共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):79-95
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we
should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of
intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is
not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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Uriah KriegelEmail: |
2.
Nathan Stemmer 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(2):315-327
Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s
theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according
to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role
in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues
such as mental causation, the nature of qualia, supervenience of the mental, or multiple realizability, presume the existence
of, or at least attribute a positive role to, mental entities. The probable correctness of Quine’s theory therefore suggests
that all these publications are worthless and reading them is a waste of time just as reading studies about how crystal spheres
can move planets is considered nowadays a waste of time.
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Nathan StemmerEmail: |
3.
Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2009,48(2):127-142
There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural
entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural
entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific
methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment.
It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural
entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow
for the possibility of supernatural entities.
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Steve ClarkeEmail: |
4.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
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Manfred KupfferEmail: |
5.
T. Parent 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):103-112
It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this
is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is
ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1)
disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the different
theses in Quine’s philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry.
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T. ParentEmail: |
6.
Natan Berber 《Axiomathes》2007,17(2):185-196
This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory
can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and
philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance
will be considered. The latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications
for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out.
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Natan BerberEmail: |
7.
Berit Brogaard 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):21-42
There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability
thesis—the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds.
If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments
can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two doctrines is illusory.
The reason that there is no real conflict is not simply that in determining our theories’ ontological commitments we naturally
rely on our home language but also (and more importantly) that ontological commitment is not intimately tied to objectual
quantification and a reference-first approach to language. Or so we will argue. We conclude with a new inscrutability argument
which rests on the observation that the notion of objectual quantification, when properly cashed out, deflates.
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Berit BrogaardEmail: Email: |
8.
Amie L. Thomasson 《Axiomathes》2009,19(1):1-15
This paper defends the view that ontological questions (properly understood) are easy—too easy, in fact, to be subjects of
substantive and distinctively philosophical debates. They are easy, roughly, in the sense that they may be resolved straightforwardly—generally by a combination of conceptual
and empirical enquiries. After briefly outlining the view and some of its virtues, I turn to examine two central lines of
objection. The first is that this ‘easy’ approach is itself committed to substantive ontological views, including an implausibly
permissive ontology. The second is that it, like neo-Fregean views, relies on transformation rules that are questionable on
both logical and ontological grounds. Ultimately, I will argue, the easy view is not easily assailed by either of these routes,
and so remains (thus far) a tenable and attractive approach.
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Amie L. ThomassonEmail: |
9.
Scott Soames 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):213-218
The article rebutts Michael Kremer’s contention that Russell’s contextual definition of set-theoretic language in Principia
Mathematica constituted the ontological achievement of eliminating commitment to classes. Although Russell’s higher-order
quantifiers, used in the definition, need not range over classes, none of the plausible substitutes provide a solid basis
for eliminating them. This point is used to defend the presentation, in The Dawn of Analysis, of Russell’s logicist reduction,
using a first-order version of naive set theory.
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Scott SoamesEmail: |
10.
The Heideggerian rupture in the history of philosophy in the name of a phenomenological and poetic ontology has provided an
opening which many of the key figures in twentieth century continental thought have exploited. However, this opening was marked
by Heidegger himself as an ambiguous one, insofar as metaphysics was perhaps integrally ‘onto-theology,’ that is, ultimately
continuous with the world-historical capture of the thought of being. This piece argues that the philosophy of Alain Badiou,
which departs from the recognition that Heidegger is the ‘last universally recognised philosopher’, provides the means for
a radical reconsideration of the philosophy-theology relationship in its specifically Heideggerian form, involving as it does
further questions of science and technology, the status of the poem, and the nature of ontological thought as such. We argue
that, through the deployment of mathematics as ontology, the Gordian knot of onto-theology and its legion of consequences
can be cut, and a new assemblage of many of the key Heideggerian motifs can be put into play: the poem, history, and philosophy
itself.
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Jon RoffeEmail: |
11.
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):131-140
Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The
failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views,
which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization
salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
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Guillermo E. Rosado HaddockEmail: |
12.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):101-116
Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help
with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding
fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in
the philosophy of mathematics.
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Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
13.
Lisa Warenski 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):403-426
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in
a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical
indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted
in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with
the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further
conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable
in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish
empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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Lisa WarenskiEmail: |
14.
Albert Casullo 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):77-90
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is
the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge.
There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose
any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general
theory of knowledge or justification (call it the background theory). Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that
are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the
failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge.
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Albert CasulloEmail: |
15.
Jonathan Schaffer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):7-19
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view
puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can
provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is
fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement.
The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
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Jonathan SchafferEmail: |
16.
Mark Day 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):417-427
The approach that philosophers have taken to history has too often been one-dimensional. It is my aim in this paper to map
out a future multi-dimensional philosophy of history, by invoking the notion of a relation with the past, and by arguing for
the philosophical relevance of multiple such relations.
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Mark DayEmail: |
17.
Christian Sachse 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):201-205
In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally
assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to
physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons
and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical
properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of
this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument
for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order
to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3).
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Christian SachseEmail: |
18.
E. J. Lowe 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):273-288
A personal view is presented of how metaphysics and ontology stand at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the light
of developments during the twentieth. It is argued that realist metaphysics, with serious ontology at its heart, has a promising
future, provided that its adherents devote some time and effort to countering the influences of both its critics and its false
friends.
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E. J. LoweEmail: |
19.
20.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
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David LigginsEmail: |