Processing objectives as a determinant of the relationship between recall and judgment

One aspect of person perception research that has been problematic for many theories is that there is often little correspondence between judgments that are made of a person and specific facts that can be recalled about that person. A model is presented that suggests this type of low correspondence is to be expected whenever evaluations of the person are spontaneously formed at the time relevant information is acquired. However, a relatively strong correspondence between the judgments that are made and the facts that can be recalled is expected when such evaluations are not spontaneously made at the time of information acquisition. The present paper reports several phenomena that are consistent with the model presented including: a much higher correspondence between recall and judgment under comprehension set than impression set conditions, judgment primacy effects for impression set subjects but judgment recency effects for comprehension set subjects, and a strong relationship between judgments and spew recall order for comprehension sets subjects but not impression set subjects. The implications of these and other phenomena are discussed in terms of how mental representations of another person are formed, and how the nature of such representations may systematically differ as a function of initial processing objectives.     

The recall and use of traits and events in social inference processes

Social inference research needs to more closely examine the kinds of information people actually have available for making social judgments. It is assumed here that the observation of behavioral events results in encoding and storage of both a relatively raw event record and of higher level encodings, such as trait inferences. Several specific hypotheses are advanced concerning the effects of higher level encodings on event recall, and the effects of encoding and memory processes on subsequent judgments about a stimulus person. Consistent with hypotheses, results indicate that higher level encodings do affect recall for stimulus information and do affect judgments of the stimulus person. The possibility that higher level encodings affect judgments solely by introducing bias into recall for the episodic record is considered and discarded in favor of the interpretation that higher level encodings are actually recalled and used in inference processes.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

The role of control processes and structural constraints in models of memory and social judgment

Six experiments examining a recent model of memory and social judgment are reported. In particular, the theoretical concept of a Work Space is examined in terms of both its structural properties and a variety of control processes that govern its operation. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about a stimulus person and told that they would later be asked to recall it as well as possible. The length of the actual delay before recall and the length of the anticipated delay were factorially varied. Under short delay conditions, subjects anticipating a short delay recalled more of the information than those anticipating a long delay. The reverse was true under actual long delay conditions. Other results suggest that the anticipated length of the delay has an effect on processes related to both encoding and storage/retrieval. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that, relative to no delay conditions, a long actual delay or a long anticipated delay produces polarization in social judgments. Both of these results are predicted by the model. Experiments 4–6 examine the effect of interpolated cognitive activity on memory and social judgment. As predicted by the model, relatively complicated cognitive activity leads to lower levels of recall and a greater polarization of judgments than less complicated intervening cognitive activity. It is argued that all of these results can be accounted for by the concept of a Work Space as a temporary repository devoted to the current information processing activities of the subject. It is thought that such a concept must be kept theoretically distinct from long-term memory. Implications of the results for models of memory and social judgment are discussed.     

Memory for incidentally perceived social cues: Effects on person judgment

Dynamic face cues can be very salient, as when observing sudden shifts of gaze to a new location, or a change of expression from happy to angry. These highly salient social cues influence judgments of another person during the course of an interaction. However, other dynamic cues, such as pupil dilation, are much more subtle, affecting judgments of another person even without awareness. We asked whether such subtle, incidentally perceived, dynamic cues could be encoded in to memory and retrieved at a later time. The current study demonstrates that in some circumstances changes in pupil size in another person are indeed encoded into memory and influence judgments of that individual at a later time. Furthermore, these judgments interact with the perceived trustworthiness of the individual and the nature of the social context. The effect is somewhat variable, however, possibly reflecting individual differences and the inherent ambiguity of pupil dilation/constriction.     

The role of source memory in older adults' recollective experience

Younger adults' "remember" judgments are accompanied by better memory for the source of an item than "know" judgments. Furthermore, remember judgments are not merely associated with better memory for individual source features but also with bound memory for multiple source features. However, older adults, independent of their subjective memory experience, are generally less likely to "bind" source features to an item and to each other in memory (i.e., the associative deficit). In two experiments, we tested whether memory for perceptual source features, independently or bound, is also the basis for older adults' remember responses or if their associative deficit leads them to base their responses on other types of information. The results suggest that retrieval of perceptual source features, individually or bound, forms the basis for younger but not for older adults' remember judgments even when the overall level of memory for perceptual sources is closely equated (Experiment 1) and when attention is explicitly directed to the source information at encoding (Experiment 2).     

Retrieval of propositional information from long-term memory

Three experiments are reported in which subjects learn propositions like A hippie is in the park. The experiments manipulate the number of such propositions involving a particular person (e.g., hippie) or a particular location (e.g., park). After learning the material, subjects are asked to judge whether particular probe propositions are from the study set. Times to make these judgments about probe propositions increase with the number of study propositions involving the person or location used in the probe proposition. A model is presented which assumes a subject simultaneously accesses memory from all concepts in a probe proposition and serially searches through all study propositions involving each concept. Search of memory terminates as soon as one search process from a concept finds the probe proposition or exhausts the study propositions attached to that concept.     

Differences in automatic social information processing between nondepressed and subclinically depressed individuals

The present research examined individual differences in automatic social information processing. We hypothesized that because nondepressed and subclinically depressed persons have different interpersonal experiences, they may process social information in different ways. In this experiment, participants were asked to make judgments about social relationships after being reminded of a target person. They had to make these judgments under either a light or a heavy memory load. Results showed that when nondepressed participants were reminded of people with whom they had frequent pleasant interactions, they made a greater number of positive judgments about their social relationships than did subclinically depressed participants. When subclinically depressed participants were reminded of people with whom they had had frequent unpleasant interactions, they made a greater number of negative judgments about their social relationships than did their nondepressed counterparts. Moreover, performance in these experimental conditions was unaffected by memory load, suggesting that automatic thoughts about their social relationships had been evoked.     

The influence of near-threshold priming on metamemory and recall

A metamemory paradigm involving the use of near-threshold visual priming is developed in which a brief flash of a previously nonrecalled answer occurs, and then the person attempts to recall the answer and/or make feeling-of-knowing judgments. The major new finding is that the feeling of knowing did not detect perceptual input from a near-threshold prime that increased the recall of otherwise nonrecallable items. This finding has two important implications: (1) The feeling of knowing is not always more sensitive than recall as an indicant of information in memory (particularly, as an indicant of small amounts of information newly deposited into memory), and (2) 'monitored' information (that the feeling of knowing would be capable of detecting, as examined in previous research) can be combined with 'nonmonitored' information (that is newly deposited into memory and that the feeling of knowing does not detect) so as to produce the successful recall of an otherwise nonrecallable item.     

Decision-making models of remember-know judgments: comment on Rotello, Macmillan, and Reeder (2004)

The sum-difference theory of remembering and knowing (STREAK) provides a sophisticated account of many interactions in the remember-know (R-K) area (C. M. Rotello, N. A. Macmillan, & J. A. Reeder, 2004). It assumes 2 orthogonal strength dimensions and oblique criterion planes. Another dual-process model (J. T. Wixted & V. Stretch, 2004) with one decision axis has also been applied to R-K judgments with considerable success and provides new insights into the processes involved. An analysis of the 4 major R-K interactions can also be explained by a simpler one-dimensional signal detection theory (J. C. Dunn, 2004a). However these models do not make contact with standard work on recognition memory, so their scope is limited. To bridge this gap, a global-matching model (a theory of distributed associative memory [TODAM]) for R-K judgments is proposed. This model can produce good fits to the data, and there are established experimental manipulations with which to test it. It provides further support for the idea that R judgments are based on associative information, whereas K judgments are based on item information.     

Boundaries of the relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details

The relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details was investigated in three experiments that combined the remember-know paradigm with a multidimensional source monitoring test. Experiment 1 replicated that source memory for perceptual details is better in the case of "remember" than "know" judgments. Experiment 2 showed that the relation between "remember" judgments and source memory for perceptual details is diminished by a semantic orienting task during encoding. Experiment 3 demonstrated that "remember" judgments are related to enhanced source memory for specific and unique kinds of perceptual source information, whereas memory for incomplete and global perceptual source information does not differentiate between "remember" and "know" judgments. The results show that the attentional focus during encoding and the specificity of retrieved source information form boundary conditions for the use of source memory for perceptual details as a basis of "remember" judgments.     

Associative storage and retrieval processes in person memory

In this article, a general associative storage and retrieval theory of person memory is proposed, and seven experiments that test various aspects of the theory are reported. Experiment 1 investigated memory for behavioral information that is congruent with, incongruent with, or irrelevant to a prior impression. The results indicated that incongruent events are best recalled and irrelevant events are most poorly recalled. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and demonstrated that there are systematic individual differences that are consistent with the general nomothetic model proposed. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that, relative to a baseline condition, adding incongruent items to the list increases the probability of recalling congruent items but has no effect on the recall of irrelevant items. Both effects are predicted by the model. Experiment 4 provided support for the retrieval assumptions of the theory by demonstrating that there is a systematic order in which various types of items are recalled, as well as consistent differences in interresponse times. Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that the model is relevant to situations in which data driven, as well as conceptually driven, processes are involved. Finally, Experiment 7 examined a special case in which the theory predicts greater recall of congruent than incongruent behavioral events. The results of all seven experiments provide converging evidence for a general theory of person memory, and they have implications for a number of issues related to the study of person memory and social judgment.     

The detection model of recognition using know and remember judgments

The signal detection model forknow andremember recognition judgments was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, two predictions of the model were tested: (1) that measures of memory sensitivity,A′, are equivalent in value when based on either the recognition (know or remember) criterion or on the remember criterion; and (2) that there is a positive correlation between recognition bias and the proportion of know judgments that are hits, but no correlation between recognition bias and proportion of remember hits (Donaldson, 1996). Both predictions were supported by the data. In Experiment 2, the context of test items was manipulated to make it more or less similar to learning context. The detection model requires that memory sensitivity be the same for both recognition and remember judgments, regardless of test context. Alternatively, if remember judgments reflect only the retrieval of episodic information from memory, the two measures of memory sensitivity should become more disparate in value as learning and test context are made more similar. Memory sensitivity was generally the same in value for recognition and remember criteria but different across context conditions, thus supporting the detection model. The nature of the memory continuum used in detection theory is also discussed.     

Use of experienced retrieval ease in self and social judgments

People base judgments from memory on both the content of the information they retrieve and the ease they experience in retrieving it (Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202). Four studies demonstrate that people rely relatively more on the experienced ease of recall when making judgments about the self compared to judgments about others. This pattern was found for judgments of an “average” (Study 1a) or specific (Study 1b) other. Subjective retrieval ease was less informative when people were relatively less familiar with the specific other person. Providing an alternative explanation for the experienced difficulty of recall affected self, but not social, assessments (Study 2). In addition, the effect generalized to risk judgments about a state of the world; namely, the safety of one’s town (Study 3). A deeper appreciation of when and why people rely on different sources of accessible information when making judgments may help in understanding and reducing social conflict.     

The eye gaze direction of an observed person can bias perception,memory, and attention in adolescents with and without autism spectrum disorder

The reported experiments aimed to investigate whether a person and his or her gaze direction presented in the context of a naturalistic scene cause perception, memory, and attention to be biased in typically developing adolescents and high-functioning adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A novel computerized image manipulation program presented a series of photographic scenes, each containing a person. The program enabled participants to laterally maneuver the scenes behind a static window, the borders of which partially occluded the scenes. The gaze direction of the person in the scenes spontaneously cued attention of both groups in the direction of gaze, affecting judgments of preference (Experiment 1a) and causing memory biases (Experiment 1b). Experiment 2 showed that the gaze direction of a person cues visual search accurately to the exact location of gaze in both groups. These findings suggest that biases in preference, memory, and attention are caused by another person’s gaze direction when viewed in a complex scene in adolescents with and without ASD