OFFICIAL APOLOGIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Abstract: This article examines the uses of official apologies for massive human rights abuses in the context of democratic transitions. It sketches a normative model of apologies, highlighting how they serve to provide some moral and practical redress for past wrongs. It discusses a number of contributions apologies can make, including publicly confirming the status of victims as moral agents, fostering public reexamination and deliberation about social norms, and promoting critical understandings of history that undermine apologist historical accounts. The article then presents certain normative criteria that any official apology must satisfy, and concludes with a discussion of several theoretical and practical challenges that apologies face in transitional contexts. It draws on Chilean President Patricio Aylwin's apology for his predecessor's crimes as an illustration of some of the promises and challenges that apologies face.     

Government Apologies for Historical Injustices

Scholars from various disciplines suggest that government apologies for historical injustices fulfill important psychological goals. After reviewing psychological literature that contributes to this discussion, we present a list of elements that political apologies should contain to be acceptable to both members of the victimized minority and the nonvictimized majority. Content coding of a list of government apologies revealed that many, but not all, include most of these elements. We then reviewed research demonstrating that political apologies that contain most of these facets are favorably evaluated, but especially by members of the nonvictimized majority. Next, we examined how the demands of victimized minorities affect their satisfaction with government apologies that lack some components. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis for when and how governments should apologize.     

Remembering as Necessary for Forgiving

As Japan marks the 75th anniversary of World War II in 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not offer a fresh apology and maintained that future generations should not have to keep apologizing for past mistakes. This paper uses the unresolved war issue of the military comfort women system as a context to discuss what it means for political apologies to be more than mere political gestures founded on political interests and discusses what it takes to facilitate forgiveness. It will examine the features of a repentant wrongdoer who deserves forgiveness based on how one relates to one’s past wrongdoing in order to distinguish political apologies that are genuine from those that are mere gestures aimed at hasty reconciliation. This will be discussed through the works of Jacques Derrida and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Next, through Jankélévitch’s and Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of forgiveness, it will be discussed how matters of justice and forgiveness should be understood as well as how the history of past wrongs and injustice is necessary for a genuine apology and makes forgiveness possible. It is also a moral responsibility for both perpetrators and victims to remember history in order to achieve personal forgiveness as well as begin social and political reconciliation.

     

Romance and Responsibility in Woody Allen’s “Manhattan”

Reflection on the wrongs done by characters in Woody Allen’s romantic comedy “Manhattan” helps us get clear about the evidence required to judge them responsible and so liable to blame them for those wrongs. On the positive side, what is required is evidence that trust remains a possibility, despite the fact that they wrong, and this in turn requires evidence that the wrongdoer had, but failed to exercise, the capacity to do the right thing when they did that wrong. On the negative side, what is not required is evidence of some explanation of that failure. This counts against a well-known suggestion of Gary Watson’s in “Skepticism about Weakness of Will.”     

Interpreting Political Apologies: The Neglected Role of Performance

In recent years, state leaders have increasingly apologized for historical wrongdoing. This article argues that there are scant conceptual tools available in current apology theory to capture the meanings of such political apologies. Salient theories treat apologies predominantly as “speech acts,” and this perspective produces frameworks of analysis that are preoccupied with linguistic features (e.g., the phrasing of the utterance of the apologizer). This article points to the limitations of this approach by arguing that dramaturgical aspects of performance are equally important. Political apologies are frequently offered during public ceremonies. Reactions in their aftermath indicate that the setup of those ceremonies matter to the victims, who, as primary addressees, assign meanings to the act. Current apology theory, however, gives little consideration to this observation. “What is said” matters most; “where and how it is said” is being neglected. The article concludes with a proposal for future research, which includes the reimagining of political apology as “performance” –a concept that gives credence to both formal speech and dramaturgy.     

Say the right thing: Apologies,reputability, and punishment

This research investigates how and when apologies work. Findings from three studies suggest that apologies influence punishment decisions, but not by reducing concerns about recidivism or perceptions of bad intentions. The extent to which future expectancies or perceived intent mediates the effects of apologies on punishment depends on the offender's reputability. However, the perceived appropriateness of the response fully mediates the effect of apologies on punishment, regardless of the offender's reputability. Overall, the findings suggest that saying the right thing helps those who do the wrong thing, but not by influencing others' beliefs about their past intentions or future behaviors.     

Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies

Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary wrongdoing. In contrast, both Steiner's and Garrard's accounts of evil do point to qualitative distinctions between kinds of action, but it is implausible that either account correctly characterizes evil. The most plausible accounts maintain that evil actions have a necessary connection to extreme harms, and this suggests that evil is not qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.     

Apologizing for Who I Am

Philosophical discussions of apologies have focused on apologizing for wrong actions. Such a focus overlooks an important dimension of moral failures, namely, failures of character. However, when one attempts to revise the standard account of apology to make room for failures of character, two objections emerge. The first is rooted in the psychology of shame. The second stems from the purported social function of apologies. This paper responds to these objections and, in so doing, sheds further light both on why we apologize (when we are in the wrong) and on why we accept apologies (when others are).     

On the Outcomes of Intergroup Apologies: A Review

Governments and political groups around the world are increasingly offering apologies to atone for past injustices. In recent years social psychologists have begun to empirically explore whether these apologies improve intergroup relations. We organize this literature into a framework outlining potential outcomes of intergroup apologies, mediators of those outcomes, and circumstances that allow those outcomes to be realized. Psychologists have focused most of their efforts around the questions of whether and when intergroup apologies elicit forgiveness and foster positive intergroup attitudes. Thus, in addition to outlining the present state of knowledge on intergroup apologies, this framework highlights areas that require further research; most notably, the model makes evident that we know little about what psychological states mediate intergroup apology effects.     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.     

A Plea against Apologies

What, if anything, gives us the right to ask the victim of our wrongdoing for forgiveness? After some conceptual clarifications, I attempt to lay open a paradoxical structure in apologies. Apologies are made in a spirit of humility: if the offender recognizes his guilt, he will see the victim?s negative emotions towards him as proper and justified. Nevertheless, by begging for forgiveness, he tries to change the victim?s negative feelings towards him. Thus, by apologizing, the offender tries to bring about a state of affairs which, if genuinely repentant and remorseful, he has no reason to want to bring about. In what follows, I examine various attempts to dissolve this paradox. These include offering reasons for apologies that are independent of our wish to alter the victim?s feeling of resentment and construing apologies as expressive or as mixed speech acts. All of these attempts, or so I argue, fail. Some of them fail to provide justificatory reasons for asking for forgiveness, others fall short of explaining why apologies can be accepted or rejected, still others cannot give a convincing account of the relation between remorse and asking for forgiveness or fail to distinguish between redressing a harm and redressing a moral wrong. The upshot of the argument is that an offender who recognizes his own guilt has no rational reason for asking for forgiveness. In many cases, not offering one?s apologies is a sign of taking guilt seriously.     

Vicarious Apologies as Moral Repair

Apologies are key components of moral repair. They can identify a wrong, express regret, and accept culpability for some transgression. Apologies can vindicate a victim's value as someone who was due different treatment. This paper explores whether acts with vicarious elements may serve as apologies. I offer a functionalist account of apologies: acts are apologies not so much by having correct ingredients but by serving certain apologetic functions. Those functions can be realized in multiple ways. Whether the offenders are individuals or collectives, they can sometimes fulfill such functions through third party agents. Having vicarious elements does not necessarily undermine the reparative reasons offenders hope to provide. 1     

Collective Apologies and Their Effects on Forgiveness: Pessimistic Evidence but Constructive Implications

In the last three decades, there has been an explosion in the frequency with which leaders of groups have issued official apologies for collective transgressions. These apologies are commonly assumed to lay a pathway to forgiveness and reconciliation, but empirical examination of the downstream consequences of collective apologies is still in its infancy. In this article, we review a series of studies—including interview studies, survey studies, and experiments—that question the assumed wisdom that collective apologies lead to intergroup forgiveness. Reasons for the muted evidence of an apology–forgiveness link at the intergroup level are elaborated, and implications for how best to issue gestures of reconciliation and remorse are discussed.     

When apologies work: How matching apology components to victims’ self-construals facilitates forgiveness

Apologies are useful social tools that can act as catalysts in the resolution of conflict and inspire forgiveness. Yet as numerous real-world blunders attest, apologies are not always effective. Whereas many lead to forgiveness and reconciliation, others simply fall on deaf ears. Despite the fact that apologies differ in their effectiveness, most research has focused on apologies as dichotomous phenomena wherein a victim either (a) receives an apology or (b) does not. Psychological research has yet to elucidate which components of apologies are most effective, and for whom. The present research begins to address this gap by testing the theory that perpetrators’ apologies are most likely to inspire victim forgiveness when their components align with victims’ self-construals. Regression and hierarchical linear modeling analyses from two studies support the primary hypotheses. As predicted, victims reacted most positively to apologies that were congruent with their self-construals.     

Mathematics of forgiveness

This study was aimed at determining the integration rule--summation or averaging--underlying the forgiveness schema. The main reason for distinguishing between these structures is that they have very different practical implications regarding the influence of various factors specific to each case on the propensity to forgive. In a summative model, the impact of the different factors and the direction of the effects are constant. For example, the presence of apologies always is a positive element even when these apologies assume a very weak form. By contrast, in an averaging model, the apologies can be a positive or a negative element depending on the current level of propensity to forgive and the form of the apologies. Two experiments were conducted using the functional theory of cognition framework. Experiment 1 applied the missing information test. Experiment 2 applied the credibility of information test. In both experiments, clear evidence favored a summative rule for judging willingness to forgive from circumstantial information such as presence or absence of intent, presence of absence of apologies, and degree of cancellation of consequences.     

Trust maintenance as a function of construal level and attributions: The case of apologies

When do recipients of an apology (“trustors”) base their decision to trust a perpetrator (a “trustee”) on the attributional information embedded in an apology? Attributions provide a detailed account of the trustee's causal involvement in committing a transgression. We therefore argue that trustors in a low construal level mindset use this information in their trusting decision. However, trustors in a high construal level mindset likely consider all apologies as simple statements of regret, regardless of the attributional information they contain. We find support for this argument in four laboratory experiments. This research nuances the idea that to restore trust by means of an apology, the trustee must only use an effective attribution for a negative outcome. We also present a more realistic understanding of the process leading from apologies to trust than has been offered in previous work by simultaneously considering the role of the trustor and that of the trustee in the trust restoration process.     

Making a Virtue of Evil: A Five‐Step Social Identity Model of the Development of Collective Hate

In the first part of this paper, we re‐examine the historical and psychological case for ‘the banality of evil’– the idea that people commit extreme acts of inhumanity, and more particularly genocides, in a state where they lack awareness or else control over what they are doing. Instead, we provide evidence that those who commit great wrongs knowingly choose to act as they do because they believe that what they are doing is right. In the second part of the paper, we then outline an integrative five‐step social identity model that details the processes through which inhumane acts against other groups can come to be celebrated as right. The five steps are: (i) Identification, the construction of an ingroup; (ii) Exclusion, the definition of targets as external to the ingroup; (iii) Threat, the representation of these targets as endangering ingroup identity; (iv) Virtue, the championing of the ingroup as (uniquely) good; and (v) Celebration, embracing the eradication of the outgroup as necessary to the defence of virtue.     

如何道歉更有效:调节聚焦与信息框架的作用

本研究结合调节聚焦理论探讨了如何道歉更有效。两个实验通过启动不同调节聚焦,创设冒犯情境并呈现不同框架的道歉信息,考察调节聚焦与道歉框架对道歉效果的影响。结果表明,向促进聚焦的受害者呈现积极框架的道歉信息、向防御聚焦的受害者呈现消极框架的道歉信息能改善受害者对冒犯者的评价,降低交往回避倾向,获得较好的道歉效果,且正确感是此种影响发生的内在机制。     

“I Am Sorry to Send You SPAM”

A series of studies investigating cultural differences in apology usage in unsolicited email advertising messages (i.e., SPAM) are reported. Study 1 documented that in comparison to American SPAM, a greater percentage of Korean SPAM included apologies. The next five studies (Ns= 516, 3132, 662, 524, 536) tested various explanations for cross‐cultural differences in uses of, and responses to, apologies. Findings indicated that advertising messages containing apologies were not necessarily more effective than advertising messages without apologies. Koreans, however, considered advertising messages with apologies as more credible and normal and exhibited a greater tendency to model other people's apology use than did Americans. Thus, the frequent presence of apologies in Korean unsolicited email advertising is likely to be based on Koreans' modeling behavior (i.e., a greater tendency to follow social norms).     

Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of apologies and excuses following rule violations

The accounts given by those who have violated a rule are likely to have important self‐presentational consequences, potentially reducing the negative impact of the breach on social evaluations of transgressors. However, little is known about young children's self‐presentational reasoning about such accounts. In the present study, a sample of 120 4‐ to 9‐year‐olds responded to rule violation stories where the transgressor uses either an apology, an excuse, or no account. Results showed that whereas children rated both account types similarly in terms of their impact on punishment consequences, even the youngest saw apologies as leading to significantly more positive social evaluation than excuses. Correspondingly, children were more likely to identify prosocial motives for apologies than for excuses, and more likely to identify self‐protective motives for excuses than for apologies. Explicit references to self‐presentational motives when explaining the accounts increased significantly with age, and were more likely following social‐conventional rather than moral rule violations.