Attention switching between perception and memory

Two experiments were conducted to explore the switching of attention between perception and memory. In Experiment 1, college students performed a task that required them to cycle or switch attention between perceptual and memorial inputs. Switching times of 293 and 376 msec per switch were obtained on the basis of two formulas. In Experiment 2, the attentional load was manipulated by varying the number of perceptual and memorial inputs. Switching time increased as a function of list length, indicating that item load affects both the control processes that set attentional allocation policies and one’s ability to perform memory and/or perceptual tasks. These results suggest that modularity, or encapsulation of item and control-process systems, does not hold. A model is presented that depicts the relation between item and control-process representation in rapidly alternating attention between perception and memory.     

Reasoning with conditionals: a test of formal models of four theories

The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking &Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.     

Time constraints and resource sharing in adults' working memory spans

This article presents a new model that accounts for working memory spans in adults, the time-based resource-sharing model. The model assumes that both components (i.e., processing and maintenance) of the main working memory tasks require attention and that memory traces decay as soon as attention is switched away. Because memory retrievals are constrained by a central bottleneck and thus totally capture attention, it was predicted that the maintenance of the items to be recalled depends on both the number of memory retrievals required by the intervening treatment and the time allowed to perform them. This number of retrievals:time ratio determines the cognitive load of the processing component. The authors show in 7 experiments that working memory spans vary as a function of this cognitive load.     

Bilingual working memory span is affected by language skill

A complex span procedure was used to study whether there is a measurable extra load on general working memory (WM) when a not fully automatised language has to be comprehended. Participants verified heard sentences in relation to simultaneously shown pictures and memorised the last word of each sentence. The sentences were presented in growing set sizes and recall of all the last words was required after each set. The largest number of sentences that could be processed in combination with successful recall of their last words determined the participant's WM span. Sentences were either in the participants' native language or a well-mastered second language, English. Participants were psychology and English students. WM span and decision accuracy were better for native-language than foreign-language sentences, especially for the psychology students. A second experiment ascertained that the difference between participant groups could not be explained by variables related to phonological shortterm memory or word processing. A third experiment controlled for systematic trade-off differences between languages and groups. We conclude that aspects of sentence comprehension in foreign language develop with practice so that they require less WM resources.     

Could it be the Case that if I am Right My Opponents will be Pleased? A Rejoinder to Johnson-Laird,Byrne and Girotto

I take up the four issues considered by Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto in their reply to Politzer (2007). Based on the conceptual clarification which they adduce, it seems that the disagreement can be settled about the first one (truth functionality) and can be attenuated about the second one (the paradoxes of material implication). However, I maintain and refine my criticisms on the last two (negation and the probability of conditionals), backed up by considerations borrowed from the perspective of the conditional probability semantics for conditionals.     

Binding facilitates attention switching within working memory

The authors investigated the units of selective attention within working memory. In Experiment 1, a group of participants kept 1 count and 1 location in working memory and updated them repeatedly in random order. Another group of participants were instructed to achieve the same goal by memorizing the verbal and spatial information in an integrative way as a moving digit. The behavioral data showed that switching attention between properties of an integrated working-memory item was faster than switching between respective properties of different items. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this switching facilitation cannot be simply ascribed to the different amount of working-memory items maintained by the two groups of participants. Finally, by adopting a pure verbal task in Experiment 3, the authors observed the same binding facilitation, with the possibility of "location-based selection" excluded. They summarize the observations of all 3 experiments in the study and suggest both a location- and object-based mechanism for attention selection in working memory.     

When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.     

Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

Attention induces surround suppression in visual working memory

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Controversy currently exists regarding whether visual working memory (VWM) maintains sensory or non-sensory representations. Here, we tested the nature of VWM...     

Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

Deduction from if-then personality signatures

Personality signatures are sets of if-then rules describing how a given person would feel or act in a specific situation. These rules can be used as the major premise of a deductive argument, but they are mostly processed for social cognition purposes; and this common usage is likely to leak into the way they are processed in a deductive reasoning context. It is hypothesised that agreement with a Modus Ponens argument featuring a personality signature as its major premise is affected by the reasoner's own propensity to display this personality signature. To test this prediction, Modus Ponens arguments were constructed from conditionally phrased items extracted from available personality scales. This allowed recording of (a) agreement with the conclusion of these arguments, and (b) the reasoner's propensity to display the personality signature, using as a proxy this reasoner's score on the personality scale without the items used in the argument. Three experiments (N = 256, N = 318, N = 298) applied this procedure to Fairness, Responsive Joy, and Self-Control. These experiments yielded very comparable effects, establishing that a reasoner's propensity to display a given personality signature determines this reasoner's agreement with the conclusion of a Modus Ponens argument featuring the personality signature.     

Latent profile analysis of working memory capacity and thinking styles in adults and adolescents

This study of adults (n = 269) and adolescents (n = 308) applied latent profile analysis to preference for rational and/or experiential cognition, coupled with working memory capacity (WMC). A 4-profile solution comprising rationally dominant, experientially dominant, dual preference, and disengaged groups was retained for both adult and adolescent samples. Our solution indicated that high WMC was associated with both preference and ability to engage in rational processing. Profile membership significantly discriminated both adults and adolescents on several reasoning tasks and measures of cognitive biases. Overall our results indicate that cognitive processing styles and WMC can be combined to create a typology that distinguishes between four types of thinkers who significantly differ in their performance on reasoning tasks.     

Negation: A theory of its meaning,representation, and use

This article presents a model-based theory of what negation means, how it is mentally represented, and how it is understood. The theory postulates that negation takes a single argument that refers to a set of possibilities and returns the complement of that set. Individuals therefore tend to assign a small scope to negation in order to minimize the number of models of possibilities that they have to consider. Individuals untrained in logic do not know the possibilities corresponding to the negation of compound assertions formed with if, or, and and, and have to infer the possibilities one by one. It follows that negations are easier to understand, and to formulate, when individuals already have in mind the possibilities to be negated. The paper shows that the evidence, including the results of recent studies, corroborates the theory.     

Attention and cognitive control as emergent properties of information representation in working memory

A hallmark of primate, and particularly human, behavior is cognitive control, the ability to integrate information from a multitude of sources and use that information to flexibly guide behavior in order to achieve an infinite number of goals. The neural mechanisms of cognitive control have yet to be fully elucidated, although the prefrontal cortex is known to play a critical role. Here, I review evidence suggesting that a unifying principle regarding the role of various portions of the prefrontal cortex in a wide range of cognitive tasks is the active maintenance in working memory of different types of currently relevant information-from specific stimulus features, to instructional cues, to motivational goals and contexts. I argue that the key to demonstrating the existence of this domain-dependent organization lies in a better understanding of the nature of the representation of this information and the ways in which this information itself controls cognition and behavior.     

Attention is required for maintenance of feature binding in visual working memory

Working memory and attention are intimately connected. However, understanding the relationship between the two is challenging. Currently, there is an important controversy about whether objects in working memory are maintained automatically or require resources that are also deployed for visual or auditory attention. Here we investigated the effects of loading attention resources on precision of visual working memory, specifically on correct maintenance of feature-bound objects, using a dual-task paradigm. Participants were presented with a memory array and were asked to remember either direction of motion of random dot kinematograms of different colour, or orientation of coloured bars. During the maintenance period, they performed a secondary visual or auditory task, with varying levels of load. Following a retention period, they adjusted a coloured probe to match either the motion direction or orientation of stimuli with the same colour in the memory array. This allowed us to examine the effects of an attention-demanding task performed during maintenance on precision of recall on the concurrent working memory task. Systematic increase in attention load during maintenance resulted in a significant decrease in overall working memory performance. Changes in overall performance were specifically accompanied by an increase in feature misbinding errors: erroneous reporting of nontarget motion or orientation. Thus in trials where attention resources were taxed, participants were more likely to respond with nontarget values rather than simply making random responses. Our findings suggest that resources used during attention-demanding visual or auditory tasks also contribute to maintaining feature-bound representations in visual working memory—but not necessarily other aspects of working memory.     

Changing-state disruption of lip-reading by irrelevant sound in perceptual and memory tasks

Three experiments investigated irrelevant sound interference of lip-read lists. In Experiment 1, an acoustically changing sequence of nine irrelevant utterances was more disruptive to spoken immediate identification of lists of nine lip-read digits than nine repetitions of the same utterances (the changing-state effect; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992). Experiment 2 replicated this finding when lip-read items were sampled with replacement from the nine digits to form the lip-read lists. In Experiment 3, when the irrelevant sound was confined to the retention interval of a delayed recall task, a changing-state pattern of disruption also occurred. Results confirm a changing-state effect in memory for lip-read items but also point to the possibility that, for lip-reading, changing-state effects may occur at an earlier, perceptual stage.     

Attention and working memory capacity: insights from blocking, highlighting, and knowledge restructuring

The concept of attention is central to theorizing in learning as well as in working memory. However, research to date has yet to establish how attention as construed in one domain maps onto the other. We investigate two manifestations of attention in category- and cue-learning to examine whether they might provide common ground between learning and working memory. Experiment 1 examined blocking and highlighting effects in an associative learning paradigm, which are widely thought to be attentionally mediated. No relationship between attentional performance indicators and working memory capacity (WMC) was observed, despite the fact that WMC was strongly associated with overall learning performance. Experiment 2 used a knowledge restructuring paradigm, which is known to require recoordination of partial category knowledge using representational attention. We found that the extent to which people successfully recoordinated their knowledge was related to WMC. The results illustrate a link between WMC and representational-but not dimensional-attention in category learning.