When the alternative would have been better: Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning—asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got—creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that—when controlling for false positives—regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

Naïve predictions of motion and orientation in mirrors: From what we see to what we expect reflections to do

The study aimed to investigate naïve beliefs regarding the dynamic and static behavior of reflections. In the first three experiments, participants in the study made predictions about the correspondence between real and reflected movements or about the orientation of the reflection of a static object placed in front of a mirror. In Experiments 1 and 2, paper-and-pencil tasks were used and in Experiment 3 participants were asked to make their predictions while imagining that they were facing a mirror. Results revealed that a percentage of undergraduates (ranging from 25% to 35%) were unable to make correct predictions. We classified the errors into types and found that responses either conform to the belief that reflections do the same or that they do the opposite. This suggests an oversimplification of the geometry of mirror reflections in two directions: participants either generalize what they see when movements are parallel to the mirror or what they see when movements are orthogonal to the mirror. Findings from Experiment 4 confirmed that these two expectations fit in with what people perceive in mirrors. Findings from Experiment 5 confirmed that this is also in agreement with the relationship perceived when looking at similar movements and orientations “outside” mirrors.     

Are errors detected before they occur? Early error sensations revealed by metacognitive judgments on the timing of error awareness

Errors in choice tasks are not only detected fast and reliably, participants often report that they knew that an error occurred already before a response was produced. These early error sensations stand in contrast with evidence suggesting that the earliest neural correlates of error awareness emerge around 300 ms after erroneous responses. The present study aimed to investigate whether anecdotal evidence for early error sensations can be corroborated in a controlled study in which participants provide metacognitive judgments on the subjective timing of error awareness. In Experiment 1, participants had to report whether they became aware of their errors before or after the response. In Experiment 2, we measured confidence in these metacognitive judgments. Our data show that participants report early error sensations with high confidence in the majority of error trials across paradigms and experiments. These results provide first evidence for early error sensations, informing theories of error awareness.     

Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

Children's understanding of human and super-natural mind

Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga [Barrett, J. L., Richert, R. A., & Driesenga, A. (2001). God's beliefs versus mother's: The development of nonhuman agents concepts. Child Development, 72(1), 50–65] have suggested that children are able to conceptualize the representational properties held by certain super-natural entities, such as God, before they achieve representational understanding of the human mind. The two experimental conditions of the present study aimed at cross-checking the above suggestion. One hundred and twenty children aged from 3 to 7 years were involved in both conditions. In the first, a modified perspective-taking and appearance-reality task, similar to that adopted in Barrett et al.'s study, was used. The task in the second addressed another aspect of representational understanding of the human mind, that is, the early emerging of the rule that knowledge is constrained by perception. The results of the study showed that younger children systematically treat God as a human protagonist regarding the representational properties they possess. Moreover, it was found that children are able to reason, accurately, about God's representational properties, only upon reaching their 5th year of age, when their representational understanding of the human mind becomes stable and robust.     

When the alternative would have been better: counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning--asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got--creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that--when controlling for false positives--regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

Visual self-recognition in mirrors and live videos: Evidence for a developmental asynchrony

Three experiments (N = 123) investigated the development of live-video self-recognition using the traditional mark test. In Experiment 1, 24-, 30- and 36-month-old children saw a live video image of equal size and orientation as a control group saw in a mirror. The video version of the test was more difficult than the mirror version with only the oldest children's performance approaching ceiling. In Experiment 2, most 24-month-olds showed self-recognition when presented with a TV-set that featured a mirror in place of a screen. This finding does not substantiate the possibility that expectations about what appears on TV are responsible for the asynchrony. In Experiment 3, children were given a mark-test involving only their legs. Again, a video version was more difficult than previously reported performance with mirrors, suggesting that the impossibility of eye-contact in video cannot explain this developmental asynchrony. The findings suggest that self-recognition can be added to the growing list of contexts in which 2-year-olds display what has been called a “video deficit” [Anderson, D. R., & Pempek, T. A. (2005). Television and very young children. American Behavioral Scientist, 48, 505–532].     

Mom told me scary things about this animal: Parents installing fear beliefs in their children via the verbal information pathway

This study investigated whether fear beliefs can be installed in children after parents had received negatively tinted information about a novel stimulus. Parents of children aged 8-13 years (N = 88) were presented with negative, positive, or ambiguous information about an unknown animal and then given a number of open-ended vignettes describing confrontations with the animal with the instruction to tell their children what would happen in these situations. Results indicated that children's fear beliefs were influenced by the information that was provided to the parent. That is, parents who had received negative information provided more threatening narratives about the animal and hence installed higher levels of fear beliefs in their children than parents who had received positive information. In the case of ambiguous information, the transmission of fear was dependent on parents' trait anxiety levels. More precisely, high trait anxious parents told more negative stories about the unknown animal, which produced higher fear levels in children.     

Analysis and meta-analysis of single-case designs: An introduction

The last 10 years have seen great progress in the analysis and meta-analysis of single-case designs (SCDs). This special issue includes five articles that provide an overview of current work on that topic, including standardized mean difference statistics, multilevel models, Bayesian statistics, and generalized additive models. Each article analyzes a common example across articles and presents syntax or macros for how to do them. These articles are followed by commentaries from single-case design researchers and journal editors. This introduction briefly describes each article and then discusses several issues that must be addressed before we can know what analyses will eventually be best to use in SCD research. These issues include modeling trend, modeling error covariances, computing standardized effect size estimates, assessing statistical power, incorporating more accurate models of outcome distributions, exploring whether Bayesian statistics can improve estimation given the small samples common in SCDs, and the need for annotated syntax and graphical user interfaces that make complex statistics accessible to SCD researchers. The article then discusses reasons why SCD researchers are likely to incorporate statistical analyses into their research more often in the future, including changing expectations and contingencies regarding SCD research from outside SCD communities, changes and diversity within SCD communities, corrections of erroneous beliefs about the relationship between SCD research and statistics, and demonstrations of how statistics can help SCD researchers better meet their goals.     

Constructions as categories of language

What causes children to categorize distinct utterances they hear into a constructional generalization? That is, what makes subjects create a constructional category instead of treating each utterance as a distinct unrelated idiom? One simple factor that encourages the learning of abstract categories is shared concrete similarity. When instances share concrete attributes, learners are more likely to categorize them together, and moreover are more likely to attend to their abstract commonalities [Gentner, D., & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development rules. Cognition, 66, 236-297; Markman, A.B., & Gentner D. (1993). Splitting the difference: A structural alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 517-535]. This paper reports results that confirm the prediction that presentation of items with concrete shared similarity early in training enhances language learning in adults.     

Countertransference in the movies: effects on beliefs about psychiatric treatment

This study examined the effect of viewing the movie Lovesick on college students' beliefs about countertransference and psychiatric practice. Consistent with the concerns of Gebbard and Gebbard (1985) that the public may develop erroneous beliefs about psychiatry from watching such movies, after seeing the film subjects were more accepting of sexual behavior between analyst and patient and were cynical about the motivation of the mental health professions in prohibiting such behavior.     

God’s categories: The effect of religiosity on children’s teleological and essentialist beliefs about categories

Creationism implies that God imbued each category with a unique nature and purpose. These implications closely correspond to what some cognitive psychologists define as an essentialistic and teleological stance towards categories. This study assessed to what extent the belief in God as creator of categories is related to the mappings of these stances to categories in different domains. Israeli secular and orthodox Jewish 1st and 5th graders responded to questions assessing these three types of beliefs. The results revealed that secular children did not differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of animal category membership, and their teleological construal of artifacts. In turn, secular children did differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of social category membership, and their teleological construal of both animal and social categories. These findings intimate that while essentialist beliefs about animals, and teleological beliefs about artifacts do not require cultural input in order to emerge, essentialist beliefs about social categories, and teleological beliefs about both animal and social categories do.     

Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision

By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties’ belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.     

Attitudes related to child sexual abuse: scale construction and explorative study among psychologists

A Child Sexual Abuse Attitude and Belief Scale was constructed and then answered by 242 child psychologists. Four CSA related attitude and belief subscales were identified through confirmatory factor analysis: (1) The Disclosure subscale reflecting favouring a disclosure at any cost; (2) The Pro-Child subscale reflecting unconditional belief in children's reports; (3) The Intuition subscale reflecting favouring an intuitive approach to CSA investigations; and (4) The Anti Criminal Justice System subscale reflecting negative attitudes towards the legal system. Beliefs that were erroneous according to empirical research were analyzed separately. The results suggest that some psychologists hold extreme attitudes and many erroneous beliefs related to CSA. Some misconceptions are common. Female participants tended to have stronger attitudes than male participants. The more training in interviewing children the participants had had, the more erroneous beliefs and stronger attitudes they had. Experience did not affect attitudes and beliefs.     

Do children really confuse appearance and reality?

Our understanding of many mental, social and physical phenomena hinges on a general understanding that appearances can differ from reality. Yet young children sometimes seem unable to understand appearance-reality dissociations. In a standard test, children are shown a deceptive object and asked what it really is and what it looks like. Many preschool children give the same answer to both questions. This error has been attributed to children's inflexible conceptual representations or inflexibility in representing their own changing beliefs. However, evidence fails to support either hypothesis: new tests show that young children generally understand appearance-reality discrepancies as well as fantasy-reality distinctions. These tests instead implicate children's failure to understand the unfamiliar discourse format of the standard test. This misunderstanding might reveal a subtler difficulty in making logical inferences about questions.     

Children's beliefs about instances of mechanical and electrical causation

Two main questions were asked regarding young children's beliefs about causal mediation: What sorts of beliefs about causal mediation are reflected by children's incomplete explanations of causal situations? In particular, do children hold a false belief in action at a distance or do they realize that something must mediate between cause and effect? When presented with a non-visible connection between cause and effect (Experiment I), the children's incomplete (Piagetion Stage 1) explanations either reflected the correct expectation of a mediating connection or else merely reflected identification of the causal agent and no concern one way or another with the issue of causal mediation. This was also the case when the mediating connection was visible and present at the outset (Experiment II). In neither experiment (both of which involved mechanical causation) was there evidence of a false belief in action at a distance. A third experiment involved instances of electrical causation in order to maximize the chances of tapping a false belief. The rationale was that, in their everyday lives, although children do have first-hand experience with the mediating connection in instances of mechanical causation, they do not have such experience with instances of electrical causation. The results from the third experiment were analogous to the results in the other two. It was concluded that, with respect to instances of physical causality, young children do not hold a false belief (in action at a distance) that is later relinquished. Rather, their concerns are, at first, restricted to identifying the causal agent and do not include any beliefs, true or false, about the issue of causal mediation. When they eventually do deal with the question of causal mediation, children hold approximately correct beliefs. In terms of school situations, these findings suggest a shift from providing the child with disconfirming data that will aid him in relinquishing his false beliefs to providing him, instead, with additional data that will supplement his existing, approximately correct beliefs.     

Personal Globe Inventory: Measurement of the Spherical Model of Interests and Competence Beliefs

The Personal Globe Inventory (PGI) evolved from the exploratory work on the spherical structure of interests (Tracey, 1997a; Tracey & Rounds, 1996a,b) and measures activity preferences, activity competence beliefs, and occupational preferences. The PGI is a viable instrument that mirrors information provided by many instruments but also includes greater complexity and flexibility. This monograph describes the inventory, examines its reliability and construct validity, discusses options for profiling inventory results, interprets five illustrative profiles, and suggests directions for future research.     

Ontological and epistemological reflexivity: A core skill for therapists

This paper argues that a core skill needed to be an effective therapist is to have developed an awareness of one's own ontological and epistemological positions in relation to one's work as a therapist. In the same way that researchers need to develop reflexive awareness of their assumptions about what there is to know (ontology) and how they can come to know about it (epistemology), therapists need to be aware of their fundamental assumptions about human beings and the world they live in (ontology), as well as their beliefs about how best to develop an understanding of their clients and the meaning(s) of their experiences (epistemology). Regardless of which therapeutic model is adopted, the language used to talk about (and in) therapy, the kinds of questions asked of clients and the comments/interpretations offered, all presuppose and reinforce particular versions of human being and experiencing, which are themselves not usually questioned or challenged during the course of therapy. It is essential that therapists are aware of their own fundamental assumptions about what it means to be human and that they recognise their ontological and epistemological positions as positions that they are taking (rather than perceiving them to be self‐evident truths). This is important for two reasons: (a) if clients do not share the therapist's assumptions, the therapeutic work cannot proceed and be effective; and (b) without such an awareness, therapists are at risk of unwittingly imposing their own model of the person upon the client which raises ethical issues.     

The emergence of narcissism and self-esteem: A social-cognitive approach*

Abstract

What separates narcissism from self-esteem, and what sparks their development? This article proposes that narcissism and self-esteem are underpinned by distinct core beliefs – beliefs about the nature of the self, of others, and of the relationship between the self and others. These beliefs (1) arise early in development, (2) are cultivated by distinct socialization experiences, and (3) can be targeted through precise interventions so as to simultaneously curb narcissism and raise self-esteem. Recognizing the distinction between narcissism and self-esteem will help parents, teachers, and practitioners nurture healthy feelings of self-worth in children from an early age.     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.