Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reducing cognitive biases in probabilistic reasoning by the use of logarithm formats

Research on probability judgment has traditionally emphasized that people are susceptible to biases because they rely on “variable substitution”: the assessment of normative variables is replaced by assessment of heuristic, subjective variables. A recent proposal is that many of these biases may rather derive from constraints on cognitive integration, where the capacity-limited and sequential nature of controlled judgment promotes linear additive integration, in contrast to many integration rules of probability theory (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009). A key implication by this theory is that it should be possible to improve peoples’ probabilistic reasoning by changing probability problems into logarithm formats that require additive rather than multiplicative integration. Three experiments demonstrate that recasting tasks in a way that allows people to arrive at the answers by additive integration decreases cognitive biases, and while people can rapidly learn to produce the correct answers in an additive formats, they have great difficulty doing so with a multiplicative format.     

Word for word: Multiple lexical access in speech production

We report an experiment in which we test the possible influence of the tense of the verb and explicit negatives with indicative conditionals. We tested the effects of systematically negating the constituents of four fundamental inferences based on conditionals in three different tenses (present tense, past tense, future tense): Modus Ponens (i.e., inferences of the form: if p then q; p; therefore q), Modus Tollens (if p then q; not-q; therefore not-p), Affirmation of the Consequent (if p then q; q; therefore p), and Denial of the Antecedent (if p then q; not-p; therefore not-q). The latter two inferences are invalid for true conditionals, but are valid for bi-conditionals (if, and only if, p then q). The participants drew their own conclusions from premises about letters and numbers on cards. We discuss the results in relation to an affirmation premise bias, a negative conclusion bias, and a double negation effect. We outline the importance of our findings for theories about conditional and counterfactual thinking.     

The influence of hierarchy on probability judgment

Consider the task of predicting which soccer team will win the next World Cup. The bookmakers may judge Brazil to be the team most likely to win, but also judge it most likely that a European rather than a Latin American team will win. This is an example of a non-aligned hierarchy structure: the most probable event at the subordinate level (Brazil wins) appears to be inconsistent with the most probable event at the superordinate level (a European team wins). In this paper we exploit such structures to investigate how people make predictions based on uncertain hierarchical knowledge. We distinguish between aligned and non-aligned environments, and conjecture that people assume alignment. Participants were exposed to a non-aligned training set in which the most probable superordinate category predicted one outcome, whereas the most probable subordinate category predicted a different outcome. In the test phase participants allowed their initial probability judgments about category membership to shift their final ratings of the probability of the outcome, even though all judgments were made on the basis of the same statistical data. In effect people were primed to focus on the most likely path in an inference tree, and neglect alternative paths. These results highlight the importance of the level at which statistical data are represented, and suggest that when faced with hierarchical inference problems people adopt a simplifying heuristic that assumes alignment.     

Probability judgment in hierarchical learning: a conflict between predictiveness and coherence

Why are people's judgments incoherent under probability formats? Research in an associative learning paradigm suggests that after structured learning participants give judgments based on predictiveness rather than normative probability. This is because people's learning mechanisms attune to statistical contingencies in the environment, and they use these learned associations as a basis for subsequent probability judgments. We introduced a hierarchical structure into a simulated medical diagnosis task, setting up a conflict between predictiveness and coherence. Thus, a target symptom was more predictive of a subordinate disease than of its superordinate category, even though the latter included the former. Under a probability format participants tended to violate coherence and make ratings in line with predictiveness; under a frequency format they were more normative. These results are difficult to explain within a unitary model of inference, whether associative or frequency-based. In the light of this, and other findings in the judgment and learning literature, a dual-component model is proposed.     

词汇共现频率视角下语义联想效应及其神经机制

词汇识别与记忆受到词汇之间语义联想关系的影响。鉴于自由联想方法建立词汇语义联想关系的局限性, 研究者们提出用共现联想法建立词汇之间的语义联想关系。本文对词汇共现频率视角下的语义联想效应及其神经机制的研究进行分析发现, 语义联想的丰富程度和关联程度影响词汇的加工; 与少语义联想词相比, 多语义联想词导致P200波幅增大和N400波幅减小; 语义联想加工涉及的脑区主要是额上回和左内侧颞叶区域。未来研究需要探讨自由联想法和共现联想法建立语义联想关系的差异, 基于共现联想法进一步地探究语义联想的行为规律和神经机制, 并从共现联想的角度开展汉语语义联想效应及神经机制的研究。     

Dimensional schizotypy,autism, and unusual word associations in artists and scientists

Studies from a range of perspectives provide evidence for a relationship between creativity and the tendency to mental illness. The present study further examined this issue by administering questionnaires measuring the minor features of psychosis and autism to 31 professional “artists” (visual artists and musicians) and 28 professional “scientists” (biological scientists and physical scientists/mathematicians). The Oxford–Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O–LIFE), the Hypomanic Personality Scale, and the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), were administered, in addition to a shortened form of the Kent–Rosanoff Word Association Scale. The results provided strong support for the connection of artistic creativity to positive schizotypy and hypomania and the tendency to make unusual word associations, and somewhat weaker support for the connection of scientific creativity to certain components of the autism spectrum.     

Extrapolating human judgments from skip-gram vector representations of word meaning

There is a growing body of research in psychology that attempts to extrapolate human lexical judgments from computational models of semantics. This research can be used to help develop comprehensive norm sets for experimental research, it has applications to large-scale statistical modelling of lexical access and has broad value within natural language processing and sentiment analysis. However, the value of extrapolated human judgments has recently been questioned within psychological research. Of primary concern is the fact that extrapolated judgments may not share the same pattern of statistical relationship with lexical and semantic variables as do actual human judgments; often the error component in extrapolated judgments is not psychologically inert, making such judgments problematic to use for psychological research. We present a new methodology for extrapolating human judgments that partially addresses prior concerns of validity. We use this methodology to extrapolate human judgments of valence, arousal, dominance, and concreteness for 78,286 words. We also provide resources for users to extrapolate these human judgments for three million English words and short phrases. Applications for large sets of extrapolated human judgments are demonstrated and discussed.     

A case study of expert judgment: Economists' probabilities versus base-rate model forecasts

In this case study of economists' forecasts concerning economic downturn, we examine key issues concerning the psychology of prediction and the controversy surrounding the value of expertise in forecasting. We examine when experts' knowledge promotes forecast accuracy and whether biases found in psychological studies (including underutilization of relevant base rates and tendencies to extreme prediction) occur in these economic forecasts. Experts' forecasts were compared to forecasts derived from base-rate models that relied on the historical frequencies of economic downturns. The performance patterns of the experts and models crossed over the forecast horizon. Experts outperformed models in shorter-term forecasting, whereas models outperformed experts in longer-term forecasting. These results highlight the abilities and limits of experts and models in prediction and the sources of their inaccuracy.     

Excessive confidence in visually-based estimates

People exhibit excessive confidence in visually-based estimates, which in turn biases decision making. Three experiments support this assertion. Experiment 1 shows a strong impact of presentation format on estimation of proportions. Experiment 2 shows that people rely on these erroneous estimates to make incentive-compatible decisions even when objective information can be easily obtained. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the biased decisions disappear when confidence in visually-based estimates is called into question by the perceived complexity of the stimulus.     

Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.     

Effects of verbal information on fear-related reasoning biases in children

The present study made an attempt to induce fear-related reasoning biases by providing children with negative information about a novel stimulus. For this purpose, non-clinical children aged 9-12 years (N = 318) were shown a picture of an unknown animal for which they received either negative, ambiguous, positive, or no information. Then children completed a series of tests for measuring various types of reasoning biases (i.e., confirmation bias and covariation bias) in relation to this animal. Results indicated that children in the negative and, to a lesser extent, the ambiguous information groups displayed higher scores on tests of fear-related reasoning biases than children in the positive and no information groups. Altogether, these results support the idea that learning via negatively tinted information plays a role in the development of fear-related cognitive distortions in youths.     

Tone of voice guides word learning in informative referential contexts

Listeners infer which object in a visual scene a speaker refers to from the systematic variation of the speaker's tone of voice (ToV). We examined whether ToV also guides word learning. During exposure, participants heard novel adjectives (e.g., “daxen”) spoken with a ToV representing hot, cold, strong, weak, big, or small while viewing picture pairs representing the meaning of the adjective and its antonym (e.g., elephant–ant for big–small). Eye fixations were recorded to monitor referent detection and learning. During test, participants heard the adjectives spoken with a neutral ToV, while selecting referents from familiar and unfamiliar picture pairs. Participants were able to learn the adjectives' meanings, and, even in the absence of informative ToV, generalize them to new referents. A second experiment addressed whether ToV provides sufficient information to infer the adjectival meaning or needs to operate within a referential context providing information about the relevant semantic dimension. Participants who saw printed versions of the novel words during exposure performed at chance during test. ToV, in conjunction with the referential context, thus serves as a cue to word meaning. ToV establishes relations between labels and referents for listeners to exploit in word learning.     

The developing role of prosody in novel word interpretation

This study examined whether children use prosodic correlates to word meaning when interpreting novel words. For example, do children infer that a word spoken in a deep, slow, loud voice refers to something larger than a word spoken in a high, fast, quiet voice? Participants were 4- and 5-year-olds who viewed picture pairs that varied along a single dimension (e.g., big vs. small flower) and heard a recorded voice asking them, for example, “Can you get the blicket one?” spoken with either meaningful or neutral prosody. The 4-year-olds failed to map prosodic cues to their corresponding meaning, whereas the 5-year-olds succeeded (Experiment 1). However, 4-year-olds successfully mapped prosodic cues to word meaning following a training phase that reinforced children’s attention to prosodic information (Experiment 2). These studies constitute the first empirical demonstration that young children are able to use prosody-to-meaning correlates as a cue to novel word interpretation.     

Inconsistency and uncertainty in multi-attribute judgment of human performance

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty and inconsistency on the judgment of human performance. The results indicate that the effect of inconsistency on judgment is not mediated by subjective uncertainty. We find that both the level and the extremity of judgment decrease with uncertainty. These effects are explained, respectively, by uncertainty aversion and by regressiveness. We also find that both the level and the extremity of judgment of human performance increase with inconsistency. These effects are explained by reliance on integration rules in which judgment is based primarily on some aspects of the information, while other aspects are, to some extent, ignored.     

A Principled Approach to Feature Selection in Models of Sentence Processing

Among theories of human language comprehension, cue-based memory retrieval has proven to be a useful framework for understanding when and how processing difficulty arises in the resolution of long-distance dependencies. Most previous work in this area has assumed that very general retrieval cues like [+subject] or [+singular] do the work of identifying (and sometimes misidentifying) a retrieval target in order to establish a dependency between words. However, recent work suggests that general, handpicked retrieval cues like these may not be enough to explain illusions of plausibility (Cunnings & Sturt, 2018), which can arise in sentences like The letter next to the porcelain plate shattered. Capturing such retrieval interference effects requires lexically specific features and retrieval cues, but handpicking the features is hard to do in a principled way and greatly increases modeler degrees of freedom. To remedy this, we use well-established word embedding methods for creating distributed lexical feature representations that encode information relevant for retrieval using distributed retrieval cue vectors. We show that the similarity between the feature and cue vectors (a measure of plausibility) predicts total reading times in Cunnings and Sturt’s eye-tracking data. The features can easily be plugged into existing parsing models (including cue-based retrieval and self-organized parsing), putting very different models on more equal footing and facilitating future quantitative comparisons.     

Differences between probability and frequency judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity

Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

Effects of circular motion on judgment of rotation direction and depth order in visual motion

Abstract:  The rotation direction and depth order of a rotating sphere consisting of random dots often reverses while it is viewed under orthographic projection. However, if a short viewing distance is simulated under perspective projection, the correct rotation direction can be perceived. There are two motion cues for the rotation direction and depth order. One is the speed cue; points with higher velocities are closer to the observer. The other is the vertical motion cue; vertical motion is induced when the dots recede from or approach the observer. It was examined whether circular motion, which does not have any depth information but induces vertical velocities, masks the vertical motion cue. In Experiment 1, the effects of circular motion on the judgment of the rotation direction of a rotating sphere were examined. The magnitude of the two cues (the speed cue and the vertical velocity cue) as well as the angular speed of circular motion was varied. It was found that the performance improved as the vertical velocity increased and that the speed cue had slight effects on the judgment of the rotation direction. It was also found that the performance worsened as the angular speed of the circular motion was increased. In Experiment 2, the effects of circular motion on depth judgment of a rotating half sphere were investigated. The performance worsened as the angular speed of the circular motion increased, as in Experiment 1. These results suggest that the visual system cannot compensate perfectly for circular motion for the judgment of the rotation direction and depth order.     

人格判断的线索及其有效性

透镜模型强调线索的有效性是人格判断准确的重要条件。已有研究表明, 文字信息, 语音内容, 面孔图片, 反映不同情境的视频片段以及面对面交流涉及的言语、非言语信息在人格判断过程中发挥着重要作用。另一方面, 网络背景下常规的文字、视频信息等同样能够有效反映个体的人格特质, 而与人格特质密切相关的网络语言、表情的使用, 状态更新与点赞等特殊线索的有效性也值得深入探究。未来对人格判断线索的研究应加强现实生活情境以提高研究的生态效度, 考虑不同线索间的相互比较以考察线索有效性的适用条件, 深入探究网络情境中个体行为线索的有效性。