Effects of categorical labels on similarity judgments: a critical evaluation of a critical analysis: comment on Noles and Gelman (2012)

Noles and Gelman (2012) attempt to critically reevaluate the claim that linguistic labels affect children's judgments of visual similarity. They report results of an experiment that used a modified version of Sloutsky and Fisher's (2004) task and conclude that "labels do not generally affect children's perceptual similarity judgments; rather, children's reliance on labels to make similarity judgments appears to be attributable to flaws in the methodological approaches used in prior studies" (p. 890). In this comment we demonstrate that these conclusions are based on inadequate analyses and reporting of statistics and are inconsistent with Noles and Gelman's own data. Instead, their data show a perfect replication of Sloutsky and Fisher (2004) and present further evidence that linguistic labels affect similarity judgment of young children.     

Why g is not an adaptation: a comment on Kanazawa (2004)

In S. Kanazawa's evolutionary theory of general intelligence (g), g is presented as a species-typical information-processing mechanism. This conceptualization of g departs radically from the accepted conceptualization of g as a source of individual differences that is manifest in the positive manifold. Kanazawa's theory is thus problematic in the sense that it concerns a purely hypothetical, and empirically unsupported, conceptualization of g. The authors argue that an evolutionary account of g should address it as a source of individual differences--that is, in a manner that is consistent with the empirical support for g.     

Unawareness is more than a chance event: comment on Lovibond and Shanks (2002)

P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that expectancy of the unconditional stimulus and emotional ratings are valid indexes of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning and that participants are aware if they can discriminate the conditional stimuli. However, research suggests that processes that are irrelevant to awareness affect these measures. Further, as awareness refers to conscious experience, a valid measures needs to index subjective state rather than discrimination ability. In support, research using subjective measures has demonstrated qualitatively different effects depending on whether participants reported being aware or unaware of the stimuli. In this research, participants reported being unaware of the stimuli even though they were clearly able to discriminate the stimuli. These findings question the validity of Lovibond and Shanks' concept of awareness and their suggestion of a close association between conditioning and awareness.     

Inference is bliss: using evolutionary relationship to guide categorical inferences

Three experiments, adopting an evolutionary biology perspective, investigated subjects' inferences about living things. Subjects were told that different enzymes help regulate cell function in two taxa and asked which enzyme a third taxon most likely uses. Experiment 1 and its follow-up, with college students, used triads involving amphibians, reptiles, and mammals (reptiles and mammals are most closely related evolutionarily) and plants, fungi, and animals (fungi are more closely related to animals than to plants). Experiment 2, with 10th graders, also included triads involving mammals, birds, and snakes/crocodilians (birds and snakes/crocodilians are most closely related). Some subjects received cladograms (hierarchical diagrams) depicting the evolutionary relationships among the taxa. The effect of providing cladograms depended on students' background in biology. The results illuminate students' misconceptions concerning common taxa and constraints on their willingness to override faulty knowledge when given appropriate evolutionary evidence. Implications for introducing tree thinking into biology curricula are discussed.     

The SNARC effect is not a unitary phenomenon

Models of the spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect—faster responses to small numbers using left effectors, and the converse for large numbers—diverge substantially in localizing the root cause of this effect along the numbers’ processing chain. One class of models ascribes the cause of the SNARC effect to the inherently spatial nature of the semantic representation of numerical magnitude. A different class of models ascribes the effect’s cause to the processing dynamics taking place during response selection. To disentangle these opposing views, we devised a paradigm combining magnitude comparison and stimulus–response switching in order to monitor modulations of the SNARC effect while concurrently tapping both semantic and response-related processing stages. We observed that the SNARC effect varied nonlinearly as a function of both manipulated factors, a result that can hardly be reconciled with a unitary cause of the SNARC effect.     

The attentional blink is not a unitary phenomenon

Identification of the second of two targets is impaired if it is presented less than about 500 ms after the first. Three models of this second-target deficit, known as attentional blink (AB), were compared:resource-depletion, bottleneck, and temporary loss of control (TLC). Five experiments, in which three sequential targets were inserted in a stream of distractors, showed that identification accuracy for the leading target depended on an attentional switch whose magnitude varied with distractor–target similarity. In contrast, accuracy for the trailing target depended on similarity between the target and the trailing mask. These results strongly suggest that the AB is not a unitary phenomenon. Resource-depletion was ruled out as a viable account. The effect of attentional switching was handled naturally by the TLC model, while bottleneck models offered the best account of the effect of backward masking.     

Bias in spatial memory: a categorical endorsement

Two experiments investigated how angular estimates reflect bias as a function of response mode, geometric plane of variation, number of implicit categories, memory load and intervening task conditions. In Experiment 1, participants made motor and verbal estimates of incline and azimuth from memory. Estimates in both response modes showed signs of bias predicted by a single-category adaptation of Huttenlocher et al. [Huttenlocher, J., Hedges, L. V., & Duncan, S. (1991). Categories and particulars: Prototype effects in estimating spatial location. Psychological Review, 98, 352-376] category-adjustment model. In Experiment 2, participants made motor estimates of azimuth from memory under a variety of conditions. Stimuli in this experiment were distributed along two contiguous spatial categories. Although increasing levels of cognitive load did not produce a graded effect, participants' estimates were biased and were well described by a multiple-category adaptation of the category-adjustment model. Results from both studies supported an implicit region-based model of bias in spatial memory. These findings were discussed with respect to accounts of spatial memory that propose multiple systems or formats for coding.     

Scholarship, consensus and advocacy: a comment on Cameron

While Cameron is right about the need for Christians to contribute more visibly to medical ethical debates, he is wrong in his analysis of bioethics. Marsha D.M. Fowler and Andrew Jameton find specific problems in several points of Cameron's argument, particularly where the Hippocratic Oath and patient autonomy are concerned.     

The preference-for-signalled-shock phenomenon: Signalling shock is reinforcing only if shock is modifiable

Inescapable, unavoidable, 5-sec. shocks were preceded by 5-sec. white-noise signals contingent on previously food-trained (FR 40) bar pressing of 20 rats. Twenty yoked-control subjects receiving the same, but non-contingent, series of signals indicated that the signal was reliably reinforcing only if the shocks were delivered through an alternate, rather than scrambled, floor-grid system. Implications are discussed for previous reports of the preference for signalled shock phenomenon.     

Face encoding is not categorical: Consistent evidence across multiple types of contingent aftereffects

ABSTRACT

Race-contingent aftereffects indicate that faces of different races are encoded via dissociable visual channels. Race-contingent aftereffects reflect perceptions of typicality, indicating a gradual transition of activity across channels as faces change from looking more typical of one race to the other We examine whether faces forming more discrete categories (sex: male/female; species: human/monkey) are encoded in a similar fashion, or whether they are instead encoded via more dichotomous categorical judgements. Curves representing the rate of change of aftereffect magnitude as stimuli changed from male to female produced shallow slopes, closely resembling ratings of typicality, but differing significantly from slopes for categorical judgements. For species, aftereffect slopes were significantly shallower than both ratings of typicality and categorical judgements. Overall, these results suggest that the encoding of facial properties such as these is not categorical, but instead involves a graded response as stimulus typicality varies. Aftereffect slopes were similar across the two experiments, raising the possibility of a common system that is recruited during contingent adaptation, regardless of the specific dimension involved or the categories used by the experimenter.     

Visual perception of orientation is categorical near vertical and continuous near horizontal

Four experiments were conducted to examine whether visual-orientation information is perceived categorically. In experiments 1 and 3, adult participants sorted oriented line stimuli into broad oblique and narrow vertical or horizontal categories. Experiments 2 and 4 showed that categorical discrimination of orientation occurred only near the vertical-oblique boundary. The data indicate that there is categorical perception near vertical and more continuous perception near horizontal. The results are relevant to the debate over whether categorical perception is derived from perceptual structure, verbal coding, or within-task learning. In addition, the asymmetrical perception of orientation around vertical and horizontal is consistent with the possibility that there may be differences in the functional significance of orientation near the two main axes.     

Justice between Age-groups: a comment on Norman Daniels

ABSTRACT  Norman Daniels suggests that the just distribution of resources between different age-groups is determined by the choice a prudential agent would make in budgeting resources over the different temporal stages of a single life. He calls this view the prudential lifespan account of justice between age-groups. Daniels thinks that the view recommends a rough kind of equality in resources between age-groups. I argue that in the case of a single life prudence would choose an unequal distribution of resources. Consequently, using prudence to model distribution between age-groups might severely restrict the share of resources assigned to the elderly. If we think that extreme inequality between age-groups would be unjust, we should continue to think of justice between age-groups as a problem concerned with the relationship between different lives. But we should apply the requirement of equality to the temporal parts of lives, not just to complete lives.