Automatic semantic association between emotional valence and brightness in the right hemisphere

Positive words (e.g., faith) were recognised better when presented in white fonts than in black fonts, whereas the opposite was true for negative words (e.g., enemy). A neural basis for this type of association between emotional valence and brightness was investigated using a visual half-field paradigm. Positive and negative words were presented in black or white fonts and presented to the left visual field–right hemisphere (LVF–RH) or right visual field–left hemisphere (RVF–LH) in a word valence judgement task (i.e., positive vs. negative). A cross-over interaction between emotional valence and brightness was observed; valence judgements were facilitated when a positive word appeared in white and when a negative word appeared in black. This interaction was qualified by a higher-order interaction. The cross-over interaction appeared only for LVF–RH trials, suggesting that the right hemisphere was responsible for the association between emotional valence and brightness.     

Automatic semantic association between emotional valence and brightness in the right hemisphere

Positive words (e.g., faith) were recognised better when presented in white fonts than in black fonts, whereas the opposite was true for negative words (e.g., enemy). A neural basis for this type of association between emotional valence and brightness was investigated using a visual half-field paradigm. Positive and negative words were presented in black or white fonts and presented to the left visual field-right hemisphere (LVF-RH) or right visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) in a word valence judgement task (i.e., positive vs. negative). A cross-over interaction between emotional valence and brightness was observed; valence judgements were facilitated when a positive word appeared in white and when a negative word appeared in black. This interaction was qualified by a higher-order interaction. The cross-over interaction appeared only for LVF-RH trials, suggesting that the right hemisphere was responsible for the association between emotional valence and brightness.     

Do approach-avoidance actions create attitudes?

Do approach-avoidance actions create attitudes? Prior influential studies suggested that rudimentary attitudes could be established by simply pairing novel stimuli (Chinese ideographs) with arm flexion (approach) or arm extension (avoidance). In three experiments, we found that approach-avoidance actions alone were insufficient to account for such effects. Instead, we found that these affective influences resulted from the interaction of these actions with a priori differences in stimulus valence. Thus, with negative stimuli, the effect of extension on attitude was more positive than the effect of flexion. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the affect from motivationally compatible or incompatible action can also influence task evaluations. A final experiment, using Chinese ideographs from the original studies, confirmed these findings. Both approach and avoidance actions led to more positive evaluations of the ideographs when the actions were motivationally compatible with the prior valence of the ideographs. The attitudinal impact of approach-avoidance action thus reflects its situated meaning, which depends on the valence of stimuli being approached or avoided.     

Affective flexibility: evaluative processing goals shape amygdala activity

ABSTRACT— Although early research implicated the amygdala in automatic processing of negative information, more recent research suggests that it plays a more general role in processing the motivational relevance of various stimuli, suggesting that the relation between valence and amygdala activation may depend on contextual goals. This study provides experimental evidence that the relation between valence and amygdala activity is dynamically modulated by evaluative goals. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants evaluated the positive, negative, or overall (positive plus negative) aspects of famous people. When participants were providing overall evaluations, both positive and negative names were associated with amygdala activation. When they were evaluating positivity, positive names were associated with amygdala activity, and when they were evaluating negativity, negative names were associated with amygdala activity. Evidence for a negativity bias was found; modulation was more pronounced for positive than for negative information. These data suggest that the amygdala flexibly processes motivationally relevant evaluative information in accordance with current processing goals, but processes negative information less flexibly than positive information.     

Why are negative behaviours likely to be immediately invoked traits? The effects of valence and frequency on spontaneous trait inferences

People make trait inferences immediately when observing others’ behaviours. Previous studies reported that this spontaneous trait inference (STI) occurs more strongly from negative behaviours than from positive behaviours. However, what is responsible for this negativity bias in STI is unclear. In this study, two experiments investigated the effects of valence (an event's affective positivity or negativity) and frequency (how frequently the behaviour is observed in everyday life) on the occurrence of STI using an adapted version of a savings‐in‐relearning paradigm. Experiment 1 revealed that only valence affected the frequent occurrence of STI. In addition, the instructions to suppress impression formation or to focus attention on an actor's face made no difference to the results. In Experiment 2, the negativity bias in STIs was shown a week after exposure to the behavioural stimuli. These results suggest that the negativity bias in STIs occurs robustly, and the negative valence of observed behaviour is mostly responsible for the negativity bias in STI. The importance of immediate categorization of negative stimuli is discussed in terms of ecological priority.     

Vivid: How valence and arousal influence word processing under different task demands

In this study, we used event-related potentials to examine how different dimensions of emotion—valence and arousal—influence different stages of word processing under different task demands. In two experiments, two groups of participants viewed the same single emotional and neutral words while carrying out different tasks. In both experiments, valence (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) was fully crossed with arousal (high and low). We found that the task made a substantial contribution to how valence and arousal modulated the late positive complex (LPC), which is thought to reflect sustained evaluative processing (particularly of emotional stimuli). When participants performed a semantic categorization task in which emotion was not directly relevant to task performance, the LPC showed a larger amplitude for high-arousal than for low-arousal words, but no effect of valence. In contrast, when participants performed an overt valence categorization task, the LPC showed a large effect of valence (with unpleasant words eliciting the largest positivity), but no effect of arousal. These data show not only that valence and arousal act independently to influence word processing, but that their relative contributions to prolonged evaluative neural processes are strongly influenced by the situational demands (and by individual differences, as revealed in a subsequent analysis of subjective judgments).     

Evidence for mixed feelings of happiness and sadness from brief moments in time

Theorists disagree about whether valence is a basic building block of affective experience or whether the positive and negative substrates underlying valence are separable in experience. If positivity and negativity are separable in experience, people should be able to feel happy and sad at the same time. We addressed limitations of earlier evidence for mixed feelings by collecting moment-to-moment measures of happiness and sadness that required participants to monitor their feelings only occasionally. In Study 1, participants were occasionally cued to press one button if they felt happy and another if they felt sad. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings (i.e., simultaneously pressing both buttons) during bittersweet scenes than non-bittersweet scenes. In Study 2, participants reported their feelings only once. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings when cued during a bittersweet, as opposed to non-bittersweet, scene. These results extend earlier evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur.     

Age-related differences in attentional bias for emotional faces

Past research suggests an aging-related positivity effect in orienting to faces. However, these studies have eschewed direct comparison of orienting when positive and negative faces are presented simultaneously, thereby potentially underestimating the degree to which emotional valence influences such effects. In the current study younger and older adults viewed face pairs for 1000 ms, and upon face-pair offset indicated the location of a dot that appeared in the former location of one of the faces, to assess attentional orienting. When shown negative–neutral pairs, both age groups were biased to attend to negative faces, but when shown positive–negative pairs only younger adults showed a bias toward negative; older adults showed a lack of orienting toward either emotional face. Results suggest younger adults have a negativity bias in attention orienting regardless of the valence of nearby stimuli, whereas older adults show an absence of this bias when positive information is present.     

Automatic influence of arousal information on evaluative processing: Valence–arousal interactions in an affective Simon task

Previous research showed that evaluation speed is faster for negative stimuli that are high in arousal and for positive stimuli that are low in arousal. The present study investigated whether arousal and valence analogously interact in automatic stimulus evaluations, i.e., if stimulus valence is irrelevant for the task. One sample of participants switched randomly between an evaluation task and an affective Simon task that assessed stimulus evaluations indirectly. Another sample completed a pure Simon task. In all conditions, the influence of affective stimuli on task performance was enhanced when valence and arousal were congruent (i.e., high-arousing negative and low-arousing positive stimuli) than when both stimulus dimensions were incongruent (i.e., low-arousing negative and high-arousing positive stimuli). These findings suggest that evaluative implications of stimulus arousal and valence are automatically inferred even when stimulus evaluation is irrelevant for the task at hand.     

Why good guys wear white

Affect is a somewhat abstract concept that is frequently linked to physical metaphor. For example, good is often depicted as light (rather than dark), up (rather than down), and moving forward (rather than backward). The purpose of our studies was to examine whether the association between stimulus brightness and affect is optional or obligatory. In a series of three studies, participants categorized words as negative or positive. The valence of the words and the brightness of the letters were varied orthogonally. In Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that categorization was inhibited when there was a mismatch between stimulus brightness (e.g., light) and word valence (e.g., negative). Studies 4 and 5 reveal boundary conditions for the effect. The studies suggest that, when making evaluations, people automatically assume that bright objects are good, whereas dark objects are bad.     

Nodding in dis/agreement: a tale of two cultures

Head movement is commonly used to communicate positive versus negative response. However, whereas in US culture, vertical head movement denotes positivity (nodding to say "yes") and horizontal head movement is associated with negativity (shaking heads to say "no"), in Bulgaria, this response pattern is reversed, that is, horizontal head movement means "yes" and vertical head movement means "no." Thus, these two cultures spatially "embody" agreement via different movement directions. We examined the effect of such cultural differences on cognitive processing that has no communicative intent by comparing ratings of likeability, brightness, and positive feeling associated with different color moving dots. Participants followed the dots' movement with their heads in a 2 (direction: vertical vs. horizontal) by 2 (speed: fast vs. slow) design. We found a two-way country by speed of movement interaction such that Bulgarian participants associated colors with more positive feeling when those were perceived in combination with slower head movement irrespective of movement direction. US participants, on the other hand, rated color dots as better mood-enhancing in combination with faster head movement. There was a similar two-way country by movement speed interaction for likeability ratings but none for brightness. Findings are discussed in terms of variability in gestural meaning and culture-specific embodiment patterns.     

Nodding in dis/agreement: a tale of two cultures

Head movement is commonly used to communicate positive versus negative response. However, whereas in US culture, vertical head movement denotes positivity (nodding to say “yes”) and horizontal head movement is associated with negativity (shaking heads to say “no”), in Bulgaria, this response pattern is reversed, that is, horizontal head movement means “yes” and vertical head movement means “no.” Thus, these two cultures spatially “embody” agreement via different movement directions. We examined the effect of such cultural differences on cognitive processing that has no communicative intent by comparing ratings of likeability, brightness, and positive feeling associated with different color moving dots. Participants followed the dots’ movement with their heads in a 2 (direction: vertical vs. horizontal) by 2 (speed: fast vs. slow) design. We found a two-way country by speed of movement interaction such that Bulgarian participants associated colors with more positive feeling when those were perceived in combination with slower head movement irrespective of movement direction. US participants, on the other hand, rated color dots as better mood-enhancing in combination with faster head movement. There was a similar two-way country by movement speed interaction for likeability ratings but none for brightness. Findings are discussed in terms of variability in gestural meaning and culture-specific embodiment patterns.     

On the Prioritized Processing of Threat in a Dual Implicit Process Model of Evaluation

Dual-process models of attitudes distinguish between implicit and explicit processes in which the valence (i.e., positivity or negativity) of a stimulus influences judgments and behavior toward the stimulus. Developing parallel to the dual-process literature has been a threat detection literature suggesting that the mind is preferentially attuned to threats to immediate bodily harm. That literature reveals early privileged responses (e.g., shorter latency of detection, stronger reflexive reactions, and faster and stronger physiological responses) to threatening stimuli relative to negative, neutral, and positive stimuli. By integrating those literatures, we develop the dual implicit process model that postulates two functionally distinct and serially linked automatic processes in which an implicit threat process precedes (and potentially influences) an implicit valence process (positive vs. negative), which precedes (and potentially influences) explicit processes. In addition to explicating the nature of the model, we examine insights it offers various research areas, and conclude by identifying open questions regarding the model.     

An experimental test of Jameson and Hurvich’s theory of brightness contrast1

Two hundred and fifty-two brightness functions for seven simultaneously presented black, gray, and white squares on black, gray, and white backgrounds approximated power curves with positive exponents when illuminance was varied in seven steps over 1.9 log fL. Mean exponents were significantly larger for whiter vs blacker squares and for squares on the white vs the gray background. Mean exponents also increased more for squares on white than on black or gray backgrounds. Finally, a white replacing a black background elicited increasingly larger décrémentai responses as the squares varied from black to white. Jameson and Hurvich’s opponent-process theory, tested by the experiment, was not predictive.     

An experimental test of Jameson and Hurvich’s theory of brightness contrast

Two hundred and fifty-two brightness functions for seven simultaneously presented black, gray, and white squares on black, gray, and white backgrounds approximated power curves with positive exponents when illuminance was varied in seven steps over 1.9 log fL. Mean exponents were significantly larger for whiter vs blacker squares and for squares on the white vs the gray background. Mean exponents also increased more for squares on white than on black or gray backgrounds. Finally, a white replacing a black background elicited increasingly larger decremental responses as the squares varied from black to white. Jameson and Hurvich’s opponent-process theory, tested by the experiment, was not predictive.     

道德概念的黑白隐喻表征及其对道德认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法在不同水平上考察道德概念的黑白隐喻表征, 探讨了黑白视知觉对道德认知的影响。实验1a发现, 在词汇选择任务中被试倾向于判断白色希腊文词汇具有道德意义, 判断黑色希腊文词汇具有不道德意义。实验1b通过词性判断任务表明, 当道德词以白色呈现、不道德词以黑色呈现时被试的判断反应更快。实验2显示, 当将道德两难故事呈现在黑色背景上时, 相比于呈现在白色背景上, 被试会在道德评判任务中将故事中人物的行为判断为更加不道德。实验3通过情境实验发现, 相比明亮环境, 在黑暗环境中完成实验的被试会更倾向于认为他人会不公正地对待自己。研究证明, 黑白颜色概念与道德概念的隐喻联结存在心理现实性, 黑白颜色刺激知觉会对道德判断产生影响作用, 且环境的亮度也会影响到人们对道德相关问题的认知判断。     

The perception of assimilation and brightness contrast as derived from code theory

It is shown that assimilation and brightness contrast effects are evoked by structural aspects of patterns. In a pilot experiment, variously shaped gray patterns were used as stimuli. The backgrounds used with each of these shapes were identical: half black and half white. If the gray area against the black part was judged to be more black than the gray area against the white part, an assimilation effect will have occurred; when the reverse occurred, this was called a contrast effect. The task was to rank-order the stimuli on the assimilation-contrast scale. It is argued that the two effects are due to two different interpretations, each derivable from a different code of a pattern. The simpler the contrast code is with respect to the assimilation code, the more it will be perceptually preferred. In the specification of pattern complexity, structural information theory was used. A significant correlation was discovered between the theoretical preference for the contrast interpretation and the contrast preference of subjects.     

The insula and evaluative processes

The insula has been implicated as a component of central networks subserving evaluative and affective processes. This study examined evaluative valence and arousal ratings in response to picture stimuli in patients with lesions of the insula and two contrast groups: a control-lesion group (the primary contrast group) and an amygdala-lesion group. Patients rated the positivity and negativity of picture stimuli (from very unpleasant to very pleasant) and how emotionally arousing they found the pictures to be. Compared with patients in the control-lesion group, patients with insular lesions reported reduced arousal in response to both unpleasant and pleasant stimuli, as well as marked attenuation of valence ratings. In contrast, the arousal ratings of patients with amygdala lesions were selectively attenuated for unpleasant stimuli, and these patients' positive and negative valence ratings did not differ from those of the control-lesion group. Results support the view that the insular cortex may play a broad role in integrating affective and cognitive processes, whereas the amygdala may have a more selective role in affective arousal, especially for negative stimuli.     

Better (or worse) for some than others: Individual differences in the positivity offset and negativity bias

People tend to respond with more positive than negative affect to mildly emotional stimuli (i.e., positivity offset) and respond more strongly to very negative than to matched positive stimuli (i.e., negativity bias). In the current study, the authors examine individual differences in the positivity offset and negativity bias and demonstrate that both are stable over time and generalize across different kinds of stimuli (e.g., pictures, sounds, words, games of chance). Furthermore, the positivity offset and negativity bias are not redundant with traditional personality measures and exhibit differential predictive validity, such that both types of measures predict behavior in meaningful ways. Implications for a comprehensive understanding of affect and emotion and their relationship to physical and mental health are discussed.