Dissociating the effects of attention and contingency awareness on evaluative conditioning effects in the visual paradigm

Two experiments are described that investigate the effects of attention in moderating evaluative conditioning (EC) effects in a picture-picture paradigm in which previously discovered experimental artifacts (e.g., Field & Davey, 1999 ) were overcome by counterbalancing conditioned stimuli (CSs) and unconditioned stimuli (USs) across participants. Conditioned responses for individuals who had attention enhanced were compared against a control group and groups for whom attention was impeded using a distracter task. In a second experiment the effects of attention were dissociated from those of contingency awareness by using backward-masked US presentations. The results of these experiments indicate that although associative EC effects may not be disrupted by a lack of contingency awareness, attention is an important factor in establishing conditioning. These results shed some light onto the possible boundary conditions that could explain past inconsistencies in obtaining EC effects in the visual paradigm.     

At the crossroads: Attention,contingency awareness,and evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to changes in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its repeated pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (US). One of the most debated topics in EC research is whether or not EC is dependent on contingency awareness. In this study, we go beyond this debate by examining whether contingency awareness mediates the impact of attentional resources and goal-directed attention on EC. Attentional resources were manipulated by presenting CSs and USs either within the same modality or in different modalities. Goal-directed attention was manipulated by asking participants to respond to the CSs or to the USs. Results indicate that the effect of goal-directed attention on EC is mediated by contingency awareness, whereas the effect of attentional resources on EC is not.     

Human evaluative conditioning: acquisition trials, presentation schedule, evaluative style and contingency awareness.

Two different processes may be operative in human Pavlovian conditioning: signal learning and evaluative learning. Whereas most studies on evaluative conditioning focused on a mere demonstration of the phenomenon or on a theoretical analysis of the underlying processes, some basic parameters of evaluative learning are still unexplored. Hence, using the standard neutral picture--(dis)liked picture pairing paradigm (Baeyens, Eelen & Van den Bergh, 1990), in this study the effect of two parameters of evaluative conditioning was assessed on a between-subjects base, namely the Number of Acquisition Trials (2/5/10/20) and the Presentation Schedule of the stimulus pairs (blockwise or random). Additionally, the study included an exploratory analysis of the potential effects of the Evaluative Style of subjects (Feelers vs Thinkers, operationalized in terms of speed of emitting evaluations). Finally, the relationship between contingency awareness and evaluative learning was reassessed. Neutral-liked conditioning was found to be quadratically related to the number of acquisition trials (increase in effect up to 10 trials, decrease from 10 to 20 trials), whereas neutral-disliked conditioning linearly increased with increasing numbers of trials. Randomized vs blockwise presentation schedules of the stimulus pairs did differentially affect the overall pattern of conditioning, but in a way which was both unexpected and difficult to account for theoretically. Both the Evaluative Style of subjects and contingency awareness were demonstrated to be generally orthogonal to conditioned shifts in CS valence. Based on these findings, some practical suggestions are provided for the application of evaluating conditioning based therapeutical interventions to affective-behavioral disorders which are centred around inappropriate (dis)likes.     

Revisiting the relation between contingency awareness and attention: evaluative conditioning relies on a contingency focus

Although evaluative conditioning has occasionally been demonstrated in the absence of contingency awareness, many recent studies imply that its acquisition depends on the availability of attentional resources during conditioning. In previous experiments attention has typically been manipulated in a general way rather than looking at the particular focus of attention. The present study investigated the role of a focus on the CS-US contingency. Two separate distraction tasks were designed that either diverted attention from the stimuli or directed it to the stimuli while drawing attention away from the contingency between the stimuli. Both types of distraction were shown to eliminate evaluative conditioning. Significant evaluative conditioning was observed in a third group of participants who were required to attend the contingencies. A mediation analysis showed that the observed discrepancy in evaluative conditioning effects between groups was mediated by contingency awareness. The results imply that attention in terms of a stimulus focus is not sufficient for evaluative conditioning to occur. Rather, attention to the contingencies between stimuli appears to be crucial in evaluative conditioning, because it is supposed to foster the acquisition of contingency awareness.     

Both trace and delay conditioning of evaluative responses depend on contingency awareness

Whereas previous evaluative conditioning (EC) studies produced inconsistent results concerning the role of contingency knowledge, there are classical eye-blink conditioning studies suggesting that declarative processes are involved in trace conditioning but not in delay conditioning. In two EC experiments pairing neutral sounds (conditioned stimuli; CSs) with affective pictures (unconditioned stimuli; USs), we tested whether the type of conditioning procedure affects the relationship between awareness and EC. Auditory CSs and visual USs were either overlapping and co-terminating (Delay Conditioning Group), or they were separated by a short temporal gap (Trace Conditioning Group). In both groups, contingency awareness was manipulated by varying the duration at which the US was presented during conditioning. Furthermore, in addition to a post-conditioning measure of awareness, US detectability was measured concurrently during the learning phase in Experiment 2. US exposure duration affected both measures of awareness. The data of both experiments demonstrate that EC does not occur if the USs are presented at very brief durations, but reliable EC effects can be observed at longer US exposure durations. As there were no differences between trace and delay conditioning, the data suggest that contingency awareness plays a crucial role in trace and in delay conditioning of evaluative responses. These results challenge automatic association-formation accounts of EC, but they are in line with ‘single-process’ accounts assuming EC to be dependent on conscious declarative knowledge about CS–US contingencies.     

The role of CS-US contingency in human evaluative conditioning

Recent studies suggest that in Pavlovian conditioning, two different processes may be operative: signal learning and evaluative learning, resulting in two qualitatively different associative structures. Signal-learning is hypothesized to be responsible for providing us with genuine predictors (CS) for significant events (US). This proposition logically entails that the statistical-correlational relation, i.e. the contingency between CS and US should be a crucial determinant of signal learning. Evaluative conditioning, on the other hand, refers to the observation that the mere pairing of neutral with (dis)liked stimuli changes the valence of the originally neutral stimuli in a (negative) positive direction. As argued elsewhere, evaluative conditioning is probably based on the CS acquiring a mere referential value to the US, without any genuine CS-US expectancy being involved. From this, it was hypothesized that evaluative conditioning might not be dependent on CS-US contingency. Using the standard evaluative conditioning paradigm, four different levels of CS-US contingency were created on a between-subject base. The overall effect of evaluative conditioning was strongly significant, and was not mediated by awareness of the CS-US relation. Of crucial importance, this conditioning effect did not interact with the level of contingency, supporting the hypothesis that CS-US contingency is not a crucial determinant of evaluative conditioning. Moreover, this effect was obtained in a situation in which Ss simultaneously evidenced to have consciously registered quite accurately the different levels of CS-US contingency.     

Evaluative conditioning may occur with and without contingency awareness

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is considered to play an important role in the attitude formation. One of the ongoing debates in this field concerns the impact of contingency awareness (i.e., awareness of the contingent relationship between conditioned and unconditioned stimulus, CS–US) on the EC occurrence. Despite the claims that EC does not require awareness of CS–US contingencies, the recent studies have claimed just the opposite. However, a number of methodological issues can be raised to undermine those claims. In two experiments, we tried to eliminate potential faults and sought to learn whether EC occurs with or without contingency awareness of either US identity or US valence. We report significant EC effects both with and without contingency awareness. These results provide support for the claim that the EC effects might be produced by independent mechanisms linked to awareness. We also argue that those mechanisms are differently captured by available measures of EC.     

Evaluative conditioning and the awareness issue: assessing contingency awareness with the four-picture recognition test

An experiment is described that tested the moderating influence of contingency awareness on evaluative conditioning. After participants were conditioned within the picture-picture paradigm, contingency awareness was assessed by means of a recognition test (i.e., the 4-picture recognition test). Results indicate an inverse relationship between the conditioned affective reaction and contingency awareness: Only participants classified as unaware in the recognition test showed significant effects of evaluative learning. A closer inspection indicates that aware individuals stored not only the valence but also the nominal stimulus in mind.     

Aware and (dis)liking: item-based analyses reveal that valence acquisition via evaluative conditioning emerges only when there is contingency awareness

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to changes in the liking of an affectively neutral stimulus (the conditioned stimulus, or CS) following the pairing of that stimulus with another stimulus of affective value (the unconditioned stimulus, or US). In 3 experiments, the authors assessed contingency awareness, that is, awareness of the CS-US associations, by relying on participants' responses to individual items rather than using a global method of assessment. They found that EC emerged on contingency aware CSs only. Of note, whether the CSs were evaluated explicitly (Experiments 1 and 2) or implicitly (Experiment 3) did not make a difference. This pattern supports the idea that awareness of the CS-US associations may be required for valence acquisition via EC.     

Revisiting the relation between contingency awareness and attention: Evaluative conditioning relies on a contingency focus

Although evaluative conditioning has occasionally been demonstrated in the absence of contingency awareness, many recent studies imply that its acquisition depends on the availability of attentional resources during conditioning. In previous experiments attention has typically been manipulated in a general way rather than looking at the particular focus of attention. The present study investigated the role of a focus on the CS–US contingency. Two separate distraction tasks were designed that either diverted attention from the stimuli or directed it to the stimuli while drawing attention away from the contingency between the stimuli. Both types of distraction were shown to eliminate evaluative conditioning. Significant evaluative conditioning was observed in a third group of participants who were required to attend the contingencies. A mediation analysis showed that the observed discrepancy in evaluative conditioning effects between groups was mediated by contingency awareness. The results imply that attention in terms of a stimulus focus is not sufficient for evaluative conditioning to occur. Rather, attention to the contingencies between stimuli appears to be crucial in evaluative conditioning, because it is supposed to foster the acquisition of contingency awareness.     

Resistance to extinction of conditioned odor perceptions: evaluative conditioning is not unique

A tasteless odor will smell sweeter after being sampled by mouth with sucrose and will smell sourer after being sampled with citric acid. This tasty-smell effect was found in experiments that compared odor-taste and color-taste pairings. Using odors and colors with minimal taste (Experiment 1), the authors found that repeated experience of odor-taste mixtures produced conditioned changes in odor qualities that were unaffected by intermixed color-taste trials (Experiment 2). An extinction procedure, consisting of postconditioning presentations of the odor in water, had no detectable effect on the changed perception of an odor (Experiments 3 and 4). In contrast, this procedure altered judgments about the expected taste of colored solutions. Evaluative conditioning (conditioned changes in liking) is claimed to be resistant to extinction. However, these results suggest that resistance to extinction in odors is related to the way they are encoded rather than to their hedonic properties.     

Classical conditioning of autonomic fear responses is independent of contingency awareness

The role of contingency awareness in classical conditioning experiments using human subjects is currently under debate. This study took a novel approach to manipulating contingency awareness in a differential Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. Complex sine wave gratings were used as visual conditional stimuli (CS). By manipulating the fundamental spatial frequency of the displays, we were able to construct pairs of stimuli that varied in discriminability. One group of subjects was given an "easy" discrimination, and another was exposed to a "difficult" CS+ and CS-. A 3rd group was exposed to a stimulus that was paired with the unconditional stimulus (UCS) 50% of the time and served as a control. Skin conductance response (SCR) and continuous UCS expectancy data were measured concurrently throughout the experiment. Differential UCS expectancy was found only in the easy discrimination group. Differential SCRs were found in the easy discrimination group as well as in the difficult discrimination group, but not in the 50% contingency control. The difficult discrimination group did not exhibit differential UCS expectancy but did show clear differential SCR. These observations support a dual process interpretation of classical conditioning whereby conditioning on an implicit level can occur without explicit knowledge about the contingencies. The role of contingency awareness in classical conditioning experiments using human subjects is currently under debate. This study took a novel approach to manipulating contingency awareness in a differential Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. Complex sine wave gratings were used as visual conditional stimuli (CS). By manipulating the fundamental spatial frequency of the displays, we were able to construct pairs of stimuli that varied in discriminability. One group of subjects was given an "easy" discrimination, and another was exposed to a "difficult" CS+ and CS-. A 3rd group was exposed to a stimulus that was paired with the unconditional stimulus (UCS) 50% of the time and served as a control. Skin conductance response (SCR) and continuous UCS expectancy data were measured concurrently throughout the experiment. Differential UCS expectancy was found only in the easy discrimination group. Differential SCRs were found in the easy discrimination group as well as in the difficult discrimination group, but not in the 50% contingency control. The difficult discrimination group did not exhibit differential UCS expectancy but did show clear differential SCR. These observations support a dual process interpretation of classical conditioning whereby conditioning on an implicit level can occur without explicit knowledge about the contingencies.     

Evaluative conditioning is pavlovian conditioning: issues of definition, measurement, and the theoretical importance of contingency awareness

In her commentary of Field (1999), Hammerl (1999) has drawn attention to several interesting points concerning the issue of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning. First, she comments on several contentious issues arising from Field's review of the evaluative conditioning literature, second she critiques the data from his pilot study and finally she argues the case that EC is a distinct form of conditioning that can occur in the absence of contingency awareness. With reference to these criticisms, this reply attempts to address Hammerl's comments by exploring the issues of how awareness is defined, how it is best measured, and whether it is reasonable to believe that EC uniformly occurs in the absence of contingency awareness. The article concludes that the available evidence supports Field's proposition that EC is, in fact, Pavlovian learning. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Reevaluating evaluative conditioning: a nonassociative explanation of conditioning effects in the visual evaluative conditioning paradigm.

In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) is an associative phenomenon. Experiment 1 compared a standard EC paradigm with nonpaired and no-treatment control conditions. EC effects were obtained only when the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) were rated as perceptually similar. However, similar EC effects were obtained in both control groups. An earlier failure to obtain EC effects was reanalyzed in Experiment 2. Conditioning-like effects were found when comparing a CS with the most perceptually similar UCSs used in the procedure but not when analyzing a CS rating with respect to the UCS with which it was paired during conditioning. The implications are that EC effects found in many studies are not due to associative learning and that the special characteristics of EC (conditioning without awareness and resistance to extinction) are probably nonassociative artifacts of the EC paradigm.     

The role of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning: empirical evidence and theoretical implications

This article reviews research over the past decade concerning the relationship between Pavlovian conditioning and conscious awareness. The review covers autonomic conditioning, conditioning with subliminal stimuli, eyeblink conditioning, conditioning in amnesia, evaluative conditioning, and conditioning under anesthesia. The bulk of the evidence is consistent with the position that awareness is necessary but not sufficient for conditioned performance, although studies suggestive of conditioning without awareness are identified as worthy of further investigation. Many studies have used inadequate measures of awareness, and strategies for increasing validity and sensitivity are discussed. It is concluded that conditioning may depend on the operation of a propositional system associated with consciousness rather than a separate, lower level system.     

Human evaluative conditioning: Order of stimulus presentation

In an experiment designed to demonstrate evaluative conditioning, subjects were shown 48 pictures of sculptures that they rated on a scale with 21 categories (?10 to +10). Then, the two most liked pictures (L) were paired with pictures from the categories ?1, 0, or +1 (N). In contrast to prior experiments, subjects were given either forward conditioning (N-L) or backward conditioning (L-N) trials but not both. Four other neutral stimuli were paired with each other (N-N) and acted as control stimulus pairs. After conditioning, the stimuli were rated a second time. There was a statistically significant difference in evaluative ratings showing a change of the evaluative tone of the previously neutral stimuli in a positive direction only after forward conditioning. This finding is inconsistent with results of prior experiments and challenges the assumption of Martin and Levey (1987) that evaluative conditioning is different from human classical conditioning.     

Learning,awareness, and instruction: Subjective contingency awareness does matter in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm

In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often in a particular target print colour (e.g., “month” most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not (control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of implicit learning.     

Expectancy-learning and evaluative learning in human classical conditioning: affective priming as an indirect and unobtrusive measure of conditioned stimulus valence

It has been argued that in classical conditioning two processes might be operative. First, one may learn that the conditioned stimulus (CS+) is a valid predictor for the occurrence of the biologically negative or positive event (US; expectancy-learning). Second, one may learn to perceive the conditioned stimulus itself as a negative or positive stimulus, depending on the valence of the event it has been associated with (evaluative learning). Until the present, however, both forms of learning have been investigated using rather different conditioning procedures. Using a differential aversive conditioning preparation with pictures of human faces as CSs and an electrocutaneous stimulus as US, we were able to demonstrate that both forms of learning can co-occur. Moreover, the extent of evaluative learning in this aversive conditioning procedure did not significantly differ from the amount of evaluative learning in an evaluative conditioning procedure with positive and negative adjectives as USs, which was administered to the same participants. In the present study evaluative learning was not only indexed by direct evaluative ratings, but we introduced affective priming as an indirect and unobtrusive, reaction time based measure of stimulus valence. Finally, imagery instructions during acquisition did not facilitate expectancy-learning nor evaluative learning.     

Dissociating spatial attention and awareness in emotion-induced blindness

Emotional stimuli attract spatial attention, sometimes improving perception at their location. But they also can disrupt awareness of targets at their location, a phenomenon known as emotion-induced blindness. Such discrepant findings might reflect the impact of emotional stimuli on different perception mechanisms. We dissociated spatial attention and awareness by investigating the spatial distribution of emotion-induced blindness. Participants searched for a target within two simultaneous rapid streams of pictures, one of which could also contain a preceding emotional distractor. When targets were followed by additional stream items, emotion-induced blindness occurred only at the location of the distractor. However, when no items appeared after the target, so that it could persist in iconic memory and its temporal position was easily discernible, emotional disruption of target perception was more robust away from the distractor's location than at the distractor's location. The results suggest that although emotional distractors attract spatial attention, they inhibit identification of competing items potentially linked to the same spatiotemporal position.