去极端化能够有效消除恐怖主义滋生的土壤 “去极端化”系列之七

<正>恐怖活动是恐怖分子的有意识、有思想、有目的的行为,极端主义是暴力恐怖活动的意识形态基础。恐怖分子制造恐怖袭击有各种各样的政治诉求,但是这些世俗的政治诉求往往因为宗教极端思想而显得更加隐蔽。恐怖势力借助宗教极端思想来欺骗广大信教群众,混淆视听。反恐应侧重预防和去极端化。去极端化可以有效消除恐怖主义滋     

基于恐怖分子的恐怖主义心理学述评

关于恐怖主义的定义至今仍没有达成共识。文章中的恐怖主义是指任何个体、团体或组织为了达成某种政治、宗教或社会目的, 而对无辜者非法使用暴力或其他胁迫性手段, 企图引起目标对象或公众的注意, 并制造恐怖气氛的行为。其形成和发展可以用综合症模型、自恋–攻击模型、挫折–攻击模型、工具模型、社会情境模型和其他综合性模型来解释。作者对这些模型进行了述评并提出了相应的防止恐怖主义的心理学策略。心理学界对于恐怖主义的实证研究较少, 而且侧重于描述和解释, 在预测和应用上有待进一步发展。     

马克·尤尔根斯迈耶全球宗教政治理论述评

马克·尤尔根斯迈耶是美国著名宗教政治研究专家，前美国宗教学会主席。他对于宗教在当前全球政治中的作用提出了一系列颇有见地的看法，比如，他认为由于上世纪70年代以来的宗教复兴运动，冷战之后的世界依然会笼罩在“新冷战”的阴云之中；宗教政治的根源不在于文明之间的差异，而在于文明内部宗教与世俗政权之间的冲突；宗教也在恐怖行为中发挥着重要作用，恐怖行为是一种“表演暴力”，宗教在其中扮演着“宇宙战争”的角色。     

中国代表团在联合国人权理事会第28次会议与宗教信仰自由问题特别报告员对话时的发言

经有关专家推荐,本刊节选联合国人权理事会宗教或信仰自由问题特别报告员海纳·比勒费尔特提交人权理事会第28届会议的关于"以宗教为名义的暴力"的报告,供读者参阅。该报告分为三个部分,118个自然段,中文本全文18000余字。限于篇幅,本刊主要节选第二部分。这部分中的以下观点,值得我们在认识宗教极端主义和暴力恐怖活动的关系时加以思考:1."宗教或信仰自由是一项人权,因此保护的是人而不是宗教。"2."不能将暴力行为归因于宗教本身或任何特定宗教,这一点始终属实,因为执行这些行为的人一直是在特定社会、经济、政治和历史背景下寻求特定目标。但同样属实的是,人类行为方动机广泛,包括宗教动机。有些情况下暴力袭击可能由煽动宗教情感的马基雅维利主义战略家策划,但显然也有宗教狂热分子似乎认为,他们折磨或杀害人类同胞时实际上是在为上帝服务。"3."宗教群体,特别是其代表和精神领袖,不应将宗教名义的暴力仅仅称为‘误解'和外部侵犯。这将导致将问题不负责任地被庸常化。反之,处理这种暴力问题时,神学家和宗教领袖应面对这一令人不安的事实:暴力行为——或至少部分暴力行为——的犯罪者在杀害人类同胞时可能深信自己的行为是在为神服务。"4."除明确谴责宗教名义的暴力行为外,各群体及其领袖还应积极增进同情、宽容和对多样性的提倡。应揭露宗教极端分子的观点中对宗教传统核心的慈善要旨的无知,从而挑战他们所谓正宗性的言论。"     

联合国人权理事会宗教或信仰自由问题特别报告员海纳·比勒费尔特向人权理事会第28届会议的报告(节选)

经有关专家推荐,本刊节选联合国人权理事会宗教或信仰自由问题特别报告员海纳·比勒费尔特提交人权理事会第28届会议的关于"以宗教为名义的暴力"的报告,供读者参阅。该报告分为三个部分,118个自然段,中文本全文18000余字。限于篇幅,本刊主要节选第二部分。这部分中的以下观点,值得我们在认识宗教极端主义和暴力恐怖活动的关系时加以思考:1."宗教或信仰自由是一项人权,因此保护的是人而不是宗教。"2."不能将暴力行为归因于宗教本身或任何特定宗教,这一点始终属实,因为执行这些行为的人一直是在特定社会、经济、政治和历史背景下寻求特定目标。但同样属实的是,人类行为方动机广泛,包括宗教动机。有些情况下暴力袭击可能由煽动宗教情感的马基雅维利主义战略家策划,但显然也有宗教狂热分子似乎认为,他们折磨或杀害人类同胞时实际上是在为上帝服务。"3."宗教群体,特别是其代表和精神领袖,不应将宗教名义的暴力仅仅称为‘误解'和外部侵犯。这将导致将问题不负责任地被庸常化。反之,处理这种暴力问题时,神学家和宗教领袖应面对这一令人不安的事实:暴力行为——或至少部分暴力行为——的犯罪者在杀害人类同胞时可能深信自己的行为是在为神服务。"4."除明确谴责宗教名义的暴力行为外,各群体及其领袖还应积极增进同情、宽容和对多样性的提倡。应揭露宗教极端分子的观点中对宗教传统核心的慈善要旨的无知,从而挑战他们所谓正宗性的言论。"     

非自杀性自伤与接纳承诺疗法的多维解析

接纳承诺疗法干预非自杀性自伤已经被一些临床案例证实疗效显著,与其他传统的心理治疗相比,接纳承诺疗法的干预效果更加持久。首先分析了非自杀性自伤基本含义以及各类特征,从心理动机的角度简要说明了非自杀性自伤发生的原因,再结合接纳承诺疗法的心理病理模型及治疗模型,阐述了接纳承诺疗法是通过提高个体心理灵活性减少非自杀性自伤发生的的理论依据与治疗过程,最后梳理了近年来国外学者通过接纳承诺疗法干预非自杀性自伤的实证研究及效果,为其他研究者实践该疗法治疗非自杀性自伤提供借鉴思路。     

青少年非自杀性自伤行为持续和停止的预测性因素

非自杀性自伤是指个体在没有自杀意图的情况下故意伤害自己的身体,且不被社会所认可的行为,是个体未来自杀意图、自杀行为以及长期心理障碍等问题的重要风险因素。青少年作为高发人群,非自杀性自伤行为会对其身心健康造成严重危害,且具有明显的社会“传染”效应。因此了解对青少年非自杀性自伤行为的持续或停止具有预测作用的因素,有助于为该行为的早期预防及干预提供新视角。 通过梳理国内外采用纵向追踪、回溯性研究等方法的相关文献,并基于Nock的整合理论模型,将青少年非自杀性自伤行为的持续或停止具有预测作用的因素划分为生理机制、个人特质和社会因素三类。在生理机制上,青少年非自杀性自伤行为的持续或停止存在一定的神经生物学基础,如当青少年体内的β-内啡肽水平、杏仁核-额叶之间的静息态功能连接(RSFC)处于异常状态时,个体为恢复体内平衡,可能会对非自杀性自伤行为产生依赖,进而将该行为持续下去。在个人特质上,情绪调节存在缺陷的青少年更易出现并维持非自杀性自伤行为,而善于接受自己的情绪反应且能够使用适应性情绪调节策略的青少年在未来更易停止该行为;具有边缘型人格障碍、冲动型人格特征、低自尊水平、高自我批评与自我惩罚水平等特点的青少年通常会在较长时间内持续非自杀性自伤行为,相反,具有高自尊水平、对逆境持积极信念、低自我惩罚水平等特点的青少年则更可能停止该行为;青少年所依赖的非自杀性自伤功能也会影响该行为的发展进程,因自我功能(如情绪调节、自我惩罚等)而依赖于非自杀性自伤的青少年有很大的可能性长时间维持这一行为,而因人际功能(如引起他人关注、融入群体等)而依赖于非自杀性自伤的青少年在一段时间后更有可能停止该行为。在社会因素上,如同伴欺凌、不良家庭关系等风险因素可能会削弱个体应对痛苦的能力,进而诱发或加剧青少年的非自杀性自伤行为,反之,有效的社会支持资源(如同伴支持、家庭支持、心理咨询与治疗等)则有助于青少年非自杀性自伤行为的停止。 目前国内外相关研究多集中于非自杀性自伤行为的流行、研究方法、相关影响因素和功能等领域,对非自杀性自伤行为持续或停止的理论和实践探讨相对较少,未来相关研究应注意采用多样化的研究方法及非自杀性自伤行为测量技术,拓展研究领域(如性格、认知取向等),同时还应关注不同的年龄群体及文化背景差异,以进一步明确对非自杀性自伤行为发展进程具有显著预测作用的风险因素和保护性因素,并深入探究各因素之间的交互作用。     

南北朝天师道天文历算学研究补议

正科学研究离不开一定的社会土壤。默顿谈到,"一个社会制度领域,例如宗教或经济的领域内的兴趣、动机和行为的社会形式,同其他制度领域如科学领域的兴趣、动机和行为的社会形式,具有相互依存的关系"。~1在两晋时,天师道已获得广泛传播,并自下而上,由世胄高门"渐染及于皇族"~2,进而衍生出上清经派等新支系。天师道在晋时仍颇受《太平经》太平均之政治乌托邦观念影响,宗教超越性与世俗政治诉求之间未形成明晰的界限,而宗教神秘主义因素更放大了     

论大卫·弗里德兰德的犹太教改革思想

大卫·弗里德兰德作为门德尔松之后德国犹太启蒙运动的代言人,只是在一定程度上继承了门德尔松的启蒙思想;在争取柏林犹太社区解放的背景下,弗里德兰德批判了传统犹太教的形式主义,提出了按照理性宗教和自然宗教的要求,对犹太教律法和仪式进行彻底变革的主张,从而将犹太启蒙运动引向激进化的道路。在当时条件下,弗里德兰德的犹太教改革思想因带有强烈的政治动机而不为基督教社会所接受,又因过于激进也没有得到犹太社区的普遍认同。     

休谟的反宗教的目的和目标——“阉割”的神话与《人性论》之谜的解决

对休谟哲学的传统解释认为休谟《人性论》出版之前删除其中有关宗教的讨论,对宗教问题没有直接的或实质性的关切;它们在《人性论》的目的和目标问题上或者采取怀疑主义观点或者采取自然主义观点,然而这两种观点恰好是方向相反的和相互背离的。作者通过考察《人性论》产生的历史语境和哲学语境而提出一种旨在说明其哲学的统一性和一贯性的反宗教解释。按照这种解释,《人性论》的总体规划是参照霍布斯著作中的相似计划设计的,其目的和目标就是反宗教,其怀疑主义和自然主义的成份就植根于其反宗教的动机;《人性论》系统地涉及和直接地关联于宗教问题,属于把人类从迷信的枷锁中解放出来的反宗教或无神论传统。以此为基础,作者在文中对其反宗教解释的性质和意义做出概括性的说明。     

Political and religious group membership,value priorities and educational values

Value priorities and educational value patterns are explored in respect to university students’ active membership to religious and political groups. The sample was 117 students of the University of Athens, Greece, with 39 of them being active members of Christian Orthodox religious groups, 34 active members of political groups or unions, and 44 students acting as the ‘control’ group, since they were not members of such religious or political groups. Group membership—religious or political—was found to be associated with the systems of value priorities and educational values, with specific value combinations differentiating between religious group membership and political group membership.     

When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and Unreasonable Religions

Some religiously devout individuals believe divine command can override an obligation to obey the law where the two are in conflict. At the extreme, some individuals believe that acts of violence that seek to change or punish a political community, or to prevent others from violating what they take to be God’s law, are morally justified. In the face of this apparent clash between religious and political commitments it might seem that modern versions of political morality—such as John Rawls’s political liberalism—that refuse to take a stance on controversial religious matters, or eschew appeal to perfectionist doctrines, are beset by a particularly acute version of this problem of religious disobedience. Whilst political liberalism follows this path so as to generate wide and stable support, it raises the question of how political liberals should respond to religiously motivated non-compliance with the norms of that liberal conception of justice. This article evaluates what resources are available to political liberalism to respond to this challenge. It examines whether anti-perfectionism can be sustained in the face of those whose religious beliefs are in conflict with the law. We argue that, under certain circumstances, political liberalism requires direct engagement with the religious views of the unreasonable, including offering religious arguments to show that their particular interpretation of their faith is mistaken. This view takes political liberalism away from its usual ambitions, but it is a position that is both anticipated by Rawls and consistent with his view. It does, however, require that political liberals give up the claim that the view is a wholly non-sectarian, purely political view, and accept that, under certain circumstances it is a partially comprehensive version of liberal theory.     

Religious Right,Religious Left,Both, or Neither? Understanding Religio‐Political Identification

In this article we analyze the effects of religious, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables on religious Americans’ propensity to identify with religio‐political movements. Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey collected by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), we sort nonsecular Americans into four categories: religious right, religious left, both religious right and religious left, or neither religious right nor the religious left. We estimate a multinomial logit model in which we depict religio‐political identification as a function of religious affiliation, worship attendance, religious embeddedness, religious convictions, political attitudes, and socioeconomic and demographic controls. We find that a wide range of religious, political, and socioeconomic/demographic variables affect individuals’ identification with the religious right and/or religious left. Our empirical results also permit us to analyze the seeming paradox of identifying with both the religious right and the religious left. We find that individuals who identify with both movements come from the ranks of the highly religious, those who believe that being moral requires one to believe in God, Tea Party supporters, strong partisans, those with lower education and income, older individuals, and blacks and Hispanics.     

Religion and Political Decision Making

Influential political theorists suggest that religious differences in political life may be overcome through shared commitment to political processes. In this article, I subject the underlying assumptions of this proposition to empirical inquiry. When faced with substantive conflict over policy outcomes, do religious persons defer to a political process for resolution? And if so, to which political process do they defer? Through a novel interview exercise with 61 respondents from a variety of religious backgrounds, I find a general willingness to defer to a legitimate political process, even if it results in an undesirable outcome that violates religious (or other) political preferences. However, I also find that a political process need not be democratic to be seen as legitimate, and that process preferences do not map onto religious differences.     

Assessing Conventional Wisdom about Religion and Politics: A Preliminary View from the Pews

Given religious leaders’ frequent opportunities to communicate to a large and receptive audience, political messages delivered during religious services have the potential to make a considerable impact on American politics—with particular significance for political education and mobilization. Social scientists routinely conclude that such messages are indeed disseminated, a claim we test in this study. Is it in fact true that church– and temple–going Americans regularly receive political messages from their ministers, priests, and rabbis during worship services? If so, what forms do these pronouncements take? How intense are they? Is this communication limited to messages from the service leader or does it come from other parts of the service, either informal or ritualistic? Existing empirical assessments of this topic depend heavily on survey research, asking congregants (or, less often, members of the clergy) about the frequency and content of political messages. Although such studies are certainly valuable, we approach religious political communications in a more immediate way: by observing them directly. Our conclusions are based on two waves of attendance at weekly services during 1998–1999, varying by religious tradition and denomination, region, and other dimensions. We find that “political” messages, broadly defined, are indeed delivered quite often. However, content analysis of these messages reveals that they typically address matters of social justice and rarely other types of political activity or belief, such as specific public policies or civic involvement (including voting). Political references during services only very occasionally constituted calls to direct political action on the part of the worshiper. Ultimately, our findings suggest that political content does occur relatively frequently during U.S. religious services, supporting the accounts of other social scientists. Our analysis offers new insight as to the content and nature of the political messages Americans are exposed to during religious services.     

Malcolm X’s Conversions: The Interplay of Political and Religious Subjectivities

In this article, I offer a way of thinking about the interplay of political and religious subjectivities in persons’ conversion experiences or faith journeys. More particularly, I contend that a person’s political and religious experiences interact such that political experiences and ideas shape the person’s religious values and beliefs, and vice versa. Malcolm X’s story is used to illustrate this interplay of subjectivities vis-à-vis the varied changes or conversions in his life. The major point here is that the richness and depth of change in Malcolm X’s life (and other figures) are better grasped when we take into account the dynamic intersection of the political and religious.     

Religion and Military Policy Attitudes in America

The present study assesses the relationship between religious faith, worship discourse, and military policy attitudes among White Americans. Our work suggests that religious congregations are important spaces for Whites to potentially engage in dissenting political talk. We find that the degree to which congregations inform military policy attitudes, laity must be involved in political discussions. However, this study also suggests that religious faith plays a role in the degree to which political discussions had within worship spaces associates with anti-war attitudes. White Evangelical Protestants tend to be less opposed to aggressive military policy than others. These differences become particularly pronounced among Evangelical and Mainline Protestants as members of these religious faiths become involved in and/or exposed to social-political discussions within worship spaces.     

Justifying political decisions through theological arguments

The relationship between religion and politics in Muslim contexts has been discussed from many different perspectives. One of these proceeds from the theory of religious politics, according to which political thoughts and decisions are justified and legitimated with the support of theological explanations. A central premise is that religion is able to provide a moral sanction for political actions and decisions. This article discusses the relationship between religion and politics in a Shiite context in pre-modern and early modern times, based on the theory of religious politics. The central point is that the Shiite scholars, during the Safavid era (1501–1736), based their secular viewpoints on interpretations of the Quran, the hadiths, and the 12 Imamite Shiite sources, especially the specific ideas about the hidden imam, to legitimate their own collaboration with the Safavid kings. According to this theory, the religious politics occur within an ideological context such as a nation-state and specific historical circumstances. The religious legitimizations of political actions are usually intertwined with local and historical identities. As such the religious ideologies reflect not a return to tradition per se, but rather an ideological reconstruction of tradition for a new context. The ultimate question is which came first? Did the theological interpretations precede secular and political decisions, or was it the other way around? The theory of religious politics arrives at the conclusion that the theological explanations are employed to legitimate traditions of political thought and secular decisions and not the reverse.     

Religious Appeals and Implicit Attitudes

This article explores the effects of religious appeals by politicians on attitudes and behavior. Although politicians frequently make religious appeals, the effectiveness of these appeals and the mechanisms of persuasion are unknown. This article explores the possibility that religious language can affect political attitudes through implicit processes. Because religious attachments are formed early in the lives of many Americans, religious language may influence citizens without their awareness. Implicit and explicit attitudes are related but distinct constructs, and implicit attitudes may have behavioral implications in the political realm. I test these hypotheses experimentally, relying on a widely used implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test. I find that a Christian religious appeal affects implicit attitudes and political behavior among people who currently or previously identify as Christian. Furthermore, an explicit preference for less religion in politics does not moderate implicit effects.     

None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States

Prior research on those who are “not religious” in the traditional, organizational sense has focused on a broad category of people in the United States who do not identify with an established religious tradition. We distinguish three categories of people who are religiously nonbelieving or nonbelonging: atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers. Examining issues of religious belief and identity, we compare private spiritual life, attitudes on political issues, and stance toward religion in the public sphere for these three categories of nonreligious respondents. Atheists are the most uniformly antireligious. Agnostics, by comparison, are less opposed to religion overall, while unchurched believers display higher levels of personal religiosity and spirituality than atheists or agnostics. While atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers are similar in their political identification and attitudes related to religiously infused political topics, unchurched believers are as strongly opposed to religion in the public sphere as atheists.