The Other Accent Effect in Talker Recognition: Now You See It,Now You Don't

The existence of the Language Familiarity Effect (LFE), where talkers of a familiar language are easier to identify than talkers of an unfamiliar language, is well-documented and uncontroversial. However, a closely related phenomenon known as the Other Accent Effect (OAE), where accented talkers are more difficult to recognize, is less well understood. There are several possible explanations for why the OAE exists, but to date, little data exist to adjudicate differences between them. Here, we begin to address this issue by directly comparing listeners’ recognition of talkers who speak in different types of accents, and by examining both the LFE and OAE in the same set of listeners. Specifically, Canadian English listeners were tested on their ability to recognize talkers within four types of voice line-ups: Canadian English talkers, Australian English talkers, Mandarin-accented English talkers, and Mandarin talkers. We predicted that the OAE would be present for talkers of Mandarin-accented English but not for talkers of Australian English—which is precisely what we observed. We also observed a disconnect between listeners’ confidence and performance across different types of accents; that is, listeners performed equally poorly with Mandarin and Mandarin-accented talkers, but they were more confident with their performance with the latter group of talkers. The present findings set the stage for further investigation into the nature of the OAE by exploring a range of potential explanations for the effect, and introducing important implications for forensic scientists’ evaluation of ear witness testimony.     

Effect of Skill on Visual Laterality: Now You See It - Now You Dont (Comments on Clancy and Hoyer, 1993)

Clancy and Hoyer (1993) have recently investigated the effects of domain-specific expertise and hemispheric asymmetry on detecting featural differences in visual patterns. Based on the pattern of reaction time results, they concluded that there is a left-hemisphere advantage for making difficult, domain-relevant visual discriminations in skilled experts but not in unskilled control subjects. However, response accuracy data from the same experiment contradict their conclusions about the relationship of skill to the pattern of hemispheric asymmetry and favor an alternative interpretation in terms of the specific aspects of visual information needed to make different types of discrimination.     

Now You See Them,Now You Do Not: The Influence of Indicator–Factor Ratio on Support for Assessment Center Dimensions

The inability of assessment center (AC) researchers to find admissible solutions for confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) models that include dimensions has led some to conclude that ACs do not measure dimensions at all. This study investigated whether increasing the indicator–factor ratio facilitates the achievement of convergent and admissible CFA solutions in 2 independent ACs. Results revealed that, when models specify multiple behavioral checklist items as manifest indicators of each latent dimension, all of the AC CFA models tested were identified and returned proper solutions. When armed with the ability to undertake a full set of model comparisons using model fit rather than solution convergence and admissibility as comparative criteria, we found clear evidence for modest dimension effects. These results suggest that the frequent failure to find dimensions in models of the internal structure of ACs is a methodological artifact and that one approach to increase the likelihood for reaching a proper solution is to increase the number of manifest indicators for each dimension factor. In addition, across exercise dimension ratings and the overall assessment rating were both strongly correlated with dimension and exercise factors, indicating that regardless of how an AC is scored, exercise variance will continue to play a key role in the scoring of ACs.     

Now You Hear It: Fourteen-Month-Olds Succeed at Learning Minimal Pairs in Stressed Syllables

We examined whether 14-month-olds learn the mapping between a novel word and object in an associative-learning task when the forms differ minimally in only one segment where the crucial difference occurs in a stressed syllable. Fifty infants were presented with novel word–object pairings. Infants in one group heard the minimal difference in an initially stressed syllable, and the other group heard the minimal difference in a medially stressed syllable. Only those infants who were taught the medially stressed minimal pair detected a mismatch in the word–object pairing. These results demonstrate that 14-month-olds can succeed at minimal pair word learning when the critical information is presented in a stressed syllable, but importantly, only when particular acoustic cues are highlighted by syllable position—in this case, the medial position.     

Can You Hear Me Now? The Impact of Voice in an Online Gaming Community

This paper reports the results of a controlled field experiment in which voice communication was introduced into an existing online community (online gaming guilds within the popular game “World of Warcraft”), comparing a mix of voice and text with text only. Quantitative results suggest increases in liking and trust due to the addition of voice, as well as insulation from unexpected negative impacts of text‐only play. The findings are discussed with respect to social capital, cyberbalkanization, and the general computer‐mediated communication literature, with special attention paid to social information processing theory.     

Gender Now

This paper offers a synthesizing position statement on gender now. Gender has been socially transformed; cultural orders and symbolic meanings have evolved. Gender theory has changed considerably. Kinship as it informs gender has been reconsidered. The binary masculine–feminine complementary relationship between gender and sexuality has been deconstructed. Gender development has been recast in a frame that is both more attuned to social transformations and more fine-tuned to the relational excess that is early human life. Gendered embodiment and fantastic experience is being thought in accord with our recognition of the anxious force of normative regulation. The intricate latticework of gender coherence, bodily coherence, and psychic equilibrium is now open to question. Clinical technique, as one listens to gender now, must also be reframed.     

Constructive Empiricism Now

Philosophical Studies -     

Now and Then

I describe my development as a psychoanalyst from my dream of psychoanalysis as a revolutionary movement battling against ignorance and fixed beliefs to finding in Freud's theoretical framework a reliable, scientific base from which I could pursue my own thinking. I trace the evolution of my thinking through my experiences on the training and at my first post-training job in an antenatal department. I give an account of the culmination of my analytic development in my work at Brent Adolescent Centre where my husband, Moe Laufer, and I developed our theory of developmental breakdown in adolescence. Here we pioneered work and research with adolescents in analysis and at the walk-in center.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Now is the time

The aim of this paper is to consider some logical aspects of the debate between the view that the present is the only ‘real’ time, and the view that the present is not in any way metaphysically privileged. In particular I shall set out a language of first-order predicate tense logic with a now predicate, and a first order (extensional) language with an abstraction operator, in such a way that each language can be shewn to be exactly translatable into the other. I shew that this translation is preserved at the metalinguistic level, so that equivalent truth conditions can be defined in a tensed metalanguage or an indexical metalanguage. I then make some remarks about the connection between proofs of relative consistency and metaphysical truth; and some historical remarks about Arthur Prior's use of formal logic in expressing his presentist views.     

The Priority of the Now

This article motivates and develops a new theory of time: priority presentism. Priority presentism is the view according to which (i) only present entities exist fundamentally and (ii) past and future entities exist, but they are grounded in the present. The articulation of priority presentism is an exercise in applied grounding: it draws on concepts from the recent literature on ontological dependence and applies those concepts in a new way, to the philosophy of time. The result, as I will argue, is an attractive position that can do much of the same work in satisfying our intuitions about time as presentism, but without the ontological cost.     

Exemplification, Then and Now

Exemplification can be found in ontologies from the ancient world, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, and more recent ontologies, in particular those that take what exists to be determined by the empiricist’s Principle of Acquaintance. This study examines some of the ways in which exemplification takes different forms in these different ontologies. Exemplification has also been criticized as an ontological category. This paper examines a number of these criticisms, to see the extent to which they are viable.