Is morphological decomposition limited to low-frequency words?

On the basis of data from masked priming experiments, it has been argued that an automatic process of decomposition is applied to all morphologically structured stimuli, irrespective of their lexical characteristics (Rastle, Davis, & New, 2004). So far, this claim has been tested only with respect to low-frequency primes and nonword primes. This is a limitation because some models of morphological processing postulate that only high-frequency complex words are recognized as whole forms. Thus, a more stringent test would be to determine whether high-frequency complex words also show evidence of masked priming. We report an experiment that compares masked-priming effects observed when the primes constitute morphologically structured nonwords (e.g., alarmer–ALARM), low-frequency words with a mean frequency of 2 per million (e.g., notional–NOTION), and high-frequency words with a mean frequency of 60 per million (e.g., national–NATION). These three conditions yielded significant and equivalent effects, lending strong support to the notion of a routine form of decomposition that is applied to all morphologically structured stimuli.     

Is there a “strength effect” in automatic semantic priming?

According to spreading activation models of automatic priming, highly related associates should yield stronger priming effects than weakly related associates. The strength of relations is usually based on word association norms. However, this strength effect has been found in some studies but not in others. The present study suggests that one factor that might be responsible for this inconsistency is whether the weak associate is the primary or nonprimary response in the word association norms This possibility was explored by comparing priming effects of weak nonprimary and primary associates with those of strong primary associates. Comparable priming effects were found for the strong and weak primary associates whereas the weak nonprimary associates did not yield any priming effects. These results were obtained both in paired (Experiment 1) and single (Experiment 2) presentation priming procedures. Thus, the rank of the associate is an important factor in predicting the magnitude of the priming effect.     

Is obesity treated like a contagious disease?

The behavioral avoidance of people with obesity is well documented, but its psychological basis is poorly understood. Based upon a disease avoidance account of stigmatization, we tested whether a person with obesity triggers equivalent self-reported emotional and avoidant-based responses as a contagious disease (i.e., influenza). Two hundred and sixty-four participants rated images depicting real disease signs (i.e., person with influenza), false alarms (i.e., person with obesity), person with facial bruising (i.e., negative control), and a healthy control for induced emotion and willingness for contact along increasing levels of physical proximity. Consistent with our prediction, as the prospect for contact became more intimate, self-reported avoidance was equivalent in the influenza and obese target conditions, with both significantly exceeding reactions to the negative and healthy controls. In addition, participants reported greatest levels of disgust toward the obese and influenza target conditions. These results are consistent with an evolved predisposition to avoid individuals with disease signs. Implicit avoidance occurs even when participants know explicitly that such signs—here, obese body form—result from a noncontagious condition. Our findings provide important evidence for a disease avoidance explanation of the stigmatization of people with obesity.     

Is the sky 2? Contextual priming in grapheme-color synaesthesia

Grapheme-color synaesthesia is a neurological phenomenon in which particular graphemes, such as the numeral 9, automatically induce the simultaneous perception of a particular color, such as the color red. To test whether the concurrent color sensations in grapheme-color synaesthesia are treated as meaningful stimuli, we recorded event-related brain potentials as 8 synaesthetes and 8 matched control subjects read sentences such as "Looking very clear, the lake was the most beautiful hue of 7." In synaesthetes, but not control subjects, congruous graphemes, compared with incongruous graphemes, elicited a more negative N1 component, a less positive P2 component, and a less negative N400 component. Thus, contextual congruity of synaesthetically induced colors altered the brain response to achromatic graphemes beginning 100 ms postonset, affecting pattern-recognition, perceptual, and meaning-integration processes. The results suggest that grapheme-color synaesthesia is automatic and perceptual in nature and also suggest that the connections between colors and numbers are bidirectional.     

Is priming during anesthesia unconscious?

General anesthesia provides an alternative to typical laboratory paradigms for investigating implicit learning. We assess the evidence that a simple type of learning--priming--can occur without consciousness. Although priming has been shown to be a small but persistent phenomenon in surgical patients (Merikle & Daneman, 1996) there is reason to question whether it occurs implicitly due to problems in detecting awareness using typical clinical signs. This paper reviews the published studies on priming during anesthesia that have included a measure of awareness or of anesthetic depth. We conclude that perceptual priming, but not conceptual priming, takes place in the absence of conscious awareness.     

Is masked neighbor priming inhibitory? Evidence using the incremental priming technique

To investigate neighbor effects in visual word recognition, the masked priming technique holds considerable advantages over unprimed methods, because a target word is used as its own control. However, inhibitory neighbor effects obtained with masked priming are still open for different interpretations, because the primes differ across conditions. Given this theoretical problem, it is useful to investigate neighbor priming effects using a prime as its own control. This option is available in the incremental priming technique (Jacobs, Grainger, & Ferrand, 1995), in which a within-condition baseline is created by comparing the response times (RTs) to a target when it is primed at different prime durations. In this study, we examined masked neighbor priming using this technique. Both the traditional and the within-condition baseline indicated that masked neighbor word priming is inhibitory in nature. The results are discussed in terms of current theories of visual word recognition.     

Is unconscious identity priming lexical or sublexical?

We examined unconscious priming in a stem-completion task with both identity and form-related primes. Participants were given exclusion instructions to avoid completing a stem (e.g., ca---) with a briefly flashed masked word (e.g., candy). In Experiment 1, priming of around 7% occurred for both identity (e.g., candy) and form-based (e.g., windy) primes at a 33 ms exposure duration. When examining only trials in which the participants failed to identify the prime, this effect increased to 12% for identity primes, but remained the same for form-based primes. In Experiment 2, priming without prime identification was 9% for identity primes, 4% for homophone primes, and 3% for orthographic control primes. Although identity priming was greater than form priming in both experiments, regression analyses revealed that orthographic and phonological overlap alone between the flashed primes and targets could completely account for unconscious identity priming. Hence, we conclude that masked words may only activate their sublexical orthographic and phonological representations and not their lexical representations.     

Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant

This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories and whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality might save foundherentism about scientific theories and the image of science as a crossword puzzle. I also draw lessons for social epistemology generally by applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.     

Is visual search really like foraging?

The visual-search paradigm provides a controlled and easy to implement experimental situation in which to study the search process. However, little work has been carried out in humans to investigate the extent to which traditional visual-search tasks are similar to more general search or foraging. Here we report results from a task in which search involves walking around a room and leaning down to inspect individual locations. Consistent with more traditional search tasks, search time increases linearly with display size, and the target-present to target-absent search slope is 1:2. However, although rechecking of locations did occur, compared to more traditional search it was relatively rare, suggesting an increased role for memory.     

Negative priming from masked words: retrospective prime clarification of center-surround inhibition?

Masked repetition and semantic priming effects were examined in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, a masked-prime lexical decision task followed a phase of detection, semantic, or repetition judgments about masked words. In Experiment 2 participants made speeded pronunciations to target words after they tried to identify masked primes, and the proportion of semantically and identically related prime-target pairs was varied. Center-surround theory CT. H. Carr & D. Dagenbach, 1990; D. Dagenbach, T. H. Carr, & A. Wilhelmsen, 1989) predicts positive repetition priming but negative semantic priming when people attempt, but fail, to extract the meanings of masked words. A retrospective prime-clarification account, in contrast, predicts that semantic and repetition priming effects will vary (being positive or negative) as a function of expectations about the prime-target relation. The data support a retrospective prime-clarification account, which, unlike center-surround theory, correctly predicted negative repetition priming effects.     

Is the processing of words during eye fixations in reading strictly serial?

Extant models of oculomotor control during reading maintain that allocation of attention confines word recognition to one (target) word at a time, and that an eye movement to a new (posttarget) word is computed before attention is shifted to it. To test these assumptions, properties of the posttarget's preview were manipulated during the fixation of the preceding target word. The main results revealed longer target viewing durations when the posttarget preview was visually distinctive or when it was orthographically illegal. The meaning of posttarget text did not affect initial target word reading, although it affected the time spent rereading the target. To account for these findings, extant attention-shift models must assume that readers obtain at least visuospatial and orthographic information from a parafovelly visible word before it is attended. This view has shortcomings, however, and several considerations favor less restrictive model assumptions according to which attention can be allocated to more than one word at a time.     

Does everybody like a liker?

The primary hypothesis examined was that people giving positive evaluations are themselves regarded as more attractive than when they give negative evaluations. This research tests whether this holds when reciprocity is not at issue. Subjects in six experiments were presented with stimulus persons who varied in the proportion of positive to negative evaluations they gave of various attitude objects (political figures, cafeteria workers, cities, movies, and college courses). Giving predominantly positive evaluations did in fact lead to greater liking of the stimulus person in each experiment. This finding held over (1) audio or written interviews with the stimulus persons, (2) a variety of classes of attitude objects, and (3) both within-subject and between-subject designs. Greater liking for likers occurred even controlling for attitude similarity.     

Can the location negative priming process operate in a proactive manner?

The location negative priming (NP) effect refers to the fact that the processing of a current target stimulus (probe trial) is delayed when it appears at a location that has recently contained a distractor event (prime trial), relative to when it occurs at a previously unoccupied position. One view is that the process causing the NP effect involves the inhibition of the internal representation of the prime-distractor event, and that the future processing of target stimuli that involve this event are prolonged because this distractor inhibition is persistent. In this study, we examined the possibility that the NP process (inhibition) could act proactively; specifically asking whether inhibition could be allocated to a location merely predicted to hold a future distractor event. To do this, we cued the probe distractor's location using an otherwise traditional location NP paradigm. No evidence of a proactive NP process was obtained. Probe-trial target latency was the same whether it appeared at the cued distractor location or at a new location, but was delayed when it occupied the prime-distractor location (NP effect). The location NP process is seemingly a reactive one, applying inhibition only when an actual distractor is present, much as past theories have implied.     

Is masked priming modulated by memory load? A test of the automaticity of masked identity priming in lexical decision

One of the key assumptions of the masked priming lexical decision task (LDT) is that primes are processed without requiring attentional resources. Here, we tested this assumption by presenting a dual-task manipulation to increase memory load and measure the change in masked identity priming on the targets in the LDT. If masked priming does not require attentional resources, increased memory load should have no influence on the magnitude of the observed identity priming effects. We conducted two LDT experiments, using a within-subjects design, to investigate the effect of memory load (via a concurrent matching task Experiment 1 and a concurrent search task in Experiment 2) on masked identity priming. Results showed that the magnitude of masked identity priming on word targets was remarkably similar under high and low memory load. Thus, these experiments provide empirical evidence for the automaticity assumption of masked identity priming in the LDT.     

Is syntax separate or shared between languages? Cross-linguistic syntactic priming in Spanish-English bilinguals

Much research in bilingualism has addressed the question of the extent to which lexical information is shared between languages. The present study investigated whether syntactic information is shared by testing if syntactic priming occurs between languages. Spanish-English bilingual participants described cards to each other in a dialogue game. We found that a participant who had just heard a sentence in Spanish tended to use the same type of sentence when describing the next card in English. In particular, English passives were considerably more common following a Spanish passive than otherwise. We use the results to extend current models of the representation of grammatical information to bilinguals.     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

Is a picture worth a thousand words? Evidence from concept definitions by patients with semantic dementia

Nine patients with semantic dementia (the temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal dementia) were asked to define concrete concepts either from presentation of a picture of the object or from its spoken name. As expected, the patients with the most severe semantic impairment produced the least detailed definitions, and the quality of the definitions overall was significantly related to concept familiarity. Further analyses of the definitions were designed to assess two key theoretical aspects of semantic organization. (i) Do objects and their corresponding names activate conceptual information in two neuroanatomically separable (modality-specific) semantic systems? If so, then-apart from any expected commonality in performance attributable to factors such as concept familiarity-one would not predict striking item-specific similarities in a patient's picture- and word-elicited definitions. (ii) Do sensory/perceptual features and more associative/functional attributes of conceptual knowledge form two neuroanatomically separable subsystems? If so, then one would predict significant dissociations in the prominence of these two types of information in the patients' definitions. The results lead us to favor a model of the semantic system that is divided by attribute type but not by modality.