ecological Damage: The Effect of Biocentric and Anthropocentric Intentions1

Moral evaluations of ecologically damaging events were studied in 5^th, 8^th, and 11^th graders and college students (N = 246). Participants made 4 kinds of judgments about 2 scenarios: decision rightness, damage rightness, blame of the decision maker, and blame of the agents causing the damage. In both scenarios, the decision maker's intentions varied (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) as did the damage severity. Overall, participants' judgments were less harsh when the decision maker had biocentric intentions and when the damage was less severe. However, there were age differences in use of intentions to judge decision rightness. The proposition that judgments of blame of the decision maker should be a joint function of decision and damage rightness was also supported.     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition--"relative meta-accuracy"--has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2).