Temporal factorisation: A unifying principle for dynamics of the world and of mental states

Dynamics play a major role in many phenomena, addressed in a variety of disciplines. This paper contributes to the identification of common principles underlying approaches to dynamics used within a variety of cognitive and noncognitive disciplines, such as Cognitive Science, Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Computer Science and Biology. More specifically, as a central, unifying principle, the temporal factorisation principle is introduced, formalised and illustrated. This principle expresses, that every temporal relationship of the form ‘past pattern implies future pattern’ can be factorised into a relationship of the form ‘past pattern implies present state’ and a relationship of the form ‘present state implies future pattern’. To enable this, for every ‘past pattern implies future pattern’ relationship, the principle postulates the existence of certain mediating state properties in the present state. It provides a conceptual framework which unifies various approaches to dynamics within a variety of disciplines. In particular, it is shown how the principle can be applied in the case of cognitive states of agents.     

Perceptual Nonconceptualism: Disentangling the Debate Between Content and State Nonconceptualism

In this paper I argue, against recent claims by Bermúdez (2007) and Toribio (2008), that within the debate about whether perceptual experiences are nonconceptual, ‘state nonconceptualism’ (or the ‘state view’) can be a coherent and plausible position. In particular, I explain that state nonconceptualism and content nonconceptualism, when understood in their most plausible and motivated form, presuppose different notions of content. I argue that state nonconceptualism can present a plausible way of unpacking the claim that perceptual experiences are nonconceptual once the notion of content it should presuppose is taken into account; and once this notion of content is clearly distinguished from the one usually presupposed by content nonconceptualism, the criticisms that Bermúdez and Toribio place against state nonconceptualism become ineffective.     

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.     

Childhood as continuity and newness: generational succession understood according to the theological logic of the gift

This article seeks to understand, in a speculative way, the relationship between a new generation and the one preceding it. After having identified two opposite extremes – the ‘continuity thesis’ and the ‘discontinuity thesis’ – the article appropriates the logic of gift exchange to map out a mediating position. The fact that the practice of gift exchange is susceptible to criticism is subsequently noted, and two major lines of philosophical criticism are considered and related to the continuity thesis and the discontinuity thesis, respectively. The article then makes use of the work done by John Milbank to show that a purified notion of gift exchange is possibly from the vantage point of Christian theology, and finally seeks to apply this notion to the relationship between generations.     

Soft facts and ontological dependence

In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ about the past needn’t be. A substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, though no consensus emerged as to the proper way to analyze it. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. The central claim of this paper is that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The crucial feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. Following recent work on the notion of dependence, however, I argue that the literature on the soft/hard distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake. This is because such attempts have tried to capture softness in terms of purely modal notions like entailment and necessitation. As I hope to show, however, such notions cannot capture the sort of asymmetrical dependence relevant to soft facthood. Arguing for this claim is the first goal of this paper. My second goal is to gesture towards what an adequate account of soft facthood will really look like.     

Transcendentality and the Gift: On Gunton,Milbank, and Trinitarian Metaphysics

This article considers the compatibility between the doctrine of the Trinity and the theory of the transcendental properties by offering an account of the notion of the ‘gift’ as a transcendental term. In particular, this article presents a re-reading of John Milbank’s influential theology of the gift through Colin Gunton’s project of developing ‘trinitarian transcendentals’. Showing how Milbank’s notion of the gift could be systematically understood in terms of what Gunton calls a ‘trinitarianly developed transcendental’ which nonetheless avoids many of the problems found in Gunton’s original project, this article argues that understanding ‘gift’ as a transcendental term not only provides new ways of conceiving the relationship between the philosophy of transcendental properties and various traditional doctrines, it can moreover demonstrate how the traditional and biblical names of the Holy Spirit as ‘the Gift’ and the Son as ‘the Word’ can offer new ways of developing distinctively trinitarian accounts of metaphysics.     

Here and now: My perspective1

In this paper the author describes her particular perspective in doing analytic work. She stresses working in the here and now. For example, making interpretations that grow out of what the patient says or does in the sessions, keeping the patient’s history in mind, but not letting it lead interpretations. The analysis tries to understand why something is being said now, in this way, and what impact it may have or be designed to have in the analytic relationship. The term ‘here’ refers to what is going on between patient and analyst in the room while not leaving out the patient’s immediate reality in the outside world, his everyday life. The word ‘now’ implies awareness of time that is not just of the past and future but of the patient’s situation at the moment in analysis, which is constantly shifting.The author believes that by working primarily in the present the patient will feel more anchored, both patient and analyst can observe what is going on, for example how anxiety arises or decreases, how defences are mobilised or lessen. Both analyst and patient experience movement and change rather than relying on more theoretical explanations.     

Creating ‘Local Publics’: Responsibility and Involvement in Decision-Making on Technologies with Local Impacts

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper makes a conceptual inquiry into the notion of ‘publics’, and forwards an understanding of this notion that allows more responsible forms of...     

A note on analysing substancehood

I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two ‘quasi-logical’ independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions.     

Actions That We Ought,But Can't

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. ¹ Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something. It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis.     

Special Divine Action and How to Do Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situations, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action’s rightness. This indicates that what is right must be determined independently of the good.

In this paper, I argue that these purported counterexamples to teleology fail to establish that the right must be prior to the good. In fact, putting the right prior to the good can lead to sets of ought statements which potentially conflict with the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. I argue that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right independently of a notion of value or goodness. Every plausible ethical theory needs a mapping from goodness to rightness, which implies that right cannot be prior to the good.     

A Theory of the Temporal Asymmetry of Deliberation

Contemporary theories of the temporal asymmetry of deliberation seek the origins of the asymmetry either in the physics of the early universe or in the epistemic orientation of agents. An attempt is made in the following lines to consolidate the rival thesis that the temporal asymmetry of deliberation is rooted in an ontological divide between the past and the future. I argue that agents can deliberate about the future but not the past because while the past is in a sense real, the future is nothing at all. The argument for the thesis includes striking a connection between deliberation and truth on the one hand and truth and being on the other. The argument thus proceeds, via a modal principle, from the asymmetry of deliberation into the semantics of propositions about the past, the present, and the future and from there to the ontology of the past, the present, and the future. The ‘ticket’ for transition in the argument from semantics to ontology is a truth‐making principle, according to which propositions are true or false in virtue of an existing reality.     

Front-line services,complexity, research and policy

The evidence-based culture of modern mental health policy and service delivery is being extended through funded efforts to accelerate implementation of research findings in practice settings. In this paper, we argue that this linear model of research and policy-making is profoundly ill adapted to the nature of practice realities and real-world policy-making processes. Both need to be re-conceptualised using the theoretical and practical resources deriving from modern complexity theory. A short case study illustrates the nature of ‘complexity’, the reframing of the notion of ‘evidence’ it implies and the different relationship between research, practice and policy that flows from this more attuned model of mental health and therapeutic processes.     

‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness

According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.     

An enactivist approach to treating depression: cultivating online intelligence through dance and music

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper utilizes the enactivist notion of ‘sense-making’ to discuss the nature of depression and examine some implications for treatment....     

Grounding Nominalism

The notion of grounding has gained increasing acceptance among metaphysicians in recent years. In this paper, I argue that this notion can be used to formulate a very attractive version of (property) nominalism, a view that I call ‘grounding nominalism’. Simplifying somewhat, this is the view that all properties are grounded in things. I argue that this view is coherent and has a decisive advantage over competing versions of nominalism: it allows us to accept properties as real, while fully accommodating nominalist intuitions. Finally, I defend grounding nominalism against several seemingly troublesome objections.     

Identifying mediators of training effects on performance-related psychobiosocial states: A single-case observational study in an elite female triathlete

ObjectivesRelationships between training load, psychobiosocial (PBS) states and performance are dynamic and individual-specific. The nature of these relationships can be investigated using a combination of dynamic linear models (DLMs) and mediating variable analysis, potentially assisting applied sports psychologists in planning and monitoring of individual elite athletes’ intervention programmes.DesignWe illustrate this approach by examining the relationships of training loads with a performance-related state (‘self-efficacy’) and the role of potential mediating PBS variables (‘fatigue/lack of energy’ and ‘being in shape’) in explaining these relationships in an elite triathlete across time.MethodSelf-reports of PBS states (twice weekly) and training data were collected over 137 days. Using DLMs and mediating variable analysis, direct (unmediated) and indirect (mediated) short-term associations of training load with ‘self-efficacy’ were examined.ResultsIn this triathlete, we found evidence for positive effects of training on ‘self-efficacy’, which were partly explained by feelings of ‘being in shape’ and suppressed by feelings of ‘fatigue/lack of energy’. Changes in the relationship between lagged training load and ‘fatigue/lack of energy’ were observed across time and were particularly pronounced in temporal proximity of an injury.ConclusionStrengths of the presented approach are its dynamic nature enabling the observation of changes occurring over time, use of statistical inference rather than visual data interpretation, and quantification of mediating effects to identify potential pathways of intervention. Additionally, the DLM method can identify complex nonlinear associations by examining correspondence between changes in levels of predictors and changes in magnitude and direction of predictor-outcome associations.     

Scaffolding within the structure of Dialogical Self: Hierarchical dynamics of semiotic mediation

Scaffolding is a notion that allows us to conceptualize direction towards change. As a form of guidance, scaffolding may result in both change and non-change. In this paper I apply the notion of scaffolding by signs (semiotic mediation) to the theory of Dialogical Self (DS). The DS is a construct that brings into psychology a new way of theoretical thought—thinking in dualities. Dualities are systemic units of two opposites that are mutually related by functional dynamic relations. Within the theory of DS, human psychological functioning is explained by transformations of constantly changed I-positions that are mapped both structurally (internal/external) and temporally (past/present/future). Semiotic mediation within the DS guarantees the person's psychological distancing from the here-and-now setting. This distancing is guided by promoter signs—generalized meanings of field-like form that orient the self's transformation. These signs are parts of the semiotic mediating processes where higher-level signs guide the range of openness of the sign hierarchy itself for further transformation when that is needed.     

A Faradayan Principle for Selecting Classical Field Theories

Faraday’s field concept presupposes that field stresses should share the axial symmetry of the lines of force. In the present article, the field dynamics is similarly required to depend only on field properties that can be tested through the motion of test‐particles. Precise expressions of this ‘Faradayan’ principle in field‐theoretical language are shown to severely restrict the form of classical field theories. In particular, static forces must obey the inverse square law in a linear approximation. Within a Minkowskian and Lagrangian framework, the Faradayan principle automatically leads to Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and to Einstein’s theory of gravitation, without appeal to the equivalence principle. A comparison is drawn between this, Feynman’s, and Einstein’s way to arrive at general relativity.