A biologically plausible robot attention model,based on space and time

After half a century of cognitive revolution we remain far from agreement about what cognition is and what cognition does. It was once thought that these questions could wait until the data were in. Today there is a mountain of data, but no way of making sense of it. The time for tackling the fundamental issues has arrived. The biogenic approach to cognition is introduced not as a solution but as a means of approaching the issues. The traditional, and still predominant, methodological stance in cognitive inquiry is what I call the anthropogenic approach: assume human cognition as the paradigm and work ‘down’ to a more general explanatory concept. The biogenic approach, on the other hand, starts with the facts of biology as the basis for theorizing and works ‘up’ to the human case by asking psychological questions as if they were biological questions. Biogenic explanations of cognition are currently clustered around two main frameworks for understanding biology: self-organizing complex systems and autopoiesis. The paper describes the frameworks and infers from them ten empirical principles—the biogenic ‘family traits’—that constitute constraints on biogenic theorizing. Because the anthropogenic approach to cognition is not constrained empirically to the same degree, I argue that the biogenic approach is superior for approaching a general theory of cognition as a natural phenomenon.

The psychology of memory,extended cognition,and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.     

TWO ISSUES IN AUDITORY COGNITION:

Abstract— The study of auditory and music cognition provides opportunities to explore general cognitive mechanisms in a specific, highly structured domain We discuss two problems with implications for other domains of perception the self-organization of perceptual categories and invariant pattern recognition The perceptual category we consider is the octave We show how general principles of self-organization operating on a cochlear spectral representation can vield octave categories The example of invariant pattern recognition we consider is the recognition of invariant frequency patterns transformed to different absolute frequencies We suggest a system that uses pitch or musical key to map tones into a pitch-invariant format.     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Human nature and cognitive–developmental niche construction

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as a radical departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche.     

Physico-mathematics and the search for causes in Descartes’ optics—1619–1637

One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed “physico-mathematics”. This signalled a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy, non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more ’physicalised’, more closely intertwined with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes’ physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases one could literally “see the causes”. Optics took pride of place within Descartes’ physico-mathematics project, because he believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes’ early physico-mathematical program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—causal knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system.     

Turing redux: Enculturation and computation

Many of our cognitive capacities are shaped by enculturation. Enculturation is the acquisition of cognitive practices such as symbol-based mathematical practices, reading, and writing during ontogeny. Enculturation is associated with significant changes to the organization and connectivity of the brain and to the functional profiles of embodied actions and motor programs. Furthermore, it relies on scaffolded cultural learning in the cognitive niche. The purpose of this paper is to explore the components of symbol-based mathematical practices. Phylogenetically, these practices are the result of concerted organism-niche interactions that have led from approximate number estimations to the emergence of discrete, symbol-based mathematical operations. Ontogenetically, symbol-based mathematical practices are associated with plastic changes to neural circuitry, action schemata, and motor programs. It will be suggested that these practices rely on previously acquired capacities such as subitizing and counting. With these considerations in place, I will argue that computations, understood in the sense of Turing (1936), are a specific kind of symbol-based mathematical practices that can be realized by human organisms, machines, or by hybrid organism-machine systems. In sum, this paper suggests a new way to think about mathematical cognition and computation.     

The role of response mechanisms in determining reaction time performance: Piéron’s law revisited

A response mechanism takes evaluations of the importance of potential actions and selects the most suitable. Response mechanism function is a nontrivial problem that has not received the attention it deserves within cognitive psychology. In this article, we make a case for the importance of considering response mechanism function as a constraint on cognitive processes and emphasized links with the wider problem of behavioral action selection. First, we show that, contrary to previous suggestions, a well-known model of the Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) relies on the response mechanism for a key feature of its results—the interference—facilitation asymmetry. Second, we examine a variety of response mechanisms (including that in the model of Cohen et al., 1990) and show that they all follow a law analogous to Piéron’s law in relating their input to reaction time. In particular, this is true of a decision mechanism not designed to explain RT data but based on a proposed solution to the general problem of action selection and grounded in the neurobiology of the vertebrate basal ganglia. Finally, we show that the dynamics of simple artificial neurons also support a Piéron-like law.     

Massive redeployment,exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations

The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components—originally developed to serve some specific purpose—were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of “motor” areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of “language” areas like Broca’s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control.     

The analysis system COGITAT for the study of cognitive deficiencies in rodents

COGITAT is an automated hole board system that, following minimal experimental interventions, makes it possible to measure a variety of parameters associated with learning, memory, relearning, cognition, and cognitive shifts, but also changes in exploratory and sensorimotor performance in rodent models. The individual parameters—that is, overall exploratory activity, number of visits (deep in the hole) into or inspections of (at the upper surface) holes, number of baited, unbaited, or previously baited holes visited or inspected, reinspections of or revisits into any holes, number of pellets eaten, time to find pellets, serial order collection (without intermediate inspections or visits), and reference and working memory errors (visits, inspections, or total)—are obtained simultaneously, and the results are immediately available after the end of each experiment. The system appears to be well suited to neurophysiological, neuropharmacological, and gene-technological investigations in rodent models.     

From autonomy to heteronomy (and back): The enaction of social life

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition.     

The emergence of personality: Dynamic foundations of individual variation

We conceptualize personality and individual variation from the perspective of dynamical systems. People’s thoughts, feelings, and predispositions for action are inherently dynamic, displaying constant change due to internal mechanisms and external forces, but over time the flow of thought and action converges on a narrow range of states—a fixed-point attractor—that provides cognitive, affective, and behavioral stability. An attractor for personal dynamics develops through two mechanisms: the synchronization of individuals’ internal states in social interaction, and the self-organization of thoughts and feelings with respect to a higher-order property (e.g., goal, self-concept). We present formal models of both processes and instantiate each in computer simulations. Discussion centers on the implications of interpersonal synchronization and self-organization dynamics for issues in personality psychology, including shared vs. non-shared environmental influences on personality development, the expression of personality in social interaction, personal stability vs. change, personal vs. situational causation, and the emergence of self-concept.     

Cognition as a dynamic system: Principles from embodiment

Traditional approaches to cognitive development concentrate on the stability of cognition and explain that stability via concepts segregated from perceiving acting. A dynamic systems approach in contrast focuses on the self-organization of behavior in tasks. This article uses recent results concerning the embodiment of cognition to argue for a dynamic systems approach. The embodiment hypothesis is the idea that intelligence emerges in the interaction of an organism with an environment and as a result of sensory-motor activity. The continual coupling of cognition to the world through the body both adapts cognition to the idiosyncrasies of the here and now, makes it relevant, and provides the mechanism for developmental change.     

基于概念外延的用户认知表达-——以智能冰箱的用户认知研究为例

--用户认知具有主观性、模糊性、进化性及多维性等不确定性特点,难以编码与度量。提出以概念外延表达的集合论方法与模糊数学把研究用户认知转换成研究代表它的因素集合;提出用数据驱动的互联网文本挖掘获取因素集,采用TF-IDF与模糊统计求解因素的隶属度,完成用户认知的数学表达,为进一步研究提供数学基础;最后以海信智能冰箱项目进行论证。由于用户认知属于典型的不确定性复杂对象,论文所用方法适用于所有复杂对象的建模与求解。     

Role Theory and Social Cognition: Learning to Think like a Recycler

While the interactionist tradition of sociological role theory has been recognized as a promising conceptual framework for linking theories of social structure and social cognition, there remains little empirical research that examines the link between cognitive structure and role behavior. Our study tests the fundamental assumption that commitment to role behavior is associated with the development of a corresponding cognitive structure, through an analysis of a six-week field experiment designed to produce commitment to the role of “recycler.” We propose that intervention program participation resulted in recycler role-identity development, as well as corresponding changes in cognitive structure—i.e., the development of cognitive schemata—linked to the emergence of a new role-based view of self.     

On the spontaneous discovery of a mathematical relation during problem solving

People spontaneously discover new representations during problem solving. Discovery of a mathematical representation is of special interest, because it shows that the underlying structure of the problem has been extracted. In the current study, participants solved gear-system problems as part of a game. Although none of the participants initially used a mathematical representation, many discovered a parity-based, mathematical strategy during problem solving. Two accounts of the spontaneous discovery of mathematical strategies were tested. According to the automatic schema abstraction hypothesis, experience with multiple, unique problem exemplars facilitates extraction of the parity relation. According to the comparison-based abstraction hypothesis, explicitly comparing gear pathways that have different number, but the same parity, should result in extraction of parity. An event history analysis showed that accumulation of experiences with different-number, same-parity comparisons predicted discovery of parity; accumulation of unique exemplars did not. Results suggest that comparison-based abstraction processes can lead to the discovery of a mathematical relation.     

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) flexibly adjust their human-directed behavior to the actions of their human partners in a problem situation

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) have been shown to actively initiate triadic communicative interactions by looking at a human partner or by alternating their gaze between the human and an object when being faced with an out-of-reach reward or an unsolvable problem. It has hardly been investigated, however, whether dogs flexibly adjust their human-directed behavior to the actions of their partners, which indicate their willingness and abilities to help them when they are faced with a problem. Here, in two experiments, we confronted dogs—after initially allowing them to learn how to manipulate an apparatus—with two problem situations: with an empty apparatus and a blocked apparatus. In Experiment 1, we showed that dogs looked back at their owners more when the owners had previously encouraged them, independently from the problem they faced. In Experiment 2, we provided dogs with two experimenters and allowed them to learn through an initial phase that each of the experimenters could solve one of the two problems: the Filler re-baited the empty apparatus and the Helper unblocked the blocked apparatus. We found that dogs could learn to recognize the ability of the Filler and spent time close to her when the apparatus was empty. Independently from the problem, however, they always approached the Helper first. The results of the present study indicate that dogs may have a limited understanding of physical problems and how they can be solved by a human partner. Nevertheless, dogs are able to adjust their behavior to situation-specific characteristics of their human partner’s behavior.