The Buridanian Account of Inferential Relations between Doubly Quantified Propositions: a Proof of Soundness

On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what could be called the ‘Buridanian theory of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions’, presented in her 1993 article ‘A theory of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic’. In the reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic categorical propositions. The present study aims at offering semantic corroboration—a proof of soundness—to the inferential relations syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition. The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of Buridan's logic can be said to be sound.     

Word recognition in loud noise

Loud noise has been shown to bias environmental stimulus selection to high-priority or ‘dominant’ task and stimulus features while causing relative neglect of less dominant aspects. The present concern was whether a similar influence of noise would occur when selecting, or rather, retrieving information from memory. Separate groups performed a semantic recognition task in 95 dB(A) ‘noise’ or 70 dB(A) ‘quiet’ conditions. Recognition of semantically ‘high-dominance’ words was reliably faster in noise but ‘low-dominance’ recognition was not impaired relative to performance in quiet conditions. On this basis, the results only partially support a possible common principle governing selection of environmental and memorial information in noise. However, they confirm Eysenck's (1975) contention that arousal may affect retrieval processes (in addition to initial learning) and that failure to account for the former influence may obscure inferences drawn from previous research.     

On the Role of Fragmentary Knowledge in a Sequence Learning Task

There has been considerable debate about whether or not we need to distinguish between the acquisition of implicit-and, independently thereof, the acquisition of explicit-knowledge in sequence learning tasks. Proponents of the view that a unitary knowledge base is formed assume (a) that the knowledge acquired is explicitly available, and (b) that information about sequence fragments forms the core of this explicit knowledge. Both of these issues are addressed empirically in the present article. In two experiments, an adapted process dissociation procedure and a suitable measurement model were used to separate recollective (explicit) and fluency-based (implicit) memory processes in a sequence learning task. Experiment 1 demonstrated that fluency-based processes came into play much later than recollective processes. Such recollective processes have been conceptualized as being based on simple knowledge about sequence fragments or chunks. Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that recollective processes are more likely to contribute to sequence judgements if chunks are readily available at test than if they are not. Together, these results are in line with the view that the learning of an event systematicity can be conceived of as the memorization of chunks of events that support both the speedingup of reaction times to systematic events and explicit, recollective memory processes even after relatively little training.     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Retrieving text inferences: Controlled and automatic influences

Bridging inferences contribute to text coherence by identifying the connections among ideas, whereas elaborative inferences simply specify sensible extrapolations from text. Bridging inferences have been indistinguishable from explicit text ideas on numerous measures, suggesting similar longterm memory (LTM) representations for the two, whereas elaborative inferences are inferior. To evaluate the LTM representations of text ideas, we used the extended process-dissociation procedure (Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, 1995; Jacoby, 1991) to partition the controlled, recollective contributions to text retrieval from the automatic, familiarity-based contributions. The automatic contribution to the recognition of implied concepts was consistently negligible, an outcome consistent with the absence of perceptual processing of those concepts during the original reading. In addition, the controlled basis of recognition was consistently higher for explicit than for implicit concepts, which suggests a more robust conceptual representation for explicit text ideas (Yonelinas, 2002). These results were interpreted to reflect the asymmetric representation of explicit ideas and inferences (elaborative and even bridging inferences) in the surface, propositional textbase, and situational levels of text representation.     

Message Intensity and Cognitive Representations of Discourse Effects on Inferential Processing

Two experiments were conducted to examine the influence of intensity on inferential processing. It was predicted that the likelihood and speed of inferential processing for high-intensity texts should be greater than for texts low in intensity. On a recognition task, both adults and children falsely recognized implicit text information after processing high-intensity texts. Further, high-intensity passages triggered inference making during recall more readily than did the texts low in intensity. In general, speed of inferential processing did not differ as a function of the intensity manipulation. Although there was some evidence indicating that fourth grade children were more sensitive to the manipulations than were kindergartners, there were no clear age-related differences in children's ability to make inferences. The results are interpreted from a general associative memory model.     

Test-Anxiety,inferential reasoning and working memory load

Abstract

Subjects high and low in test-anxiety were presented with an inferential reasoning task requiring the verification of necessary and unnecessary inferences. The task was performed whilst holding either two or six digits in memory. On the verification task, the performance of high-test-anxious subjects was slower and less accurate than that of the low-test-anxious subjects. In addition, unnecessary inferences took longer to process than necessary inferences for the high-test-anxiety group only. The high-test-anxious subjects studied the memory loads for longer than the low-test-anxious group, but their recognition accuracy did not differ. Findings support Eysenck and Calvo's (Cognition and Emotion, 6, 409–434, 1992) processing efficiency theory. The high-test-anxious group's performance on the sentence verification task was impaired overall, and was particularly impaired when performing the unnecessary inference task. However, we also demonstrated that the high-test-anxious group's performance on a secondary memory task was unimpaired as a result of increased effort.     

心智化社会认知观的演变及发展——来自潜心智化的思考

社会认知的机制一直存在心智化与具身认知观点的争论。前者认为社会认知是对心理状态的推测,而后者则认为社会认知是具身实践活动。虽然,心智化研究者认为具身认知有关灵长类动物和婴儿的社会认知的解释可以兼容于内隐心智化,但内隐心智化在解释社会互动时仍然存在间接性的问题。近期,潜心智化理论旨在挑战上述立场中有关社会认知先天论的预设,该理论将个体的潜心智化视为内隐心智化的替代,通过检验与分析相关研究的构想效度,强调社会认知是从非社会性的一般认知功能中衍生而来的,这种立场在社会认知的领域特殊性与非社会认知的领域一般性之间建立起了纽带,从而挑战了心智化与具身认知的争论。未来研究应设计更为严谨的心智化研究方法并对其进行方法学验证,借助先进的技术手段,尝试在神经科学层面探索一般认知功能与社会认知的关系。     

Concessive and semifactual interpretations during reasoning with multiple conditionals

The present research evaluates how people integrate factual ‘if then’ and semifactual ‘even if’ conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: ‘A & B’ is conjectured and ‘not-A & B’ is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we evaluated each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants make inferences from two conditionals: two factual conditionals or one factual and one semifactual, with different representations. In Experiment 2, participants make inferences with a factual conditional followed by two different semifactual conditionals that share the same representations but differ in their epistemic status. Accuracy and latency data suggest that people think of both the conjectured and the presupposed situations, but do not codify the epistemic status of either when the task does not require it. The results are discussed through theoretical predictions about how people make inferences from different connected conditionals.     

Longevity of attentional bias modification effects for food cues in overweight and obese individuals

Accumulating evidence shows that overweight individuals exhibit an attentional bias for food and that this bias can be modified. This study investigated the longevity of such modification effects. Using a dot probe paradigm, a community sample of overweight and obese women (N = 104) was trained to direct attention towards (‘attend’) or away from (‘avoid’) food pictures. Participants completed five weekly training sessions. Attentional bias was measured before and after training, at 24 h and one-week follow-up. To increase generalisability, at each of the post-training and follow-up assessments, participants were shown a mix of old and new food pictures. They also completed another implicit bias measure, i.e. a word stem task. Attentional bias for food increased in the ‘attend’ group and decreased in the ‘avoid’ group. These retraining effects were maintained at 24 h and one-week follow-up, and extended to new food pictures. Participants in the ‘avoid’ group also produced relatively fewer food words on the word stem task than those in the ‘attend’ group. Results are consistent with predictions of cognitive-motivational models that attentional biases are malleable. They further suggest that attentional bias modification, which targets the implicit processes that underlie the heightened food responsivity in overweight individuals, could help combat pathological (over)eating.     

Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: Inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study–test trials using both strategies, participants' predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study–test trials—they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation—noncompliance with strategy instructions—was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.     

On problems of context and attribution in verbal reasoning

Investigated the effect of the verb on inferences in reasoning tasks with conditionals. Subjects were 60 pupils, both male and female, aged 17 to 18 years. Six verbs (buy, have, understand, ignore, hate, avoid) served as independent variables in conditional tasks consisting of two premises. The results which are statistically, highly significant, show an effect due to the verb depending upon the logical form of the task (2Î = 86.1, df= 30). indicate that certain semantic characteristics implicit in verbs determine the way in which a reasoning task is interpreted. A second experiment investigated why verbs differ in this way. Interviews were carried out with subjects using the verbs ‘buy’ and ‘ignore’. It is suggested that implicit meanings acquired through processes of social attribution play an essential role in verbal reasoning. In the present case, such attributions concern the depositional and episodic character of verbs and appear to be responsible for the interpretation of the premises of our tasks. It is concluded that any logical model aiming at an adequate representation of language in reasoning must take these implicit social attributions into account.     

Emotionality,distinctiveness, and recollective experience

Two experiments investigated the effects of emotional stimuli on recollective experience in recognition memory. In Experiment 1, words judged to evoke a positive emotional response (e.g., warmth, freedom) or a negative emotional response (e.g., mucus, corpse) were associated with more “remember” responses than emotionally neutral words (e.g., crate, border) when presented in mixed lists. This effect was stronger with negative words than with positive words. In Experiment 2 the effects of emotional stimuli were eliminated when participants studied pure lists of either all emotional or all neutral words. These findings are discussed in relation to Rajaram's (1996) distinctiveness account of recollective experience.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dimensional effects of missing information on choice processing

This paper demonstrates that choice processing may be different in missing information situations than in full information situations depending on whether inferences are used to fill in missing values and the overlap of the missing information itself. It is shown that when individuals do not form inferences to fill in missing values, fewer full attribute-based processes and more processes which accommodate for missing attribute values, alternative-based or given-dimension attribute-based, are used. It is also shown that when a processing shift due to missing information does occur, the overlap of the missing values will affect the type of shift that takes place. If overlap is high, a shift to given-dimension attribute-based processing is more likely, and when overlap is low, a shift to alternative-based processing is more likely. When individuals do form inferences to fill in missing values, processing is more similar to that in full information situations. Finally, it is shown that individuals will often partially fill in missing information, thus moderating the proposed effects.     

Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study-test trials using both strategies, participants' predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study-test trials--they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation--noncompliance with strategy instructions--was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.     

Sleep enhances explicit recollection in recognition memory

Recognition memory is considered to be supported by two different memory processes, i.e., the explicit recollection of information about a previous event and an implicit process of recognition based on an acontextual sense of familiarity. Both types of memory supposedly rely on distinct memory systems. Sleep is known to enhance the consolidation of memories, with the different sleep stages affecting different types of memory. In the present study, we used the process-dissociation procedure to compare the effects of sleep on estimates of explicit (recollection) and implicit (familiarity) memory formation on a word-list discrimination task. Subjects studied two lists of words before a 3-h retention interval of sleep or wakefulness, and recognition was tested afterward. The retention intervals were positioned either in the early night when sleep is dominated by slow-wave sleep (SWS), or in the late night, when sleep is dominated by REM sleep. Sleep enhanced explicit recognition memory, as compared with wakefulness (P < 0.05), whereas familiarity was not affected by sleep. Moreover, explicit recognition was particularly enhanced after sleep in the early-night retention interval, and especially when the words were presented with the same contextual features as during learning, i.e., in the same font (P < 0.05). The data indicate that in a task that allows separating the contribution of explicit and implicit memory, sleep particularly supports explicit memory formation. The mechanism of this effect appears to be linked to SWS.     

Working memory differences in illusory recollection of critical lures

In the present experiments, we explored the relationship between individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity and susceptibility to false recognitions and their accompanying subjective experiences. Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) associative lists were used to elicit false memories, and remember/know judgments were used to measure the recollective experiences accompanying recognition decisions. We found that WM capacity was related to false recognitions of nonpresented critical lures and to the proportion of remember responses given to critical lures, such that higher WM capacity was associated with lower false-recognition rates and with lower proportions of remember responses. Importantly, these WM differences were only found when participants were forewarned about the nature of the DRM task prior to encoding (Exp. 1). When the forewarning was absent, WM capacity was not related to false recognitions or to the proportion of remember responses given to critical lures (Exp. 2). These results support the controlled-attention view of WM and suggest that subjective experiences of falsely recognized lures fluctuate as a function of WM capacity.