论责任心的类型与层级

责任心的类型多种多样,并且,自个体步入前习俗水千开始,其责任心就既不再是有与无的关系,也不是一个平面关系,而是一个呈金字塔形的层级关系。就正确责任心而言,将“他律型责任心”与“自律型责任心”、“硬角色责任心”与“软角色责任心”进行排列组合,并考虑到量的差异,就生出了发展水平高低不同的多层次责任心：其中,拥有他律型硬角色责任心,是做个有责任心之人的底线。拥有第二层次的责任心有两种典型做法：一是拥有一般水平的自律型硬角色责任心;二是拥有他律型软角色责任心。个体二旦拥有一般水平的自律型软角色责任心,其责任心就达到了第三层次。拥有第四层次的责任心有两种典型做法：拥有高水平的自律型硬角色责任心,或拥有舍小我成大我且自律型软角色责任心。拥有高水平自律型软角色责任心,是做一个有责任心之人的最高境界。     

Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency

This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent's determining or controlling her action (if it's not the action's being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O'Connor's agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O'Connor's objections to it and offers objections to O'Connor's view.     

消费的自由与消费的社会责任

在社会主义市场经济条件下,消费者有自由选择的权利,但这并不意味着人们在消费过程中就可以忽视甚至否认应当承担的社会责任.这些社会责任包括:第一,对生态环境的社会责任;第二,对预防疾病,搞好公共卫生安全的责任;第三,对社会风气的道德责任.     

Moral Responsibility,Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will

In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes (such as blame, resentment, indignation, and moral approval) were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our practices of holding responsible cannot be entirely insulated from incompatibilist concerns about freedom and determinism. The second purpose is to argue that these incompatibilist concerns are in fact legitimate concerns: There are sound reasons to believe that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible do require at least sometimes in our lives that we must be capable of acting freely in a manner that is not determined. I defend this thesis by spelling out why I believe various compatibilist strategies attempting to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism fail to show this. In the course of this critique, a general theme will emerge: In order to do full justice to our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible and the freedoms thus involved, one must distinguish between different types of freedom, and in particular, between freedom of action and freedom of will.     

Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom

Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one's-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and leads to counter-intuitive results; or, if the supposition is acceptable, then it is possible to use it to construct a FSC in which there is no flicker of freedom at all. Either way, the flicker of freedom strategy is ineffective against FSCs. Since the flicker of freedom strategy is arguably the best defense of PAP, I conclude that FSCs are successful in showing that PAP is false. An agent can act with moral responsibility without having alternative possibilities available to her.     

Perpetrators' Freedom of Choice as a Determinant of Responsibility Attribution

Abstract

In the present study, a swindler had high versus low freedom of choice while deciding to commit a crime. He actually swindled Polish university students (involved observers) out of a large versus a small amount of money (high vs. low loss). Other students (noninvolved observers) were informed about the swindler's action. All students suggested the punishment that they believed the swindler deserved (the punishments chosen were used as an index of responsibility attribution). Involved students assigned more severe punishments than noninvolved students did. In the high-loss condition, involved observers were more punitive than they were in the low-loss condition. The judgments of the swindler's victims were determined by the magnitude of their loss; they ignored information about the swindler's freedom of choice. In contrast, the responsibility attributed by the noninvolved observers was influenced by the swindler's freedom of choice, but only in the low-loss condition. Noninvolved observers informed that the swindler had high freedom of choice were insensitive to information about the magnitude of the consequences for the victim.     

Two Kinds of Awareness: Foucault,the Will,and Freedom in Somatic Practice

This essay identifies two kinds of awareness of one’s body that occur in a variety of literatures: awareness as psychologically or spiritually enabling or therapeutic, and awareness as undesirable self-consciousness of the body. Drawing on Foucault’s account of normalizing judgment, it argues that these two forms of awareness are impossible to separate, if that separation is into authentic versus extrinsic somatic experience. Nonetheless, awareness is an important component of embodied freedom, but a freedom understood with Spinoza and Nietzsche as grounded in necessity rather than only in the will, and with Arendt and Foucault as a practice rather than an achievement of a sovereign subject. Somatic practices grounded in awareness and acceptance of the body’s necessities, along with attention to the I-can (rather than the I-will) cultivate a form of embodied freedom that bridges care of the self and the political.     

On Freedom And Responsibility: Remarks On Sartre, Levinas And Derrida

This article looks at some main stages of contemporary thought about freedom and responsibility and outlines an account of important stages of 20th century philosophy as well. Whereas the early Sartre particularly coined the notion of infinite freedom, his later writings, Levinas and Derrida (re-)discovered the conception of infinite responsibility. The article draws attention to the questions which arise out of these understandings of both responsibility and freedom and asks whether these issues can be answered from a purely secular point of view. The last part is devoted to the role of God in current philosophical considerations about responsibility and freedom.     

Promoting Freedom,Responsibility, and Learning in the Classroom: The Learning Covenant a Decade Later

Abstract. This essay discusses an approach to teaching religious studies in a general education or core curriculum that I have experimented with for the last decade, which I call the “Learning Covenant.” The Learning Covenant brings together various pedagogical theories, including transformational, experiential, contract, and cooperative learning, in an attempt to address diverse learning styles, multiple intelligences, and student learning assessment. It has advantages over more traditional teacher‐directed approaches to teaching, including meeting student resistance to “required” courses head‐on by inviting them to identify learning needs regardless of chosen vocation and meeting them in the context of a religious studies course, recognizing the multiple ways in which students learn and providing a variety of opportunities for students to express their learning, and allowing students opportunity to take increased responsibility for their own learning. The essay will focus on the Learning Covenant's development, components, strengths, and drawbacks.     

Freedom And Responsibility In Constructing Public Life: Toward A Revised Ethic Of Discourse

The current rationale for Freedom of Speech is entangled in Enlightenment assumptions about the relationship of discourse to public life. This article critiques those assumptions and proposes an alternative rationale for Freedom of Speech based in assumptions of contemporary rhetorical theory.     

Freedom and the Cogito

Drawing on Descartes' account of générosité, a reinterpretation of the Cogito is offered, emphasizing the role of the will. The paper's first part focuses on Cartesian ethics. It is argued that Descartes can be viewed as a Stoical thinker rather than a Baconian one. That is, he holds that theoretical contemplation is itself the primary ground of human happiness and tranquility of mind – experienced as the feeling of générosité. The paper's second part draws on the first in accounting for the relation between radical doubt and certainty. By engaging with doubt, it is argued, the meditator comes to experience générosité, assert freedom. This experience is not, then, as argued by some, merely the Cogito's ethical counterpart. It is rather the Cogito's foundation. The meditator's assertion sum follows from – insofar as freedom is, as the definition of générosité asserts, ‘the only thing truly belonging to us', it consists in – the assertion of freedom.     

Freedom from and Freedom for: Luther's Concept of Freedom for the Twenty‐First Century

This article examines Martin Luther's two fundamental claims around Christian freedom. Drawing on Luther, I suggest three primary characteristics of Christian freedom that should be recovered and championed in our twenty‐first‐century context: it is relational, it is a gift; and it contains within it an ethical imperative for the sake of the neighbor. Together, these three characteristics point to the fact that in a Christian understanding, “freedom” is never considered by itself, but only in the larger context of “freedom from” and “freedom for.”     

被自由误导的自由

本文主要分析了自由以及表现为权利自由的政治哲学问题,其中着重批评了伯林的两种自由模式,试图论证,不自由切割为两种,将导致对自由的各种误解。所谓消极自由和积极自由只是同一种自由的两面,但伯林问题可以转换为消极权利和积极权利问题,这样就可以消除混乱。     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

Nationalism and the Scope of Freedom

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The world that we live in today is now dominated by strict national identities, where this national allegiance is given paramount importance....