From vision to action: experiments and models of steering control during driving

Experienced drivers performed simple steering maneuvers in the absence of continuous visual input. Experiments conducted in a driving simulator assessed drivers' performance of lane corrections during brief visual occlusion and examined the visual cues that guide steering. The dependence of steering behavior on heading, speed, and lateral position at the start of the maneuver was measured. Drivers adjusted steering amplitude with heading and performed the maneuver more rapidly at higher speeds. These dependencies were unaffected by a 1.5-s visual occlusion at the start of the maneuver. Longer occlusions resulted in severe performance degradation. Two steering control models were developed to account for these findings. In the 1st, steering actions were coupled to perceptual variables such as lateral position and heading. In the 2nd, drivers pursued a virtual target in the scene. Both models yielded behavior that closely matches that of human drivers.     

Speech abnormalities in seizures: a comparison of absence and partial complex seizures

In order to determine whether speech changes are useful in differentiating seizure types, a study was done in which speech abnormalities during two distinct seizure types, partial complex and absence seizures, were compared. Speech changes noted during prolonged electroencephalographic and video monitoring were compared in 16 patients with 47 partial complex seizures and 19 patients with 95 absence seizures. Speech changes were common during both seizure types. Although some significant differences in speech patterns were noted in the two seizure types, the degree of overlap was such to preclude using speech changes alone as the sole clinical criteria in differentiating the seizures.     

Close to me: multisensory space representations for action and pre-reflexive consciousness of oneself-in-the-world

Philosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space (i.e. closely surrounding the body-parts) is structured in a body-centred manner and represented through integrated sensory inputs. Multisensory representations may deserve the function of coding peripersonal space for avoiding or interacting with objects. Neuropsychological evidence is reviewed for dynamic interactions between space representations and action execution, as revealed by the behavioural effects that the use of a tool, as a physical extension of the reachable space, produces on visual-tactile extinction. In particular, tool-use transiently modifies action space representation in a functionally effective way. The possibility is discussed that the investigation of multisensory space representations for action provides an empirical way to consider in its specificity pre-reflexive self-consciousness by considering the intertwining of self-relatedness and object-directness of spatial experience shaped by multisensory and sensorimotor integrations.     

The multisensory basis of the self: From body to identity to others

By grounding the self in the body, experimental psychology has taken the body as the starting point for a science of the self. One fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the sense of body ownership that refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, the feeling that “my body” belongs to me. The primary aim of this review article is to highlight recent advances in the study of body ownership and our understanding of the underlying neurocognitive processes in three ways. I first consider how the sense of body ownership has been investigated and elucidated in the context of multisensory integration. Beyond exteroception, recent studies have considered how this exteroceptively driven sense of body ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the unobservable, yet felt, interoceptive body, suggesting that these two sides of embodiment interact to provide a unifying bodily self. Lastly, the multisensorial understanding of the self has been shown to have implications for our understanding of social relationships, especially in the context of self–other boundaries. Taken together, these three research strands motivate a unified model of the self inspired by current predictive coding models.     

The interaction of attention and action: From seeing action to acting on perception

We discuss evidence indicating that human visual attention is strongly modulated by the potential of objects for action. The possibility of action between multiple objects enables the objects to be attended as a single group, and the fit between individual objects in a group and the action that can be performed influences responses to group members. In addition, having a goal state to perform a particular action affects the stimuli that are selected along with the features and area of space that is attended. These effects of action may reflect statistical learning between environmental cues that are linked by action and/or the coupling between perception and action systems in the brain. The data support the argument that visual selection is a flexible process that emerges as a need to prioritize objects for action.     

Perception and action: On the praxial structure of intentional consciousness

Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates.     

From intention to action: The role of presence

Recent research in neuroscience has tried to understand human action from two different but converging perspectives: the cognitive and the volitional. On one side, cognitive studies analyze how action is planned and controlled in response to environmental conditions. On the other side, volitional studies analyze how action is planned and controlled by a subject's needs, motives and goals. In this paper we suggest that the notion of presence may be the missing link between these two approaches, explaining how can we differentiate between perception, action and concepts.In particular, a consideration of presence can explain how can we distinguish between a perceived action, a planned or an executed one. We argue that the evolutionary role of presence is the control of agency through the unconscious separation of “internal” and “external” and the enaction/reenaction of intentions.The model makes sense in terms of evolutionary psychology and is beginning to be supported by evidence of the neural and other physical correlates of action, imitation and self-monitoring. Another strength of this model is that it provides testable predictions about how to improve the experience of presence in media: maximal presence in a mediated experience arises from an optimal combination of form and content, able to support the intentions of the user.     

From handicap to handy capable: training systemic therapists in use of self

This article describes and discusses the rationale for an experiential methodology to help trainees expand their repertoire of behaviors in clinical situations. The goal in addressing the trainee's personal, "handicapping" responses is to pay attention to "how" a therapist is perceived, "why" a therapist has certain blindspots, and "what" the therapist does to co-create a therapeutic impasse. In addition, experientially considering the impact of self encourages therapists to "learn to learn" that they are an active, resourceful participant in the evolutionary process of the therapeutic system.     

The availability versus the use of partial information: Multiple levels of selective processing between perception and action

Temporal overlap of cognitive processes occurs when partial information about a stimulus activates associated responses before the stimulus has been fully identified. Recent evidence obtained with psychophysiological measures suggests that such overlap sometimes does, and sometimes does not occur. In this contribution, we argue that in order to understand why, we have to distinguish between selection of partial information for perception and selection of partial information for control over activation of responses. We discuss several mechanisms and factors that may modulate the temporal overlap of mental processes because they selectively influence the perceptual availability or the use of partial information.     

The development of a Cognitive Activation Theory of Stress: From limbic structures to behavioral medicine

This paper attempts to argue for a consistent trend in a research spanning more than fifty years, starting in the exciting neuroscience environment in the Anatomical Institute at the University of Oslo, and presently to be found as an active behavioral medicine unit in Bergen. The most comprehensive theoretical result is a systematic and formalized theory of stress, referred to as the Cognitive Activation Theory of Stress, CATS for short ( Ursin & Eriksen, 2004 ). There are many roots, many related issues, and many scientists involved. There is no way to produce a complete story. However, one aspect is beyond discussion, the story started in the Neurophysiology laboratory in Oslo.     

From action to discourse: The bridging function of gestures

Gestures are pervasive in human communication across cultures; they clearly constitute an embodied aspect of cognition. In this study, evidence is provided for the contention that gestures are not only a co-expression of meaning in a different modality but also constitute an important stepping stone in the evolution of discourse. Data are provided from a Grade 10 physics course where students learned about electrostatics by doing investigations for which they constructed explanations. The data show that iconic gestures (i.e. symbolic hand movements) arise from the manipulation of objects (ergotic hand movements) and sensing activity (epistemic hand movements). Gestures not only precede but also support the emergence of scientific language. School science classes turn out to be ideal laboratories for studying the evolution of domain ontologies and (scientific) language. Micro-analytic studies of gesture–speech relationships and their emergence can therefore serve as positive constraints and test beds for synthetic models of language emergence.     

The development of bodily self‐consciousness: changing responses to the Full Body Illusion in childhood

The present work investigates the development of bodily self‐consciousness and its relation to multisensory bodily information, by measuring for the first time the development of responses to the full body illusion in childhood. We tested three age groups of children: 6‐ to 7‐year‐olds (n = 28); 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds (n = 21); 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds (n = 19), and a group of adults (n = 31). Each participant wore a head‐mounted display (HMD) which displayed a view from a video camera positioned 2 metres behind their own back. Thus, they could view a virtual body from behind. We manipulated visuo‐tactile synchrony by showing the participants a view of their virtual back being stroked with a stick at the same time and same place as their real back (synchronous condition), or at different times and places (asynchronous condition). After each period of stroking, we measured three aspects of bodily self‐consciousness: drift in perceived self‐location, self‐identification with the virtual body, and touch referral to the virtual body. Results show that self‐identification with the virtual body was significantly stronger in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition even in the youngest group tested; however, the size of this effect increased with age. Touch referral to the virtual body was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for 10‐ to 11‐year‐olds and adults. Drift in perceived self‐location was greater in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition only for adults. Thus, the youngest age tested can self‐identify with a virtual body, but the links between multisensory signals and bodily self‐consciousness develop significantly across childhood. This suggests a long period of development of the bodily self and exciting potential for the use of virtual reality technologies with children.     

From religious emotions to affects: historical and theoretical reflections on injury to feeling,self and religion

ABSTRACT

Images of angry Muslims have become a common sight in repeated controversies problematising the compatibility of Islam and freedom of speech. To explain such outrage, it is often put forward that Muslims reacted to the disrespect and violation of their ‘religious feelings’. In this paper, we challenge the trope of hurt religious feelings in the explanation of unrest. Referring to the writings of Schleiermacher, James and Taylor, the discussion traces how religion and feeling have become inextricably intertwined, located within the individual self and institutionalised as a dominant interpretation of religion. We introduce affect as a conceptual alternative to such understandings, which allows us to analyse the emphasis on Muslim emotionality as a relationship between Muslim and secular bodies, hence no longer reduced to the interiority of Muslim subjects. We will illustrate the potential of an affect-based approach discussing Muslim feelings’ vital role in the construction of European democracies.     

Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self

Abstract

We review a program of research on identity orientations – the relative importance or value that individuals place on various identity attributes when constructing their self-definitions. We first provide a brief history of the development of our measure of identity orientations – the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ) – after which we present our tetrapartite model of the self that distinguishes among individual, relational, public, and collective aspects of identity. We then review previous research on how the four identity orientations uniquely influence cognition, emotion, and behavior, and close by highlighting what we see as interesting and important directions for future research.     

Emergence of self and other in perception and action: an event-control approach

The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order.     

Predictors of volitional personality change in younger and older adults: Response surface analyses signify the complementary perspectives of the self and knowledgeable others

Goals to change personality traits have been linked to self-rated Big Five traits. Extending previous research, we investigated the associations between change goals and diverse personality characteristics (e.g., self-esteem), other-rated Big Five traits, and self-other agreement in an age-heterogeneous sample (N = 378). Results replicated previous associations of change goals with age and self-rated traits. Additionally, change goals were stronger when others rated a person’s traits as low and when self-other agreement about traits was greater for extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Associations of additional personality characteristics with change goals diminished when we controlled for the Big Five traits. We conclude that goals to change personality traits primarily reflect the perspective of the self and, for some traits, of knowledgeable others.     

From instinct to identity: Implications of changing psychoanalytic concepts of social life from Freud to Erikson

Applied to the interpretation of social phenomena, Freud's insights have been at once extraordinarily fruitful yet susceptible to oversimplification and pejorative stereotyping. A number of his fundamental concepts–the existence of an irrational mass mind, the Oedipal family constellation, the pathology of psychic regression–have, when used to understand collective experience, created powerful myths. Only gradually did he and his successors modify and amplify these myths, resulting in the elaboration of ego psychology and the concept of identity. These concepts connected psychoanalysis with contemporary social, political, and historical thought and allowed more nuanced forms of explanations.     

From archaic narcissism to empathy for the self: the evolution of new capacities in psychoanalysis

The concept of the selfobject was central to Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self. With an eye to studying the development of narcissism and its implications for the growth of new psychic structure, this concept is reviewed and reassessed. Post-Kohutian complexities regarding its definition and use extend our consideration of the development of narcissism beyond archaic configurations toward further evolution of the self and the nature of mature narcissism. The hypothesis is offered that developing narcissism and the growth of self-regulation impact the acquisition of new structure and new capacities through the emergence of newly potentiated aspects of the self. The implications of these emergent qualities of the self are examined in the context of our understanding of self-esteem regulation, the state of the self, and the goals of psychoanalysis. A clinical example illustrates how technique and process in an analysis may be organized around the development of such new capacities.     

Enacting the self: Buddhist and Enactivist approaches to the emergence of the self

In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self (anātman) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore, human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast, that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account of the self. I argue for a non-reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what the Buddhists call ‘I’-making (ahaṃkāra). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience: autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self-reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and empty, but nevertheless real.     

Relationship of IQ to suicide and homicide rate: an international perspective

IQs were correlated with the z score of suicide rate minus z score of homicide rate using nine regions of the world--established market economies, formerly socialized Europe, India, China, other Asian nations, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East Crescent, and the USA. Correlations were .85 and .83 with crude rates and age-adjusted rates, respectively. The homicide findings are consistent with previous research in individual countries showing that less intelligent persons commit homicide more often. However, the present findings of a positive correlation between IQ and suicide rates are the opposite of what has been found in the more definitive studies within countries. Explanations for the apparent paradox and for the findings more generally were offered.