The past and future of the past tense

What is the interaction between storage and computation in language processing? What is the psychological status of grammatical rules? What are the relative strengths of connectionist and symbolic models of cognition? How are the components of language implemented in the brain? The English past tense has served as an arena for debates on these issues. We defend the theory that irregular past-tense forms are stored in the lexicon, a division of declarative memory, whereas regular forms can be computed by a concatenation rule, which requires the procedural system. Irregulars have the psychological, linguistic and neuropsychological signatures of lexical memory, whereas regulars often have the signatures of grammatical processing. Furthermore, because regular inflection is rule-driven, speakers can apply it whenever memory fails.     

Narcissus locked in the past: Vulnerable narcissism and the negative views of the past

We examined how the perception of past events might contribute to the understanding of vulnerable narcissism. Across seven samples (N_Grand = 1271), we investigated the association between vulnerable narcissism and individual differences in negative view of the past as well as how both were associated with basic personality traits, intrapersonal (i.e., affect, life satisfaction, and self-esteem) and interpersonal (i.e., anger, and hostility) outcomes, and memory biases of immediate life events and early life traumas. We found that vulnerable narcissism was reliably correlated with a negative view of the past. Additionally, both variables showed similar personality profiles (e.g., high neuroticism) and overlapped in explaining various outcomes, including self-esteem, anger, hostility, recalled traumas, and a negative memory bias.     

Conceiving the past and future

The authors compared people's views of their histories and futures by asking them to recall and anticipate personally significant episodes. It was hypothesized and found in Study 1 that individuals spontaneously recall an affectively mixed past, containing both "highs" and "lows," whereas they anticipate homogeneously ideal futures. It was further hypothesized that people devote little thought to negative futures, and this was tested directly in Studies 2 and 3 by assessing how quickly past and likely future events came to mind. Asked to report positive and negative episodes from the past and future, participants took longer to generate future negative than positive events. Speed of recall was unaffected by the valence of past episodes. In Study 4, the response latency difference was again replicated for future events and it was demonstrated that people are slower in both generating negative future events and judging those events as likely.     

On forgetting the historical past

In this paper, empirical data are presented related to memory and time perception. The data are the frequencies with which specific calendar years are cited in newspaper texts. When plotted, the curves produced by the time series of these frequencies turn out to be independent of the languages and cultures in which the texts have been written as well as the year and the year density of the text corpus. The frequency of a specific year is inversely proportional to the distance from that year to the year in which the texts were written. It is argued that these curves are forgetting curves. It is suggested that the curves might be explained in terms of the “cognitive distance” between past and present. An argument is presented based on the curve representing the frequencies with which future years are cited in newspaper texts.     

The existence of the past

My goal in this paper is to address what I call the ‘Incoherence’ objection to the growing universe theory of time. At the root of the objection is the thought that one cannot wed objective temporal becoming with the existence of a tenseless past—which is apparently what the growing universe theorist tries to do. To do so, however, is to attribute both dynamic and static aspects to time, and, given the mutual exclusivity of these two aspects—so the thought goes—incoherence results. My solution to the problem is to offer an alternative account of past existence that is compatible with a dynamic conception of time. I take as my starting point Adams’ suggestion that the past exists in virtue of the existence of thisnesses of past individuals. I first seek to defend this suggestion, before amending it in order to provide a satisfactory response to the Incoherence objection. The result is a new growing universe theory which avoids the Incoherence objection but which has some surprising features of its own. Chief among these is the rejection of present events. I argue, however, that such a rejection is a necessary consequence of endorsing the growing universe theory, and that it is not as counter-intuitive as it initially sounds.     

Holocaust messages from the past

The impact of the Holocaust on the functioning of the survivors in the role of parents, and its influence on the second generation, has now become apparent. Most research findings and observations point to typical characteristics of survivor parents, such as: over-protection, insecurity, separation anxiety, guilt, as well as excessive expectations of their children. While building new families, many of the survivors are haunted by memories of traumatic events-mainly the loss of former families, spouses, and children. The off-spring are often committed to a heritage they cannot understand, which they absorb either by over-exposure or through the protective cover of silence. It is their wish to find ways of transmitting these historical messages to the third generation without the heavy emotional burden they themselves experienced.All quotations are freely translated from the Israeli film Because of that War by Orna Ben-Dror, Niv, with the permission of the publishers-Shani films, Israel. In this film, Yehuda Poliker and his father Jacko, and Yacov Gilad and his mother, Alina, describe their personal experiences. The authentic stories of these two families represent an excellent example of the transmission of Holocaust messages from generation to generation.     

Witnessing across time: accessing the present from the past and the past from the present

We are used to the idea that trauma in the past interrupts our capacity to grasp the present. But present or recent trauma can have a similar dissociative effect on our capacity to experience the more distant past. Contemporary trauma can rob the past of its goodness, leaving one feeling as if the past is gone, dead, separated from the present. The vitalization of the present by the past or the past by the present requires that experiences be linked across time. These links are created, in both directions, via categories of experience characterized by shared affect (Modell 1990, 2006). Such categories are created, in turn, by metaphor; and the construction of these metaphors across time requires that one be able to occupy self-states in both the past and the present that can then bear witness to one another. Trauma can result in the dissociation of these self-states from one another, leading to a disconnection of present and past.     

With the past behind and the future ahead: Back-to-front representation of past and future sentences

Several studies support the psychological reality of a mental timeline that runs from the left to the right and may strongly affect our thinking about time. Ulrich and Maienborn (Cognition 117:126–138, 2010) examined the linguistic relevance of this timeline during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. Their results indicate that the timeline is not activated automatically during sentence comprehension. While no explicit reference of temporal expressions to the left–right axis has been attested (e.g., *the meeting was moved to the left), natural languages refer to the back–front axis in order to encode temporal information (e.g., the meeting was moved forward). Therefore, the present study examines whether a back–frontal timeline becomes automatically activated during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. The results demonstrate a clear effect on reaction time that emerges from a time–space association along the frontal timeline (Experiment 1). However, this activation seems to be nonautomatic (Experiment 2), rendering it unlikely that this frontal timeline is involved in comprehension of the temporal content of sentences.     

Counterfactuals and the fixity of the past

I argue that David Lewis’s attempt, in his ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, to explain the fixity of the past in terms of counterfactual independence is unsuccessful. I point out that there is an ambiguity in the claim that the past is counterfactually independent of the present (or, more generally, that the earlier is counterfactually independent of the later), corresponding to two distinct theses about the relation between time and counterfactuals, both officially endorsed by Lewis. I argue that Lewis’s attempt is flawed for a variety of reasons, including the fact that his own theory about the evaluation of counterfactuals requires too many exceptions to the general rule that the past is counterfactually independent of the present. At the end of the paper, I consider a variant of Lewis’s strategy that attempts to explain the fixity of the past in terms of causal, rather than counterfactual, independence. I conclude that, although this variant avoids some of the objections that afflict Lewis’s account, it nevertheless seems to be incapable of giving a satisfactory explanation of the notion of the fixity of the past.     

Using the past to predict the future

This research addressed three issues. First, we examined whether retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) and judgments of learning (JOLs) assess memory differently. Second, we examined the relative accuracy of JOLs and RCJs at predicting future recall performance. Third, we examined whether making JOLs improves subsequent recall better than making RCJs or making no metacognitive judgment. Results suggest that RCJs and JOLs are both based on retrievability, but that participants use their memory differently when making JOLs. RCJs were more accurate than JOLs at predicting future recall for some subsets of items, but the reverse was true for other subsets of items. Finally, eventual recall performance was facilitated when participants made JOLs but not when they made RCJs, suggesting that the JOL task helps to improve people's learning of the items.     

Cosmic inflation and the past hypothesis

The past hypothesis is that the entropy of the universe was very low in the distant past. It is put forward to explain the entropic arrow of time but it has been suggested (e.g. [Penrose, R. (1989a). The emperor’s new mind. London:Vintage Books; Penrose, R. (1989b). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 571, 249–264; Price, H. (1995). In S. F. Savitt (Ed.), Times’s arrows today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Price, H. (1996). Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Price, H. (2004). In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Oxford: Blackwell]) that it is itself in need of explanation. It has also been suggested that cosmic inflation could provide the explanation, but Price (2004) raises a serious objection to this suggestion, which has otherwise received very little attention in the philosophical literature. Price points out that the standard inflationary explanation involves a double standard: although the evolution of the universe described by the inflationary model seems natural from the standard temporal perspective it looks highly unnatural from the reversed temporal perspective. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a novel form of the inflationary explanation that avoids this objection. It is argued that the inflationary model would not involve a double standard (but would still explain the past hypothesis) if we construct the model with a global “boundary” condition instead of a conventional boundary condition: if we assume that the universe is as generic as possible overall, rather than as generic as possible at some given point (e.g. the Big Bang) as is assumed in the standard inflationary model. This novel form of the inflationary explanation is then compared with Price’s 1996 preferred explanation, a version of the so-called “Weyl hypothesis”.