The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited

This paper provides a defence of the account of partial resemblances between properties according to which such resemblances are due to partial identities of constituent properties. It is argued, first of all, that the account is not only required by realists about universals à la Armstrong, but also useful (of course, in an appropriately re-formulated form) for those who prefer a nominalistic ontology for material objects. For this reason, the paper only briefly considers the problem of how to conceive of the structural universals first posited by Armstrong in order to explain partial resemblances, and focuses instead on criticisms that have been levelled against the theory (by Pautz, Eddon, Denkel and Gibb) and that apply regardless of one’s preferred ontological framework. The partial identity account is defended from these objections and, in doing so, a hitherto quite neglected connection—between the debate about partial similarity as partial identity and that concerning ontological finitism versus infinitism—is looked at in some detail.     

Partial Monotonic Protothetics

This paper has four parts. In the first part, I present Leniewski's protothetics and the complete system provided for that logic by Henkin. The second part presents a generalized notion of partial functions in propositional type theory. In the third part, these partial functions are used to define partial interpretations for protothetics. Finally, I present in the fourth part a complete system for partial protothetics. Completeness is proved by Henkin's method [4] using saturated sets instead of maximally saturated sets. This technique provides a canonical representation of a partial semantic space and it is suggested that this space can be interpreted as an epistemic state of a non-omniscient agent.     

Partial avoidance contingencies

Rats were trained in a discrete-trial paradigm with no intertrial interval. The first response changed an auditory stimulus for the remainder of the trial. Shocks were delivered only at the end of the trial cycle. Avoidance contingencies were defined by the conditional probability of shock, given no response (P₀), and the conditional probability of shock given a response (P₁). The maximal avoidance contingency was P₀=1.0, P₁=0, and noncontingent conditions were those for which P₀=P₁. In Experiment I, after training on the maximal contingency, three groups of subjects experienced either P₀=P₁=0, P₀=P₁=0.5, or P₀=P₁=1.0. Eight of 10 subjects stopped responding under the noncontingent conditions. Experiment II studied partial contingencies by varying P₀ and P₁. For one group, P₀ was reduced holding P₁=0. Responding decreased to zero as P₀ approached zero. A second group was studied under P₁>0, holding P₀=1.0. For three of the six rats in this group, responding decreased to zero with increasing P₁. The other three maintained responding as P₁ was increased up to the noncontingent, P₁=P₀=1.0 value. The P₀ group was also studied with P₀=P₁>0, and half of these subjects responded. The results demonstrated two modes of response to weakening or eliminating the avoidance contingency. Some subjects were sensitive to contingency only, and insensitive to changes in shock density. Approximately one half of the subjects were sensitive to both contingency and shock density. This shared control was observed only when P₁> 0.     

经鼻内镜下鼻甲黏膜下切除术和传统手术的对比

为了比较经鼻内镜下鼻甲黏膜下切除术与传统行下鼻甲部分切除术治疗下鼻甲肥大的有效性及安全性,对我院2008年1月至2010年12月的230例慢性鼻炎的患者分为两组,观察组125例行下鼻甲黏膜下部分切除术,对照组105例行传统切除术,观察两组患者的疗效及并发症,发现两种手术的近期疗效无差异(P>0.05),下鼻甲黏膜下切除术远期疗效和并发症发生率均优于传统手术(P<0.05).因此,下鼻甲黏膜下切除术疗效显著,并发症少,值得推广.     

Partial assessment of technologies

Trade‐Offs: Imperatives of Choice in a High‐Tech World, by Ed Wenk, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 238 pages, hb $20     

Partial worlds and paradox

Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on the totality of possible worlds semantics can be found in the fact that the so-called Strengthened Liar problem is avoided.I would like to thank Dirk Koppelberg for helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks to an anonymous referee for detailed comments.     

Partial isomorphisms and intuitionistic logic

A game for testing the equivalence of Kripke models with respect to finitary and infinitary intuitionistic predicate logic is introduced and applied to discuss a concept of categoricity for intuitionistic theories.     

Partial Structures and Jeffrey-Keynes Algebras

In Tsuji 1997 the concept of Jeffrey-Keynes algebras was introduced in order to construct a paraconsistent theory of decision under uncertainty. In the present paper we show that these algebras can be used to develop a theory of decision under uncertainty that measures the degree of belief on the quasi (or partial) truth of the propositions. As applications of this new theory of decision, we use it to analyze Popper's paradox of ideal evidence and to indicate a possible way of formalizing Keynes' theory of economic action.     

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly‐veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects (partial intrinsic resemblance) requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object is roughly for it to be wholly present in that object. (So understood, immanence does not imply repeatability, and thus tropes count as immanent.) If two objects are intrinsically similar in one way but not another, there must be a difference between the two ways. And if the similarity is between the objects as they are in themselves, then this difference, too, must be within the objects. Partial intrinsic resemblance thus requires internal structure. Without it, there can be no distinctions between ways in which things are intrinsically alike and ways in which they aren't. I will argue, further, that distinctions between properties that transcend objects fail to account for the possibility of partial intrinsic resemblance.     

Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity

I demonstrate that analysing the resemblance of properties in terms of partial identity has insuperable logical consequences. It follows that the strategy of vindicating the realism of universals against particularistic ontologies such as tropism by appeal to partial identity is incoherent.     

A Partial Defense of Permissivism

Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by distinguishing two versions (each) of Permissiveness and Uniqueness. I then respond to several recent challenges to Permissivism in an attempt to even the score between Permissivism and Uniqueness. I will also respond to a worry – arising out of my discussion – that a defense of Permissivism itself introduces an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality.     

Partial integration of single electrocutaneous pulses

Psychometric functions generated by single eleetroeutaneous stimuli yielded a median coefficient of variation ( σ/μ ) of 0.23. These data are consistent with other psychometric data recently reported by us which yielded σ/μ ratios of this size. The data are discussed and related to conflicting data reported in the recent literature indicating coefficients of variation for this mode of stimulation which are only 1/3 as large. Evidence is presented for partial temporal summation (time-intensity reciprocity) for electrocutaneous stimuli ranging from 175 to 610 microseconds. The data are best fitted by the equation I x t^a = k, where a is approximately 0.57. This equation and exponent also fit summation data reported by the same authors who report finding steep psychometric functions. Clearly, then, the mechanism responsible for the very limited temporal summation found for eleetrocutaneous stimulation and the mechanism responsible for very steep psychometric functions are not identical. The discussion also includes speculation regarding possible mechanisms and suggestions for research.