Regression toward the mean or heuristic processing in detecting deception? Reply to Elaad (2010)

Masip, et al. (2009) conducted a study in which observers had to make truth-lie judgments at the beginning, middle, or end of a series of videotaped statements. They found a decline in truth judgments over time and explained this finding in terms of information processing mode. Recently, Elaad (2010) challenged this explanation and contended that the decline could be a result of regression toward the mean. In the present paper, it is argued that because Masip, et al. took multiple Moment 1 judgments over time and then averaged across judgments, regression toward the mean was extremely unlikely. Furthermore, the decrease in truth judgments was found under several separate conditions; this cannot be explained by random fluctuations alone. Finally, Masip, et al.'s data were re-analyzed adjusting for the effects of regression toward the mean. The outcomes of these analyses were the same as those reported in the original article.     

What are we doing to the earth's climate and what are we going to do about it?

Climatic considerations are critical if our planet is to survive. The environment, and in particular the atmosphere, is particularly sensitive to man. The time has come to act in favor of that which gives us life. This is why, in a field which knows no boundaries, only an international strategy can be effective.     

What's Possible? What Matters? Reply to Commentaries

The three discussants agree that a definition of psychoanalysis tied to session frequency is problematic and needs to change. Yet none supports my recommendation to redefine the practice of psychoanalysis in terms of the practitioner's training. This prompted me to look more closely at my proposal and push my thinking further. I argue that psychoanalysis, like many other professions, needs to define its practice as the application of its complex and evolving knowledge and skill base, grounded in its unique field of inquiry. Although there are individual exceptions, the inculcation of this knowledge and skill base is generally best accomplished through psychoanalytic training. This assertion, however, rests on the premise that our training curricula keep pace with our rapidly evolving field of inquiry and knowledge. To further clarify my vision I examine the nature of psychoanalytic expertise. I suggest that such expertise amounts to the inculcation and integration of a large number of psychoanalytic frames of reference. I contend further that the nature of contemporary psychoanalytic theories is such that important psychoanalytic frames of reference are proliferating more rapidly than in the past, that the relationships among them are becoming more complex, and that consequently the application of psychoanalytic theory to practice is also becoming more complex. Psychoanalytic training programs need to recognize this expanding complexity and revise curricula and pedagogic methods on an ongoing basis to reflect this evolution within our field.     

How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)

T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (see record 2004-15929-012) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.     

What is the answer? And come to that, what are the questions?

In recent years, the topic of car-following has become of increased importance in traffic engineering and safety research. Models of this phenomenon, which describe the interaction between (typically) adjacent vehicles in the same lane, now form the cornerstone for many important areas of research including (a) simulation modelling, where the car-following model (amongst others) controls the motion of the vehicles in the network, and (b) the functional definition of advanced vehicle control and safety systems (AVCSS), which are being introduced as a driver safety aid in an effort to mimic driver behaviour but remove human error. Despite the importance of this area however, no overview of the models availability and validity exists. It is the intent of this paper therefore to briefly assess the range of options available in the choice of car-following model, and assess just how far work has proceeded in our understanding of what, at times, would appear to be a simple process.     

Access to HIV care among migrant Africans in Britain. What are the issues?

In the UK, substantial numbers of new HIV diagnoses are within migrant communities, especially African communities. Current surveillance shows that despite health promotion efforts and advances in therapy these communities are accessing HIV care late. This paper explores the issues influencing the access and uptake of HIV care by migrant Africans in Britain. Using Kleinman's model of health care systems (Kleinman, 1980) as a theoretical framework, we highlight the importance of placing health within its broader context if we are to make significant improvement to the health of HIV-infected Africans in Britain.     

How are Bayesian models really used? Reply to

In response to the proposal that cognitive phenomena might be best understood in terms of cognitive theories (Endress, 2013), Frank (2013) outlined an important research program, suggesting that Bayesian models should be used as rigorous, mathematically attractive implementations of psychological theories. This research program is important and promising. However, I show that it is not followed in practice. I then turn to Frank’s defense of the assumption that learners prefer more specific rules (the “size principle”), and show that the results allegedly supporting this assumption do not provide any support for it. Further, I demonstrate that, in contrast to Frank’s criticisms, there is no circularity in an account of rule-learning based on “common-sense psychology”, and that Frank’s other criticisms of this account are unsupported. I conclude that the research program outlined by Frank is important and promising, but needs to be followed in practice. Be that as it might, the rule-learning experiments discussed by Frank are still better explained by simple psychological mechanisms.     

What in the world are the ways things might have been?

Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis, P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.

What are the phenomena of physics?

Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. My paper investigates the historical background of these different meanings of “phenomenon” in the traditions of physics and philosophy. In particular, I discuss Newton’s account of the phenomena and Bohr’s view of quantum phenomena, their relation to the philosophical discussion, and to data and evidence in current particle physics and quantum optics.     

What exactly are victim-sensitive persons sensitive to?

Research has repeatedly shown that people who are habitually sensitive towards unjust victimizations tend to behave uncooperatively and hostile under certain circumstances. But what exactly is the underlying motivation for such uncooperativeness? One explanation is that victim-sensitive individuals behave uncooperatively in order to retribute fateful disadvantages in the past; an alternative explanation is that victim-sensitive individuals behave uncooperatively in order to avoid being exploited in the future. Two experimental studies are presented in which participants were confronted with an unfavorable outcome that was either due to bad luck or to another person’s mean intentions. Findings from both studies suggest that victim-sensitive individuals are specifically sensitive towards mean intentions, but not to fateful disadvantages in general.     

What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them

This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining the nature of social groups. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social groups are enormously diverse, but show how we can investigate their natures nonetheless. I analyze social groups from a bottom-up perspective, constructing profiles of the metaphysical features of groups of specific kinds. We can characterize any given kind of social group with four complementary profiles: its “construction” profile, its “extra essentials” profile, its “anchor” profile, and its “accident” profile. Together these provide a framework for understanding the nature of groups, help classify and categorize groups, and shed light on group agency.

     

What are the values of young people and how are these different from the values of older generations in Georgia?

This article examines the basic values of young people (aged 18 to 25) and analyses how, if at all, these are different from the values of older generations in Georgia. Based on Shalom H. Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values (2012), the study uses quantitative (secondary analysis of the World Values Survey [WVS]) and qualitative (40 in-depth interviews) research methods to explore basic values, perceptions and attitudes, as well as tolerance towards different minority groups in Georgia. The research findings reveal that Schwartz’s higher-ordered values ‘conservation’ (including ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’) and ‘self-transcendence’ (including ‘benevolence’ and ‘universalism’) are very important for all age groups in Georgia. In contrast, the values of ‘openness to change’ and ‘self-enhancement’ are assessed quite dissimilarly by young and older generations. In addition, the youth turned out to be more tolerant towards different minority groups, such as people of a different religion and race, immigrants and sexual minorities.     

What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.