Probabilistically Valid Inference of Covariation From a Single x,y Observation When Univariate Characteristics Are Known

Participants were asked to draw inferences about correlation from single x,y observations. In Experiment 1 statistically sophisticated participants were given the univariate characteristics of distributions of x and y and asked to infer whether a single x, y observation came from a correlated or an uncorrelated population. In Experiment 2, students with a variety of statistical backgrounds assigned posterior probabilities to five possible populations based on single x, y observations, again given knowledge of the univariate statistics. In Experiment 3, statistically naïve participants were given a problem analogous to that given in Experiment 1, framed verbally. Experiment 4 replicated Experiment 3 but added an "impossible to determine" response option. Models that rely on computing sample correlations make no predictions about these investigations. From a Bayesian perspective, participants' inferences in all four experiments tended to make probabilistically valid inferences as long as the single datum was directional. The results are discussed in light of the Brunswikian notion of vicarious functioning.     

Reasoning about emotional and neutral materials. Is logic affected by emotion?

In two experiments, we investigated whether people reason differently when they reason about emotional and neutral contents. We gave participants a conditional reasoning task ("If p, then q") and varied the emotionality of the items used as p and q. Participants were asked to draw inferences based on these statements. In Experiment 1, we compared statements including preexisting emotional and neutral words. In Experiment 2, we experimentally manipulated the emotionality of initially neutral words using classical conditioning. In both experiments, emotionality affected participants' responses. They were more likely to draw invalid inferences in response to emotional compared with neutral statements.     

How falsity dispels fallacies

From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants did not receive these instructions. There were more correct answers for illusory disjunctions whose premises had been falsified than there were for illusory disjunctions that had not been falsified. A second Experiment introduced illusory inferences in a real world context that accentuated falsification of premises. Accuracy also improved. Knowledge of how to falsify premises and to consider their implications for true premises transferred to a new problem introduced at the end of the Experiment without the falsification instruction. The participants' ratings of the difficulty of the inferences showed that they did not err simply because illusory inferences are perceived to be more difficult than control problems. The model theory predicts these results because it postulates that the limitations of working memory preclude the representation of false information.     

现实预期和意愿预期在文本阅读中的激活强度

文本阅读中,读者往往对事件的后续发展进行预期推理。预期推理有两种倾向,要么是倾向于根据客观现实条件进行的现实预期,要么是倾向于根据主观个人意愿进行的意愿预期。两个实验探讨了文本阅读中读者产生的现实预期和意愿预期的激活强度。结果发现,现实预期和意愿预期都可以在阅读中即时产生,意愿预期强于现实预期;把读者分为"情感导向型"和"非情感导向型",发现"情感导向型"的读者,阅读过程中产生的意愿预期强于现实预期,而"非情感导向型"的读者则不是。     

A comparison of verbal and tangible stimulus preference assessment methods in adults with schizophrenia

Verbal stimulus preference assessments were compared with tangible stimulus preference assessments for four adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In the verbal assessment, participants were asked, ‘Do you want X or Y?’, the items were not present, and the participant chose an item verbally. In the tangible assessment, pairs of items were placed in front of the participant and s/he was asked to choose by approaching the stimuli. The two assessment methods yielded identical highest preference items for three of the four participants and identical lowest preference items for all participants. In addition, the verbal assessment method took less time to complete than the tangible assessment method. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference Task

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.     

Do readers make inferences about conversational topics?

When we read that two protagonists in a story chatted together for a couple of minutes, do we draw inferences about the topic of the conversation on the basis of information presented earlier in the text? Participants read passages in which protagonists part and later reunite; the passages ended with a sentence either that implied conversation or did not. In Experiment 1, participants' continuation sentences indicated that inferences about the topic of conversation were drawn. Recognition probe data in Experiment 2 provided more immediate evidence of such inferences. Experiment 3 addressed a possible confound in Experiment 2 and again provided evidence that readers inferred the continuation of the conversation. In Experiments 4 and 5, we investigated the effect of having the targeted conversational topic be a secret that should not be shared between the protagonists. The results are discussed in terms of the collaboration between passive, memory-based text processing and schema-driven comprehension processes.     

Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions

We examine the interaction of two cues that children use to make judgments about cause-effect relations: probabilities and interventions. Children were shown a "detector" that lit up and played music when a block was placed on its surface. We varied the probabilistic effectiveness of the block, as well as whether the experimenter or the child was performing the interventions. In Experiment 1, we found that children can use probabilistic evidence to make inferences about causal strength. However, when the results of their own interventions are in conflict with the overall frequencies, preschoolers favor the results of their own interventions. In Experiment 2, children used probabilistic evidence to infer a hidden causal mechanism. Though they again gave preference to their own interventions, they did not do so when their interventions were explicitly confounded by an alternative cause.     

Memory-based versus on-line processing: Implications for attitude strength

Three experiments tested whether the manner in which attitudes are created—through on-line or memory-based processing—can impact the resultant strength of those attitudes. In each study, participants were presented with 20 behavioral statements about a person named Marie. Whereas some participants were asked to continually evaluate Marie based upon each sentence and then report their overall evaluation (on-line processing), others were asked to focus on the sentence structure and to evaluate Marie only after they had read all the sentences (memory-based processing). Even when controlling for attitude accessibility, attitudes created through on-line processing were stronger than attitudes created through memory-based processing: Experiment 1 showed that participants in the on-line condition felt more certain of their attitudes, Experiment 2 showed that on-line attitudes were better predictors of participants’ evaluative preferences, while Experiment 3 showed that on-line attitudes manifested stronger attitude-behavioral intention correspondence.     

Wired for Gender: Experientiality and Gender-Stereotyping in Computer-Mediated Communication

The present experiments examined how experiential thinking moderates gender stereotyping in anonymous, text-based computer-mediated communication. In Experiment 1, participants played a trivia game with an ostensible partner via computer, represented by a randomly assigned gender-marked character. Consistent with the cognitive-experiential self-theory, high experientials were more likely than lows to infer their partner's gender from arbitrary characters and also exhibited greater conformity to the male- than to female-charactered partners. In Experiment 2, when the partner's comments revealed gender-linked language differences, high experientials were more likely than lows to base their gender inferences on the linguistic features. Women were more likely to accept the partner's answers when masculine than feminine questions were asked and showed greater overall conformity than men, but such self-stereotyping was more pronounced among high experientials than lows.     

An on-line look at automatic contrast and correction of behavior categorizations and dispositional inferences

The current study examined on-line behavior recategorization as a mechanism underlying corrections for contextual influences in dispositional inferences. After watching an initial comparison video that portrayed either a successful or unsuccessful performance on a spatial ability task, cognitive load and no load participants watched and made real-time ratings of a target performance. The comparison video was expected to exert a contrastive influence on participants' automatic impressions of the performance (behavior categorizations) and the child's intelligence (dispositional inferences). Load participants' on-line and post-video performance and ability ratings showed this expected effect, as did no load participants' initial on-line performance ratings. However, no load participants' later on-line and post-video ratings did not. These findings support the notion that corrections for contextual influence can occur at the level of behavior identification as perceivers encode behavioral cues.     

Change blindness blindness: beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection

Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants' beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants predicted equal levels of change detection for both types of changes across scene complexity. In Experiment 2, emphasizing the differences between intentional and incidental tasks allowed participants to make predictions that were less inaccurate. In Experiment 3, using more sensitive measures and accounting for individual differences did not further improve predictions. These findings suggest that adults do not fully understand the role of intention and scene complexity in change detection.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

The function of information immediacy and smartphone usage

The current study used the delay discounting method to understand the need to respond to different communication mediums. In this method, participants were asked their preference between responding immediately for a smaller reward or after a delay for a larger reward. Experiment 1 asked participants their preference for responding to a text message, sticky note, and postcard. Participants indicated lower willingness in responding to the text message but did not have differing preferences between the other mediums. Experiment 2 sought to understand if the effect was related specifically to text messages or all instantaneous communication. Participants indicated their preference for responding to a text message, email, and voicemail while driving on a road trip. Participants indicated no differences in preference for responding to the message mediums. These results have implications for interpreting distracted driving research, specifically texting and driving, as the effect may apply to other communication mediums.     

The interplay of controlled and automatic processing in the expression of spontaneously inferred traits: A PDP analysis

Inferences made about actors influence subsequent processing about those actors. Three experiments conducted in the context of spontaneous trait inference (STI) making demonstrate that such influences occur can either occur via automatic processes or via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that processing goals manipulated prior to encoding actor behavior affected the extent to which STIs automatically influenced subsequent responses but did not alter the extent to which STIs influenced those responses via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 2 showed that the extent to which STIs affected subsequent responding via the action of controlled processes were more affected by a delay between exposure to an actor behavior and the response task than the extent to which STIs affected task performance via the action of automatic processes. Finally, results from Experiment 3 showed that participants' subjective experience of awareness of their trait inferences is related to estimates of the extent to which controlled processing is involved in the production of their future responses but not to estimates of the extent to which those responses are affected by automatic processing.     

Valuing intervention and observation

Understanding causal relations is fundamental to effective action but causal data can be confounded. We examined the value that participants placed on data derived from a hypothetical intervention or observation. Our materials involved a possible cause ("bottled water"), a possible confound ("food"), and a context ("a restaurant"). We supposed that participants seek to draw as specific a causal inference as possible from presented data and value information sources more highly that allow them to do so. On this basis, we predicted that in circumstances where an intervention removed the confounding causal factor but observation did not, participants would prefer data derived from an intervention when the possible cause was present (the bottled water was drunk) but show the reverse preference when the possible cause was absent (the bottled water was not drunk). Experiment 1 confirmed this prediction. Using a between-subjects design, Experiment 2 tested for a difference in confidence in causal judgements given identical data, including data on the confound, as a function of method of data collection (intervention or observation). There was no significant difference in confidence ratings between the two methods but confidence ratings were sensitive to the probability of an effect (illness) given the cause. Using a within-subjects design, Experiment 3 revealed systematic individual differences in preference for the two methods. Participants were divided between those who considered intervention more confounded and those who considered observation more confounded. Our experiments point to the subtleties of participants' evaluation of data from studies of human beings.     

A balancing act: Physical balance, through arousal, influences size perception

Previous research has demonstrated that manipulating vision influences balance. Here, we question whether manipulating balance can influence vision and how it may influence vision--specifically, the perception of width. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the width of beams while balanced and unbalanced. When unbalanced, participants judged the widths to be smaller. One possible explanation is that unbalanced participants did not view the stimulus as long as when balanced because they were focused on remaining balanced. In Experiment 2, we tested this notion by limiting viewing time. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1, but viewing time had no effect on width judgments. In Experiment 3, participants' level of arousal was manipulated, because the balancing task likely produced arousal. While jogging, participants judged the beams to be smaller. In Experiment 4, participants completed another arousing task (counting backward by sevens) that did not involve movement. Again, participants judged the beams to be smaller when aroused. Experiment 5A raised participants' level of arousal before estimating the board widths (to control for potential dual-task effects) and showed that heightened arousal still influenced perceived width of the boards. Collectively, heightened levels of arousal, caused by multiple manipulations (including balance), influenced perceived width.     

Elaborative inferences during reading: do they occur on-line?

Four experiments were conducted to examine the extent to which readers construct elaborative inferences on-line during reading. In Experiment 1, gaze durations were measured while subjects read anaphors to target antecedents that referenced a particular category member either explicitly or implicitly. When the context strongly suggested a particular category member, gaze durations on an anaphor were the same following either an implicit or an explicit antecedent. When the context did not suggest any particular category member, gaze durations were significantly longer following an implicit antecedent. The results confirmed that, with sufficient context, readers will generate a simple elaborative inference on-line. These results were replicated in Experiment 2 in which the materials did not strongly signal the inference but a sentence designed to encourage subjects to infer was included. In Experiment 3, this "demand sentence" was not included, and readers did not appear to construct the targeted inference. The results of Experiment 4 confirmed that once generated, elaborative inferences are stored as part of the long-term-memory representation of a passage.