Temporal factorisation: Realisation of mediating state properties for dynamics

Temporal factorisation is a principle underlying approaches to dynamics used within many disciplines. According to this principle any temporal relationship of the form ‘past pattern implies future pattern’ can be factorised into a relationship of the form ‘past pattern implies present state’ and a relationship of the form ‘present state implies future pattern’. To enable this, the principle postulates the existence of certain mediating state properties in the present state. In this paper the question is addressed whether and how a postulated mediating state property relates to other state properties in the (present) state in which they occur. In particular, the situation is analysed that realisers exist: other state properties or combinations thereof that co-occur with the mediating state property in states. This analysis provides a conceptual framework covering various concepts and themes that usually are considered totally different and unrelated, such as, the notion of differential equation in Mathematics, the notions of transition system and rule-based system in Computer Science, Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, and the notion of reduction in Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science.     

Some unresolved issues in philosophy and psychology: their implications for therapy

This paper is divided into two interrelated sections: the first section examines the scientific status of mainstream Western psychology. It will also consider the major arguments concerning the relationship of mainstream Western psychology to philosophy—in particular to metaphysics and the philosophy of science. It will be argued that psychology has turned away from its past philosophical heritage and has thus, short-changed itself by avoiding the very issues, which form an integral part of one's subjective and existential world and of the therapeutic process. The second section argues that, to a large measure the contemporary approaches to counselling and psychotherapy have moved away from the scientific ideologies, which guide research within mainstream Western psychology. Over the last 30 years or more, counselling and psychotherapy as ‘disciplines’ have proliferated into several sub-disciplines. This has made it difficult, if not impossible, to determine their pedigree and parentage. Although a great deal of ingenuity has gone into the construction of such new therapies, very little effort has gone into testing their validity. Unless serious attempts are made to bring about a rapprochement, it is likely to lead to a state of ‘epistemological anarchy’, or, anything goes.     

Paradigm shift in religious education? A reply to Gearon,or when is a paradigm not a paradigm?

This article responds to Liam Gearon’s reply to my article Misrepresenting Religious Education’s Past and Present in Looking Forward: Gearon Using Kuhn’s Concepts of Paradigm, Paradigm Shift and Incommensurability. In maintaining my critique of Gearon’s use of Kuhn’s terminology, I question his claim that ‘incommensurability’ does not necessarily imply ‘incompatibility’, and challenge his view that ‘faith-based’ approaches to religious education and ‘inclusive’ approaches are incommensurable and deeply incompatible. I also question Gearon’s placement of particular scholars within his constructed paradigms, noting that those identified by Gearon with specific paradigms do not necessarily share the same views concerning the nature of religious education and its pedagogy, and that various scholars, associated by Gearon with particular paradigms, draw on a variety of disciplines in their work. I argue that Gearon’s construction of paradigms is a device he uses for ‘separation’, leading to his misrepresentation of the work of researchers. I argue for the benefits of collaboration, in research, teaching and policy development. Finally, I give reasons for writing the article, which do not result from any engagement in ‘paradigm wars’, and I draw attention to pressing issues relating to the future of ‘inclusive’ religious education which are not addressed by Gearon.     

‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.     

‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness

According to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it is never the case that you ought to do something you cannot do. While many accept this principle in some form, it also has its share of critics, and thus it seems desirable if an argument can be offered in its support. The aim of this paper is to examine a particular way in which the principle has been defended, namely, by appeal to considerations of fairness. In a nutshell, the idea (due to David Copp) is that moral requirements we cannot comply with would be unfair, and there cannot be unfair moral requirements. I discuss several ways of spelling out the argument, and argue that all are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.     

Modeling the emergence of informational content by adaptive networks for temporal factorisation and criterial causation

Propagated activation of neurons through their network is an important process in the brain. Another crucial part of neural processing concerns adaptation over time of characteristics of this network such as connection strengths or excitability thresholds. This adaptation can be slow, as in learning from a multiple experiences, or it can be fast, as in memory formation. These adaptive network characteristics can be considered informational criteria for activation of a neuron. This then is viewed as a form of emergent information formation. Activation of neurons is determined by such information via a process termed criterial causation. In the current paper, the relationship of criterial causation with the principle of temporal factorisation for the dynamics of the world in general is explored. Temporal factorisation describes how the world represents information about its past in its present state, which then in turn determines the world’s future. In the paper, it is shown how these processes are analysed in more detail and modeled by (adaptive) network models.     

Deviant interdisciplinarity as philosophical practice: prolegomena to deep intellectual history

Philosophy may relate to interdisciplinarity in two distinct ways On the one hand, philosophy may play an auxiliary role in the process of interdisciplinarity, typically through conceptual analysis, in the understanding that the disciplines themselves are the main epistemic players. This version of the relationship I characterise as ‘normal’ because it captures the more common pattern of the relationship, which in turn reflects an acceptance of the division of organized inquiry into disciplines. On the other hand, philosophy may be itself the site for the production of interdisciplinary knowledge, understood as a kind of second-order understanding of reality that transcends the sort of knowledge that the disciplines provide, left to their own devices. This is my own position, which I dub ‘deviant’ and to which most of this article is devoted. I begin by relating the two types of interdisciplinarity to the organization of inquiry, especially their respective attitudes to the history of science. Underlying the two types are contrasting notions of what constitutes the ‘efficient’ pursuit of knowledge. This difference is further explored in terms of the organization of the university. The normal/deviant distinction was already marked in the institution’s medieval origins in terms of the difference between Doctors and Masters, respectively, an artefact of which remains in the postgraduate/undergraduate degree distinction. In the context of the history of the university, the prospects for deviant interdisciplinarity were greatest from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth century—the period called ‘early modern’ in the philosophy curriculum. Towards the end of that period, due to Kant and the generation of idealists who followed him, philosophy was briefly the privileged site for deviant interdisciplinarity. After Hegel’s death, the mantle of deviant interdisciplinarity increasingly passed to some version of ‘biology’. I explore the ‘Natur-’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaft’ versions of that post-philosophical vision, which continue to co-exist within today’s biological science. I then briefly examine the chequered reputation of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, someone who exemplified the promise and perils of deviant interdisciplinarity over the past 200 years. I conclude with an Epilogue that considers contemporary efforts to engage philosophy in interdisciplinary work, invoking William James as an exemplar.     

Why concepts can't be theories

In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's.     

A Theory of the Temporal Asymmetry of Deliberation

Contemporary theories of the temporal asymmetry of deliberation seek the origins of the asymmetry either in the physics of the early universe or in the epistemic orientation of agents. An attempt is made in the following lines to consolidate the rival thesis that the temporal asymmetry of deliberation is rooted in an ontological divide between the past and the future. I argue that agents can deliberate about the future but not the past because while the past is in a sense real, the future is nothing at all. The argument for the thesis includes striking a connection between deliberation and truth on the one hand and truth and being on the other. The argument thus proceeds, via a modal principle, from the asymmetry of deliberation into the semantics of propositions about the past, the present, and the future and from there to the ontology of the past, the present, and the future. The ‘ticket’ for transition in the argument from semantics to ontology is a truth‐making principle, according to which propositions are true or false in virtue of an existing reality.     

Therapist memory and reverie: implications for the clinical setting

In this work, the author considers reveries to be ‘dream-like-memories’. In the course of a session they appear as proto-memory – the therapist’s early traumatic object relations that are recorded in the unconscious at an almost bodily level (a type of unthought known) and which are resurrected between therapist and patient when a similar traumatic subject arises between them. The therapist’s reveries are recollections in the form of dream-like allusions to his past experience. A clinical vignette from the psychotherapy of a child whose father suffered from PTSD (following a wartime experience in Afghanistan and Iraq) is discussed. Dissociative dynamics were repeated in the therapeutic relationship, in the form of an obsessive game intending to preserve the state in which there was no need to remember what had been unconsciously transmitted to the child: his father’s wartime experience. The projection of the primary elements which had been silenced evoked in the therapist allusions to his unconscious identification with his ancestor’s post-traumatic experiences. These allusions helped in overcoming the dissociated state. The role of memory in child psychotherapists’ receptivity of trauma is revisited.     

A Critical Assessment of the Programmes of Producing ‘Islamic Science’ and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’

In the present article, working from within the framework of critical rationalism and focusing mostly on the views developed by some Iranian writers, I argue that the programmes of producing ‘Islamic Science’ (cIS) and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’ (IoK) are doomed to failure. I develop my arguments in three parts. I start by explaining that the advocates of the programmes of producing cIS or IoK subscribe to mistaken images of science that are shaped by either a positivist or outmoded culturalist/interpretivist theories of science. I shall then focus on the similarities and differences of ‘science’ and ‘technology’, arguing that despite close interconnection between the two it is of utmost importance, for analytical purposes, to keep these two socially constructed entities apart. Drawing on the above distinction, I argue that while creating ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ sciences is impossible, constructing ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ technologies is, in principle, feasible. Lastly, I turn to some of the more recent works on creating/constructing cIS and/or IoK. I shall try to show that none of the arguments introduced by the advocates of the projects of cIS/IoK is tenable.     

Here and now: My perspective1

In this paper the author describes her particular perspective in doing analytic work. She stresses working in the here and now. For example, making interpretations that grow out of what the patient says or does in the sessions, keeping the patient’s history in mind, but not letting it lead interpretations. The analysis tries to understand why something is being said now, in this way, and what impact it may have or be designed to have in the analytic relationship. The term ‘here’ refers to what is going on between patient and analyst in the room while not leaving out the patient’s immediate reality in the outside world, his everyday life. The word ‘now’ implies awareness of time that is not just of the past and future but of the patient’s situation at the moment in analysis, which is constantly shifting.The author believes that by working primarily in the present the patient will feel more anchored, both patient and analyst can observe what is going on, for example how anxiety arises or decreases, how defences are mobilised or lessen. Both analyst and patient experience movement and change rather than relying on more theoretical explanations.     

Time to get rid of the ‘Modular’ in neuropsychology: A unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding

Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non‐modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of ‘cognitive’ next to ‘neuropsychology’ will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain.     

The Medieval Octagon of Opposition for Sentences with Quantified Predicates

The traditional Square of Opposition consists of four sentence types. Two are universal and two particular; two are affirmative and two negative. Examples, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ designate the subject and the predicate, are: ‘every S is P’, ‘no S is P’, ‘some S is P’ and ‘some S is not P’. Taking the usual sentences of the square of opposition, quantifying over their predicates exhibits non-standard sentence forms. These sentences may be combined into non-standard Squares of Opposition (an Octagon in this case), and they reveal a new relationship not found in the usual Square. Medieval logicians termed ‘disparatae’ pairs of sentences like ‘every S is some P’ and ‘some S is every P’, which are neither subaltern nor contrary, neither contradictory nor subcontrary. Walter Redmond has designed a special language L to express the logical form of these sentences in a precise way. I will use this language to show how Squares of Opposition, standard and non-standard, form a complex network of relations which bring to light the subtleties contained in this traditional doctrine.     

Actions That We Ought,But Can't

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. ¹ Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something. It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis.