Ageing affects conceptual but not perceptual memory processes

Whereas age effects commonly occur in tests of explicit memory, tests of implicit memory often show age invariance. In two experiments, the traditional confound between test type (implicit vs explicit) and retrieval process (conceptually driven vs perceptually driven) was removed by using conceptually driven and perceptually driven tests of both implicit and explicit memory. Experiment 1 revealed a significant age effect for conceptually driven retrieval and no age effect for perceptually driven retrieval, regardless of the type of memory being measured. Experiment 2 highlighted a difference between the two age groups in their ability to utilise semantic encoding in a nominally perceptually driven explicit memory test. The paper concludes that although perceptually driven processing is stable over age, particular care must be taken to minimise contamination from conceptually driven retrieval processes in such investigations.     

Implicit memory and depression: preserved conceptual priming in subclinical depression

Depression impairs explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. Initial studies indicated preserved implicit memory, implying a depressive deficit in intentional but not unintentional forms of memory. Subsequent research indicated that conceptual priming is reduced in depression, implying a deficit in conceptual memory processes be they implicit or explicit. However, the findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study compared subclinically depressed and non-depressed participants on matched conceptual tests of explicit memory (category-cued recall) and implicit memory (category production). The implicit test was followed by a post-test questionnaire used to categorise participants as test-aware or test-unaware. On the explicit test, the subclinically depressed participants recalled less than the non-depressed participants. The results on the implicit test depended on test-awareness. Among test-unaware participants, conceptual priming was equivalent across the two groups, whereas for the test-aware, non-depressed participants produced significantly more priming than the subclinically depressed. This indicates that when explicit contamination is controlled, depression does not impair conceptual priming. The depressive dissociation between implicit and explicit memory is better accounted for by the difference between intentional and unintentional forms of memory rather than by the difference between conceptual and perceptual memory processes.     

Dissociating perceptual and conceptual implicit memory in multiple sclerosis patients

Previous studies indicate that Multiple Sclerosis (MS) patients exhibit deficits in tests of explicit memory such as free recall, but show normal priming on implicit tests of memory such as word stem completion. However, the memory performance of patients with different MS disease subtypes has not been fully examined. In the current study, memory was assessed in Primary Progressive (PPMS), Relapsing Remitting (RRMS), and Secondary Progressive (SPMS) MS subgroups. Explicit memory as well as perceptual and conceptual implicit memory were examined using free recall, word fragment completion, and exemplar generation tests, respectively. All three groups of MS patients exhibited free recall deficits and normal priming on the exemplar generation test. However, the PPMS group exhibited a deficit in word fragment completion priming, whereas the RRMS and SPMS groups exhibited normal levels of priming on this task. Lesion load was assessed using magnetic resonance imaging and was negatively correlated with explicit memory performance, but it did not account for the observed deficits in perceptual implicit memory. The results indicate that PPMS patients exhibit a pattern of memory impairment that is distinct from that of the RRMS and SPMS groups. Moreover, the results indicate that perceptual implicit memory can be neurologically dissociated from conceptual implicit memory.     

Proofreading familiar text: Allocating resources to perceptual and conceptual processes

Levy (1983) demonstrated that more spelling errors were detected, within a limited time period, when familiar passages were proofread than when unfamiliar passages were proofread. In the present series, Experiment 1 eliminated a possible confound in the Levy (1983) studies and showed that errors were detected both faster and more accurately in familiar texts. Experiment 2 demonstrated higher order involvement in the proofreading transfer effect, suggesting that a strictly word-level account was insufficient. Experiment 3 explored the proofreader’s sensitivity to the semantic properties of the proofreading passage, showing that the familiarity effect resulted from more efficient processing, not from lack of either visual or semantic analyses. The results are more consistent with a resource-allocation explanation than with either a visual-scanning or a skilled-visual-processing account.     

Effects of color on perceptual and conceptual tests of implicit memory

Two experiments are reported that explore why recent investigations of implicit memory failed to find any effects of color information on test performance. In the first experiment, participants studied colored pictures as well as words printed in colored ink without any memory instructions. During the test phase, a verbal and a pictorial version of a color-choice task (a conceptual priming test) were compared to two perceptual tests (word-stem completion and picture-fragment identification). Similar and significant amounts of priming to color occurred in both color-choice tasks. The perceptual tests were found to be sensitive to changes in the stimulus-presentation mode from study to test, but stimuli remaining the same color and those changed to black-and-white did not differ in the priming scores. In the second experiment, a mild division of attention was introduced in the study phase. Once again, priming to color was observed only in the verbal version of a color-choice test and not in the word-stem completion test. Dividing attention did not decrease performance on both implicit tests, whereas an explicit test of color recall for studied pictures suffered from dividing attention at encoding. It is concluded that a perceptual attribute such as color may be represented and coded by conceptual processing. Furthermore, automatic (or not attention-demanding) encoding processes may suffice for later conceptual tests of implicit memory. Previous failures to find any effects of color information on implicit performance are attributed to the use of perceptual priming tests. Received: 30 June 1997 / Accepted: 20 April 1998     

The representational bias of acquired memory processes

The notion that some memory processes are acquired has been around for at least two thousand years. However, acquired memory processes have been made the object of scientific investigation in only the past two decades. Traditionally, psychologists have assumed that acquired memory processes are equally effective across the entire range of memory tasks. This article reviews research that has investigated whether these processes are equally effective across tasks or are more effective for just certain tasks. The review indicates that most, if not all, acquired memory processes are biased to deal effectively just certain kinds of mental representation. The article proposes that these processes are representationally biased because (1) they activate basic memory processes (e.g. imagery, rehearsal) which themselves are biased to process certain representational attributes and because (2) their use of basic processes follows a sequence required by particular memory tasks. Increased understanding of the representational bias of acquired processes may be seen to enable better control of memory performance and to foster more powerful investigations of memory phenomena.     

Priming on verbal perceptual tests: Roles of lexical,surface, and conceptual processes

According to a lexical-access hypothesis, priming on verbal-completion tests requires previous access to higher-order nodes such as morphemes or words. In two experiments, subjects studied words presented in printed color, either by reading the words or by naming the printed colors. In Experiment 2, some of the words were to be ignored in both study conditions. The words presented in Experiment 2 were either conceptually related or unrelated to each other. And the cues in the test phase for repeated targets were either printed in the studied color or in a different color. In both experiments, the word stems of nouns studied and of new targets were presented with word-completion instructions (implicit test of memory). Consistent with the hypothesis, the amount of priming obtained was greater in the reading than in the color-naming condition. The least amount of priming was observed for targets that were to be ignored at study. In addition, Experiment 2 showed considerable effects of surface similarity (i.e., stronger priming effects with cues whose color was not changed from the study to the test phase) and some effects of conceptual processing, as was indicated by different amounts of priming for unrelated and for related nouns. Because these two effects were observed with both types of study task, it is concluded that perceptual and conceptual processes may make independent contributions to priming effects in verbal perceptual tests. This conclusion modifies and extends the original hypothesis, according to which previous lexical access is required in order to obtain effects of perceptual or conceptual processes on the priming scores.     

Effects of divided attention on perceptual and conceptual memory tests: An analysis using a process-dissociation approach

In two experiments, the nature of the relation between attention available at learning and subsequent automatic and controlled influences of memory was explored. Participants studied word lists in full and divided encoding conditions. Memory for the word lists was then tested with a perceptually driven task (stem completion) in Experiment 1 and with a conceptually driven task (category association) in Experiment 2. For recall cued with word stems, automatic influences of memory derived using the process-dissociation procedure remained invariant across a manipulation of attention that substantially reduced conscious recollection for the learning episode. In contrast, for recall cued with category names, dividing attention at learning significantly reduced the parameter estimates representing both controlled and automatic memory processes. These findings were similar to those obtained using indirect test instructions. The results suggest that, in contrast to perceptual priming, conceptual priming may be enhanced by semantic processing, and this effect is not an artifact of contamination from conscious retrieval processes.     

Selection from perceptual and conceptual representations

The lateral prefrontal cortex has been implicated in a wide variety of functions that guide our behavior, and one such candidate function is selection. Selection mechanisms have been described in several domains spanning different stages of processing, from visual attention to response execution. Here, we consider two such mechanisms: selecting relevant information from the perceptual world (e.g., visual selective attention) and selecting relevant information from conceptual representations (e.g., selecting a specific attribute about an object from long-term memory). Although the mechanisms involved in visual selective attention have been well characterized, much less is known about the latter case of selection. In this article, we review the relevant literature from the attention domain as a springboard to understanding the mechanisms involved in conceptual selection.     

Autobiographical memory processes and the course of depression.

The authors report a 6-month follow-up study of clinically depressed patients. At baseline, 2 indexes of autobiographical memory functioning were assessed: the presence of spontaneous intrusive memories of stressful life events and performance on the Autobiographical Memory Test (J. M. G. Williams & K. Broadbent, 1986), which measures overgeneral memory. The index of overgeneral memory was associated with greater levels of spontaneous intrusion of stressful memories. Overgeneral memory did not predict outcome, but depression at follow-up was predicted by the amount of intrusion and avoidance of stressful memories, even after controlling for initial severity of psychiatric symptoms.     

Implicit memory bias,explicit memory bias,and anxiety

Abstract

Normals high, medium, and low in trait anxiety performed two encoding tasks (one predominantly data-driven and the other conceptually driven) on threat-related and neutral words, followed by tests of word completion, cued recall, and free recall. Memory performance indicated the existence of negative memory biases in the high trait-anxious group, but it was generally not possible to decide whether the biases were associated with trait anxiety rather than with depression. The biases were obtained mainly when there was a match between the processes at encoding and those at the time of test, whether the matching processes were predominantly data-driven or conceptually driven. Implications of these findings for implicit and explicit memory biases associated with high trait anxiety are discussed.     

Perceptual boundedness and perceptual support in conceptual development.

A theoretical framework for describing the role of perceptual information in early conceptual development is presented. In the main section of the article, a general operationalization of perceptual boundedness is introduced, 3 causes of this limitation are identified, the conditions under which infants and children seem to be perceptually bound are formulated, and the mechanisms by which this limitation declines are described. Traditional claims that young children are perceptually bound, as well as contemporary objections to these claims, are often based on the assumption that perceptual information is generally unveridical or insufficient. Recent doubts about this assumption are evaluated in the final section of the article. It is concluded that although realist arguments are untenable, there are limited forms of perceptual support for conceptual development.     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias.     

Effects of perceptual and conceptual similarity in semantic priming

Summary The study investigates the different contributions to semantic priming of two components of the semantic representation underlying a word. The two components are perceptually based information and conceptually based information. Perceptual information is based on physical attributes such as shape or color, while conceptual information consists of more abstract elements such as functional attributes. The question asked in this study was whether both components would produce an effect in semantic priming. Pairs of words either related because of a conceptual property (banana-apple), a perceptual property (ball-apple), or both because of a perceptual and conceptual property (cherry-apple) were presented as prime and target in a lexical decision and a word-naming task. The results showed independent contributions of perceptual and conceptual attributes to semantic priming.This research was supported by a grant from the Dutch Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). All three authors are senior authors and have contributed to all parts of the project.     

Training in family therapy: perceptual, conceptual and executive skills.

This paper presents a comprehensive and detailed outline of family therapy skills to aid in providing a more precise focus in the training of clinicians in family therapy. The skills are based on an integrated treatment model within a systems framework. Four major functions performed by a family therapist are separated and are further differentiated into general therapeutic competencies. Specific perceptual, conceptual, and executive skills are described in the form of instructional objectives and are listed under each competency. Occasional clarifying notes or examples are cited along with particular skills. Clinicians and trainees should find this outline a useful guide in skill development.     

Unconscious priming by color and form: different processes and levels

Using a metacontrast masking paradigm, prior studies have shown (a) that a target's color information and form information, can be processed without awareness and (b) that unconscious color processing occurs at early, wavelength-dependent levels in the cortical information processing hierarchy. Here we used a combination of paracontrast and metacontrast masking techniques to explore unconscious color and form priming effects produced by blue, green, and neutral stimuli. We found that color priming in normal observers is significantly reduced when an additional paracontrast mask precedes the target at optimal masking SOAs. However, no reduction of form-priming effects was obtained at similar optimal paracontrast SOAs. We conclude that unconscious color priming depends on an early, wavelength- or stimulus-dependent response of color neurons located at early cortical levels whereas unconscious form priming occurs at later levels.