The ecology of automaticity: toward establishing the conditions needed to produce automatic processing effects.

In the past 15 years, the single term automatic has been applied to a diversity of laboratory phenomena that differ as to the preconditions necessary for their occurrence. Several major strains of automaticity are distinguished, based on the experimental conditions under which they are obtained: preconscious automatic processes, requiring only the proximal stimulus event; postconscious automatic processes, similar to preconscious effects but needing a recent activation or "priming" event for their operation; and goal-dependent automatic processes, which occur only when a specific, intentional processing goal is in place. It is argued that to more accurately specify the conditions under which an automatic effect will occur in the natural environment, greater attention needs to be given to aspects of the experimental paradigm (e.g., subjects' task goal, questionnaire administrations, previous tasks) that might be necessary to produce the effect.     

When can we introspect accurately about mental processes?

Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person’s perforance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously conrolled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; howver, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomlish othe goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesisesting strategy.     

The automaticity of perceiving animacy: Goal-directed motion in simple shapes influences visuomotor behavior even when task-irrelevant

Visual processing recovers not only simple features, such as color and shape, but also seemingly higher-level properties, such as animacy. Indeed, even abstract geometric shapes are readily perceived as intentional agents when they move in certain ways, and such percepts can dramatically influence behavior. In the wolfpack effect, for example, subjects maneuver a disc around a display in order to avoid several randomly moving darts. When the darts point toward the disc, subjects (falsely) perceive that the darts are chasing them, and this impairs several types of visuomotor performance. Are such effects reflexive, automatic features of visual processing? Or might they instead arise only as contingent strategies in tasks in which subjects must interact with (and thus focus on the features of) such objects? We explored these questions in an especially direct way—by embedding such displays into the background of a completely independent “foraging” task. Subjects now moved their disc to collect small “food” dots (which appeared sequentially in random locations) as quickly as possible. The darts were task-irrelevant, and subjects were encouraged to ignore them. Nevertheless, foraging was impaired when the randomly moving darts pointed at the subjects’ disc, as compared to control conditions in which they were either oriented orthogonally to the subjects’ disc or pointed at another moving shape—thereby controlling for nonsocial factors. The perception of animacy thus influences downstream visuomotor behavior in an automatic manner, such that subjects cannot completely override the influences of seemingly animate shapes even while attempting to ignore them.     

Towards a postconscious processes model of mental control: A conceptual analysis

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.     

The influence of intention on masked priming: a study with semantic classification of words

Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes. We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control, which is implemented in task-sets that define how the task is to be performed. In consequence, those prime attributes that are relevant to the task will be most effective. To investigate this hypothesis, we used a paradigm which has been shown to yield reliable short-lived priming in tasks based on semantic classification of words. This type of study uses fast, well practised classification responses, whereby responses to targets are much less accurate if prime and target belong to a different category than if they belong to the same category. In three experiments, we investigated whether the intention to classify the same words with respect to different semantic categories had a differential effect on priming. The results suggest that this was indeed the case: Priming varied with the task in all experiments. However, although participants reported not seeing the primes, they were able to classify the primes better than chance using the classification task they had used before with the targets. When a lexical task was used for discrimination in experiment 4, masked primes could however not be discriminated. Also, priming was as pronounced when the primes were visible as when they were invisible. The pattern of results suggests that participants had intentional control on prime processing, even if they reported not seeing the primes.     

Intentional and automatic processing of numerical information in mathematical anxiety: testing the influence of emotional priming

ABSTRACT

Current theoretical approaches suggest that mathematical anxiety (MA) manifests itself as a weakness in quantity manipulations. This study is the first to examine automatic versus intentional processing of numerical information using the numerical Stroop paradigm in participants with high MA. To manipulate anxiety levels, we combined the numerical Stroop task with an affective priming paradigm. We took a group of college students with high MA and compared their performance to a group of participants with low MA. Under low anxiety conditions (neutral priming), participants with high MA showed relatively intact number processing abilities. However, under high anxiety conditions (mathematical priming), participants with high MA showed (1) higher processing of the non-numerical irrelevant information, which aligns with the theoretical view regarding deficits in selective attention in anxiety and (2) an abnormal numerical distance effect. These results demonstrate that abnormal, basic numerical processing in MA is context related.     

Emotions and their computations: Three computer models

Abstract

Three computational models: a narrative reader (BORIS), an editorial reader (OpEd), and a stream of thought generator (DAYDREAMER), are presented and discussed, with specific focus on the emotion-related processing and representational elements of each. These models exhibit comprehension and/or generation of emotional behaviour through the interaction of cognitive processes (memory retrieval, planning, and reasoning) over intentional constructs (goals and beliefs).     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

The effect of self-referencing on memory for different kinds of source information

ABSTRACT

Self-referential processing has been proven to be effective in improving source memory. However, it is unclear whether different types of source information would be consistently enhanced when an item is self-referentially processed. In two experiments, the authors examined the influence of the self (compared with other-referencing and semantic processing) as well as learning intention (incidental/intentional learning) on memory for two types of source information (spatial location and colour) that differ in the amount of cognitive resources they require to be encoded in memory. Results show that self-referencing has enhanced memory for spatial location of words whatever this information is learned intentionally or incidentally, whereas it cannot facilitate memory for the colour of words under the intentional learning condition, nor can it under the incidental condition. These findings suggest that self-referential processing is beneficial in memory improvement but not all-powerful, a source self-reference effect is subject to source information type.     

When mistakes affecting one’s own group result in compensation: Evidence of a compensatory own goal effect

ObjectivesAlthough sports team members often value their teams highly, they sometimes make mistakes and thereby unintentionally put their teams at a disadvantage. Thus, they should be motivated to compensate for their mistake to resolve this discrepancy. To test this hypothesis, we studied whether professional soccer players compensate for their own goals by scoring regular goals in the same game (Study 1) and possible processes underlying such compensation efforts (Study 2).DesignIn Study 1, we compared how frequently prior own goal scorers scored a regular goal in the same game to (a) their expected goal scoring frequencies and (b) their probabilities to score a regular goal following a regular goal by the opposing team. In Study 2, we investigated four possible processes underlying the expected compensatory efforts.MethodWe analyzed all own goals from the first fifty years of the German Bundesliga (N = 889) and possible ensuing regular goals by the own goal scorer. Moreover, we surveyed amateur soccer players about four motives: group performance, individual performance, individual public image, and group public image.ResultsFollowing their own goals, professional soccer players are particularly likely to score regular goals in the same game (i.e., a compensatory own goal effect). Presumably, they primarily do so to secure a good group performance, but the other motives also play a role.ConclusionsGroup members who make highly visible mistakes are motivated to compensate for the disadvantage they caused. Presumably, they mainly do so to secure a good team performance.     

Implementing flexibility in automaticity: Evidence from context-specific implicit sequence learning

Attention is often dichotomized into controlled vs. automatic processing, where controlled processing is slow, flexible, and intentional, and automatic processing is fast, inflexible, and unintentional. In contrast to this strict dichotomy, there is mounting evidence for context-specific processes that are engaged rapidly yet are also flexible. In the present study we extend this idea to the domain of implicit learning to examine whether flexibility in automatic processes can be implemented through the reliance on contextual features. Across three experiments we show that participants can learn implicitly two complementary sequences that are associated with distinct contexts, and that transfer of learning when the two contexts are randomly intermixed depends on the distinctiveness of the two contexts. Our results point to the role of context-specific processes in the acquisition and expression of implicit sequence knowledge, and also suggest that episodic details can be represented in sequence knowledge.     

Mind and movement

Voluntary movements embrace both intentional, conscious and post-intentional, largely automatic processes. Here, we examine these types of processes and the relations between them during preparation and execution of voluntary movements. First, a general overview is given about how intentional and post-intentional components are interleaved to enable successful control of purposeful movements. Second, we briefly describe some post-intentional processes that are triggered by preceding intentions. Third, we discuss findings according to which such post-intentional processes or their results can become accessible to conscious awareness. Under such conditions, automatic and conscious processes can co-occur. We show that intentional interventions into post-intentional processes can be overridden by automatic processes, can interfere with automatic processes and can be independent so that their outcomes add to those of automatic processes.     

Laterality briefed: laterality modulates performance in a numerosity-congruity task

It is widely agreed that irrelevant numerical values are automatically activated. However, automatic and intentional activations may give rise to different numerical representations. We examined processing of symbolic and non-symbolic (i.e., numerosity) representations asking whether they differ in automatic and intentional processing. Participants were presented with two-dimensional displays containing repetitions of a digit and were asked to report, in different blocks, whether the digit or numerosity was smaller or larger than 5. Incongruent trials differed either in laterality between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions (i.e., the location of both dimensions in reference to the midpoint 5) or in numerical distance between dimensions. Congruency affected performance regardless of symbolic or non-symbolic presentation. For incongruent trials, laterality (not distance) affected performance, again regardless of presentation. This implies that automaticity does not mean similar processing of relevant and irrelevant dimensions. Specifically, the relevant dimension is processed elaborately whereas the irrelevant dimension is processed crudely.     

The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans

Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task‐dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top‐down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom‐up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top‐down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal‐directed action that goes beyond existing models by operationalizing an interface between two putative systems—a routine and a non‐routine system—thereby demonstrating how explicitly represented goals can interact with the emergent task representations that develop through learning in the routine system. The gradual emergence of task representations offers an explanation for the transfer of control with experience from the non‐routine goal‐based system to the routine system. At the same time it allows action selection to be sensitive both to environmental triggers and to biasing from multiple levels within the goal system.     

A test of the impact of pain on automatic motivational processes in people with knee osteoarthritis

ObjectivePeople with osteoarthritis are likely to be physically inactive and current socio-cognitive approaches to changing physical activity in this patient population are generally ineffective. We assessed prospective associations between physical activity and the automatic processes of habit automaticity, automatic evaluations, and automatic self-schema in people with knee osteoarthritis.DesignOne-week prospective.Method253 adults (aged 46–82 years, 72% female, 28% male) with knee osteoarthritis self-reported their physical activity behaviour of the past week, habit automaticity for physical activity and completed two implicit association tests to assess automatic evaluations of physical activity (relative to sedentary behaviour) and automatic self-schema for physical activity. One week later, participants self-reported physical activity and pain while walking over the prior week. Linear regression models assessed associations of each automatic process with subsequent physical activity and the moderation effect of pain and each automatic process on subsequent physical activity, controlling for covariates.ResultsWe did not find evidence of a statistical relationship between physical activity with automatic evaluations, automatic self-schema, or habit automaticity. The inclusion of pain while walking did not moderate the relationship between any automatic process and physical activity.ConclusionAlthough previous research on healthy, young adults suggests that automatic processes affect physical activity behaviour, we did not find evidence to confirm whether a similar relationship exists for older adults with knee osteoarthritis. Replication and extension work testing these research questions is needed to ensure the findings are not a result of measurement and design features of the study.     

The influence of alcohol (0.5‰) on the control and manoeuvring level of driving behaviour,finding measures to assess driving impairment: A simulator study

ObjectiveThe influence of psychoactive substances on driving performance and traffic safety has been extensively studied. Research on the influence of alcohol at the control level of behaviour (i.e. automated processes) has been well established and has shown that the ability to operate a vehicle decreases with rising alcohol levels. However, results one level higher at the manoeuvring level (i.e. conscious processes), are inconsistent. The current study aimed to replicate findings on the influence of alcohol on the control level of behaviour and investigate effects on the manoeuvring level in order to find suitable measures to assess driving impairment.MethodThe study was double-blind, placebo-controlled with a counterbalanced treatment order and a two-way crossover design. Thirty participants performed tasks in a driving simulator under the influence of alcohol (0.5‰) and a placebo. In the driving tasks the control level of behaviour (swerving, average speed, and speed variation) was investigated, as well as the manoeuvring level of behaviour (distance to other traffic during an overtaking manoeuvre, reaction time to a traffic light turning amber, and response to a suddenly merging car).ResultsAs expected, alcohol affected the control level of behaviour negatively. Participants swerved more and showed more speed variation after alcohol intake. The manoeuvring level of driving behaviour was also affected by alcohol. The distance to other drivers during an overtaking manoeuvre was smaller under the influence of alcohol. Results on reaction time were however less straightforward. Reaction time increased significantly under the influence of alcohol when reacting to a traffic light but not in reaction to a car unexpectedly merging into traffic. When analysing behaviour in reaction to these different events in more detail it became clear that they were responded to in varying manners, making it difficult to find an average impairment measure.ConclusionsThe deteriorating effect of alcohol at the control level of driving behaviour was replicated, confirming the suitability of the standard deviation of lateral position and the variation in speed as measures of impairment. At the manoeuvring level, the kept distance to the leading car during an overtaking manoeuvre appeared to be a suitable measure to assess impairment as well as reaction time to a traffic light. The current study also confirms the difficulties in evaluating complex driving behaviour and the need for more research on this subject.     

Contingency learning and stereotype formation: Illusory and spurious correlations revisited

The ability of implicit measures to predict behaviour varies greatly across studies, emphasising the need for accounts of this variability. In order to organise and review the literature on moderators that influence individuals' information processing, we suggest a classification system of moderators with two dimensions. One dimension distinguishes moderators according to their influence on the opportunity to control, the motivation to control, or the reliance on either automatic or controlled processes without changes in opportunity or motivation. The second dimension classifies moderators according to whether they pertain to a disposition of the acting person, the situation in which the behaviour occurs, or the behaviour itself. Increased predictive validity of implicit measures is associated with conditions that foster the impact of automatic processes on behaviour determination. In the discussion we derive several additional moderators from the classification system, delineate emerging research questions, and discuss implications of the reviewed studies for research on self-regulation.     

Interplay between action and movement intentions during social interaction

Observing the movements of another person influences the observer's intention to execute similar movements. However, little is known about how action intentions formed prior to movement planning influence this effect. In the experiment reported here, we manipulated the congruency of movement intentions and action intentions in a pair of jointly acting individuals (i.e., a participant paired with a confederate coactor) and investigated how congruency influenced performance. Overall, participants initiated actions faster when they had the same action intention as the coactor (i.e., when participants and the coactor were pursuing the same conceptual goal). Participants' responses were also faster when their and the coactor's movement intentions were directed to the same spatial location, but only when participants had the same action intention as the coactor. These findings suggest that observers use the same representation to implement their own action intentions that they use to infer other people's action intentions and also that a dynamic, multitiered intentional mechanism is involved in the processing of other people's actions.     

Instance-based categorization: Automatic versus intentional forms of retrieval

Two experiments are reported which attempt to disentangle the relative contribution of intentional and automatic forms of retrieval to instance-based categorization. A financial decision-making task was used in which subjects had to decide whether a bank would approve loans for a series of applicants. Experiment 1 found that categorization was sensitive to instance-specific knowledge, even when subjects had practiced using a simple rule. L. L. Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure was adapted for use in Experiment 2 to infer the relative contribution of intentional and automatic retrieval processes to categorization decisions. The results provided (1) strong evidence that intentional retrieval processes influence categorization, and (2) some preliminary evidence suggesting that automatic retrieval processes may also contribute to categorization decisions.     

Dimensions of movement specific reinvestment in practice of a golf putting task

ObjectivesThis study aimed to investigate the role of the two dimensions of movement specific reinvestment (conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness) in performance of a complex task early and later in practice. Furthermore, the study also examined the underlying kinematic mechanisms by which conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness influence performance in practice.MethodsTrait measures of conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness were obtained from participants using the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale. Participants (n = 30) with no prior golf putting experience practiced 300 golf putts over the course of two days. Putting proficiency (number of putts holed) and variability of movement kinematics (SD impact velocity and SD putter face angle at impact) were assessed early and later in practice.ResultsMovement self-consciousness positively influenced putting proficiency early and later in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. Conscious motor processing positively influenced putting proficiency early in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. Later in practice, conscious motor processing was not associated with putting proficiency.ConclusionThe findings suggest that higher propensity for movement self-consciousness potentially influences performance early and later in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. A higher propensity for conscious motor processing benefits performance in a similar manner as movement self-consciousness early in practice but it does not seem to influence performance later in practice. The findings of the current study suggest that movement self-consciousness and conscious motor processing differentially influence performance at different stages in practice of a complex motor skill, suggesting that they might depict different types of conscious processing.