建设性还是破坏性?羞愧的双路径模型

羞愧是一种典型的自我意识情绪, 在个体行为以及心理发展结果中发挥着重要作用。羞愧同时是一种中国传统文化中极为重要的道德情绪, 被认为是中国人自我反省的重要途径。但当前关于羞愧的导向性存在两个截然相反的观点:羞愧导向建设性还是破坏性?理论模型包括:其一, 羞愧导向破坏性, 相应的理论解释有社会威胁防御模型、羞愧调节模型等, 其二, 羞愧导向建设性, 相应的理论解释有进化心理学视角及功能主义视角等。这两种观点均得到大量实证研究的支持。为了合理解释这一分歧, 系统理解羞愧促发的行动机制, 本文提出羞愧的双路径结构模型, 突出社会自我威胁评估在其中的重要作用。未来研究需要开发出更客观全面的羞愧测量方法, 基于文化差异关注社会自我修复的影响因素, 理解不同文化背景社会对羞愧的诠释, 从而提出更具针对性的干预方法, 以促进个体羞愧可能的破坏性结果向建设性方向转化。     

Moving beyond “shame is bad”: How a functional emotion can become problematic

Shame research has been divided. At present, the shame literature can be broadly dichotomized into whether it argues for a problematic or functional view of shame. Shame is commonly linked, for example, to aggression, poor health and wellbeing, and psychopathologies such as post‐traumatic stress disorder, eating disorders, and depression. Some researchers, however, suggest that shame is functional as it serves the purpose of gauging when one's social self is threatened, because of a loss of status or social bonds. To resolve this conflict, shame has been redefined in a variety of ways in an attempt to distinguish functional shame from problematic shame. However, approaches that ever more narrowly define the construct can lead to a defining away of the complexity of the lived experience of shame. In this review, we integrate the conflicting research on shame, examining how shame, as an emotion that evolved for a functional purpose, can become problematic. Avoidance in response to shame can move shame from being a functional social gauge that motivates repair to a problematic emotion, and avoidance is more likely to the extent that shame seems irreparable. Therefore, understanding what factors impact on perceived reparability will be important for understanding how shame can become problematic. How we see ourselves, others, our actions, and the costs of repair are all likely to impact on whether or not shame becomes functional or problematic.     

Hidden shame

Shame dynamics, after decades of neglect, reappeared in psychoanalytic thinking with increasing prevalence in the last thirty years. Shame that is hidden is an aspect of complex clinical phenomenology that is particularly likely to be missed and hidden further by partial psychoanalytic explanations that drive shame more and more from view. Shame is often hidden theoretically by formulations limiting conflict to conflict between drives or impulses and something opposing them. By contrast, the incompatible idea model propounded by Freud in Studies on Hysteria emphasizes awareness incompatible with the dictates of conscience, and hence is broader in scope and closer to actual experience. Although shame and guilt arise developmentally earlier than does a true sense of morality, these emotions and their unconscious variants become entwined with the individual's sense of morality as development proceeds. The dynamics of shame and guilt are considerably more complex than their phenomenology as overt emotions. Shame emphasizes weakness, vulnerability, and the likelihood of rejection--so much so that its acknowledgment often generates more shame. Guilt, however, since it is action- and power-oriented, often obscures shame and so defends against it.     

Seeing and being seen: Shame in the clinical situation

Shame may prevent the patient from emerging from a psychic retreat. As begins to do so he confronts two fears, first of seeing the object more clearly and second of being seen become prominent. Seeing leads to deeper and more distressing feelings connected with guilt and depression as the damage done to good objects is recognized. However it cannot be faced if shame leads to a demand for immediate relief. Shame is a prominent feature of the analytic situation and recognizing this may help the analyst to support his patients to tolerate the discomfort of being seen so that the conflicts about seeing can be worked through. Two clinical examples are briefly discussed. In the first feelings of inferiority lessened as they were analysed and allowed appreciative and depressive feelings to emerge. In the second embarrassment was associated with progress that the patient felt he had made but was embarrassed to admit. It is argued that the analysis of shame in the analytic situation is necessary so that being seen can be tolerated and allow the conflicts over seeing to be worked through.     

Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

A New Measure of the Expression of Shame: The Shame Code

While shame is essential for adaptive functioning, experiencing shame more often or intensely than others is strongly associated with psychopathology. To date, no measure of the behavioral expression of shame exists, despite the great potential for use in research and clinical settings. The present study aimed to assess the Shame Code, a new behavioral coding system of the expression of shame. Participants included 149 youth between the ages of 12 and 17 (50?% female, M?=?14.5). Shame was elicited with a spontaneous speech task. Participants’ overall Shame Code scores were correlated only with a state measure of shame, however, structural equation modeling results showed that Shame Code variables combined differentially to assess state and trait shame scores. A two-factor model was the best fit to the data. The first factor, Fidget, consisted of Hiding, Fidget (positively loaded), Nervous Positive, and Stillness (negatively loaded). The second factor, Freeze, was comprised of Stillness, Facial Tension, and Silence (positively loaded). The Fidget factor was associated with higher Trait Shame and the Freeze factor was associated with higher State Shame but lower Trait Shame. Therefore, the Shame Code not only effectively captured the behavioral manifestations of shame, but Shame Code variables also differentially predicted state and trait shame.     

A Lover’s Shame

Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.     

Conceptualising humiliation

Humiliation lacks an empirically derived definition, sometimes simply being equated with shame. We approached the conceptualisation of humiliation from a prototype perspective, identifying 61 features of humiliation, some of which are more central to humiliation (e.g. losing self-esteem) than others (e.g. shyness). Prototypical humiliation involved feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation in which one was brought down and in which an audience was present, leading the person to appraise the situation as unfair and resulting in a mix of emotions, most notably disappointment, anger, and shame. Some of the features overlapped with those of shame (e.g. looking like a fool, losing self-esteem, presence of an audience) whereas other features overlapped with those of anger (e.g. being brought down, unfairness). Which specific features are present may determine whether the humiliation experience becomes more shame- or anger-like (or a combination thereof).     

“Error That Is Anguish to Its Own Nobleness”: Shame and Tragedy in The Mill on the Floss

In George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss, early unresolved emotional conflicts in Maggie set a pattern that leads her to "tragic error" as a young adult. Eliot links Maggie's dilemma with Sophocles's Ajax, in which the Greek hero takes his life after shame pushes him blindly to an action that results in only deeper humiliation and a shattering of his social being. In both works, emotional conflict is driven by a desire to transcend shame and ultimately leads to a mortifying error that is recognized only after the fact as tragic in its consequences.     

Shame and the temporality of social life

Shame is notoriously ambivalent. On one hand, it operates as a mechanism of normalization and social exclusion, installing or reinforcing patterns of silence and invisibility; on the other hand, the capacity for shame may be indispensible for ethical life insofar as it attests to the subject’s constitutive relationality and its openness to the provocation of others. Sartre, Levinas and Beauvoir each offer phenomenological analyses of shame in which its basic structure emerges as a feeling of being exposed to others and bound to one’s own identity. For Sartre, shame is an ontological provocation, constitutive of subjectivity as a being-for-Others. For Levinas, ontological shame takes the form of an inability to escape one’s own relation to being; this predicament is altered by the ethical provocation of an Other who puts my freedom in question and commands me to justify myself. For Beauvoir, shame is an effect of oppression, both for the woman whose embodied existence is marked as shameful, and for the beneficiary of colonial domination who feels ashamed of her privilege. For each thinker, shame articulates the temporality of social life in both its promise and its danger.     

A comparison of concepts in self-psychology and Winnicott's theory of the development of the self

The humiliation and traumatization of political opponents during periods of violent and non-violent conflict can create deadlocked situations with great potential for regression, and may serve to aggravate the conflict or escalate the level of violence. In this article, I will examine this type of regressive dynamic. My point of departure is the current terror situation and the “war against terror” as it is being conducted in different parts of the world. The key concepts in this connection are violations of human rights, victim psychology, group processes and the development of regressive group identities. Political-ideological-religious discourses can serve to mediate between collective unconscious fantasies and the actual misery/humiliation experienced at group and individual levels. They can reinforce an identity as victim, and the significance of this identity is often underestimated when the background of terror and violent conflicts is being analysed.     

From Ego Psychology to Psychoanalysis in the Year 2000: One Analyst's Journey

Challenged by clinical findings and necessity, psychoanalysts proceed on a lifelong professional journey of exploring, deleting, adding, and integrating from various theoretical and technical paradigms. This article briefly depicts one analyst's journey from ego psychology in the early 1970s to the year 2000. The emphasis on retaining early valuable tenets and adding new theoretical and technical concepts. As an example, conflicts involving problems of the self and ego ideal, brought to the fore through work with patients having significant self-esteem, shame, and envy difficulties, are singled out. These conflicts are found in cases such as those with anorexia, body image disturbance, gender identity and negative gender message problems, and cases having early denigrating environments. Shame dynamics are addressed. The presenting pictures for problems involving shame are usually new compromise formations prompted by signal shame. A case is reported to depict the use of modern conflict theory in analyzing such problems.     

Correspondence: Mental health care in South Africa

Shame has been an insufficiently studied emotion in psycho-analytic literature until recently, mainly because it tended to be ‘absorbed’ under the concept of guilt. Now it is recognized as a powerful affect of pregenital origin, linked with narcissism and the ego ideal. Shame can be a motivation for achievements and social adaptation, it can protect an individual's integrity and can be a modulator of interpersonal relatedness; it can also function as a defence or initiate psychopathological states, such as depression, self-alienation, identity confusion or acting out. In adolescence shame is a ubiquitous phenomenon, as this developmental stage consists of all the parameters that can trigger feelings of shame. The emotional regression connected with the emergence of primitive impulses, conflicts and defences; the grandiose phantasies and the increased narcissism; the preoccupation with bodily functions and body image; the tendency to idealization and the need for social acceptance constitute the matrix within which shame and shame-derived feelings can develop. Shame is discussed as it is experienced by young patients and often by the therapist. Shame in the countertransference and during supervision is also considered. Stress is put on the importance of taking shame into account as a fundamental factor in psychotherapy with adolescents, particularly in relation to the establishment of the therapeutic relationship, understanding and interpretations. The thesis is illustrated with clinical vignettes.     

Development and Preliminary Validation of a New Measure to Assess Shame: The Shame Inventory

Research on the emotion of shame has increased significantly in recent years. However, there remains a need for more psychometrically sound measures of shame, including measures of shame in response to specific, idiographic experiences. The Shame Inventory was developed in order to assess both global feelings of shame as well as shame in response to specific life events or personal characteristics. Two studies were conducted to determine the preliminary psychometric properties of the Shame Inventory. Across both studies, results indicate that the inventory has high internal consistency, test-retest reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity. The Shame Inventory holds promise as a new measure designed to assess both global feelings of shame as well as specific shame-eliciting cues.     

Assessment of Shame and Guilt and Their Relationships to Psychopathology

Two studies are reported. First, we tested the previously validated Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2; Harder & Zalma, 1990) shame and guilt proneness measure and the Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS; Hoblitzelle, 1982) Shame subscale against the newly introduced Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney, 1990) for shame and guilt dispositions. Fiftynine college undergraduates completed randomly ordered personality inventories reflecting constructs theoretically relevant to the presence of shame and guilt proneness. Correlations between the affect measures and personality variables showed evidence of validity for all shame scales. The PFQ2 Guilt subscale also demonstrated construct validity when partialled for shame, but the SCAAI did not. Second, we tested hypotheses regarding the relative importance of shame and guilt to various symptom types (Symptom Checklist-90-Revised; Derogatis, 1983) using 71 college undergraduates.. Both emotions were approximately equally related to all major symptom clusters, but there was some-evidence for differential patterns of relative importance for shame and guilt to different symptoms.     

Not so ugly after all: when shame acts as a commitment device

Most psychological theories and research on shame focus on the ugly aspects and negative consequences of this emotion. Theories on moral emotions, however, assume that shame acts as a commitment device motivating prosocial behavior. To solve this apparent paradox, the authors studied the effects of shame on prosocial behavior. Shame was hypothesized to motivate prosocial behavior when it was relevant for the decision at hand (endogenous). In contrast, shame that was not relevant for the decision at hand (exogenous) was hypothesized to have no such effects. Four experiments with three different shame inductions and two different measures of prosocial behavior confirmed that endogenous shame motivated prosocial behavior for proselfs but that exogenous shame did not. Shame is shown to have a clear interpersonal function in the sense that it acts as a commitment device.     

Assessment of shame and guilt and their relationships to psychopathology.

Two studies are reported. First, we tested the previously validated Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2; Harder & Zalma, 1990) shame and guilt measure and the Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS; Hoblitzelle, 1982) Shame subscale against the newly introduced Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI; Tangney, 1990) for shame and guilt dispositions. Fifty-nine college undergraduates completed randomly ordered personality inventories reflecting constructs theoretically relevant to the presence of shame and guilt proneness. Correlations between the affect measures and personality variables showed evidence of validity for all shame scales. The PFQ2 Guilt subscale also demonstrated construct validity when partialled for shame, but the SCAAI did not. Second, we tested hypotheses regarding the relative importance of shame and guilt to various symptom types (Symptom Checklist-90-Revised; Derogatis, 1983) using 71 college undergraduates. Both emotions were approximately equally related to all major symptom clusters, but there was some evidence for differential patterns of relative importance for shame and guilt to different symptoms.     

Restore and protect motivations following shame

Shame has been found to promote both approach and withdrawal behaviours. Shame theories have not been able to explain how shame can promote such contrasting behaviours. In the present article, the authors provide an explanation for this. Shame was hypothesised to activate approach behaviours to restore the threatened self, and in situations when this is not possible or too risky, to activate withdrawal behaviours to protect the self from further damage. Five studies with different shame inductions and different dependent measures confirmed our predictions. We therefore showed that different behavioural responses to shame can be understood in terms of restore and protect motives. Implications for theory and behavioural research on shame are discussed.     

Vengeance: The Half Hidden Pillager of Our Lives

Vengeance is presented as a destructive, deeply rooted, human tendency to punish without limit those who arouse the sense of injustice. Retribution is distinguished from it principally by being measured out in proportion to the wrong felt, though the two are often fused in individual and corporate life. Vengeance is viewed as rooted in infantile mourning for the felt loss of the mothering figure, but significantly developed through experiences of shame. Retribution, sometimes not distinguished from vengeance, is defended by some sophisticated ethical and legal theorists. Christianity has had a mitigating effect upon vengeance, but further remedies need to be found. Symbolic acts of public reparation at monuments may be one such remedy.