Impact of decision goal on escalation

This research investigates the sunk-cost effect or escalation defined as the irrational tendency to choose to continue to invest money, time, or effort following unsuccessful investments. Building on previous research demonstrating a loss-sensitivity principle in sequential decision making, the hypothesis was proposed that a loss-minimization goal would lead to stronger effects of sunk outcomes (prior gains and losses) than would a gain-maximizing goal. The hypothesis was investigated in three experiments with undergraduates responding to investment decision scenarios. Although the tendency to continue investments was always larger for gain-maximizing than for loss-minimizing goal instructions, the sunk-outcome effect was stronger in the former case. However, when the decisions were personal and concerned lower stakes rather than business investments involving large amounts of money, the expected stronger effect of sunk outcomes was found for loss-minimizing goal instructions. Another finding was that the expected value was never ignored, thus suggesting that future research should focus on the joint effects of the expected value and sunk outcomes.     

A conceptualisation of task dimensions affecting escalation of commitment

People frequently continue an investment despite a negative outcome or sunk cost. Such irrational persistence in a losing course of action has been termed escalation of commitment. Although several explanations of escalation of commitment have been proposed, none of them accounts for all determinants that have been empirically demonstrated. Based on a review of previous research, a conceptualisation is introduced of how escalation of commitment is affected by 4 task dimensions: type and nontransparency of decision goal, nontransparency of sunk costs, time course of sunk costs, and accountability. A more inclusive theory that subsumes escalation of commitment is offered as an alternative that may be developed to account for the effects of the task dimensions.     

Escalation of commitment with transparent future outcomes

A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling people's noneconomic reasons for escalation.     

Optimism as modifier of escalation of commitment

To study whether optimism-pessimism modifies escalation of commitment, 52 undergraduates were told that they had made an unsuccessful investment, then they chose to continue or discontinue this investment. Optimism about future returns was induced in one group by varying the probability of a successful outcome from an initial low to medium, pessimism was induced in another group by varying this probability from an initial high to medium. Supporting the assumption of the manipulation, the results showed that optimistic participants preferred to continue investments whereas pessimistic participants preferred not to. As predicted, when the sunk cost increased, optimism led to escalation of commitment, whereas pessimism led to de-escalation of commitment. These effects were strengthened when probability of a successful outcome was ambiguous.     

The Effects of Goal Distance and Value in Escalation of Commitment

Escalation of commitment describes individuals’ tendencies to spend resources beyond the point of rationality in order to persist in a chosen course of action, and most believe that sunk cost is the primary cause. However, it has been noted that sunk costs are confounded with progress made toward a goal, and that sunk costs do not affect individuals’ tendencies to escalate as all economic information is ignored in pursuit of the goal. Thus, the apparent escalation tendency may be a consequence of goal proximity instead of sunk costs. In Experiment 1, I show that individuals’ tendencies to escalate reflect the goal-gradient effect after controlling for the sunk costs. Experiment 2 provides a psychological process model to explain why goal-gradient influences individuals’ tendencies to escalate commitment by demonstrating that as individuals progress toward their goal, they exaggerate the value difference between the object that they are pursuing and the object that they are not pursuing. This perceived value difference, in turn, influences individuals’ tendencies to commit escalation of commitment. Results suggest a new interpretation for escalation of commitment and new approaches to guiding people to avoid it.     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

Behavioral Causality Orientations and Investment Decisions Following Negative Feedback

Individual differences in the locus of causality for behavior are seldom considered in tests of regulatory events (e. g., feedback and coercion). This study examined the relationship between Deci and Ryan's (1985a) causality orientation constructs and decision makers' behavioral intention responses to negative feedback following an initial decision. A laboratory experiment involved 98 Singaporean business students in a commitment escalation context in which sunk costs for an initial investment failure could be recovered by reinvesting in that prospect in preference to selecting an alternative that had previously performed better. Consistent with various theories of the escalation effect, in which subjects responsible for prior negative outcomes tend to reinvest in the initially chosen project, control orientation was positively associated with reinvestment and impersonal orientation was negatively related to reinvestment. The influence of personality on reinvestment/withdrawal behavior was moderated by the experimental condition of responsibility for the initial sunk cost. We discuss the implications of these findings for the construct validity of the causality orientations, the role of personality in commitment escalation, and the important role that individual differences in perceptions of regulatory events may play in determining behavior.     

Sunk cost of local elected representatives in situation of fiscal competition: An example of escalating commitment

Introduction

Competition between French local communities to build infrastructures to attract enterprises and residents could sometimes result in irrational public spending.

Escalation and De-escalation of Commitment in Response to Sunk Costs: The Role of Budgeting in Mental Accounting

Research has traditionally assumed that people increase investment (or "escalate commitment") in response to previous investments (sunk costs). This paper presents several demonstrations which show that people will incorrectly de-escalate investment in response to sunk costs. I propose that people set mental budgets to control their resource expenditures: they set a budget for a class of expenses and track their investments against their budget. A lab study with real monetary incentives shows support for de-escalation and supports a specific rule for how people set budgets - based on the breakeven of total costs and total benefits. The budgeting process suggests that people are only likely to escalate commitment when they fail to set a budget or when expenses are difficult to track. The later part of the paper organizes the previous literature on escalation around these processes and provides additional experiments to illustrate each point. For example, I argue that previous demonstrations that have shown errors of escalation exclusively involve "incidental" investments that are difficult to track. A study in the current paper shows that people are more willing to invest time than money to salvage a monetary sunk cost and more willing to invest money than time to salvage a sunk cost of time, even when the time and money investments are of equal value. The paper concludes by discussing the rationality of escalation and de-escalation.     

Do Measures of Executive Functioning and Manipulation of Ego Depletion Predict How University Students Discount Probabilistic Gains and Losses?

Discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome is altered because the outcome is delayed or uncertain. Previous research has suggested that how individuals discount delayed gains is related to executive functioning. The present study attempted to extend this relationship to discounting of probabilistic gains and losses, and to examine whether diminishing cognitive resources would impact how participants discounted monetary outcomes. In Experiment 1, university students completed an executive function measure and then a probability-discounting task that involved the hypothetical sum of either $1,000 or $100,000 framed as either a gain or a loss. The executive function of organization was a significant predictor of how participants discounted all four outcomes while motivational drive predicted discounting of losses, but not gains. In Experiment 2, participants completed the same measures with the addition of an ego-depletion task to deplete cognitive resources before making discounting decisions. The executive function of motivational drive and empathy were significant predictors of how participants discounted both loss outcomes. The results suggest that discounting of monetary outcomes is related to the executive function of organization for gains and motivational drive, and empathy for losses. They also support the notion that the discounting of gains may be a distinct process from the discounting of losses.     

De‐escalation after repeated negative feedback: emergent expectations of failure

Research on willingness to make marginal investments (e.g., the escalation and sunk cost literatures) has often focused on project completion decisions, such as the “radar‐blank plane.” This paper discusses a fundamentally different type of marginal investment decision, that of couples deciding whether to continue infertility treatment in the face of repeated failures. Two experiments based on this context show that when people face multiple independent chances to achieve a valued goal but are unsure about chances of success, premature quitting or “de‐escalation” is the norm. Repeated negative feedback appears to induce individuals to see each successive failure as more and more diagnostic. As a result, even a short series of failed attempts evokes beliefs that future attempts will also fail. These emergent expectations of failure, generated by causal attribution processes, associative learning, and/or discounting of ambiguous information, appear very compelling and induce people to forgo profitable marginal investments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach

An explanation for escalating commitment based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is extended to the group level of analysis. Hypotheses concerning the likelihood and degree of escalating commitment of individuals and groups were derived from the model and tested using six investment decision scenarios. Subjects responded to decision dilemmas in which substantial funds have been invested in a failing course of action. Subsequent investment would likely exacerbate although it could potentially reverse the situation. Consistent with hypotheses derived from the model, escalating commitment occurred in both individual and group decision making. Group decision making amplified trends apparent at the individual level in terms of the frequency with which escalation occurred and its severity. Although the results are consistent with a prospect-theory-based explanation of escalating commitment at two levels of analysis, support for the self-justification approach was also found. Motives for self-justification, however, do not appear to be a necessary condition for escalation to occur.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.     

The role of probability of success estimates in the sunk cost effect

The sunk cost effect is manifested in a tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment has been made. Arkes and Blumer (1985) showed that a sunk cost increases one's estimated probability that the endeavor will succeed [p(s)]. Is this p(s) increase a cause of the sunk cost effect, a consequence of the effect, or both? In Experiment 1 participants read a scenario in which a sunk cost was or was not present. Half of each group read what the precise p(s) of the project would be, thereby discouraging p(s) inflation. Nevertheless these participants manifested the sunk cost effect, suggesting p(s) inflation is not necessary for the effect to occur. In Experiment 2 participants gave p(s) estimates before or after the investment decision. The latter group manifested higher p(s), suggesting that the inflated estimate is a consequence of the decision to invest. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of mortality salience on escalation of commitment

Based on propositions derived from terror management theory (TMT), the current study proposes that people who are reminded of their mortality exhibit a higher degree of self-justification behavior to maintain their self-esteem. For this reason, they could be expected to stick with their previous decisions and invest an increasing amount of resources in those decisions, despite the fact that negative feedback has clearly indicated that they might be on a course toward failure (i.e., "escalation of commitment"). Our experiment showed that people who were reminded of their mortality were more likely to escalate their level of commitment by maintaining their current course of action. Two imaginary scenarios were tested. One of the scenarios involved deciding whether to send additional troops into the battlefield when previous attempts had failed; the other involved deciding whether to continue developing an anti-radar fighter plane when the enemy had already developed a device to detect it. The results supported our hypothesis that mortality salience increases the tendency to escalate one's level of commitment.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Escalate shamefully,de‐escalate angrily or gratefully: The influence of discrete emotions on escalation of commitment

Decision makers often tend to escalate their commitment when faced with a dilemma of whether to continue a losing course of action. Researchers recently began to investigate the influence of discrete emotions on this decision tendency. However, this work has mainly focused on negative emotions and rarely considered positive emotions, to say nothing of comparing the effects of both of them simultaneously. The current study addresses this need by presenting the results of three experiments that examined the effects of four emotions of both positive and negative valences in escalation situations. Experiment 1 investigated the relationships of three trait emotions (hope, shame, and anger) and escalation of commitment. Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of three induced emotions (anger, shame, and gratitude) on escalation of commitment in a student sample and an employee sample, respectively. The results revealed that the effects of discrete emotions in escalation situations are mainly due to their associated differences on the appraisal dimension of responsibility that is related to escalation situations rather than their valence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

沉没成本效应的产生根源与影响因素

沉没成本效应是指决策者的决策行为因受沉没成本影响而产生的一种非理性决策现象。针对这一决策偏差的产生根源,研究者从认知、动机和神经三个角度提出了解释。沉没成本效应的影响因素包括沉没成本特性、情境因素、个体差异和文化差异等。基于先前研究存在的问题和不足,沉没成本效应的未来研究应着眼于改进研究方法,探究产生根源,关注行为沉没成本和加强应用研究。