A theory of meaning

A theory of word meaning developed jointly by Adrienne and Keith Lehrer is summarized, which accommodates the empirical facts of natural languages, especially the diversity of types of words. Reference characterizes the application of words to things, events, properties, etc. and sense the relationship among words and linguistic expressions. Although reference and sense are closely connected, neither can be reduced to the other. We use the metaphor of vectors to show how different, sometimes competing forces interact to provide an understanding of what a word in context means. Topics discussed include vagueness, indeterminacy, the role of experts, possible worlds, pragmatic influences, semantic change, semantic networks, fields, and entailments. A formal theory for understanding the relationship of idiolects, dialects, and communal languages is proposed to account for the dynamic interaction of individuals and communities which occurs continuously.     

Literal meaning and psychological theory

This paper evaluates the psychological status of literal meaning. Most linguistic and philosophical theories assume that sentences have well-specified literal meanings which represent the meaning of a sentence independent of context. Recent debate on this issue has centered on whether literal meaning can be equated with context-free meaning, or whether a sentence's literal meaning is determined only given a set of background assumptions. Neither of these positions meet the demands of a psychological theory of language understanding. Sentences do not have well-defined literal meanings, regardless of whether these are determined in light of a set of background assumptions. Moreover, the putative literal meanings of sentences do not contribute in systematic ways toward the understanding of speakers' utterance meanings. These observations suggest that the distinctions between literal and metaphoric meanings, and between semantics and pragmatics, have little psychological validity.     

Ethical dilemmas in context: Some preliminary questions

I have tried to build on O'Neill's thought-provoking paper by examining two influences that shape and define ethical dilemmas in the community: our personal agendas and the broader context. The first influence is the way in which our personal and professional values shape our agendas for community work. The way these agendas frame the choices for action are a force to be recognized separate from the question of who constitutes our community constituency. Our values may push us into proactive roles and we must face the way our actions make personal/political statements. The broader context of the community situation and the ways in which resource limitations frame the ethical question also need to be actively recognized. Otherwise there is a danger of making the psychologist the victim by posing the ethical dilemma as a question of how they alone should find a solution. The nature of our personal agenda must be clear before we ask “responsible to whom?” The broader context must be considered before we ask “responsible for what?”     

Explanation and the theory of questions

In The Scientific Image B. C. van Fraassen argues that a theory of explanation ought to take the form of a theory of why-questions, and a theory of this form is what he provides. Van Fraassen's account of explanation is good, as far as it goes. In particular, van Fraassen's theory of why-questions adds considerable illumination to the problem of alternative explanations in psychodynamics. But van Fraassen's theory is incomplete because it ignores those classes of explanations that are answers not to why-questions but to how-questions. In this article I provide a unified theory of explanatory questions that comprehends both how-questions and why-questions, and I show that a question-theoretic approach to explanation can be defended independently of van Fraassen's programme of Constructive Empiricism.     

论戴维森的真之理论

毫无疑问,真之理论在戴维森的哲学理论中扮演着核心地位,如果不理解他的真之理论也就无法理解他的整个哲学思想。虽然在他的哲学生涯中,戴维森对真的理解并非完全保持一致,甚至在某些地方曾出现过重大转变,但这并不妨碍他的真之理论形成一个整体。因为戴维森在很多关键地方,对真的理解保持着不变。戴维森对真的理解可以从两个方面进行阐述。从否定方面看,戴维森认为真是不可被定义的,因为它是一个最简单的概念;其次,真之紧缩论对真的解释是不能成立的,因为它并不能把握真的实质。从积极方面看,戴维森肯定了真与人之间的紧密关系,并认为人是真的前提;同时,他又强调了真与信念、愿望以及意义之间的联系,认为对这些概念的解释必须以真为基础。     

Davidson's Fear of the Subjective

According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson's own work on thought‐attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson's negative reaction to Gareth Evans's works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn't slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy rather than an externalist ally, and suggests that Evans's work could play an important role in furthering Davidson's distinctive externalism.     

Towards a cognitive theory of existential meaning

The capacity to attribute meaning to personal experiences may rest on a specialized cognitive system enabling this form of causal reasoning. Close examination of these attributional tendencies suggests that this system may be distinct from those underlying other forms of causal reasoning such as a “theory of mind” system in the behavioral domain, a folk physics system in the physical domain, and a folk biology system in the biological domain. A fourth, existential domain, an abstract ontological frame within which the subjective, narrative self is envisioned to be contained, may have driven the construction of an intuitive capacity in humans that encourages them to search for the underlying purpose or reason for having had certain life experiences. This system likely has specific, definable operational rules that are responsible for activating such explanatory searches. In addition, it appears anchored to a general intentionality system that promotes the attribution of teleological purpose and higher-order mental states to an abstract agency that is envisioned to cause events and personal experiences. Identifying the component parts of this specialized cognitive system through empirical investigations can help researchers to reconstruct both its evolutionary phylogeny and to track its developmental emergence.     

The phonological loop: Some answers and some questions

Jones, Hughes, and Macken (2007) claim that their data and our own are inconsistent with a multicomponent working-memory model. We explain in greater detail how the model can account for the data and can address their more specific criticisms. Both sides accept that data relating to the presence of a phonological similarity effect throughout the list depend on list length. We accept that, at this point, all explanations of their interaction are speculative and require further empirical investigation. We examine J, H, & M's interpretation of their and our results in terms of an auditory modality effect, observing that their interpretation of this effect is not well supported by the literature. We suggest that their account assumes a very narrow basis for a general theory of short-term retention, in contrast to a phonological loop interpretation, which forms part of a well-developed and articulated model of working memory.     

Evidence-based practice in stuttering: Some questions to consider

A recent forum in JFD (28/3, 2003) evaluated the status of evidence-based practice in fluency disorders, and offered recommendations for improvement. This article re-evaluates the level of support available for some popular approaches to stuttering therapy and questions the relative value placed on some types of programs endorsed by the forum. Evidence-based practice is discussed within the context of emerging concerns over its application to non-medical interventions and suggestions are made for grounding fluency interventions by reference to empirically supported principles of change. A popular, evidence-based intervention for stuttering in young children (the Lidcombe program) is evaluated within the suggested parameters. EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: After reading this article, the reader will be able to: (1) evaluate the status of evidence-based practice in fluency disorders; (2) list concerns about the impact of narrow interpretation of EBP on research and practice in the field of fluency disorders and other non-medical domains; (3) articulate the role of theory and basic research in selecting among and evaluating therapy approach options.     

Conditionals: a theory of meaning,pragmatics, and inference

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.