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Carl Ginet 《The Journal of Ethics》2016,20(1-3):219-228
If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while doing A, intended of that action that it contribute to satisfying their desire D, a condition that does not entail any causal connection between the explaining desire and the explained action. This claim has received trenchant criticism from Randolph Clarke. The main part of the present paper responds to Clarke’s latest objections. The rest of the paper addresses another worry about my account (not raised by Clarke): does my non-causal sufficient condition hold as widely as it needs to if responsible, uncaused actions are as widespread as we would like to think? 相似文献
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Stephanie Leary 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):529-542
Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. 相似文献
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We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism. 相似文献
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Lex Newman 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2023,104(3):597-621
Widespread scholarly agreement has it that Descartes' theory of judgment favors a compatibilist interpretation. This essay explains and rebuts the standard arguments made on behalf of compatibilist readings, while explaining and defending a libertarian interpretation. Along with relevant Fourth Meditation doctrines and texts, my analysis encompasses a much discussed 1645 letter discussing his account. Although some scholars view the letter as departing from the account of the Meditations, I argue that the two works present a consistent view – allowing us to take at face value that the letter purports to elaborate Descartes' intended meaning in the associated Fourth Meditation passage. 相似文献
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Debra Shogan 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》1993,8(4):129-133
In this response to Kathleen Martindale and Martha Saunders's “Realizing Love and Justice: Lesbian Ethics in the Upper and Lower Case,” which appeared in Hypatia 7(4), I argue that a worldly separatism depends upon taking attention from those in positions of dominance and redirecting it to members of nondominant groups, as apolitical, worldly act of resistance. 相似文献
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Michael Sollberger 《European Journal of Philosophy》2015,23(4):815-837
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness. 相似文献
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Rebecca Tuvel 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2017,32(2):263-278
Former NAACP chapter head Rachel Dolezal's attempted transition from the white to the black race occasioned heated controversy. Her story gained notoriety at the same time that Caitlyn Jenner 1 graced the cover of Vanity Fair, signaling a growing acceptance of transgender identity. Yet criticisms of Dolezal for misrepresenting her birth race indicate a widespread social perception that it is neither possible nor acceptable to change one's race in the way it might be to change one's sex. Considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism. Although Dolezal herself may or may not represent a genuine case of a transracial person, her story and the public reaction to it serve helpful illustrative purposes. 相似文献
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Loewy EH 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2005,26(6):445-468
This paper argues that we have wrongly and not for the patient’s benefit made a form of stark autonomy our highest value which
allows physicians to slip out from under their basic duty which has always been to pursue a particular patient’s good. In
general – I shall argue – it is the patient’s right to select his or her own goals and the physician’s duty to inform the
patient of the feasibility of that goal and of the means needed to attain it. If the goal is not one that is possible, the
patient, with the physician and family, must select a feasible goal and then discuss the costs/benefits of various approaches.
The physician should take a leading role in helping the patient select the goal. I argue that to simply present a laundry
list of means and insist that patients choose for themselves is not only abandoning patients to their autonomy but is, in
fact, a crass form of violating the patient’s autonomy. Freely choosing not to choose is a choice a patient with decisional
capacity is entitled to make and one that needs to be respected. 相似文献
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