The Experience of Insight Follows Incubation in the Compound Remote Associates Task

The phenomenon of insight is frequently characterized by the experience of a sudden and certain solution. Anecdotal accounts suggest that insight frequently occurs after the problem solver has taken some time away from the problem (i.e., incubation). However, the mechanism by which incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving remains unclear. Here, we used compound remote associates problems to explore the likely mechanisms by which incubation may facilitate problem‐solving. First, we manipulated problem fixation to explore whether forgetting can explain incubation effects. Second, leveraging previous work linking the experience of insight to unconscious semantic integration, we asked participants to report their experience of insight after each problem solution, including problems solved after a period of distracted incubation. We hypothesized that incubation was not principally important for forgetting but rather frequently causes a shift to a more unconscious semantic integration strategy. Consistent with this we found that initial problem fixation did not predict the improvement in problem‐solving after incubation and that participants were more likely to report insight on problems solved after incubation. Our findings suggest that incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving leading to a mind‐set shift to a more unconscious problem‐solving strategy involving semantic integration.     

No Role of Initial Problem Representation in Insight Problem Solving

The literature on insight problems—problems that supposedly can only be solved by rejection of an initial faulty problem representation and sudden comprehension of another, nonobvious representation (restructuring)—suggests that the size of initial representations affects the very process of problem solving. Large initial representations impose systematic, analytical search, whereas only small representations promote intuitive, associative processes assumed by some theorists to underpin insight. In a group of 353 young healthy participants, 6 previously validated insight problems were applied in either a small or large initial representation variant. Results demonstrated no reliable difference in performance between the problem variants with regard to (a) solution accuracy, (b) self-reported insight accompanying solutions, (c) effects of fatigue, (d) correlations with another 6 small representation-size problems, and (e) correlations with working memory capacity (which were notable). This outcome suggests that the size of initial faulty representation plays no role in insight problem solving process, supporting the account assuming its strong similarity to systematic, analytical problem solving.     

顿悟问题思维僵局早期觉察的脑电研究

思维僵局不仅是顿悟问题有别于常规问题的重要要素, 而且是顿悟赖以实现的基础。先前研究虽对顿悟瞬间的脑认知活动进行了较充分的探讨, 但却较少对思维僵局的有关过程进行研究。思维僵局究竟是源于早期的知觉阶段还是晚期的问题加工阶段至今仍是未解之谜, 但它却是人们认识顿悟过程所必需的。只有充分认识和理解了该过程, 才可能更全面地理解顿悟究竟建立在怎样的脑认知表征的基础之上。研究运用ERPs技术, 采用猜谜任务范式对顿悟中思维僵局产生的阶段及其脑认知活动进行了探讨。研究发现, 在120~210 ms和620~800 ms内, “有僵局”谜题较之“无僵局”谜题在额-中央区分别诱发了一个更正的P170和晚期LPC。其中, P170主要反映人脑对思维僵局的早期觉察, LPC则主要表征人脑经过一定解题尝试后对前期预评估僵局的修正和有意识反思。这些结果挑战了传统的思维僵局的晚期产生假说, 支持思维僵局的“早期产生机制”假说, 表明人脑在早期知觉阶段就能直觉地觉察思维僵局的存在。     

工作记忆对顿悟和分析型问题解决的影响

摘要 采用顿悟-分析自我报告范式,以远距离联想任务为实验材料,从工作记忆容量和工作记忆负荷两个角度考察了工作记忆对顿悟和分析型问题解决的影响。结果表明,高工作记忆容量个体分析型问题解决的表现优于低工作记忆容量者,但在顿悟表现上无显著差异;工作记忆负荷较小时个体分析型问题解决表现更佳,但对顿悟表现没有影响。说明通过分析解决创造性问题的表现依赖于工作记忆的支持,而通过顿悟解决问题的表现与工作记忆无关。     

Insight versus analysis: Evidence for diverse methods in problem solving

Since the Gestalt psychologists made the distinction approximately 100 years ago, psychologists have differentiated between solving problems through analysis versus insight. The present paper presents evidence to support the idea that, rather than conceptualising insight versus analysis as distinct modes of solving problems, it is more useful to conceive of insight and analysis as two approaches within a set of possible solving methods. In the present research, 60 participants solved insight problems while thinking aloud, which provided evidence concerning the processes underlying problem solution. Comparison with performance of a nonverbalisation control group (n = 35) indicated no negative effects of thinking aloud on insight in problem solving. The results supported the idea that various methods are utilised in solving insight problems. The “classic” impasse–restructuring–insight sequence occurred in only a small minority of solutions. A number of other solution methods were found, ranging from relatively direct applications of knowledge, to various heuristic methods, to restructuring arising from new information gleaned from a failed solution. It is concluded that there is not a sharp distinction between solving a problem through analysis versus insight, and implications of that conclusion are discussed.     

In search of the ‘Aha!’ experience: Elucidating the emotionality of insight problem‐solving

Although the experience of insight has long been noted, the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience, reflecting a sudden change in the brain that accompanies an insight solution, remains largely unknown. This work aimed to uncover the mystery of the ‘Aha!’ experience through three studies. In Study 1, participants were required to solve a set of verbal insight problems and then subjectively report their affective experience when solving the problem. The participants were found to have experienced many types of emotions, with happiness the most frequently reported one. Multidimensional scaling was employed in Study 2 to simplify the dimensions of these reported emotions. The results showed that these different types of emotions could be clearly placed in two‐dimensional space and that components constituting the ‘Aha!’ experience mainly reflected positive emotion and approached cognition. To validate previous findings, in Study 3, participants were asked to select the most appropriate emotional item describing their feelings at the time the problem was solved. The results of this study replicated the multidimensional construct consisting of approached cognition and positive affect. These three studies provide the first direct evidence of the essence of the ‘Aha!’ experience. The potential significance of the findings was discussed.     

顿悟问题解决的心理机制的验证性研究

目前顿悟问题解决的心理机制主要存在两个有争议性的理论：进程监控理论和表征变化理论。现以非限制性的停车场问题为实验材料,检验顿悟问题解决的这两个心理机制。结果发现：（1）进程监控理论可解释顿悟被试的成绩优劣;（2）表征变化理论可对顿悟问题能否解决做出解释。     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.     

Gesture offers insight into problem‐solving in adults and children

When asked to explain their solutions to a problem, both adults and children gesture as they talk. These gestures at times convey information that is not conveyed in speech and thus reveal thoughts that are distinct from those revealed in speech. In this study, we use the classic Tower of Hanoi puzzle to validate the claim that gesture and speech taken together can reflect the activation of two cognitive strategies within a single response. The Tower of Hanoi is a well‐studied puzzle, known to be most efficiently solved by activating subroutines at theoretically defined choice points. When asked to explain how they solved the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, both adults and children produced significantly more gesture‐speech mismatches—explanations in which speech conveyed one path and gesture another—at these theoretically defined choice points than they produced at non‐choice points. Even when the participants did not solve the problem efficiently, gesture could be used to indicate where the participants were deciding between alternative paths. Gesture can, thus, serve as a useful adjunct to speech when attempting to discover cognitive processes in problem‐solving.     

Time of day effects on problem solving: When the non-optimal is optimal

In a study examining the effects of time of day on problem solving, participants solved insight and analytic problems at their optimal or non-optimal time of day. Given the presumed differences in the cognitive processes involved in solving these two types of problems, it was expected that the reduced inhibitory control associated with non-optimal times of the day would differentially impact performance on the two types of problems. In accordance with this expectation, results showed consistently greater insight problem solving performance during non-optimal times of day compared to optimal times of day but no consistent time of day effects on analytic problem solving. The findings indicate that tasks involving creativity might benefit from a non-optimal time of day.     

Effects of subliminal hints on insight problem solving

Two experiments tested a total of 509 participants on insight problems (the radiation problem and the nine-dot problem). Half of the participants were first exposed to a 1-min movie that included a subliminal hint. The hint raised the solution rate of people who did not recognize it. In addition, the way they solved the problem was affected by the hint. In Experiment 3, a novel technique was introduced to address some methodological concerns raised by Experiments 1 and 2. A total of 80 participants solved the 10-coin problem, and half of them were exposed to a subliminal hint. The hint facilitated solving the problem, and it shortened the solution time. Some implications of subliminal priming for research on and theorizing about insight problem solving are discussed.     

Priming problem solving with conceptual processing of relevant objects

In the present study, the author explored the effect of processing relevant information on producing solutions to brief insight problems. She hypothesized that the conceptual processing of objects relevant to the target solution would facilitate that solution relative to unrelated objects or the shallow processing of words. The author also explored the effect of knowledge of the relationship between the initial object-processing task and the problem-solving task. The results showed that participants who conceptually processed objects related to the target solution (Experiment 1), but not those who shallowly processed words related to the target solution (Experiment 2), were more likely to produce the solution relative to the control; and knowledge of the relationship between objects and solutions made no difference in the frequency of target solutions produced. The results of Experiment 3 showed that conceptual processing of an object could prime a nondominant solution for an ambiguously worded problem. Taken together, the results of the studies supported the effect of conceptual processing on facilitating insight in problem solving.     

Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving

This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.     

The effects of expected reward on creative problem solving

Creative problem solving involves search processes, and it is known to be hard to motivate. Reward cues have been found to enhance performance across a range of tasks, even when cues are presented subliminally, without being consciously detected. It is uncertain whether motivational processes, such as reward, can influence problem solving. We tested the effect of supraliminal and subliminal reward on participant performance on problem solving that can be solved by deliberate analysis or by insight. Forty-one participants attempted to solve 100 compound remote associate problems. At the beginning of each problem, a potential reward cue (1 or 25 cents) was displayed, either subliminally (17 ms) or supraliminally (100 ms). Participants earned the displayed reward if they solved the problem correctly. Results showed that the higher subliminal reward increased the percentage of problems solved correctly overall. Second, we explored if subliminal rewards preferentially influenced solutions that were achieved via a sudden insight (mostly processed below awareness) or via a deliberate analysis. Participants solved more problems via insight following high subliminal reward when compared with low subliminal reward, and compared with high supraliminal reward, with no corresponding effect on analytic solving. Striatal dopamine (DA) is thought to influence motivation, reinforce behavior, and facilitate cognition. We speculate that subliminal rewards activate the striatal DA system, enhancing the kinds of automatic integrative processes that lead to more creative strategies for problem solving, without increasing the selectivity of attention, which could impede insight.     

“This doesn’t look too hard”: A mixed methods exploration of self‐efficacy and sources of self‐efficacy information in a novel puzzle task

Studies have found self‐efficacy to be a key predictor of performance across domains (e.g., Feltz & Magyar, 2006; Judge & Bono, 2001). However, few studies have examined how self‐efficacy and the sources of self‐efficacy information change over time, and most of these studies utilized tasks participants were familiar or experienced with. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to examine how participants weighed and interpreted the sources of self‐efficacy information during initial learning of a novel puzzle task. A secondary aim was to explore differences between student‐athletes and non‐athletes in the sources of self‐efficacy information. Sixty‐three college students completed measures of self‐efficacy, sources of self‐efficacy information, and performed trials of the Tower of Hanoi Puzzle, a wooden puzzle solving test requiring participants to move wooden pieces from one point to another in a specific order. Quantitative results revealed hierarchical performance self‐efficacy for the number of moves required and time required to solve the puzzle significantly changed across the four trials. Qualitative results indicated verbal and imaginal experiences were the two most prominent sources of participants’ self‐efficacy information on trial 1, but by trial 4 mastery experiences and verbal information were the most prominent sources, also suggesting that that the influence of self‐efficacy sources may change over time. Implications for practitioners to assist individuals with novel cognitive tasks are discussed.     

Discovery misattribution: when solving is confused with remembering

This study explored the discovery misattribution hypothesis, which posits that the experience of solving an insight problem can be confused with recognition. In Experiment 1, solutions to successfully solved anagrams were more likely to be judged as old on a recognition test than were solutions to unsolved anagrams regardless of whether they had been studied. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anagram solving can increase the proportion of "old" judgments relative to words presented outright. Experiment 3 revealed that under certain conditions, solving anagrams influences the proportion of "old" judgments to unrelated items immediately following the solved item. In Experiment 4, the effect of solving was reduced by the introduction of a delay between solving the anagrams and the recognition judgments. Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that anagram solving leads to an illusion of recollection.     

四巧板问题解决中关键启发信息激活的实验研究

本研究采用四巧板问题为材料,通过操作源问题中的关键启发信息形成不同型的多个源问题,来探讨关键启发信息激活在顿悟问题解决中的作用。结果表明:原型事件中关键启发信息的激活是顿悟问题解决的关键机制;顿悟问题的解决是一个无意识的自动加工过程。     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945)) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

When shoes become hammers: Goal-derived categorization training enhances problem-solving performance

Problem-solving theories have not examined how solvers navigate their knowledge to interpret problem situations or to plan strategies toward goals. In this article, the author argues that success in problem solving depends on the solver's ability to construct goal-derived categories, namely categories that are formed ad hoc to serve goals during the instantiation of problem frames. Experiment 1 (N = 140) showed improved problem-solving performance after training to construct goal-derived categories. Experiment 2 (N = 80) demonstrated that effects of training in category construction can be obtained without participants being explicitly informed regarding the relevance of training to problem solving. These studies suggest that problem solving is a dynamic expression of goal-directed cognition and provide evidence for the involvement of categorization in problem-solving processes.     

Aha! experiences leave a mark: facilitated recall of insight solutions

The present study investigates a possible memory advantage for solutions that were reached through insightful problem solving. We hypothesized that insight solutions (with Aha! experience) would be remembered better than noninsight solutions (without Aha! experience). 34 video clips of magic tricks were presented to 50 participants as a novel problem-solving task, asking them to find out how the trick was achieved. Upon discovering the solution, participants had to indicate whether they had experienced insight during the solving process. After a delay of 14 days, a recall of solutions was conducted. Overall, 55 % of previously solved tricks were recalled correctly. Comparing insight and noninsight solutions, 64.4 % of all insight solutions were recalled correctly, whereas only 52.4 % of all noninsight solutions were recalled correctly. We interpret this finding as a facilitating effect of previous insight experiences on the recall of solutions.