A partially ordered extention of the integers

This paper presents a monotonic system of Post algebras of order +* whose chain of Post constans is isomorphic with 012 ... -3-2-1. Besides monotonic operations, other unary operations are considered; namely, disjoint operations, the quasi-complement, succesor, and predecessor operations. The successor and predecessor operations are basic for number theory.The editing of this unified version of two previous papers [Epstein, Rasiowa 1990, 1991] by the authors was completed, except for footnotes, while the first author visited at Warsaw University during June–July, 1994. The footnotes were added by the first author in September, 1994.Presented byRyszard Wójcicki     

Training Psychologists for a Future in Evolving Health Care Delivery Systems: Building a Better Boulder Model

Recent and dramatic changes in the demand for and reimbursement of psychological services and expertise in health care delivery systems have radical implications for the preparation of psychologists at the predoctoral, internship, and postdoctoral levels. In order to respond to these changes effectively and advance the profession, training programs must realize the expanded and potential role of psychological expertise in evolving health care delivery systems. In this paper, we review several limitations and unfortunate consequences of traditional training programs that have confined the scope of research and practice to the realm of mental health. We propose that future psychologists be recognized and trained from a broader perspective as behavioral scientists, prepared to operate at the highest levels of health care delivery systems. Specific recommendations for training and education are discussed.     

The Client Is the Most Important Common Factor: Clients' Self-Healing Capacities and Psychotherapy

I first briefly review the dodo bird verdict and suggest that we should be responding to it by looking for a new way to conceptualize how therapy works. Then I describe the dominant medical or treatment model of psychotherapy and how it puts the client in the position of a dependent variable who is operated on by supposedly potent therapeutic techniques. Next I argue that the data do not fit with this model. An alternative model is that the client is the most important common factor and that it is clients' self-healing capacities which make therapy work. I then argue that therapy has two phases—the involvement phase and the learning phase—and that the involvement phase is the most important. I next review the five learning opportunities provided by therapy. Finally, I argue that a relational model of therapy focused on consultation, collaboration, and dialogue is better than a treatment model.     

The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut: What's It All About Theologically?

As a psychoanalytic thinker who offered by means of his self psychology a new paradigm of psychological development and functioning, Heinz Kohut was also a theologian manqué. With the help of the method of interpretation devised by Paul Tillich and David Tracy, Kohut's limit-concepts of tragic man, the self-object, and empathy, all set within his theory of narcissism, are elucidated as theological constructs. These are critiqued for adequacy from a Christian perspective. The conclusion is that Kohut's understanding of the human dilemma and of the way of salvation correlates well with Christianity, while his view of empathy as the means of salvation has created some confusion. Kohut has thus left an unfinished, profoundly important, agenda for theologians and clinicians.     

Sets and Classes as Many

In this paper the view is developed that classes should not be understood as individuals, but, rather, as classes as many of individuals. To correlate classes with individuals labelling and colabelling functions are introduced and sets identified with a certain subdomain of the classes on which the labelling and colabelling functions are mutually inverse. A minimal axiomatization of the resulting system is formulated and some of its extensions are related to various systems of set theory, including nonwellfounded set theories.     

From I: A/M to “Who am I?”—Aggregation/Massification and Trauma-Based Affects and Object Relations in Groups: A Response to Earl Hopper

Hopper's portrayal of the fourth basic assumption of Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification has two components: (1) a revision of Turquet's theory of BA Oneness to incorporate the polarity of aggregation and massification stemming from annihilation anxiety; and (2) a conception of the difficult patient as having an encapsulated psychosis. Hopper's theory of the encapsulated psychosis offers an important but incomplete perspective in explaining borderline and narcissistic pathology, as well as psychological trauma. In this response to Hopper, I suggest that the fourth assumption is in fact a still more primitive state of boundary opening and closing. I also see a need to differentiate trauma as such from borderline pathology, and further hold that the relationship between Hopper's British Independent theory and trauma theories based on dissociation needs to be clarified.     

“Minimax length links” of a dissimilarity matrix and minimum spanning trees

A theorem is proved stating that the set of all minimax links, defined as links minimizing, over paths, the maximum length of links in any path connecting a pair of objects comprising nodes in an undirected weighted graph, comprise the union of all minimum spanning trees of that graph. This theorem is related to methods of fitting network models to dissimilarity data, particularly a method called Pathfinder due to Schvaneveldt and his colleagues, as well as to single linkage clustering, and results concerning the relationship between minimum spanning trees and single linkage hierarchical trees.Acknowledgments: The author thanks Phipps Arabie, Lawrence J. Hubert, and K. Christoph Klauer for a number of helpful suggestions and comments on various aspects of this paper.     

Intellectual fascism

Intellectual fascism is the arbitrary belief that individuals possessing certain good traits (such as intelligence and creativity) are intrinsically superior to those possessing bad traits (such as stupidity or lack of artistry). Although it is true that under certain conditions and for various purposes some human traits are more advantageous or better than others, rating people as good or bad on the basis of their intellectual performances is inaccurate and is often as pernicious as is political-social fascism. Moreover, where political fascists at least rate themselves highly while damning and persecuting others, intellectual fascists tend to severely damn themselves (as well as others) when they lack superlative intellectual and artistic traits. According to RET, all global ratings of people tend to be fascistic overgeneralizations. Intellectual fascism is political-social fascism with the trait names changed—the same hearse with different license plates.This article is a revision of one that originally appeared in a book by Dr. Ellis entitledSuppressed.     

Quantum mechanics as subjectivity and projective stimulus

In this paper I attempt to show that subjectivity, as an input to the creative core of physics, is a misunderstood, but crucial factor. Utilizing Rapaport's fundamental paper, Principles Underlying Projective Techniques which identifies the determinants of the projective technique as: 1. lack of organization, 2. undifferentiation, 3. closeness to the core of the personality, and 4. the meaning of the stimulus being unknown to the subject, a link is suggested to quantum mechanics. It is further suggested the revolutionary nature of quantum mechanics satisfies the projective criterion of the material being unorganized or unfamiliar so that the function of organization can become predominant (Rapaport 1942, p. 93).     

Reformatory blame

It is argued that blame is an ambiguous and misused term leading to ineffective, harmful consequences, such as hate, guilt, revenge (retaliation, or retribution), or punishment for its own sake. A clarification of blame is given by showing that it is an open-context, value term and, so, meaningless in itself. For intelligibility, it must be reduced to naturalistic and pragmatic terms. The definition almost universally given is based on the fallacious beliefs that (1) we can change the past, and (2) we can have done otherwise than we did. But can here is seen also to be used in a pseudo-scientific and subjunctive, rather than in a factual sense. It is shown that retributive blame makes no sense because, as Marcus Aurelius said, we must accept what is and we can only do what is within our power. We cannot change past behavior, but we can try to change present behavior. For effectiveness and intelligibility, we are forced to substitute rehabilitative blame for retributive blame. Thus, in the prevention and elimination of such negative emotions as guilt, inferiority, hatred, revengefulness, a thorough understanding of the term blame is required.     

Truth,Sentential Non-Compositionalit,and Ontology

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

The Deep Structure of Group Life: Unconscious Dimensions

There is a reconsideration and renaissance of interest in expanded conceptions of unconscious processes as they affect individuals and groups (Grotstein, 1999). Recent focus on social unconscious (Hopper, 1996) and cultural unconscious processes (Henderson, 1988) and the nature of intersubjectivity (Harwood and Pines, 1998) raise questions about the location of group analysis. This paper considers the deep structure of group life by examining four functions of the unconscious: repressive, conservative, creative, and mythopoetic (Ellenberger, 1970). On an individual level of analysis, these functions are equated respectively with formative ideas about the: personal–subjective, social–political, intersubjective–cultural and collective–objective unconscious. Group level analogs, as they develop and affect groups and their members, are explored as synthetic, shared, symbolicy and synchronous unconscious processes.     

The drive for meaning in William James' analysis of religious experience

Summary Now that we have looked at the characteristics of mystical experience, we are ready to discuss the assumption made in this paper that mystical experience can be translated into an understanding of integration or the drive for meaning which Fingarette pursues in a much more analytic fashion. Reviewing the conversion process as an integration process we have seen that for the sick-souled, beset with the meaninglessness or melancholy which paralyzes his will, his own awareness of wrong in his situation prevents him from opening up to larger views of reality. But, as James has described, at the same time as the subject is attending so strongly to his own sense of worthlessness, all the while the forces of mere organic ripening within him are going on towards their own prefigured result, and his conscious strainings are letting loose subconscious allies behind the scenes, which in their way work toward rearrangements. Yet the rearrangements can only come about by obeying the command of Chaung-Tse: Cease striving. The result is self-transformation in reconciling, unifying states. There is achieved a supersensuous meaning to the ordinary outward data of consciousness; facts already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connection with our active life.However, James cautions us to realize that the same incursions of the subconscious which produce such reconciling, unifying states can also produce pathological states, a diabolical mysticism, a sort of religious mysticism turned upside down. In such a state the meanings of events become dreadful and the ruling emotion is pessimism. To this possibility James applied the pragmatic test, By their fruits..., and concluded that the mystical experience which brings optimism to the individual is a genuine experience and one which brings truth. In our context then, we would say that real integration brings the subject away from the melancholy and meaninglessness he felt into the genuinely insightful resolution of which Fingarette speaks.Conversion, then, is a process in James's analysis of religious experience analogous to the process of integration and meaning-discovery while mysticism is analogous to the state in which integration or meaning-discovery is achieved. Conversion is climaxed by self-surrender; mysticism is characterized by new determination, self-transformation: two ways of describing an indivisible event. Furthermore, the four characteristics James applies to mysticism are indeed characteristic of the experience of integration.Two other points should be added here which are much in line with James's treatment of experience. In the first place, one of the basic principles of radical empiricism is that not only objects but relations between objects are the subject of experience. Such an experience of relationships, of wholeness, is exactly what characterizes integration. At the same time, the five senses are suspended, and the insight is experienced with such a strong immediacy that it is almost sensed. James refers to this quality of mystical states: The records show that even though the five senses be in abeyance in them, they are absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality, if I may be pardoned the barbarous expression, - that is, they are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to exist.I am not saying that every integration is a mystical experience. Rather I have been saying that James's discussion of religious experiences such as healthy-minded, sick-souled, melancholy, conversion, and mysticism provide analogues for better understanding the phenomenological processes and characteristics of the drive for meaning and integration which Fingarette analyzes. In fact, the very notion of religion itself for James bears not just an analogous resemblance but perhaps an identification with integration. For in his personal letters James had defined religious experience as Any moment of life that brings the reality of spiritual things more home to one. And in Varieties James defines religion as a man's total reaction upon life....; his attitude towards what he felt to be the primal truth.If we look upon this outlook of James toward religion as an exaggeration of the reality of integration, we can follow James to what he perceives as the importance of religion upon an individual's life. The man of religious feeling possesses the excitement of a higher kind of emotion, an enthusiastic temper of espousal in regions where morality strictly so called can at best but bow its head and acquiesce. So we are brought again to the area of creativity in which an individual has experienced the widening of the area of his immediate experience and is re-born in the karmic pattern, a valid pattern for both James and Fingarette. As Fingarette describes it, the converted individual creates values which the dead reality he had previously faced did not possess. The result of the achieved integration is explained by James when referring to religious experience as an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, dynamogenic order which, like any tonic, freshens our vital powers. This emotion overcomes temperamental melancholy [meaninglessness] and imparts endurances to the subject, or a zest, or a meaning, or an enchantment and glory to the common objects of life.We might sum up this discussion not by a criticism of the shortcomings of James's treatment of the religious life, such as his apparent insensitivity to the part played by institutions in the religious experience itself, but rather by underscoring the richness of the phenomenological analysis James has undertaken. James Edie acknowledges that James's studies of religious experience itself rather than of religion. ... are not only more sound phenomenologically than some of the studies which have, under the influence of Husserl, up to now explicitly invoked the phenomenological method, but they are also the first to establish any solid basis for a true phenomenology of religious experience.And John Wild has pointed out the parallel between James's concept of melancholy and Heidegger's concept of anxiety as the genesis of the process of becoming: beginning with the prospect of death and nothingness, the individual gropes toward new birth.As we have seen, then, James's analysis of the varieties of religious experience leads to a fruitful discussion of the psychological processes involved in melancholy and meaninglessness, rearrangement and integration. In all such experiences, a sense of inner unity is reached to which the following words of Fingarette would apply by analogy: The soul-racking death which leads to blissful rebirth is the death of the subjectively experienced, anxiety-generated self perception; it is the emergence into the freedom of introspective self-forgetfulness of the psychically unified self.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

The dream in group therapy: A reappraisal of unconscious processes in groups

Addressing the issue of the existence of a group unconscious, this paper views dreams as providing potential evidence on the question. Dream material presented by various members in each of three psychotherapy groups is considered. In each group, convergences were found in the material presented by separate individual dreamers. By integrating a conceptual model of neurological information processing during REM dream sleep with a variety of behavioral research, a conceptual model is offered for the development of a group disposition, which represents an overlap of both individual and shared group psychic content. Group phenomena of cohesion and dependency are derived from this conceptual model.     

Structuring argumentation in a social constructivist framework: A pedagogy with computer support

What we usually think of as higher order skills in argumentation can be profitably viewed as systematic structures for organizing and representing information. Standard terms like line of argument, synthesis, analysis and draft can be viewed as ways of constructing, storing, and accessing data in a social context — data structures for social communication. What makes argument difficult are the multiple structures that arguers have to construct and negotiate when reading and composing. In this paper, we describe the WARRANT project, a project designed to identify data structures of written argument and to design and implement computer tools to aid in the reading and design of argument.     

Visual discrimination and response programming

Summary Choice reaction time (RT) depends on the relationship between responses, and these dependencies are usually interpreted in terms of the advance-specification assumption. According to this assumption characteristics that are the same for the choice responses can be specified in advance of the response signal, thus allowing faster RTs. Since the advance-specification assumption is called into question by some of the available data, an alternative interpretation is suggested and formalized in terms of an accumulator model. According to the programming-interactions assumption, stimulus processing is tightly linked to response programming, so that both the possible responses are programmed as long as there is uncertainty with regard to stimulus identity. This gives rise to interactions between simultaneous processes of motor programming. Predictions of this assumption for the joint effects of signal similarity and the relationship between responses are tested and confirmed.This research was supported by grant no. He 1187/3–1 from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft     

Community,subjectivity, and intersubjectivity

This paper deals with the notions of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and community from several different points of view that include subjective and intersubjective agency, a sense of community, the community as a social institution, and the idea of social justice. The context of these considerations can be found in the Community–Social–Psychological approach to social action as it is often practiced in Latin America. A review of these themes is considered important because different models of community intervention and practice may lead to different expressions of community interaction.