A Practical Guide to Building an Integral World

We stand at the start of a new millennium with a growing awareness of what is wrong with our civilization but little agreement as to what to do. From environmental crises to democratic systems dominated by moneyed interests, the list of dangers is long and growing. Each issue has a band of defenders who struggle to right that particular wrong but, because these bands are disjointed, the broad movement they serve remains incoherent and weak. The broad movement is usually described as toward "sustainable civilization," but its precise designation is "integral society." The challenge for the emerging "new science" is to provide a framework for understanding that unifies and gives direction to the disparate efforts that comprise the integral movement. This framework must address three needs. First, it must provide a sound understanding of why, despite our sophistication, things seem to be going badly in so many spheres. Secondly, it must present a believable vision of where our civilization should be headed. Finally, it must provide a sense that there are concrete steps we can take to achieve the deep dreams that most of us actually share. What we need, in short, is not more disparate insights, but rather a collective intellectual unity that integrates existing insights into a logically coherent and emotionally compelling whole. Such integration, however, cannot be constructed artificially, by committee or consensus. Rather, true integration can only come from a unified scientific understanding of why various ideas connect. Today, a scientific story capable of such unifying understanding is found in the expanded theory of evolution that is emerging from the union of a broad range of scientific efforts. This theory also serves as a unifying thread for an integrated new science. This article outlines the "dynamic" view of evolution and how it unites integral efforts.     

Hierarchies,Networks, and Causality: The Applied Evolutionary Epistemological Approach

Applied Evolutionary Epistemology is a scientific-philosophical theory that defines evolution as the set of phenomena whereby units evolve at levels of ontological hierarchies by mechanisms and processes. This theory also provides a methodology to study evolution, namely, studying evolution involves identifying the units that evolve, the levels at which they evolve, and the mechanisms and processes whereby they evolve. Identifying units and levels of evolution in turn requires the development of ontological hierarchy theories, and examining mechanisms and processes necessitates theorizing about causality. Together, hierarchy and causality theories explain how biorealities form and diversify with time. This paper analyzes how Applied EE redefines both hierarchy and causality theories in the light of the recent explosion of network approaches to causal reasoning associated with studies on reticulate and macroevolution. Causality theories have often been framed from within a rigid, ladder-like hierarchy theory where the rungs of the ladder represent the different levels, and the elements on the rungs represent the evolving units. Causality then is either defined reductionistically as an upward movement along the strands of a singular hierarchy, or holistically as a downward movement along that same hierarchy. Upward causation theories thereby analyze causal processes in time, i.e. over the course of natural history or phylogenetically, as Darwin and the founders of the Modern Synthesis intended. Downward causation theories analyze causal processes in space, ontogenetically or ecologically, as the current eco-evo-devo schools are evidencing. This work demonstrates how macroevolution and reticulate evolution theories add to the complexity by examining reticulate causal processes in space–time, and the interactional hierarchies that such studies bring forth introduce a new form of causation that is here called reticulate causation. Reticulate causation occurs between units and levels belonging to different as well as to the same ontological hierarchies. This article concludes that beyond recognizing the existence of multiple units, levels, and mechanisms or processes of evolution, also the existence of multiple kinds of evolutionary causation as well as the existence of multiple evolutionary hierarchies needs to be acknowledged. This furthermore implies that evolution is a pluralistic process divisible into different kinds.

     

Interpretation and method

Abstract

Interpretation started as the central tool of psychoanalytic theory, but it has undergone changes, just as the theory it was based on has evolved. Not only have these significant changes been determined by cultural trends, but different authors have also contributed to their evolution through their approaches to various other pathologies besides neurosis. Today, the cure process is divided between those who believe that therapeutic efficiency should be based on the different interpretation models, and those who maintain that it can be only sustained by the modifying capacity of the therapeutic relationship. Both positions are supposedly upheld by the results of tests that both models believe are sufficient proof but that, in the current author's opinion, lead back to the type of pathology they arose from, although they may at times attempt to cover the entire theoretical spectrum. The position upheld by Gedo—who considers that the psychoanalyst's intervention will depend on the degree of evolution that the pathology has achieved—is of great interest for specific practice. Hence, the more primitive levels require a treatment founded on holding, whereas more evolved pathologies require a more classic level of interpretation. This implies that the stages of a particular patient's evolution may require interventions at different levels, even though these may be founded on different theoretical models. This model, which we may brand as eclectic, is basically the one we find underpinning different theoretical models, which effectively appear to integrate others.     

Integrating Theories of Psychological Needs‐as‐Requirements and Psychological Needs‐as‐Motives: A Two Process Model

Two conceptions of psychological needs predominate within contemporary motivational science. Motive disposition theory conceives of needs as behavioral motives which direct behavior (needs‐as‐motives), while self‐determination theory conceives of needs as universally required experiences for optimal functioning (needs‐as‐requirements). Until recently, these perspectives on psychological needs have proceeded without much intersection, despite the fact that they address the same fundamental concept. Here we summarize the Two Process Model of Psychological Needs, which attempts to bridge these two conceptions. We argue that psychological needs are best defined as tendencies to seek out certain basic types of psychosocial experiences, to a somewhat varying extent across individuals, and to feel good and thrive when those basic experiences are obtained, to the same extent across individuals. We suggest that this definition allows a reconciliation of needs‐as‐motives and needs‐as‐requirements perspectives and a more consilient science of human motivation. Empirical support for the TPM is also summarized.     

源于“反常”终于“常理”的禀赋效应

如果忽略收入影响和交易成本, 愿意为一样物品支付的价格应等于愿意出售的价格。而塞勒教授却发现, 现实生活中有一些“反常”现象, 个体会对自己所拥有的物品赋予更高的价值, 造成“愿意支付价格”和“愿意出售价格”的不一致。塞勒利用预期理论中的损失厌恶对这些反常现象进行解释, 并将该现象称为禀赋效应(endowment effect)。此后, 众多研究者从不同角度对该效应进行了探索和论证。文章详细梳理了禀赋效应的多种解释机制, 包括损失厌恶、心理所有权理论、偏差的认知过程以及进化的观点等, 论证了禀赋效应符合“常理”的原因, 同时也探讨了禀赋效应在商业销售策略和政府拆迁政策等方面的应用前景。     

Reasons given by UK churchgoers for their stance on evolution

A sample of 661 churchgoers from a range of Christian denominations in the United Kingdom was asked about Darwinian evolution (defined as the common origin of all species, including humans). Respondents were categorised as those who accepted the idea, those who rejected it, and those who were unsure or neutral. People in each category were given a number of statements that related to reasons why they might have held their particular stance, and responses were used to create summated rating scales. Reasons for accepting or rejecting evolution could be classified as broadly relating to the theory itself or to the religious consequences of the theory. Accepters saw the theory as rational and attractive, and one that allowed a role for God in shaping evolution. Rejecters saw the theory as unsupported by evidence and one that denied a role for God and/or contradicted Scripture. Those unsure or neutral seemed to be so because they lacked sufficient knowledge about evolution or the Bible, and/or because they were disinterested. Predicting which reasons were likely to be chosen by an individual was difficult, though there were significance differences in some cases between denominations and between those with or without education in biology or science.     

A progress report on the ongoing Heidegger reception

Philosophy, which does not begin again, always unfolds against the background of the ongoing philosophical tradition, which it needs to interpret. I argue that Heidegger’s theories, like all philosophical theories, can neither be reduced to, nor separated from, the historical context. In that sense they are like all other philosophical views, perhaps in theory ahistorical but in practice historical, hence always bound up with and inseparable from their historical moment. If, as I believe, Heidegger’s theories led him in part toward National Socialism, there is no alternative, if philosophy is to survive in a meaningful sense, to rejecting those aspects of his position, which must now be considered as simply and wholly dead, in favor of other aspects of Heidegger’s thinking that, if they are still living, can possibly be saved.     

Psychodynamic and systemic paradigms: An attempted integration in the light of personal experience with groups

Conclusion Our purpose is not to confuse psychoanalysis with systems theory: Karen Horney defined herself as a psychoanalyst, while the theory of autopoietic systems remains a systems theory. With the exception of the basic matrices that determine the identity of each current of thought, it seems possible to point out interesting points of contact among different anthropological views. They appear to converge on some points that are not to be overlooked, though they may take off from premises that are very different from each other. These are recent working hypotheses, which I have presented as a theme of research that needs to be verified scientifically. If these hypotheses can be rigorously verified in such a way as to avoid superimpositions, the theories would be enriched reciprocally, opening up interesting prospectives of scientific research. This is our wish.     

A Geneticist Responds

The theory of evolution challenges the traditional temporal pattern of creation, fall, and restoration that lies behind Christian soteriology. This paper explores the possibility of interpreting soteriology without tying it to this temporal pattern. To do so, it examines how salvation is presented in John Wesley's theology to see whether his soteriological concerns can be maintained when the temporal pattern is broken. Certain features of his theology allow a reconception of salvation in light of humans as having evolved to be biocultural.     

Gerald Edelman’s Project: How Gerald Edelman’s Theory of Consciousness Completes Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and Provides a Basis for a Brain-Based Psychoanalytic Perspective

In this article we consider Nobel Prize Winner Gerald Edelman’s remarkable contribution to the understanding of human evolution, and our own application of Edelman’s theory to a brain-based psychoanalytic perspective we have devised. Edelman’s paradigm setting out his theory of the evolution of mind, brain, and consciousness concerns not only mankind’s evolution over all of time, but also the evolution of each and every individual over and within his single lifetime. Edelman contends that human beings, as individuals, and not only as the taxonomic category from which they sprang, have a separate and distinct evolutionary history of their own, and it is especially from within Edelman’s theoretical assumptions about the evolution of the individual per se that our own psychoanalytic understanding of theory and practice derives.     

Darwinism Extended: A Survey of How the Idea of Cultural Evolution Evolved

In the past 150 years there have been many attempts to draw parallels between cultural and biological evolution. Most of these attempts were flawed due to lack of knowledge and false ideas about evolution. In recent decades these shortcomings have been cleared away, thus triggering a renewed interest in the subject. This paper offers a critical survey of the main issues and arguments in that discussion. The paper starts with an explication of the Darwinian algorithm of evolution. It is argued that this ‘formula’ is substrate-neutral, which means that biological evolution might not be the only Darwinian process. Other dynamic systems could evolve as well provided that certain conditions are met. In the case of human culture this seems to be the case. The paper then focuses on the notion of niche construction. It is argued that niche construction plays a crucial role in human evolution because it has altered the sources of natural selection and thus the path of evolution. Next two approaches to cultural evolution are discussed: sociobiology and memetics. I will argue that both approaches have flaws because they either underestimate the influence of culture or they stretch analogies too far. Finally two common objections against the idea of cultural evolution are addressed: Lamarckian inheritance and the issue of guided variation. I will argue that although cultural evolution differs from biological evolution in several respects, these discrepancies do not jeopardize the claim that cultural evolution is essentially Darwinian.     

A way out of the wasteland

This essay describes the author's experiences with Judaism, with the art of Jane Austen, and with the thought of a radical Catholic theologian, Leslie Dewart. The author's synthesis of these disparate elements indicates that it is possible to achieve a religious view that satisfies one's spiritual and emotional needs without conflicting with the widespread modern conception of the integrity and openness of man's evolution.     

Conventional naturalism: A perceptualist account of pictorial representation

This paper proposes that pictures are functional objects which figure in norm‐governed practices of usage yet whose specific function is to present the world as it looks to acculturated perceivers. Pictorial content presents the way the world looks to a subject's acculturated perceptual grasp. Hence, pictorial content needs to be explained in terms of a theory of perceptual content, but a novel theory which departs from the two‐stage sensation‐based approach to perception and the polarization between naturalism and conventionalism that it engenders. Following a diagnosis of this polarization, I invoke a novel theory of perception that explains perceptual content as conceptually articulated and determinate in character. I show that (1) pictures present content of the same distinctive determinate type as perceptual content; and that (2) pictures do so by invoking perceptual experience and perceptual processes that are of the same kind as those invoked by actual scenes. This perceptualist approach considers and explains the role of norms as well as of the nature of our visual processes, allowing us to allocate the insights of both conventionalism and naturalism to their proper theoretical roles.     

A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences

The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they become capable of modeling all aspects of decision making, including those normally considered "psychological," "sociological," or "anthropological." The mind as a decision-making organ then becomes the organizing principle of psychology.     

Comparing Visitors' Conceptions of Evolution: Examining Understanding Outside the United States

ABSTRACT

In contrast to the United States, other predominantly English-speaking countries generally have higher acceptance rates of evolutionary theory. This article explores whether natural history museum audiences in these regions also have fewer misconceptions about the underlying processes of evolution. Museum visitors in Great Britain, Canada, and Australia were asked to explain how evolution worked, as well as whether or not they believed that the theory was valid. Although findings suggest that these visitors were significantly less likely to reject evolution (compared with a recent investigation conducted at natural history museums across the United States), they were just as likely to harbor misconceptions as their American counterparts.     

体验的心理机制研究

体验是个体以身体为中介,以“行或思”为手段,以知情相互作用为典型特征,作用于人的对象对人产生意义时而引发的不断生成的居身状态。体验的心理机制研究一般包括对象的呈现、意义的建构、身体的变化、体验的形成,以及体验的延展五个环节。从存在的基本形态看,体验可分为外显体验和内隐体验两种。体验及其心理机制的深入研究,对未来的情绪心理学、认知心理学、文化心理学,以及本土心理学的进一步发展都有着重要的促进作用。     

Evolutionary psychology is compatible with equity feminism, but not with gender feminism: A reply to Eagly and Wood (2011)

I comment on Eagly and Wood's biosocial constructionist evolutionary theory (2011; DOI: 10.1007/s11199-011-9949-9). Although this gender feminist theory allows for evolved physical differences between men and women and evolved psychological similarities for men and women, it fails to consider evolutionary accounts of psychological sex differences. I hypothesize that gender feminists' reluctance to acknowledge that evolution has left different fingerprints on men's and women's bodies and brains stems from two common misunderstandings of evolutionary psychology: the myth of immutability and the naturalistic fallacy. I conclude that although evolutionary psychology is eminently compatible with equity feminism, evolutionary psychology and feminist psychology will conflict as long as the latter adheres to gender feminism and its unwillingness to acknowledge the evidence for evolved psychological sex differences. Gender feminism's dualistic view of evolution hinders the search for and understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of inequality. Feminist psychology needs to evolve by embracing equity feminism, which has no a priori stance on the origin or existence of differences between the sexes.     

The causal explanatory functions of medical diagnoses

Diagnoses in medicine are often taken to serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms and signs. This article examines how they do so. I begin by arguing that although some instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, they are explanatory neither in virtue of their argumentative structures nor in virtue of general regularities between diagnoses and clinical presentations. I then consider the theory that medical diagnoses explain symptoms and signs by identifying their actual causes in particular cases. While I take this to be largely correct, I argue that for a diagnosis to function as a satisfactory causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms and signs, it also needs to be supplemented by understanding the mechanisms by which the identified cause produces the symptoms and signs. This mechanistic understanding comes not from the diagnosis itself, but rather from the theoretical framework within which the physician operates.